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India's neighbourhood

India and Pakistan

A relationship shaped by Partition, by Pakistan's claim on Jammu and Kashmir and by its use of terrorism as policy. Since Pahalgam and Operation Sindoor in 2025, India has narrowed it to deterrence and the leverage of the Indus waters.

India (gold) and Pakistan. Boundaries approximate; India per Natural Earth’s India point-of-view data.

India and Pakistan at a glance

Relationship
India's neighbourhood
Two-way trade, 2025⁠–⁠26
0.3 USD billion
Merchandise exports plus imports
India's balance, 2025⁠–⁠26
Surplus of 0.3
USD billion; exports 0.3, imports 0.0
Key agreements
9 listed
1949 to 2019
On the timeline
23 events
1948 to 2026
Asked by UPSC
5 questions
2025, 2026

01Geography

Pakistan lies along India's western and north-western frontier, from the Arabian Sea and the Rann of Kutch through the Thar desert and the plains of Punjab to the mountains of Jammu and Kashmir. The Indus and the five rivers of the Punjab, the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, rise in or flow through territory India holds before reaching Pakistan, which makes water inseparable from the quarrel over Kashmir. To the west Pakistan borders Iran and Afghanistan; in the north, across the Karakoram, it borders China, and the Karakoram Highway and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor run through Gilgit-Baltistan to the port of Gwadar.

The geography of the rivalry is compressed. Major Pakistani cities such as Lahore lie close to the border, and missile flight times between the two countries are measured in minutes, which shortens warning and decision time in any crisis. Pakistan's lack of strategic depth on its eastern side is one reason its army has long sought influence in Afghanistan to the west.

02Political context

Pakistan's political system

Pakistan is a federal parliamentary republic under the constitution of 1973, but the army has ruled directly for more than three decades (1958–71, 1977–88 and 1999–2008) and has shaped governments when it has not ruled. The Prime Minister, elected by the National Assembly of 336 members, heads the government; the President, chosen by an electoral college of both houses and the provincial assemblies, is head of state; the Senate of 96 members represents the four provinces, Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, to which the Eighteenth Amendment of 2010 devolved substantial powers.

After the disputed election of February 2024, from which Imran Khan, imprisoned since 2023, was excluded, Shehbaz Sharif of the PML-N became Prime Minister with the support of the PPP, and Asif Ali Zardari became President. The Twenty-sixth Amendment (October 2024) gave Parliament a larger role in appointing the Chief Justice and created constitutional benches; the Twenty-seventh (November 2025) created a Federal Constitutional Court and the post of Chief of Defence Forces, held by Field Marshal Asim Munir. Analysts commonly describe the result as a hybrid regime in which the army is the senior partner.

Political and diplomatic developments

Diplomatic relations have been run at the level of chargés d'affaires since August 2019, when Pakistan expelled India's High Commissioner and suspended bilateral trade in protest at the constitutional changes in Jammu and Kashmir. India's position is that those changes, upheld by the Supreme Court in December 2023, are an internal matter. After the Pahalgam attack the Cabinet Committee on Security declared Pakistan's defence, naval and air advisers in New Delhi persona non grata and cut the strength of both High Commissions from 55 to 30.

India's stated doctrine has three parts. Terror and talks cannot go together; all issues are bilateral under the Simla Agreement, so there is no role for third-party mediation; and on Jammu and Kashmir the only matter left to discuss is the vacation of the territory Pakistan illegally occupies. Pakistan's strategy is the mirror image: to internationalise Kashmir at the UN and the OIC and to present itself as the party seeking dialogue.

The civil–military balance inside Pakistan shapes every Indian calculation. Elected governments have sought openings with India, notably Nawaz Sharif's in 1999 and 2014–15, and the army has set their limits. The 27th Constitutional Amendment of November 2025 created the post of Chief of Defence Forces, held by the army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, with command over all three services, and moved constitutional cases to a new Federal Constitutional Court. For India, the decisive interlocutor in Pakistan is now formally, not just informally, the army chief.

03Historical bilateral relations

The rivalry began as a quarrel over Partition and became a quarrel over territory. When Pakistan-backed raiders entered Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947 and Indian troops were flown into Srinagar. India took a complaint of aggression to the UN Security Council on 1 January 1948. The UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 placed the withdrawal of Pakistani forces before any plebiscite, a precondition Pakistan never met; the ceasefire of 1 January 1949 was followed by the Karachi Agreement, which drew the ceasefire line.

The Cold War externalised the dispute: Pakistan joined SEATO (1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955) and received American arms while India held to non-alignment. Even so, the two states concluded the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 with the World Bank, the most durable agreement in their history. In 1963 Pakistan signed a so-called boundary agreement with China handing over the Shaksgam Valley, which India rejects as illegal and invalid. The 1965 war, begun by Pakistan's infiltration of armed men into the valley, ended in stalemate and the Soviet-brokered Tashkent Declaration.

The decisive break came in 1971, when Pakistan's crackdown in East Pakistan drove about ten million refugees into India and the war of 3–16 December ended in the creation of Bangladesh. The Simla Agreement of 2 July 1972 committed both states to bilateral, peaceful settlement and created the Line of Control. For India, Simla displaced the UN resolutions; Pakistan still invokes them.

Nuclear weapons changed the character of the contest rather than ending it. Pakistan's support for the insurgency that began in Jammu and Kashmir in 1989, and the tests of May 1998, illustrated the stability–instability paradox: deterrence at the top of the ladder appeared to make sub-conventional violence below it safer. Kargil (May–July 1999) followed the Lahore Declaration within months, and the attack on Parliament in December 2001 a ten-month mobilisation.

Détente followed the ceasefire of November 2003 and Pervez Musharraf's assurance of January 2004 that territory under Pakistan's control would not be used for terrorism; the composite dialogue produced bus links, trade openings and, by participants' accounts, a back-channel framework on Kashmir. The Mumbai attacks of 26 November 2008 ended it. Every later opening, including Narendra Modi's stop in Lahore in December 2015, was followed by an attack: Pathankot and Uri in 2016, Pulwama in 2019, Pahalgam in 2025.

Diplomatic timeline

23 events, 1948–2026 · 10 turning points

The dated events of the Global Political Timeline that involve Pakistan. Open an entry to read it in full.

  1. India refers Jammu and Kashmir to the UN Security CouncilDiplomatic · Turning point

    Two months after the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India on 26 October 1947, India complained to the Security Council of aggression by Pakistan-backed raiders. The UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 made the withdrawal of Pakistani forces the first step towards any plebiscite, a condition never met. The ceasefire of 1 January 1949 left part of the state under Pakistan's illegal occupation. The reference is the origin of Pakistan's reliance on UN resolutions, which India regards as superseded by the Simla Agreement of 1972.

    From history to today

    The reference still shapes how the dispute is argued. Pakistan invokes the plebiscite resolutions; India answers that Pakistan never met their first condition, withdrawal, and that the Simla Agreement made the issue bilateral. The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, deployed in 1949, outlived the plebiscite plan, and India regards its role as overtaken by Simla. The episode left Indian diplomacy wary of Security Council involvement and of third-party mediation.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  2. Indus Waters Treaty signedDiplomatic · Turning point

    Signed in Karachi on 19 September 1960 by Jawaharlal Nehru and Ayub Khan, with the World Bank a signatory for limited purposes, the treaty gave India the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) and Pakistan the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab), subject to limited Indian uses. It survived three wars. India held it in abeyance on 23 April 2025 after the Pahalgam attack.

    From history to today

    For six decades the treaty was cited as proof that India and Pakistan could honour an agreement through war. Since 23 April 2025 India has held it in abeyance, linking it to Pakistan's support for cross-border terrorism, and it has rejected the awards of a Court of Arbitration constituted at Pakistan's request. The treaty's dispute machinery, in which the World Bank has a role in appointments, has become a contested arena of its own.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  3. The 1965 India–Pakistan warDiplomatic

    Pakistan's infiltration of armed men into the Kashmir valley in August 1965 (Operation Gibraltar) and its armoured thrust towards Akhnoor at the start of September led India to open a front across the international border in Punjab. The Security Council demanded a ceasefire on 20 September, and fighting stopped on 23 September. Neither side achieved its aims, and the war ended at Tashkent.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  4. Tashkent DeclarationDiplomatic

    Brought together by the Soviet Premier, Aleksei Kosygin, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Ayub Khan agreed on 10 January 1966 to withdraw their forces to the positions held before 5 August 1965 and to restore normal relations. Shastri died in Tashkent the following night. The declaration was the high point of Soviet diplomacy in South Asia and a rare instance of India accepting a third party's good offices with Pakistan.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  5. Pakistani forces surrender in Dhaka; Bangladesh is bornDiplomatic · Turning point

    After Pakistan's air strikes on Indian bases on 3 December 1971, India went to war in support of the Bangladeshi liberation struggle and recognised Bangladesh on 6 December. On 16 December Pakistani forces in the east surrendered in Dhaka, and about 93,000 soldiers and civilians became prisoners of war. Soviet vetoes blocked ceasefire resolutions at the Security Council, while the United States sent a carrier group into the Bay of Bengal.

    From history to today

    The war created Bangladesh, ended the two-wing Pakistan of 1947 and left India the pre-eminent military power in South Asia; 16 December is marked as Vijay Diwas in India and Victory Day in Bangladesh. India's role in 1971 still underpins its claim to a special relationship with Bangladesh, a claim tested by the fall of Sheikh Hasina in 2024 and by the effort to reset relations after the 2026 election. The Simla Agreement was its diplomatic sequel.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  6. Simla AgreementDiplomatic · Turning point

    Signed by Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on 2 July 1972, the agreement committed India and Pakistan to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations and converted the ceasefire line of 17 December 1971 into the Line of Control, to be respected by both sides. India returned captured territory and later the prisoners of war. India regards the agreement as excluding third-party mediation.

    From history to today

    Simla remains the legal anchor of India's position that Jammu and Kashmir, like every other issue with Pakistan, must be settled bilaterally, without third-party mediation, a position India restated after Operation Sindoor. The Line of Control it created still divides the territory of the former princely state, and every violation of it, from Kargil onwards, has been judged against the commitment that neither side would seek to alter it unilaterally.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  7. Pokhran I: India's first nuclear testDiplomatic · Turning point

    India conducted an underground test at Pokhran on 18 May 1974 and described it as a peaceful nuclear explosion. The test led Canada to end nuclear cooperation, prompted the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1975 and brought American non-proliferation legislation that cut off fuel for the Tarapur reactors. India did not openly weaponise for another 24 years.

    From history to today

    The test's most durable consequence was the Nuclear Suppliers Group, created in 1975 in response to it to tighten controls on nuclear exports. Working around that regime defined Indian nuclear diplomacy for three decades, until the waiver of 2008, and India's bid for membership of the Group has been blocked since 2016, chiefly by China. The test also began the weapons capability that India declared openly with Pokhran II.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  8. SAARC founded at DhakaDiplomatic

    The leaders of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka adopted the SAARC Charter at Dhaka on 8 December 1985; Afghanistan joined in 2007. The charter excludes bilateral and contentious issues and requires unanimity, which kept the association alive but made it ineffective. No summit has been held since Kathmandu in 2014.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  9. Pokhran II: India declares itself a nuclear-weapon stateDiplomatic · Turning point

    India conducted five tests on 11 and 13 May 1998; Pakistan tested on 28 and 30 May. The United States, Japan and others imposed sanctions, and the Security Council condemned the tests in Resolution 1172. India announced a moratorium on further testing and a doctrine of credible minimum deterrence and no first use. The dialogue that followed with Washington began the transformation of the relationship.

    From history to today

    The tests made India a declared nuclear-weapon state outside the NPT. The doctrine that followed, made public in 2003, still rests on credible minimum deterrence and no first use, and the voluntary moratorium on testing has held. Pakistan's answering tests created a nuclear dyad that shadows every India–Pakistan crisis, from Kargil to Operation Sindoor, while the dialogue with Washington led to the civil nuclear initiative.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  10. Lahore DeclarationDiplomatic

    Atal Bihari Vajpayee travelled to Lahore by bus, and on 21 February 1999 he and Nawaz Sharif signed a declaration committing both governments to intensify dialogue, including on Jammu and Kashmir, and to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. Within months Pakistani forces had occupied the heights at Kargil.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  11. The Kargil conflictDiplomatic

    In May 1999 India discovered that Pakistani soldiers and militants had occupied positions on its side of the Line of Control in Kargil. Operation Vijay recovered them by July. India kept the fighting on its own side of the LoC, and President Clinton pressed Nawaz Sharif to withdraw, a turning point in American views of South Asia. The Kargil Review Committee's report led to reforms of India's security institutions.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  12. The September 11 attacksWorld · Turning point

    Al-Qaeda hijackers flew airliners into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001; a fourth aircraft crashed in Pennsylvania, and almost 3,000 people were killed. NATO invoked its collective-defence clause for the first time, and Security Council resolution 1373 of 28 September, adopted under Chapter VII, obliged every state to criminalise the financing of terrorism and deny safe haven to terrorists. The American-led war in Afghanistan began on 7 October. For India, which had proposed a comprehensive convention against terrorism in 1996, the new regime still lacked an agreed definition, and Pakistan became a frontline American ally.

    From history to today

    The attacks built the counter-terrorism architecture that states still use: binding obligations under resolution 1373 monitored by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, sanctions lists and standards against terrorist financing. The war in Afghanistan that they began ended with the Taliban's return in 2021. India has used this architecture to seek listings of Pakistan-based terrorists and chaired the Counter-Terrorism Committee in 2022, though the comprehensive convention it proposed remains stalled over the definition of terrorism.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  13. Attack on Parliament and Operation ParakramDiplomatic

    Terrorists attacked Parliament on 13 December 2001; India blamed Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. India mobilised its forces along the border for ten months and withdrew its High Commissioner from Islamabad. The crisis ended without war after American diplomacy and President Musharraf's pledge of January 2002 to act against terrorism; it exposed the slowness of Indian mobilisation and prompted new thinking on limited war.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  14. The Mumbai terrorist attacksDiplomatic · Turning point

    Ten Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists who came by sea from Pakistan attacked hotels, a railway station, a hospital and a Jewish centre in Mumbai from 26 to 29 November 2008, killing 166 people. India chose diplomatic pressure over military retaliation, and the composite dialogue with Pakistan ended. The attacks reshaped India's coastal security and its counter-terrorism partnerships; the slow pace of prosecutions in Pakistan remains a grievance.

    From history to today

    The attacks reorganised India's internal security: the National Investigation Agency was created within weeks, coastal surveillance was rebuilt around the Navy and the Coast Guard, and counter-terrorism became central to India's partnerships with the United States and others. They also set the template for diplomacy against Pakistan-based groups, pressing for listings at the Security Council and the prosecution of the planners; after later attacks, that approach gave way to the punitive responses of 2016 onwards. See terrorism.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  15. Cross-LoC surgical strikesDiplomatic

    Eleven days after militants killed Indian soldiers at Uri, the Indian Army announced on 29 September 2016 that it had struck terrorist launch pads across the Line of Control. It was the first publicly acknowledged Indian strike of its kind, and it began a pattern of overt punitive responses continued at Balakot in 2019 and in Operation Sindoor in 2025.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  16. India becomes a full member of the SCODiplomatic

    India and Pakistan were admitted as full members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation at the Astana summit on 9 June 2017. Membership gave India a seat in a Eurasian security forum led by China and Russia and a platform for engagement with Central Asia. India has used it to press its positions on terrorism and sovereignty, declining to endorse the Belt and Road Initiative in SCO declarations.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  17. Balakot air strike after PulwamaDiplomatic

    After a Jaish-e-Mohammed suicide bomber killed 40 CRPF personnel at Pulwama on 14 February 2019, India withdrew Most Favoured Nation treatment from Pakistan, and on 26 February the Indian Air Force struck a Jaish facility at Balakot in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Pakistan retaliated the next day; an Indian pilot was captured and returned. In May 2019 the UN listed Masood Azhar under its sanctions regime after China lifted its hold.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  18. Taliban take Kabul; Security Council adopts Resolution 2593Diplomatic

    The Taliban entered Kabul on 15 August 2021 as American forces withdrew, and India evacuated its diplomats and citizens and closed its embassy. On 30 August, under India's presidency, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2593, demanding that Afghan territory not be used to threaten or attack any country or to shelter terrorists. India returned with a technical team in 2022 and upgraded it to an embassy in 2025.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  19. Neutral Expert upholds his competence on Kishenganga and RatleDiplomatic

    The Neutral Expert appointed under the Indus Waters Treaty, Michel Lino, made public his decision that all seven points of difference referred to him in proceedings begun by India, on the designs of the Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects, fell within his competence under Paragraph 7 of Annexure F, so that he would proceed to the merits; the decision itself is dated 7 January 2025. India welcomed it the next day as vindicating its position that the Neutral Expert alone was competent to decide these differences, said it would continue to take part in his process, and repeated that it did not recognise or participate in the parallel Court of Arbitration constituted at Pakistan's request.

    From history to today

    The decision confirmed the forum India had asked for. After holding the treaty in abeyance in April 2025, India asked the Neutral Expert to suspend his proceedings and, when he declined, withdrew from them in July 2025, according to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, while Pakistan has continued to take part. Any ruling on the designs would now come from the mechanism India had chosen, without India before it. See the Indus Waters arbitration.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  20. Pahalgam attack; India holds the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyanceDiplomatic · Turning point

    Terrorists killed 26 people, almost all tourists, near Pahalgam on 22 April 2025. The next day the Cabinet Committee on Security held the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance "until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism", closed the Attari check post, cancelled visas for Pakistani nationals and reduced the strength of the High Commissions. It was the first time India had suspended the treaty.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  21. Operation SindoorDiplomatic · Turning point

    In the early hours of 7 May 2025 India struck nine terrorist sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, including facilities of Jaish-e-Mohammed at Bahawalpur and Lashkar-e-Taiba at Muridke. Pakistan responded with drones, missiles and artillery, and India struck Pakistani air bases. On 10 May the two Directors General of Military Operations agreed to stop firing and military action. India rejected claims of third-party mediation.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  22. India upgrades its mission in Kabul to an embassyDiplomatic

    During the visit of the Taliban's acting foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, to New Delhi in October 2025, India announced that its technical mission in Kabul would become an embassy; the upgrade took effect on 21 October. India did not recognise the Taliban government, but the step, taken as Afghanistan and Pakistan fought along the Durand Line, marked a decisive change from the policy of 2021.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  23. India rejects the arbitral award on the Indus Waters TreatyDiplomatic

    On 31 August 2026 the Ministry of External Affairs rejected an award on the "status" of the Indus Waters Treaty, and an order on interim measures concerning the Ratle project, issued by the Court of Arbitration constituted at Pakistan's request. India called the court illegally constituted and without jurisdiction, as it had for the court's earlier awards of 2025 and May 2026, and said the treaty remained in abeyance.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
Follow Pakistan across the Global Political Timeline

04Strategic interests

India's strategic interests in Pakistan are defensive: to end the use of cross-border terrorism as state policy, to keep deterrence stable under the nuclear shadow, to stop Pakistan serving as a forward platform for China, and to secure Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh and the waters that rise there. India claims no Pakistani territory; its claim is to the parts of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh that Pakistan illegally occupies.

Pakistan's strategic culture has been read in two ways. One school (T. V. Paul's The Warrior State and C. Christine Fair's Fighting to the End, both 2014) argues that the army's institutional identity depends on permanent rivalry with India, so that revisionism is structural rather than episodic. On this reading, inducements cannot buy moderation; only denial and punishment can raise the cost of proxy war.

The opposing view deserves its full weight. Advocates of engagement note that the composite-dialogue years (2004–2008) were among the least violent in Jammu and Kashmir, that trade and travel create constituencies for peace inside Pakistan, and that isolation strengthens the army against civilian politicians. A policy built only on punishment, they argue, leaves every crisis to Pakistan's choice of the next provocation.

The China–Pakistan axis gives the problem its depth. China is Pakistan's principal arms supplier, its shield at the UN, where it held up the listing of Masood Azhar under the 1267 sanctions regime until May 2019, and the financier of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. A two-front contingency is now an Indian planning assumption.

05Key agreements

  • 1949Karachi Agreement

    Military agreement under UNCIP auspices establishing the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir.

  • 1960Indus Waters Treaty

    Signed in Karachi on 19 September 1960, with the World Bank a signatory for limited purposes. It gives the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan, with limited Indian uses on the western rivers, including run-of-river hydropower, and a graded dispute mechanism. India has held it in abeyance since 23 April 2025.

  • 1966Tashkent Declaration

    Signed on 10 January 1966 after Soviet mediation; restored the pre-war positions of August 1965.

  • 1972Simla Agreement

    Signed by Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on 2 July 1972. It commits the parties to settle differences bilaterally and peacefully and turns the ceasefire line of 17 December 1971 into the Line of Control, which neither side is to alter unilaterally.

  • 1988Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities

    Signed on 31 December 1988; lists of nuclear installations are exchanged every 1 January.

  • 1999Lahore Declaration

    Signed on 21 February 1999 during Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Lahore; committed both governments to nuclear risk reduction and intensified dialogue.

  • 2005Agreement on Pre-notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles

    Requires advance notice of ballistic missile tests.

  • 2007Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons

    Commits each side to notify the other of nuclear accidents with possible cross-border effects; extended at five-year intervals.

  • 2019Kartarpur Sahib Corridor Agreement

    Signed on 24 October 2019 to allow Indian pilgrims visa-free travel to Gurdwara Darbar Sahib, Kartarpur; renewed in October 2024 for a further five years.

06Cooperation

Economy, connectivity, defence and technology: where the two work together, where they do not, and where cooperation could grow.

Economic relationship

Economic ties are marginal and politically hostage. India withdrew Most Favoured Nation treatment from Pakistan on 15 February 2019, after Pulwama, and imposed a 200 per cent customs duty on Pakistani goods; Pakistan suspended bilateral trade in August 2019. After Pahalgam, Pakistan's National Security Committee suspended all trade, including through third countries, and India prohibited the direct or indirect import of goods originating in or transiting through Pakistan.

What trade survives moves informally or through third countries such as the UAE, at higher cost to both. The World Bank's study A Glass Half Full (2018) put India–Pakistan trade potential at many times its recorded level, a measure of how completely security has subordinated economics; the South Asian Free Trade Area has never worked between its two largest members.

The asymmetry is structural. Pakistan's recurring balance-of-payments crises and its reliance on IMF programmes, Chinese rollovers and Gulf deposits mean it has more to gain from normal trade than India, and Indian policy has chosen not to offer that gain while terrorism continues.

India’s merchandise trade with Pakistan

2021–22 to 2025–26 · USD billion

Exports 2025–26
0.3
India to Pakistan
Imports 2025–26
0.0
Pakistan to India
Two-way trade 2025–26
0.3
Exports plus imports
Trade surplus 2025–26
0.3
Exports exceed imports
  • Exports from India
  • Imports into India
  • Balance: exports minus imports
0.000.250.500.751.001.252021–220.50.0+0.52022–230.60.0+0.62023–241.20.0+1.22024–250.60.0+0.62025–260.30.0+0.3ExportsImportsBalance
India’s merchandise trade with Pakistan, USD billion, by financial year
Financial yearExports from IndiaImports into IndiaBalance (exports minus imports)
2021–220.50.0+0.5
2022–230.60.0+0.6
2023–241.20.0+1.2
2024–250.60.0+0.6
2025–260.30.0+0.3

Unit: USD billion. Balance and two-way trade are calculated here from the published exports and imports.

Note: Merchandise trade only; services excluded. Indian financial years (April–March). Figures for 2025–26 are provisional and those for 2021–22 to 2024–25 revised, as published by the Reserve Bank of India from data compiled by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S) of the Department of Commerce. Imports from Pakistan round to zero: they were US$20.1 million in 2022–23 and under US$3 million in every other year shown, after Pakistan suspended bilateral trade in August 2019.

Official dataSource: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026.

Trade and connectivity

Physical links have closed one by one. The trains and cross-LoC routes opened during the détente were suspended by 2019; after Pahalgam India closed the Attari check post and cancelled visas for Pakistani nationals, including under the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme, and both countries shut their airspace to each other's airlines.

The Kartarpur Corridor, opened in November 2019 to let Indian pilgrims visit Gurdwara Darbar Sahib without a visa, was the one link built in a hostile decade. Pilgrim movement was halted in the 2025 crisis; its fate is an index of whether any humanitarian space survives.

Pakistan denies India overland transit to Afghanistan and Central Asia, which is why India invested in Chabahar in Iran and the International North–South Transport Corridor (see connectivity corridors). The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor runs through Gilgit-Baltistan, Indian territory under Pakistan's illegal occupation; that objection of sovereignty is the root of India's refusal to join the Belt and Road Initiative.

Defence and security

Three layers define the security relationship. At the top is nuclear deterrence between two states outside the NPT. India's nuclear doctrine of 2003 commits it to no first use and massive retaliation; Pakistan keeps first use open and has developed short-range systems such as the Nasr as part of what it calls full-spectrum deterrence. A small set of confidence-building measures (listed below) has survived every crisis.

The middle layer is the Line of Control, where the ceasefire of November 2003 broke down repeatedly after 2013 and was recommitted by the two Directors General of Military Operations in February 2021. The bottom layer is terrorism by groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, which India holds are sheltered by the Pakistani state; Pakistan's years on the FATF grey list (2018–2022) were the most effective external pressure on their finances.

India has moved the threshold of conventional response three times: the cross-LoC surgical strikes of September 2016, the air strike at Balakot in February 2019, and Operation Sindoor on 7 May 2025, when India struck nine terrorist sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. After four days of missile, drone and artillery exchanges, including Indian strikes on Pakistani air bases, the two DGMOs agreed on 10 May to stop firing and military action. In his address of 12 May 2025 the Prime Minister set out the new terms: a response on India's terms to any terror attack, no tolerance for nuclear blackmail, and no distinction between terrorists and the states that sponsor them.

Whether this has strengthened deterrence is the central debate. For: each round imposed costs Pakistan did not expect and showed the nuclear threshold to be higher than Pakistan claimed. Against: each round also raised the floor of the next crisis, compressed decision time between two nuclear-armed militaries and drew outside powers into crisis management that India rejects.

Opportunities

  • Renegotiating the Indus Waters Treaty to reflect hydropower needs and climate change, as India's notices of 2023 and 2024 sought.
  • The nuclear confidence-building measures both sides have observed through every crisis.
  • Humanitarian channels (prisoner releases, flood warnings, pilgrimages) that sustain minimal trust without concessions on terrorism.
  • Pressure on terrorist financing through the FATF and UN sanctions.
  • Regional cooperation through BIMSTEC and sub-regional groupings that do not need Pakistani consent.

07Points of disagreement

Border issues

The frontier has four segments: the International Boundary from Gujarat to Jammu, the Line of Control, the Actual Ground Position Line on the Siachen glacier (held by India since Operation Meghdoot in 1984), and Sir Creek in the Rann of Kutch, where the sides disagree over whether the boundary follows the channel's middle or its eastern bank.

India's position is categorical. The entire Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh are an integral and inalienable part of India, including the areas under Pakistan's illegal occupation — Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan — and the Shaksgam Valley, which Pakistan purported to cede to China in 1963. Parliament's unanimous resolution of 22 February 1994 declared that Pakistan must vacate the areas it occupies. Pakistan's claim to the whole of Jammu and Kashmir, which it frames as a matter of self-determination under the UN resolutions, is in India's view extinguished by the accession of 1947 and superseded by the Simla Agreement (see the Union and its territory).

Challenges

  • Cross-border terrorism, with each major attack able to trigger a crisis between two nuclear-armed militaries.
  • Compressed escalation after 2016, 2019 and 2025, with no political channel above the DGMO hotline.
  • The China–Pakistan partnership, which turns a bilateral rivalry into a two-front problem.
  • The legal contest over the Indus Waters Treaty and the precedent India sets as an upstream state.
  • Constitutional and military authority in Pakistan formally concentrated in the army chief.
  • The paralysis of SAARC and of South Asian economic integration as long as the rivalry persists.

08Regional context

The rivalry has been the single largest obstacle to South Asian regionalism. SAARC has not held a summit since Kathmandu in 2014; the 2016 Islamabad summit collapsed when India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Afghanistan withdrew after the Uri attack and Sri Lanka followed. India has since invested in BIMSTEC and sub-regional groupings without Pakistan, which critics call regionalism by exclusion.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which both joined in 2017, is the main room where Indian and Pakistani ministers still sit together, and a venue of contest: in June 2025 India declined to endorse an SCO defence ministers' document that omitted Pahalgam, and the Tianjin leaders' declaration of September 2025 condemned the attack. Pakistan took over the SCO chair for 2026–27 at the Bishkek summit and is to host the leaders' summit of 2027, which will test India's participation.

Pakistan's alignments have widened. Its Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia, signed on 17 September 2025, treats aggression against one as aggression against both; India said it would study the implications and expected Riyadh to keep "mutual interests and sensitivities" in mind. Washington's courtship of Pakistan's army chief in 2025 sat uneasily with India's rejection of American claims to have brokered the May ceasefire; Pakistan's conflict with the Taliban has meanwhile opened space for India in Kabul.

09India's diplomatic approach

Indian policy has oscillated between engagement and coercion, but the oscillation has narrowed since 2016. The current approach combines punitive military options, diplomatic isolation (through the FATF, UN sanctions listings and statements by partners), economic disengagement and, since April 2025, the leverage of the Indus waters. Crisis communication is confined to the DGMO channel, consistent with India's insistence on bilateralism.

Its strengths are evident: it denies the army dialogue without cost, it has made terrorist financing a concern of the Financial Action Task Force rather than of India alone, and it keeps escalation choices in Indian hands.

It also carries costs. Without any political process the relationship is managed entirely through deterrence, and the initiative for the next crisis rests with whoever plans the next attack. The use of the Indus waters raises questions of treaty law and sets a precedent that an upstream China could cite on the Brahmaputra, where India is the downstream state. And refusing mediation does not stop outside powers from claiming a role. The question for Indian strategy is whether a policy of calibrated punishment can be joined to a political offer that strengthens those in Pakistan who want a different relationship.

10Competing interpretations

Competing perspectives

How the relationship looks from different standpoints. A strong answer weighs them rather than adopting one.

The deterrence hawk's reading

The hawk reads Pakistan through its army. On the argument of T. V. Paul and C. Christine Fair, the army's institutional identity depends on permanent rivalry with India, so revisionism is structural and inducements cannot buy moderation; only denial and punishment raise the cost of proxy war. Kargil followed the Lahore Declaration within months, and every later opening, including Modi's stop in Lahore in 2015, was followed by an attack. India's answer has been to move the threshold of conventional response three times, in 2016, in 2019 and with Operation Sindoor in 2025. The 27th Amendment, which made the army chief Chief of Defence Forces, confirms for this school that the decisive interlocutor is the army. The prescription follows: no talks while terror continues, no outside mediation, and economic disengagement, pressure through the FATF and the leverage of the Indus waters until terrorism ends.

The engagement school's reading

Advocates of engagement start from the record. The composite-dialogue years of 2004 to 2008, after the ceasefire of November 2003 and Musharraf's assurance on terrorism, were among the least violent in Jammu and Kashmir and produced bus links, trade openings and, by participants' accounts, a back-channel framework on Kashmir. Trade and travel create constituencies for peace inside Pakistan, while isolation strengthens the army against civilian politicians, who have sought openings with India and found their limits set by the army. A policy built only on punishment, on this view, leaves every crisis to Pakistan's choice of the next provocation and raises the floor of each round between two nuclear-armed militaries. The engagers point to what has survived, the nuclear confidence-building measures and humanitarian channels such as prisoner releases, flood warnings and pilgrimages, as the base for a political offer.

The legal and institutional reading

A legal reading centres on the Indus Waters Treaty, the most durable agreement between the two states, which survived three wars before India held it in abeyance on 23 April 2025. Liberal institutionalists treat the abeyance as the hardest test of their claim, since institutions endure only while the states that sustain them value them more than the leverage of breaking them. India's notices of 2023 and 2024 sought a renegotiation to reflect hydropower needs and climate change, and India rejects the Court of Arbitration constituted at Pakistan's request as a body without jurisdiction. Critics within this reading warn of two costs: the questions of treaty law that abeyance raises, and the precedent it sets for an upstream China on the Brahmaputra, where India is the downstream state. Law, on this view, is a resource India may one day need for itself.

Islamabad's view of India

Seen from Islamabad, the rivalry is bound up with the idea of the state itself. Pakistan frames its claim to Jammu and Kashmir as self-determination under the UN resolutions, seeks to internationalise the dispute at the UN and the OIC, and presents itself as the party seeking dialogue, while India insists on bilateralism under Simla. As the weaker state, it has sought to offset India's conventional superiority through alliances with the United States and then China, through nuclear weapons with first use kept open and, in India's account, through militant proxies. Its alignments widened in 2025 and 2026 with a mutual defence agreement with Saudi Arabia, American courtship of its army chief and the chair of the SCO. Its army, now commanding all three services and the senior partner in a hybrid regime, has built its identity around the rivalry, so Islamabad's view is ultimately the army's.

Reading the relationship through IR theory

Realism treats the rivalry as an enduring security competition between neighbours of unequal size. Pakistan, the weaker state, has sought to offset India's conventional superiority through alliances (with the United States in the Cold War and with China since), nuclear weapons and militant proxies; India has sought to deny it those equalisers. The security dilemma is sharpened by short distances, compressed warning times and the absence of trust.

Nuclear deterrence theory frames the debate after 1998. Kenneth Waltz argued that nuclear weapons make war between their possessors less likely; Scott Sagan replied that organisational pathologies and weak civilian control make proliferation dangerous, and South Asia has been a central case in their debate. The stability–instability paradox is the standard explanation of why Kargil, Mumbai, Pulwama and Pahalgam happened under the nuclear shadow, and Thomas Schelling's analysis of coercion and the manipulation of risk explains India's effort, from 2016 to Operation Sindoor, to show that its threshold for a conventional response is lower than Pakistan assumed.

Constructivism explains why the dispute resists material bargains. The two states were founded on rival ideas of nationhood, Pakistan as a homeland for South Asia's Muslims and India as a secular and plural nation, and Jammu and Kashmir became the test of each idea; Pakistan's army, as T. V. Paul and C. Christine Fair argue, has built its institutional identity around the rivalry. Liberal institutionalism finds its best evidence in the Indus Waters Treaty, which survived three wars, and its sharpest disappointment in India's decision to hold the treaty in abeyance in 2025: institutions endure only while the states that sustain them value them more than the leverage of breaking them.

11Contemporary developments

As of 20 November 2026

The relationship is in its most restricted state since 1971: the measures taken after the Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025 remain in force, and the understanding of 10 May 2025 stopped the fighting but restored nothing else.

The water question has become a legal contest in which India declines to take part. A Court of Arbitration constituted at Pakistan's request has issued a supplemental award (June 2025), an award on general interpretation (8 August 2025), an award on maximum pondage (15 May 2026, rejected by India the next day) and, on 31 August 2026, an award on the treaty's status with interim measures concerning the Ratle project. The same day the Ministry of External Affairs rejected the latest as the work of an "illegally constituted" body without jurisdiction and said the treaty remained in abeyance. India has also left the parallel Neutral Expert proceedings it had itself sought: after the Neutral Expert declined in June 2025 to suspend them, India confirmed its withdrawal by a letter of 28 July 2025, according to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which serves as secretariat to both tracks.

Exchanges in 2026 have been rebuttals. In July India rejected remarks by Pakistan's foreign minister at the ASEAN Regional Forum and restated its condition for restoring the treaty; in September it said Pakistan must take "credible action" against cross-border terrorism before its pledges could be believed; and on 3 October it summoned Pakistan's chargé d'affaires to protest against continued facilitation of cross-border infiltration after an incident on the international border in the Ferozepur sector. In November 2026 the Ministry signalled that the Chief Minister of Punjab was unlikely to be cleared to attend a conference in Lahore, citing national policy after Pahalgam.

12UPSC syllabus connections

Syllabus lines

  1. GS-II

    India and its neighbourhood

    Official wording: “India and its neighborhood- relations.”

    Where it is taught on this platform
  2. GS-II

    Groupings and agreements

    Official wording: “Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India's interests.”

    Where it is taught on this platform
  3. Prelims

    Current events

    Official wording: “Current events of national and international importance.”

    Where it is taught on this platform

Quoted in UPSC’s official wording.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

5 questions · 2025–2026

  1. 2026 · PSIR II · Q5(b) · 10 marks

    What strategic options can India exercise as a response to the tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan ?

  2. 2026 · PSIR II · Q6(a) · 20 marks

    Accelerating of Chinese influence across South Asia is fundamentally reshaping the region’s geopolitical landscape. This is a big foreign policy challenge for India. Analyse.

  3. 2025 · PSIR II · Q5(b) · 10 marks

    Would you agree with the contention that India’s inclination to lean on a ‘more aggressive hyper-realist posture’ has gained a new momentum in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terrorist strike? Comment.

  4. 2025 · PSIR II · Q7(a) · 20 marks

    India continues to invoke its time-tested policy of strategic autonomy vis-à-vis both the United States of America and Russia by rejecting US’ offer of mediation on Kashmir issue and by refusing to criticize Russia in its ongoing war against Ukraine. Comment.

  5. 2025 · PSIR II · Q8(a) · 20 marks

    India’s reluctance to perceive any ‘existential threat’ inevitably made the multilateral path to nuclear security a ‘default option’ until it decided to cross the nuclear Rubicon in 1998. Identify and analyze some of the major reasons behind this shift in India’s position on the nuclear question.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to India and Pakistan in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    India placed the Indus Waters Treaty "in abeyance" in April 2025. Examine the legal and strategic implications of this decision, including for India's position as a downstream riparian elsewhere.

    How to approach it

    Set out the treaty's allocation and dispute mechanism; explain India's grounds (terrorism, changed circumstances, the 2023 and 2024 notices); weigh the arbitral awards India rejects; then turn to the Brahmaputra, where India is downstream of China.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    From 2016 to Operation Sindoor in 2025, India has repeatedly redrawn the threshold of military response to cross-border terrorism. Critically evaluate whether this has strengthened deterrence.

    How to approach it

    Distinguish deterrence by punishment from compellence; credit the costs imposed; then give the strongest counter-argument on escalation, nuclear risk and third-party crisis management.

  3. Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Why has the Simla Agreement remained central to India's rejection of third-party mediation on Jammu and Kashmir? Discuss in the light of recent developments.

    How to approach it

    Explain the bilateralism clause and the Line of Control; contrast Pakistan's reliance on UN resolutions; use the mediation claims of May 2025.

  4. Q4UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Discuss how the civil–military balance in Pakistan shapes the prospects of normalisation with India.

    How to approach it

    Use the record of civilian openings (1999, 2015); analyse the 27th Amendment; ask whether engagement or isolation better strengthens civilian authority.

  5. Q5UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Assess the effect of the India–Pakistan rivalry on regional cooperation, with reference to SAARC and the SCO.

    How to approach it

    Show how SAARC stalled after 2014 and why India turned to BIMSTEC; treat the SCO as a venue of contact and contest; weigh the charge of regionalism by exclusion.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

13Relevant PSIR topics

  1. Paper II · BUnit 1

    Indian Foreign Policy

    Official syllabus: “Indian Foreign Policy: Determinants of foreign policy; institutions of policy-making; continuity and change.”

  2. Paper II · BUnit 3

    India and South Asia

    Official syllabus: “India and South Asia: (a) Regional Co-operation: SAARC – past performance and future prospects. (b) South Asia as a Free Trade Area. (c) India's "Look East" policy. (d) Impediments to regional co-operation: river water disputes; illegal cross-border migration; ethnic conflicts and insurgencies; border disputes.”

  3. Paper II · BUnit 7

    India and the Nuclear Question

    Official syllabus: “India and the Nuclear Question: Changing perceptions and policy.”

  4. Paper II · A

    Key Concepts in International Relations

    Official syllabus: “Key concepts in International Relations: National interest, security and power; Balance of power and deterrence; Transnational actors and collective security; World capitalist economy and globalisation.”

Each line is quoted from the official PSIR syllabus.

Explore further

Polity & Governance

Five-minute module

Sources

  1. 01Ministry of External Affairs, India–Pakistan bilateral relations and statements (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
  2. 02Simla Agreement, 2 July 1972. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
  3. 03Indus Waters Treaty, 19 September 1960. World Bank
  4. 04'No jurisdiction': India rejects Court of Arbitration's Indus Waters ruling, says treaty remains in abeyance (opens in a new tab). The Week, 31 August 2026
  5. 05Indus Waters Treaty: India rejects latest arbitration award as null and void (opens in a new tab). The Wire
  6. 06India categorically rejects Pakistan's remarks at ASEAN forum; holds Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance (opens in a new tab). Republic World, 24 July 2026
  7. 07MEA signals Punjab CM unlikely to get clearance for Lahore event, cites Pakistan policy (opens in a new tab). ThePrint, November 2026
  8. 08The Indus Waters Treaty a year after the Pahalgam terror attack (opens in a new tab). Institute of South Asian Studies, NUS, 2026
  9. 09Pakistan's 27th constitutional amendment moves it one step closer to authoritarian rule (opens in a new tab). Chatham House, December 2025
  10. 10Pakistan president signs into law 27th constitutional amendment (opens in a new tab). Arab News Pakistan, November 2025
  11. 11What does the Pakistan–Saudi Arabia defence deal mean for India? MEA says it will study implications (opens in a new tab). The Week, 18 September 2025
  12. 12India condemns Pakistani aggression against Afghanistan (opens in a new tab). The Week, 22 September 2026
  13. 13T. V. Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World. Oxford University Press, 2014
  14. 14C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War. Oxford University Press, 2014
  15. 15A Glass Half Full: The Promise of Regional Trade in South Asia. World Bank, 2018
  16. 16Pakistan hails PCA's decision in IWT proceedings (opens in a new tab). Dawn, May 2026
  17. 17The Indus Waters Treaty: status award and interim measures (ISAS Brief 1421) (opens in a new tab). Institute of South Asian Studies, NUS, September 2026
  18. 18Pakistan SCO chairmanship for 2026–27 (opens in a new tab). Manorama Yearbook, 2 September 2026
  19. 19Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026
  20. 20Chargé d'Affaires of the Pakistan High Commission summoned by Ministry of External Affairs (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 3 October 2026
  21. 21Official Spokesperson's response to media queries on matters pertaining to the illegally constituted so-called Court of Arbitration (award on maximum pondage) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 16 May 2026
  22. 22Matters pertaining to the illegally-constituted so-called Court of Arbitration (statement of 31 August 2026) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 31 August 2026
  23. 23Indus Waters Treaty Neutral Expert Proceedings (India v. Pakistan), PCA Case No. 2023-14: case page (opens in a new tab). Permanent Court of Arbitration