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Major powers · Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership

India and United States

India's most consequential partnership: its largest export market and its leading partner in defence technology and the Indo-Pacific. Built on convergence over China, it was shaken in 2025 by tariffs and by quarrels over Russia, Pakistan and migration.

India (gold) and United States. Boundaries approximate; India per Natural Earth’s India point-of-view data.

India and United States at a glance

Relationship
Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership
Major powers
Two-way trade, 2025⁠–⁠26
140.8 USD billion
Merchandise exports plus imports
India's balance, 2025⁠–⁠26
Surplus of 33.8
USD billion; exports 87.3, imports 53.5
Key agreements
8 listed
2005 to 2026
On the timeline
31 events
1787 to 2026
Asked by UPSC
21 questions
2024, 2025, 2026

01Geography

The United States is a continental power between the Atlantic and the Pacific, far from India; what makes it a presence in India's region is its global military reach. India falls within the area of the US Indo-Pacific Command, headquartered in Hawaii, while Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Gulf fall under Central Command, a division that shapes how Washington plans for South Asia. American forces operate from Diego Garcia in the central Indian Ocean, the Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain and the Seventh Fleet in Japan, so the sea lanes that carry India's energy and trade run between the two ends of American naval power.

That geography is why maritime cooperation, from logistics agreements to the Malabar exercises, became the first practical ground of the partnership, and why distance has never been a barrier to a relationship carried by trade, technology and a large diaspora.

02Political context

United States's political system

The United States is a federal presidential republic under the constitution of 1787, the oldest written national constitution still in force. The President, elected through the Electoral College for four years and limited to two terms, is head of state and government and commander-in-chief; Donald Trump began his second, non-consecutive term on 20 January 2025. Congress has two chambers: the Senate of 100 members, two per state, which must consent to treaties by a two-thirds majority and confirms senior appointments, and the House of Representatives of 435 members. The constitution gives Congress the power to lay duties, and the Supreme Court can strike down federal laws and executive acts: on 20 February 2026 it held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorise the President to impose tariffs.

In the midterm elections of 3 November 2026 the Democrats won control of both chambers, according to early counts, which from January 2027 will give the country divided government. India's diplomacy therefore has to work with the White House, which sets tariffs, sanctions waivers and summit agendas, and with a Congress that legislates sanctions such as CAATSA, approved the civil nuclear agreement in 2008 and shapes immigration policy (see the American political system).

Political and diplomatic developments

The second Trump term opened on familiar terms. Narendra Modi's visit of 13 February 2025 produced a joint statement setting "Mission 500" (US$500 billion of trade by 2030), a first tranche of a bilateral trade agreement by autumn 2025, a ten-year defence framework and the TRUST technology initiative; Tahawwur Rana, an accused in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, was extradited in April.

The year then turned. President Trump repeatedly claimed to have brokered the India–Pakistan ceasefire of May 2025, which India denies; he hosted Pakistan's army chief at the White House in June. The United States imposed a 25 per cent reciprocal tariff on Indian goods from 7 August 2025 and a further 25 per cent from 27 August as a penalty for purchases of Russian oil, a fee of US$100,000 on new H-1B petitions in September, and withdrew the sanctions exemption for Chabahar. No Quad leaders' summit was held in India in 2025.

Repair began late in 2025. A new ambassador, Sergio Gor, took up the post; the Framework for the US–India Major Defence Partnership was signed on 31 October 2025; and in February 2026 the two governments announced a framework for an interim trade agreement under which the additional penalty was suspended and the reciprocal tariff cut to 18 per cent. The episode showed both the resilience of the institutional relationship and how quickly presidential politics can override it.

03Historical bilateral relations

For four decades the two largest democracies were, in Dennis Kux's phrase, estranged. Washington armed Pakistan from 1954 as an ally against communism; Nehru's non-alignment looked to American officials like neutrality in a moral contest. The relationship was not empty (PL-480 food aid in the 1950s and 1960s and emergency arms during the 1962 war mattered), but the 1965 arms embargo, Richard Nixon's tilt towards Pakistan in 1971 and the dispatch of the USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal fixed Indian suspicions for a generation. India's 1974 test brought it into the American non-proliferation regime as a target.

The end of the Cold War and India's reforms of 1991 changed the incentives. Military contacts began in the early 1990s, but the tests of May 1998 brought sanctions. What followed was the most important sustained dialogue in the relationship's history, between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott, which ended with Bill Clinton's visit in March 2000. American pressure on Pakistan to withdraw from Kargil in July 1999 had already shown that Washington's South Asian policy was changing.

The transformation came under George W. Bush. The Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (2004), the New Framework for the Defence Relationship (28 June 2005) and the civil nuclear initiative of 18 July 2005 ended India's nuclear isolation: the Nuclear Suppliers Group exempted India on 6 September 2008 and the 123 Agreement was signed on 10 October 2008. Barack Obama endorsed a permanent seat for India on the Security Council (2010) and designated India a Major Defence Partner (2016); the foundational agreements LEMOA (2016), COMCASA (2018) and BECA (2020) followed.

Donald Trump's first term revived the Quad (2017), renamed Pacific Command as Indo-Pacific Command (2018) and raised the relationship to a Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership in February 2020, while ending India's trade preferences. Joe Biden's term brought Quad leaders' summits from 2021, the initiative on critical and emerging technology and the state visit of June 2023.

Diplomatic timeline

31 events, 1787–2026 · 17 turning points

The dated events of the Global Political Timeline that involve United States. Open an entry to read it in full.

  1. The United States Constitution is signedWorld

    Delegates to the Philadelphia Convention signed the Constitution of the United States on 17 September 1787. It replaced the weak Articles of Confederation with a federal government of separated and balanced powers, a bicameral Congress, an elected President and a Supreme Court, under a written constitution as supreme law. It took effect after New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify on 21 June 1788, and the Bill of Rights followed in 1791. The oldest written national constitution still in use, it influenced India's framers on fundamental rights, judicial review and the independence of the judiciary.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  2. Covenant of the League of Nations signedWorld

    Adopted by the Paris Peace Conference on 28 April 1919 and signed on 28 June as Part I of the Treaty of Versailles, the Covenant created the first standing organisation of states for collective security, with an Assembly, a Council and a Secretariat at Geneva; it entered into force with the treaty on 10 January 1920. India, though not self-governing, became an original member because it had signed the treaty. The League never included the United States, whose Senate rejected the treaty, failed to stop aggression in Manchuria and Ethiopia, and was wound up in 1946.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  3. Bretton Woods conference creates the IMF and World BankWorld · Turning point

    Delegations of 44 countries met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, from 1 to 22 July 1944 and agreed the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The system designed by Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes pegged currencies to the dollar, itself convertible into gold, to prevent a return to the competitive devaluations of the 1930s. India's delegation, led by Sir Jeremy Raisman with C.D. Deshmukh, pressed for development to be among the institutions' purposes and for help with its wartime sterling balances, a question left to Britain.

    From history to today

    The IMF and the World Bank remain the core of the international financial system, although the fixed exchange rates of 1944 ended in the early 1970s. Their weighted votes, which still give the United States a veto over major IMF decisions, and the convention of an American at the Bank and a European at the Fund are the main targets of governance reform. India, a founding member, presses for a realignment of quotas, and the BRICS New Development Bank is in part a response to slow reform.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  4. Goa, Daman and Diu: Portuguese rule endsDiplomatic

    After Portugal had refused for more than a decade to negotiate the transfer of its Indian territories, Indian forces entered Goa, Daman and Diu on 18 December 1961 in Operation Vijay, and the Governor-General, Manuel António Vassalo e Silva, surrendered on 19 December, since marked as Goa's Liberation Day. At the Security Council a Western draft calling on India to withdraw was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The Twelfth Amendment made the territories a Union territory from 20 December 1961. Portugal recognised Indian sovereignty after its own revolution of 1974, and Goa became a State in 1987.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  5. The Cuban missile crisisWorld

    On 16 October 1962 John F. Kennedy was shown photographs of Soviet missile sites under construction in Cuba. Rejecting an air strike, he announced a naval "quarantine" on 22 October, and after days at the edge of nuclear war Nikita Khrushchev announced on 28 October that the missiles would be dismantled; the United States secretly undertook to remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey, which it did in April 1963. The crisis led to the Moscow–Washington hotline and the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. It coincided with China's attack on India, which began on 20 October.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  6. The India–China warDiplomatic · Turning point

    Chinese forces attacked in the eastern and western sectors on 20 October 1962. After a pause and a second offensive in November, China declared a unilateral ceasefire on 21 November, withdrew from most of the territory it had taken in the east and kept Aksai Chin. The defeat discredited the Forward Policy, led to the resignation of the defence minister, V. K. Krishna Menon, opened India to Western military aid and shaped Indian strategic thinking for decades.

    From history to today

    The war left the boundary undefined and Aksai Chin, which India regards as its territory, under Chinese control; the Line of Actual Control that emerged from it has still not been agreed on the ground. Its memory shaped India's defence build-up, its distrust of Chinese assurances and its reading of the Galwan clash. India rejects China's claim to Arunachal Pradesh, and the Special Representatives are still seeking a settlement.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  7. Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and CooperationDiplomatic · Turning point

    Signed on 9 August 1971, as the East Pakistan crisis deepened and the United States and China drew together, the twenty-year treaty committed the parties to consult immediately if either faced attack or the threat of attack (Article IX). It gave India diplomatic cover for the war that December. Critics argued that it compromised non-alignment; its defenders saw non-alignment adapted to a threat.

    From history to today

    The treaty made Moscow India's most dependable great-power partner for two decades and set a pattern of Soviet, then Russian, arms supply that still accounts for a large share of the equipment of India's armed forces. After the Soviet collapse it gave way in 1993 to a treaty without the security clause, and the strategic partnership of 2000 and its annual summits carry on its logic, tested by Russia's war in Ukraine.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  8. Pakistani forces surrender in Dhaka; Bangladesh is bornDiplomatic · Turning point

    After Pakistan's air strikes on Indian bases on 3 December 1971, India went to war in support of the Bangladeshi liberation struggle and recognised Bangladesh on 6 December. On 16 December Pakistani forces in the east surrendered in Dhaka, and about 93,000 soldiers and civilians became prisoners of war. Soviet vetoes blocked ceasefire resolutions at the Security Council, while the United States sent a carrier group into the Bay of Bengal.

    From history to today

    The war created Bangladesh, ended the two-wing Pakistan of 1947 and left India the pre-eminent military power in South Asia; 16 December is marked as Vijay Diwas in India and Victory Day in Bangladesh. India's role in 1971 still underpins its claim to a special relationship with Bangladesh, a claim tested by the fall of Sheikh Hasina in 2024 and by the effort to reset relations after the 2026 election. The Simla Agreement was its diplomatic sequel.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  9. Pokhran I: India's first nuclear testDiplomatic · Turning point

    India conducted an underground test at Pokhran on 18 May 1974 and described it as a peaceful nuclear explosion. The test led Canada to end nuclear cooperation, prompted the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1975 and brought American non-proliferation legislation that cut off fuel for the Tarapur reactors. India did not openly weaponise for another 24 years.

    From history to today

    The test's most durable consequence was the Nuclear Suppliers Group, created in 1975 in response to it to tighten controls on nuclear exports. Working around that regime defined Indian nuclear diplomacy for three decades, until the waiver of 2008, and India's bid for membership of the Group has been blocked since 2016, chiefly by China. The test also began the weapons capability that India declared openly with Pokhran II.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  10. Iran becomes an Islamic RepublicWorld

    Months of protest forced Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to leave Iran on 16 January 1979, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned from exile on 1 February. After a referendum, Khomeini declared Iran an Islamic Republic on 1 April 1979, and a constitution approved that December placed a supreme leader, under the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, above the elected institutions. The revolution turned a close American ally into a state hostile to the United States and Israel, an enmity that began with the seizure of the American embassy that November and led, in 2026, to a US–Israeli war on Iran.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  11. The Berlin Wall fallsWorld · Turning point

    On the evening of 9 November 1989 Günter Schabowski, a member of East Germany's ruling party leadership, mistakenly announced at a televised press conference that new rules allowing citizens to travel to the West took effect immediately. Crowds gathered at the crossings, and that night the border guards opened them. The Wall, built in 1961, had been the emblem of a divided Europe; its fall came amid the revolutions of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe, opened the way to German reunification on 3 October 1990 and was followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

    From history to today

    The Wall's fall began the post-Cold War order: a reunified Germany at the heart of the European Union, the eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO, and a period of American primacy. Russia's grievance over that enlargement became part of its case for the invasion of Ukraine. For India the end of bipolarity forced the rethinking that followed the Soviet collapse, and the turn to multi-alignment.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  12. Dissolution of the Soviet UnionWorld · Turning point

    The Soviet Union ceased to exist on 26 December 1991, removing India's principal arms supplier, its protector at the Security Council and its partner in rupee trade. Coinciding with India's balance-of-payments crisis and economic reforms, the collapse forced a rethinking of foreign policy: the opening to the United States and Israel, the Look East policy and a new treaty with Russia in 1993.

    From history to today

    The collapse ended the bipolar order in which non-alignment had made sense and pushed India towards economic liberalisation and new partners: the United States, Israel and, through Look East, Southeast Asia. Russia's attempt to recover lost status, which many analysts trace through to the invasion of Ukraine, and India's effort to keep Russia close while partnering the West, are still working out the consequences of 1991.

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  13. Pokhran II: India declares itself a nuclear-weapon stateDiplomatic · Turning point

    India conducted five tests on 11 and 13 May 1998; Pakistan tested on 28 and 30 May. The United States, Japan and others imposed sanctions, and the Security Council condemned the tests in Resolution 1172. India announced a moratorium on further testing and a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and no first use. The dialogue that followed with Washington began the transformation of the relationship.

    From history to today

    The tests made India a declared nuclear-weapon state outside the NPT. The doctrine that followed, made public in 2003, still rests on credible minimum deterrence and no first use, and the voluntary moratorium on testing has held. Pakistan's answering tests created a nuclear dyad that shadows every India–Pakistan crisis, from Kargil to Operation Sindoor, while the dialogue with Washington led to the civil nuclear initiative.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  14. The Kargil conflictDiplomatic

    In May 1999 India discovered that Pakistani soldiers and militants had occupied positions on its side of the Line of Control in Kargil. Operation Vijay recovered them by July. India kept the fighting on its own side of the LoC, and President Clinton pressed Nawaz Sharif to withdraw, a turning point in American views of South Asia. The Kargil Review Committee's report led to reforms of India's security institutions.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  15. The September 11 attacksWorld · Turning point

    Al-Qaeda hijackers flew airliners into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001; a fourth aircraft crashed in Pennsylvania, and almost 3,000 people were killed. NATO invoked its collective-defence clause for the first time, and Security Council resolution 1373 of 28 September, adopted under Chapter VII, obliged every state to criminalise the financing of terrorism and deny safe haven to terrorists. The American-led war in Afghanistan began on 7 October. For India, which had proposed a comprehensive convention against terrorism in 1996, the new regime still lacked an agreed definition, and Pakistan became a frontline American ally.

    From history to today

    The attacks built the counter-terrorism architecture that states still use: binding obligations under resolution 1373 monitored by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, sanctions lists and standards against terrorist financing. The war in Afghanistan that they began ended with the Taliban's return in 2021. India has used this architecture to seek listings of Pakistan-based terrorists and chaired the Counter-Terrorism Committee in 2022, though the comprehensive convention it proposed remains stalled over the definition of terrorism.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  16. Attack on Parliament and Operation ParakramDiplomatic

    Terrorists attacked Parliament on 13 December 2001; India blamed Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. India mobilised its forces along the border for ten months and withdrew its High Commissioner from Islamabad. The crisis ended without war after American diplomacy and President Musharraf's pledge of January 2002 to act against terrorism; it exposed the slowness of Indian mobilisation and prompted new thinking on limited war.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  17. New Framework for the India–US Defence RelationshipDiplomatic

    Signed in Washington on 28 June 2005 by Pranab Mukherjee and Donald Rumsfeld, the ten-year framework provided for joint exercises, defence trade, co-production and cooperation on missile defence. Renewed in 2015, it was the military counterpart of the nuclear initiative announced three weeks later and the foundation of the defence partnership that followed.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  18. India–US civil nuclear initiativeDiplomatic · Turning point

    In their joint statement of 18 July 2005, Manmohan Singh and George W. Bush agreed that the United States would work for full civil nuclear cooperation with India, while India would separate its civil and military facilities and place the civil ones under IAEA safeguards. The deal accepted India's nuclear weapons in practice. Opponents in India feared constraints on the strategic programme; critics abroad feared damage to the NPT.

    From history to today

    The initiative turned estrangement over non-proliferation into a strategic partnership and opened the way to the defence and technology partnerships that followed. Its nuclear promise was only partly kept: India's liability law of 2010 deterred American suppliers, and none has built a reactor in India under the deal. Its larger effect was political, ending the treatment of India as a target of the non-proliferation regime and recasting it as a partner in non-proliferation; see nuclear diplomacy and the NSG waiver.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  19. The Nuclear Suppliers Group exempts IndiaDiplomatic · Turning point

    On 6 September 2008 the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed by consensus to exempt India from its requirement of full-scope safeguards, allowing civil nuclear trade with a state outside the NPT. The decision followed the IAEA's approval of an India-specific safeguards agreement and India's restatement of its testing moratorium and no-first-use policy. Agreements with France, the United States, Russia and others followed.

    From history to today

    The waiver allowed India civil nuclear trade with France, Russia, the United States and others, including imports of uranium for its safeguarded reactors, without signing the NPT. It opened the way to the export-control regimes: India joined the Missile Technology Control Regime in 2016, the Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017 and the Australia Group in 2018. Membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group itself has been blocked since 2016, chiefly by China; see nuclear diplomacy.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  20. India–US 123 Agreement signedDiplomatic

    Pranab Mukherjee and Condoleezza Rice signed the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy on 10 October 2008, completing the process begun in 2005. The debate over the deal had nearly brought down the Indian government, which survived a confidence vote in July 2008. India's nuclear liability law of 2010 later kept American suppliers from building reactors.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  21. The Mumbai terrorist attacksDiplomatic · Turning point

    Ten Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists who came by sea from Pakistan attacked hotels, a railway station, a hospital and a Jewish centre in Mumbai from 26 to 29 November 2008, killing 166 people. India chose diplomatic pressure over military retaliation, and the composite dialogue with Pakistan ended. The attacks reshaped India's coastal security and its counter-terrorism partnerships; the slow pace of prosecutions in Pakistan remains a grievance.

    From history to today

    The attacks reorganised India's internal security: the National Investigation Agency was created within weeks, coastal surveillance was rebuilt around the Navy and the Coast Guard, and counter-terrorism became central to India's partnerships with the United States and others. They also set the template for diplomacy against Pakistan-based groups, pressing for listings at the Security Council and the prosecution of the planners; after later attacks, that approach gave way to the punitive responses of 2016 onwards. See terrorism.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  22. Paris Agreement adoptedWorld · Turning point

    Adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change on 12 December 2015, the Paris Agreement committed its parties to hold warming well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. In place of the Kyoto Protocol's binding targets for developed countries alone, every party sets its own nationally determined contribution, to be renewed every five years, in the light of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. India ratified it on 2 October 2016, and it entered into force on 4 November 2016.

    From history to today

    The agreement's bottom-up model of nationally determined contributions now governs climate diplomacy: each party sets, reports and periodically raises its own targets. India's commitments include net zero by 2070, announced at Glasgow in 2021, and a large expansion of non-fossil power. The second American withdrawal took effect on 27 January 2026, testing whether the regime can hold without the largest historical emitter, while the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion of July 2025 treated its 1.5°C limit as the primary temperature goal.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  23. The Quad is revivedDiplomatic

    Officials of Australia, India, Japan and the United States met in Manila on 12 November 2017, reviving the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue a decade after its first iteration lapsed. The grouping rose to ministerial level in 2019 and to leaders' summits in 2021. India insists it is not a military alliance; China calls it containment.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  24. First Quad leaders' summitDiplomatic

    Joe Biden hosted the first Quad leaders' meeting virtually on 12 March 2021, followed by the first in-person summit in Washington on 24 September 2021. The leaders launched initiatives on vaccines, critical and emerging technologies, climate and maritime domain awareness. Summits followed in Tokyo (2022), Hiroshima (2023) and Wilmington (2024); India's turn to host in 2025 passed without one.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  25. Taliban take Kabul; Security Council adopts Resolution 2593Diplomatic

    The Taliban entered Kabul on 15 August 2021 as American forces withdrew, and India evacuated its diplomats and citizens and closed its embassy. On 30 August, under India's presidency, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2593, demanding that Afghan territory not be used to threaten or attack any country or to shelter terrorists. India returned with a technical team in 2022 and upgraded it to an embassy in 2025.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  26. Russia invades UkraineWorld · Turning point

    Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 confronted India with a choice between its oldest defence partner and its Western partners. India abstained on the UN resolutions condemning Russia, called for dialogue and diplomacy, and became a large buyer of discounted Russian oil. Modi's remark to Putin in September 2022 that this was not an era of war, and his visit to Kyiv in 2024, marked the limits of Indian neutrality.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  27. New Delhi G20 summit: the African Union joinsDiplomatic · Turning point

    At the summit of 9–10 September 2023 the G20 admitted the African Union as a permanent member and adopted the New Delhi Leaders' Declaration by consensus despite divisions over Ukraine. On the sidelines, India, the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, France, Germany, Italy and the European Union signed a memorandum on the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor.

    From history to today

    The African Union now sits in the G20 as a permanent member alongside the European Union, a rare enlargement of a major economic forum in favour of the Global South, and South Africa's presidency of 2025, the first on the continent, followed. The India–Middle East–Europe corridor launched on the sidelines has advanced slowly, clouded by the war in Gaza and then by the war on Iran.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  28. Operation SindoorDiplomatic · Turning point

    In the early hours of 7 May 2025 India struck nine terrorist sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, including facilities of Jaish-e-Mohammed at Bahawalpur and Lashkar-e-Taiba at Muridke. Pakistan responded with drones, missiles and artillery, and India struck Pakistani air bases. On 10 May the two Directors General of Military Operations agreed to stop firing and military action. India rejected claims of third-party mediation.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  29. United States raises tariffs on Indian goods to 50 per centDiplomatic

    A 25 per cent "reciprocal" tariff on Indian goods took effect on 7 August 2025, and an additional 25 per cent, imposed as a penalty for India's purchases of Russian oil, followed on 27 August — among the highest rates the United States applied to any partner. The tariffs hit textiles, gems and seafood and marked the lowest point in relations in two decades. A framework agreement in February 2026 cut the rate to 18 per cent and suspended the penalty.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  30. Putin's visit and the 23rd India–Russia summitDiplomatic

    Vladimir Putin's state visit on 4–5 December 2025, his first to India since the war in Ukraine began, produced sixteen agreements and a programme for economic cooperation to 2030. It came weeks after American sanctions on Russia's largest oil companies and amid pressure on India's oil purchases, and it showed India's determination to keep the partnership.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  31. War on Iran and the closure of the Strait of HormuzWorld · Turning point

    A US–Israeli military campaign against Iran began on 28 February 2026. Iran restricted and then closed the Strait of Hormuz, through which a large share of India's oil and gas imports pass, before reopening it during a ceasefire in April. India evacuated thousands of its nationals from Iran by land, deployed its Navy to protect Indian shipping and turned to other suppliers, including Russia. The war also clouded the future of Chabahar and of the India–Middle East–Europe corridor.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
Follow United States across the Global Political Timeline

04Strategic interests

The strategic logic is convergence over China. Washington wants a strong India that complicates Chinese power in Asia; India wants American technology, capital, markets and support for its rise in institutions from the Nuclear Suppliers Group to the Security Council. The Indo-Pacific frame, adopted in Washington in 2017–18, is the shared map.

Convergence does not make an alliance. India's doctrine of strategic autonomy keeps it out of formal commitments and inside groupings that Washington distrusts, such as BRICS and the SCO; its partnership with Russia, its ties with Iran and its scepticism of democracy promotion remain points of friction. Ashley Tellis argued in Foreign Affairs in 2023 that America's "bad bet" was to expect India to side with it in a conflict with China; Indian officials answer that a strong, independent India serves American interests without being an ally.

The 2025 tariffs added a third view: that the United States under Trump treats partners transactionally and that India should hedge. On this reading, India's thaw with China and its trade agreements with the UK and the EU are insurance. The counter-argument is that nothing else can replace American technology and naval power in balancing China, so that hedging must stop short of drift.

05Key agreements

  • 2005New Framework for the India–US Defence Relationship

    Signed on 28 June 2005 for ten years and renewed in 2015; set out joint exercises, defence trade and co-production, and preceded the civil nuclear initiative.

  • 2008Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement)

    Signed on 10 October 2008 after the IAEA safeguards agreement and the NSG exemption of 6 September 2008; allowed civil nuclear trade with India outside the NPT.

  • 2016Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)

    Allows each side's forces to use the other's bases for supplies, fuel and repairs on a reimbursable basis.

  • 2018Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA)

    Signed at the first 2+2 dialogue on 6 September 2018; permits encrypted communications equipment on American platforms sold to India.

  • 2020Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA)

    Signed on 27 October 2020; enables the sharing of geospatial intelligence for navigation and targeting.

  • 2024Security of Supply Arrangement

    A reciprocal commitment to prioritise each other's defence orders in supply chains.

  • 2025Framework for the US–India Major Defence Partnership

    Signed in Kuala Lumpur on 31 October 2025; a ten-year framework for co-development, co-production, interoperability and maritime cooperation.

  • 2026Framework for an Interim Agreement on Reciprocal Trade

    Announced in a joint statement of 6 February 2026; cut the US reciprocal tariff on Indian goods to 18 per cent, suspended the oil-related penalty and committed India to tariff reductions and purchases. Its implementation was put on hold after the US Supreme Court's IEEPA ruling, and it had not been signed by early November 2026.

06Cooperation

Economy, connectivity, defence and technology: where the two work together, where they do not, and where cooperation could grow.

Economic relationship

The United States was India's largest trading partner in 2024–25 and remains its largest export market; India runs a surplus in goods and earns heavily from services. China overtook the United States as India's largest trading partner in 2025–26, according to commerce ministry data reported by PTI. American firms are among the largest investors in India, and Indian IT companies are significant employers in the United States.

Tariffs became the instrument of American policy in 2025. The combined 50 per cent duty hit labour-intensive exports such as textiles, gems and jewellery and seafood. The February 2026 framework committed India to lower or remove tariffs on a range of American industrial and farm goods and to buy American energy, aircraft and technology, while keeping dairy and cereals protected.

Then the legal ground shifted. On 20 February 2026 the US Supreme Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act does not authorise tariffs, removing the basis of the reciprocal duties. The administration replaced them with a temporary 10 per cent global tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act for 150 days, kept sectoral tariffs under Section 232 and opened Section 301 investigations. The interim agreement was put on hold until the new tariff framework was settled, and talks resumed with the visit of the US Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, to New Delhi on 22–24 June 2026.

India’s merchandise trade with United States

2021–22 to 2025–26 · USD billion

Exports 2025–26
87.3
India to United States
Imports 2025–26
53.5
United States to India
Two-way trade 2025–26
140.8
Exports plus imports
Trade surplus 2025–26
33.8
Exports exceed imports
  • Exports from India
  • Imports into India
  • Balance: exports minus imports
0204060801002021–2276.243.3+32.92022–2378.550.9+27.62023–2477.542.1+35.42024–2586.545.6+40.92025–2687.353.5+33.8ExportsImportsBalance
India’s merchandise trade with United States, USD billion, by financial year
Financial yearExports from IndiaImports into IndiaBalance (exports minus imports)
2021–2276.243.3+32.9
2022–2378.550.9+27.6
2023–2477.542.1+35.4
2024–2586.545.6+40.9
2025–2687.353.5+33.8

Unit: USD billion. Balance and two-way trade are calculated here from the published exports and imports.

Note: Merchandise trade only; services excluded. Indian financial years (April–March). Figures for 2025–26 are provisional and those for 2021–22 to 2024–25 revised, as published by the Reserve Bank of India from data compiled by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S) of the Department of Commerce.

Official dataSource: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026.

Trade and connectivity

Washington is a partner in India's corridor diplomacy rather than a builder of corridors in South Asia. It signed the memorandum on the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023 and joined the I2U2 group with Israel and the UAE. Quad initiatives on ports, undersea cables and maritime domain awareness extend the same idea to the Indo-Pacific (see connectivity corridors).

American sanctions policy cuts the other way. India's operation of the Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar, its route to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan, depended on an American exemption granted in 2018 and revoked with effect from 29 September 2025. A six-month waiver followed in October 2025 and ran until 26 April 2026, with no confirmed extension, and the US–Israeli war on Iran that began on 28 February 2026 left the project's future uncertain.

Defence and security

Defence is the most institutionalised part of the relationship. The four foundational agreements, GSOMIA (2002), LEMOA (2016), COMCASA (2018) and BECA (2020), allow logistics support, secure communications and geospatial data sharing; a Security of Supply Arrangement followed in 2024. India now operates American P-8I, C-17, C-130J, Apache, Chinook and MH-60R platforms and contracted for 31 MQ-9B drones in October 2024. Co-production of GE F414 engines for Indian fighters has been under negotiation since 2023.

The Framework for the US–India Major Defence Partnership, signed by Rajnath Singh and his American counterpart in Kuala Lumpur on 31 October 2025, sets the agenda for ten years: co-development and co-production, interoperability, and the Indian Ocean. The armed forces exercise together in Malabar, Yudh Abhyas and Tiger Triumph.

Counter-terrorism cooperation has deepened. In July 2025 the United States designated The Resistance Front, which claimed the Pahalgam attack before retracting, as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation. The other side of the ledger is Washington's engagement with Pakistan's army and the indictment in American courts in 2023–24 of persons, including a former Indian official, over an alleged plot against a US-based Khalistani separatist; India set up a high-level inquiry.

Technology

Technology is where the partnership has its largest ambitions and its hardest bargains. The initiative on critical and emerging technology (iCET, launched in January 2023) was succeeded in February 2025 by TRUST, covering semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum, biotechnology, energy and space. Micron's assembly and test plant at Sanand is the flagship investment of the semiconductor push. India joined the Minerals Security Partnership in 2023, and the Quad's critical minerals work is now its main plurilateral supply initiative.

Space cooperation has produced results: the NISAR earth-observation satellite was launched from Sriharikota on 30 July 2025, and an Indian astronaut flew to the International Space Station on the Axiom-4 mission the same summer. Civil nuclear cooperation, promised in 2008, has still not produced an American reactor in India, largely because of India's liability law, which successive governments have tried to accommodate.

People are the deepest technology link and the most exposed. Indians receive the largest share of H-1B visas, so the US$100,000 fee on new petitions announced in September 2025 fell hardest on Indian professionals and firms. The diaspora, among the most prosperous immigrant groups in the United States, is both an asset and a site of political argument (see diaspora diplomacy).

Opportunities

  • Co-production of engines, drones and armoured vehicles under the 2025 defence framework.
  • Semiconductor, critical-mineral and AI supply chains under TRUST and the Quad.
  • A trade agreement that secures market access for labour-intensive Indian exports.
  • Space and civil nuclear cooperation, including small modular reactors.
  • Maritime domain awareness and logistics cooperation across the Indian Ocean.

07Points of disagreement

Challenges

  • Tariff and trade policy made by presidential decree and litigated in American courts, which makes any agreement provisional.
  • Disagreement over India's energy and defence ties with Russia and over Iran and Chabahar.
  • Washington's renewed engagement with Pakistan's military and its claims of mediation.
  • Restrictions on skilled migration, including the H-1B fee, that hit India's most valuable people-to-people link.
  • Slow translation of technology agreements into co-production, from jet engines to nuclear reactors.
  • The risk that a US–China accommodation reduces Washington's interest in India.

08Regional context

In the Indo-Pacific the Quad is the core. Its leaders did not meet between the Wilmington summit of September 2024 and November 2026; India was due to host a summit in 2025, but it did not take place. Foreign ministers kept the grouping alive: they met in New Delhi on 26 May 2026, where they launched a critical minerals framework intended to mobilise up to US$20 billion, and in Manila in July 2026. The leaders met again in Manila on 17 November 2026.

In South Asia, American policy towards Pakistan and Bangladesh matters to India as much as American policy towards India. The warmth Washington showed Pakistan's military leadership in 2025 revived memories of the Cold War. In West Asia, the war on Iran that began in February 2026 closed and then restricted the Strait of Hormuz, put at risk the millions of Indians who live and work in the Gulf and drove up energy costs. India's continued purchases of Russian oil remain the most persistent source of friction.

09India's diplomatic approach

India's approach is partnership without alliance — the practice its diplomats call multi-alignment. It seeks to lock in the relationship through institutions that survive changes of administration (the ten-year defence framework, TRUST, the 2+2 dialogue), to negotiate trade with clear red lines on agriculture, dairy and data, and to keep options with Russia, the European Union and the Global South.

The 2025 crisis divided Indian opinion. One school drew the lesson that dependence on Washington is a liability and that India should rebalance towards Europe, Russia and even China. The other held that the structural drivers (China, technology, the diaspora, the Indian Ocean) were untouched, and that India should absorb the shock and keep building. Policy since late 2025 has followed the second view while acting on some of the first: India repaired the relationship and simultaneously concluded trade agreements with the UK and the EU.

10Competing interpretations

Competing perspectives

How the relationship looks from different standpoints. A strong answer weighs them rather than adopting one.

The strategic convergence reading

A structural realist reads the partnership as balancing against China. As China's power grew, Washington sought a large Asian partner and India sought the technology and backing to rise without a confrontation it could not win, which is why the years after 2005 brought the civil nuclear deal, the foundational agreements and India's designation as a Major Defence Partner. India now flies American P-8I, C-17 and Apache aircraft, exercises in Malabar and Yudh Abhyas, and signed a ten-year defence framework in Kuala Lumpur in 2025. The realist also explains the limits. India balances through partnership without alliance because it fears entrapment in American wars as much as abandonment in its own, and Ashley Tellis warned that Washington would be making a bad bet if it expected India to side with it in a conflict with China.

The trade and tariff reading

An economic reading starts from the shock of 2025. The United States is India's largest export market, India runs a surplus in goods and earns heavily from services, yet a combined 50 per cent duty in August 2025 hit textiles, gems and jewellery and seafood. The framework of February 2026 cut the reciprocal tariff to 18 per cent in exchange for Indian tariff cuts and purchases, while keeping dairy and cereals protected, and then the Supreme Court's ruling of 20 February 2026 removed the legal basis of the duties and left the interim agreement on hold. Hegemonic stability theorists see a deeper lesson: the power that built the open trading order from which India's growth benefited has itself turned to tariffs, so India's diversification through agreements with the UK and the EU is insurance rather than drift.

The domestic politics on both sides

Neoclassical realists stress that domestic politics decides how far convergence becomes policy. In Washington that means a President who sets tariffs, sanctions waivers and summit agendas, a Congress that legislated CAATSA, approved the civil nuclear agreement and shapes immigration, courts that can strike down tariffs, and a prosperous diaspora that is both an asset and a site of argument. The H-1B fee of September 2025 fell hardest on Indian professionals, and the Democrats' capture of both chambers in November 2026 adds a new actor from January 2027. In New Delhi it means farmers, coalition partners and public opinion, which split in 2025 between a school that saw dependence on Washington as a liability and one that saw the structural drivers untouched. Policy followed the second while acting on some of the first, repairing ties and diversifying at once.

Washington's view of India

Seen from Washington, India is the large democracy that complicates Chinese power in Asia and a partner in the Quad, whose leaders met again in Manila in November 2026. It is also a frustrating one. India's purchases of Russian oil are the most persistent source of friction, its ties with Iran and its membership of BRICS and the SCO sit uneasily with American priorities, and its red lines on agriculture, dairy and data make every trade agreement hard won. The second Trump administration has treated partners transactionally, using tariffs as an instrument, claiming to have brokered the India–Pakistan ceasefire of May 2025 and hosting Pakistan's army chief. The institutional relationship has survived each turn, but on this reading Washington values India for what it does about China more than for the shared democracy Vajpayee invoked when he called the two countries natural allies.

Reading the relationship through IR theory

Structural realism explains the turn of the 2000s. As China's power grew, the United States sought a large Asian partner to help balance it, and India sought the technology and backing to rise without a confrontation it could not win. Kenneth Waltz's theory predicts balancing against the strongest power, and both states see China in that light. Realism also explains the limits: India balances in its own way, through partnership without alliance, because it fears entrapment in American wars as much as abandonment in its own.

Liberal accounts emphasise shared democratic institutions, a large and prosperous diaspora, technology ties and the dense web of agreements built since 2005; Atal Bihari Vajpayee called the two countries natural allies. The events of 2025 tested the liberal view: tariffs, migration restrictions and a warmer American approach to Pakistan showed that institutional density does not stop a transactional President from overriding it.

Hegemonic stability theory offers a third perspective. The United States built the open trading order from which India's growth has benefited, and its own turn to tariffs in 2025 put that order in question. India's response, diversifying through agreements with the UK and the EU while repairing ties with Washington, reflects a judgement that the hegemon's reliability can no longer be assumed. Neoclassical realists add that domestic politics decides how far structural convergence becomes policy: Congress, the courts and the diaspora in Washington; farmers, coalition partners and public opinion in New Delhi.

11Contemporary developments

As of 20 November 2026

The relationship is recovering from its worst year since 1998 without returning to the confidence of 2023. The tariff crisis of 2025 has given way to a negotiation conducted under shifting American law: after the Supreme Court's ruling of 20 February 2026 the interim agreement announced on 6 February was held back until Washington settled its new tariff framework, and talks continued through the year, including in New Delhi in June. As of early November 2026 the interim agreement had not been signed, although the White House listed India among the trade deals the administration had secured.

The Quad has been revived. Its foreign ministers met in New Delhi in May and in Manila in July 2026, and its leaders met in Manila on 17 November 2026, on the margins of the ASEAN summits, for the first time since September 2024. Friction persists over India's purchases of Russian crude, which reached record shares in mid-2026 as the Iran war disrupted Gulf supplies, and over Chabahar, where the American waiver lapsed in April 2026. When Congress passed the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act in September, India said it had noted the passage and would secure its energy through diversified sourcing while protecting its trade and economic interests. The Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, visited India again on 20–22 October 2026, beginning in Mumbai. The Democrats' victory in both chambers of Congress in the midterm elections of 3 November 2026 adds a new actor in trade and sanctions policy from January 2027.

12UPSC syllabus connections

Syllabus lines

  1. GS-II

    Developed and developing countries; diaspora

    Official wording: “Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India's interests, Indian diaspora.”

    Where it is taught on this platform
  2. GS-II

    Groupings and agreements

    Official wording: “Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India's interests.”

    Where it is taught on this platform
  3. Prelims

    Current events

    Official wording: “Current events of national and international importance.”

    Where it is taught on this platform

Quoted in UPSC’s official wording.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

21 questions · 2024–2026

  1. 2026 · GS-II · Q14 · 15 marks

    Examine how the separation of powers is practised in India compared to the rigid presidential model of the United States of America. In this context, compare the actual authority of the Indian Prime Minister with that of the President of the USA.

  2. 2026 · PSIR II · Q3(a) · 20 marks

    NATO, the oldest surviving collective security system, is facing challenge of transactional coercion from its own biggest member. What future does NATO have amidst such developments ?

  3. 2026 · PSIR II · Q3(c) · 15 marks

    Does power transition theory reflect the dynamics of US-China relations ?

  4. 2026 · PSIR II · Q4(a) · 20 marks

    QUAD requires more robust architecture than the summit driven mode to tide over the current challenges. Elaborate.

  5. 2026 · PSIR II · Q8(a) · 20 marks

    Critically evaluate India-Russia relations in the 21st century. How have both the countries responded to America meddling in their relations in the recent times.

  6. 2025 · GS-II · Q3 · 10 marks

    Compare and contrast the President’s power to pardon in India and in the USA. Are there any limits to it in both the countries? What are ‘preemptive pardons’?

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to India and United States in the PYQ dataset.All 21 in PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    The India–US relationship has been described as a partnership without alliance. Examine this description in the light of developments since 2025.

    How to approach it

    Define strategic autonomy and multi-alignment; use the 2025 tariffs, the defence framework and the Quad; give the strongest case for and against deeper alignment.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    How did the use of tariffs as an instrument of foreign policy in 2025–26 affect India–US relations? What lessons does it hold for India's trade strategy?

    How to approach it

    Explain the reciprocal and oil-related tariffs, the February 2026 framework and the Supreme Court ruling; connect to India's FTAs with the UK and the EU.

  3. Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Discuss the significance of the foundational defence agreements for India–US defence cooperation.

    How to approach it

    Explain each agreement in a line; show how they enable interoperability; note the sovereignty concerns raised in India and how they were addressed.

  4. Q4UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    The India–US civil nuclear agreement of 2008 transformed India's place in the nuclear order but not its energy mix. Comment.

    How to approach it

    Cover the NSG exemption and its strategic value; then the liability problem and the absence of American reactors.

  5. Q5UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Evaluate the role of the Indian diaspora in shaping India–US relations.

    How to approach it

    Use the H-1B question, political influence and the friction over separatist activity; avoid treating the diaspora as a single bloc.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

13Relevant PSIR topics

  1. Paper II · BUnit 5

    India and the Global Centres of Power

    Official syllabus: “India and the Global Centres of Power: USA, EU, Japan, China and Russia.”

  2. Paper II · BUnit 7

    India and the Nuclear Question

    Official syllabus: “India and the Nuclear Question: Changing perceptions and policy.”

  3. Paper II · BUnit 8

    Recent Developments in Indian Foreign Policy

    Official syllabus: “Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy: India's position on the recent crisis in Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia, growing relations with US and Israel; vision of a new world order.”

  4. Paper II · A

    Key Concepts in International Relations

    Official syllabus: “Key concepts in International Relations: National interest, security and power; Balance of power and deterrence; Transnational actors and collective security; World capitalist economy and globalisation.”

Each line is quoted from the official PSIR syllabus.

Explore further

Political system

Sources

  1. 01Ministry of External Affairs, India–US joint statements and bilateral brief (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
  2. 02US and India announce framework trade agreement to ease tariffs (opens in a new tab). Baker McKenzie, 11 February 2026
  3. 03After ten months of tariff deadlock, US and India find common ground on trade (opens in a new tab). India Briefing, February 2026
  4. 04India–US interim trade deal put on hold until new US tariff framework (opens in a new tab). Outlook Business, February 2026
  5. 05What the new US 150-day 10% duty after the Supreme Court's rejection of Trump tariffs means for India (opens in a new tab). ThePrint, February 2026
  6. 06Commerce ministry notes 'substantial progress' on India–US trade pact (opens in a new tab). Republic World, 24 June 2026
  7. 07Trump, other Quad leaders to meet in Manila on Nov 17, sources say (opens in a new tab). Khaleej Times (Reuters), November 2026
  8. 08Indo-Pacific Quad ministers work on supply chains, denounce arbitrary export restrictions (opens in a new tab). GMA News, 31 October 2026
  9. 09Chabahar port: India in talks with US as sanctions waiver nears its 26 April 2026 expiry (opens in a new tab). Outlook Business, April 2026
  10. 10India's vulnerability exposed: Iran strikes spark market plunge and energy crisis (opens in a new tab). The Week, 3 March 2026
  11. 11Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941–1991. National Defense University Press, 1992
  12. 12Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb. Brookings Institution Press, 2004
  13. 13Ashley J. Tellis, 'America's Bad Bet on India', Foreign Affairs, May 2023
  14. 14United States–India Joint Statement (opens in a new tab). The White House, 6 February 2026
  15. 15Supreme Court rejects IEEPA as a tariff statute (opens in a new tab). Thomson Reuters, 20 February 2026
  16. 16Quad leaders oppose unilateral actions, announce new maritime surveillance and cybersecurity initiatives in Manila (opens in a new tab). Republic World, 17 November 2026
  17. 17Quad critical minerals initiative framework among the United States, Japan, Australia and India (opens in a new tab). Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia, 26 May 2026
  18. 18Democrats win full control of Congress, ushering in a new era of divided government (opens in a new tab). KUT (NPR), 4 November 2026
  19. 19White House lists India among nations with new Trump trade deals (opens in a new tab). Telangana Today, 3 November 2026
  20. 20Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026
  21. 21Statement on passage of the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act in the US Congress (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 17 September 2026
  22. 22Visit of H.E. Mr. Marco Rubio, Secretary of State of the United States of America, to India (October 20–22, 2026) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 19 October 2026
  23. 23Quad Leaders' Summit Joint Press Release (Manila) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 17 November 2026