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Managed thaw: Xi Jinping in New Delhi and the limits of India–China normalisation

Xi Jinping's attendance at the BRICS summit in New Delhi in September 2026, his first visit to India since 2019, capped two years of step-by-step normalisation after the 2024 disengagement in eastern Ladakh. The two governments' accounts of the leaders' meeting showed that they still differ on the most basic question: whether the boundary and the wider relationship can be kept apart.

Event: Published: Updated: By Arjun Agrawal

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12 September 2026 · 17 November 2026
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01Executive summary Facts

Xi Jinping attended the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi on 12 and 13 September 2026, his first visit to India since 2019, and met Narendra Modi on 12 September. India's readout described peace and tranquillity in the border areas as the essential basis for the relationship; China's, as reported, spoke of advancing the relationship and the boundary question in parallel and recorded Indian assurances on Taiwan and Tibet. Two weeks earlier the Special Representatives had agreed that an expert group on boundary delimitation and a working group on border management would pursue an 'early and substantial harvest', beginning with their terms of reference. The thaw is real but bounded: mechanisms meet and pilgrims and traders cross again, while the China–Pakistan military partnership and a record trade deficit persist.

02Background Facts

The relationship broke in 2020. Chinese troop deployments across the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh led to the clash in the Galwan valley on 15 June 2020, in which twenty Indian soldiers were killed, the first deaths in a clash between the two armies since 1975. India's response was both military and economic: forward deployments, a ban on many Chinese apps and tighter screening of investment from neighbouring countries. Its diplomatic position became that relations could not be normal while the border was not.

Disengagement came in stages through talks between commanders and diplomats. On 21 October 2024 India and China agreed on patrolling arrangements in Depsang and Demchok, completing disengagement from the friction points of 2020, and Modi and Xi met at the BRICS summit in Kazan on 23 October. The Special Representatives met again in December 2024, for the first time since 2019, and in New Delhi in August 2025, when the two sides agreed to reopen border trade through Lipulekh, Shipki La and Nathu La; Modi and Xi met again in Tianjin on 31 August 2025, where Modi invited Xi to the New Delhi summit. The August 2026 round was thus the third since the standoff ended. Pilgrimages to Kailash Manasarovar resumed as well.

The structural rivalry did not end. China supplied 81 per cent of Pakistan's arms imports in 2020–24, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; India's trade deficit with China reached a record of about 112 billion dollars in 2025–26, the year China became India's largest trading partner; and China began building a very large hydropower project on the Yarlung Tsangpo at Medog, upstream of the Brahmaputra, in July 2025, adding a riparian dimension to the boundary dispute.

03Political actors Facts

Prime Minister Narendra Modi
Hosted the BRICS summit and framed normalisation as conditional on peace in the border areas and on the 'three mutuals' of respect, sensitivity and interest.
President Xi Jinping
Made his first visit to India since 2019 and, in China's account, presented the boundary as one track of a relationship to be advanced in parallel.
Special Representatives Ajit Doval and Wang Yi
Lead the boundary negotiation through the mechanism created in 2003; their August 2026 round in Beijing tasked an expert group on delimitation and a working group on border management.
Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination
The diplomatic mechanism established by an agreement of 17 January 2012, under which the new groups will operate.
BRICS partners, notably Russia and Brazil
Provided the multilateral setting that allowed a leaders' meeting without a separate bilateral visit, and joined the New Delhi Declaration.
Pakistan and the United States
Third parties whose relations with China and India, respectively, shape the limits of any India–China accommodation.

04Timeline Facts

  1. 7 September 1993

    India and China sign the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control.

  2. 11 April 2005

    India and China sign the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the settlement of the boundary question.

  3. 17 January 2012

    An agreement establishes the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India–China Border Affairs.

  4. 15 June 2020

    Clash in the Galwan valley; twenty Indian soldiers are killed.

  5. 21 October 2024

    India and China agree on patrolling arrangements in Depsang and Demchok.

  6. 23 October 2024

    Modi and Xi meet at the BRICS summit in Kazan.

  7. 31 August 2025

    Modi and Xi meet in Tianjin on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit.

  8. 25 August 2026

    The Special Representatives hold their 25th round of boundary talks in Beijing.

  9. 12 September 2026

    Modi and Xi meet in New Delhi; the BRICS New Delhi Declaration is adopted.

  10. 22 October 2026

    The Director General of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police says Indian and Chinese troops have faced off at several locations in Arunachal Pradesh; the Ministry of External Affairs responds on 23 October and China's foreign ministry on 26 October.

05Main developments

What happened Facts

India hosted the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi on 12 and 13 September 2026. President Xi Jinping attended, making his first visit to India since 2019, and the two leaders met on the sidelines on 12 September, their third meeting since October 2024 after Kazan and Tianjin.

India's account of the meeting said that the leaders welcomed steady progress since Tianjin, that differences should not become disputes, and that Modi wanted ties guided by 'three mutuals': mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interest. Modi emphasised that peace and tranquillity in the border areas remain an essential basis for the continued development of relations and that existing agreements on border issues must be observed; both leaders committed themselves to a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable resolution of the boundary question. On trade, they underlined the need to address each other's concerns, including the structural trade imbalance and supply-chain issues. China's readout, as reported, spoke of handling the relationship and the boundary question in parallel and of not letting the boundary define the relationship, and stated that India's position on Taiwan and Tibet was unchanged and that India would not allow anti-China activities on its territory; the MEA spokesperson confirmed that Taiwan and Tibet had come up.

The summit adopted the BRICS New Delhi Declaration. Its 140 paragraphs called for maximum restraint in West Asia while 'recalling our respective national positions', condemned unilateral coercive measures without naming any country, condemned the terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir of 22 April 2025, recorded that China and Russia support the aspirations of Brazil and India to play a greater role in the United Nations, including its Security Council, and extended full support to China's chairship of BRICS in 2027.

The visit followed the 25th round of talks between the Special Representatives on the boundary question, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in Beijing on 25 August 2026. Both sides described the talks as a candid and in-depth exchange of views. An eight-point outcome released the next day committed them to advancing negotiations on a framework for a settlement in accordance with the 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters; tasked an Expert Group on Boundary Delimitation and a Working Group on Border Management, under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination, to pursue an 'early and substantial harvest', starting with their terms of reference; added two meeting points for senior military commanders and two hotline channels in the Eastern and Middle Sectors; welcomed the reopening of the three designated border trading points; and fixed the 26th round for India in 2027.

What changed Facts

  1. Leaders' meeting in India. Modi and Xi met in New Delhi on 12 September 2026, their third meeting since October 2024, with India stressing border peace as the basis of ties.
  2. Delimitation back on the agenda. The 25th Special Representatives' round tasked an Expert Group on Boundary Delimitation and a Working Group on Border Management to pursue an 'early and substantial harvest', beginning with terms of reference.
  3. Border management measures. Two new meeting points for senior military commanders and two new hotline channels were agreed; the 26th round is due in India in 2027.
  4. Divergent readouts. India's account put the border first and the 'three mutuals'; China's, as reported, put the boundary and the relationship in parallel and cited Indian assurances on Taiwan and Tibet.
  5. BRICS text. The New Delhi Declaration condemned the Pahalgam attack, repeated China's and Russia's support for Brazil's and India's aspirations to a greater role in the United Nations, and backed China's chairship in 2027.
  6. Friction in the eastern sector. On 22 October 2026 the Director General of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police said that Indian and Chinese troops had faced off at several locations in Arunachal Pradesh and that the situation was continuing. The Ministry of External Affairs said the next day that the border areas are disturbed from time to time when Chinese forces diverge from established patrolling patterns, and that the two sides use diplomatic and military channels to address such issues; on 26 October China's foreign ministry said its forces conduct routine patrols and abide by the bilateral agreements. Six weeks after the New Delhi meeting, the thaw had not removed friction along the LAC.

Why it matters Analysis

The thaw is real but bounded. Since October 2024 the relationship has moved from crisis management to managed coexistence: leaders meet, mechanisms meet, pilgrims and traders cross. What has not changed is the order of priorities. India's readout put the border first, as a basis for everything else; China's, as reported, put the relationship and the boundary side by side. That difference is not semantic. If the boundary is a precondition, India retains leverage over the pace of normalisation; if it is one track among several, China can bank economic and diplomatic gains while the boundary question waits.

The boundary negotiation itself shows a modest shift. An expert group charged with an 'early and substantial harvest' on delimitation suggests that both sides are again prepared to discuss where the boundary should lie, not only how to prevent clashes along an undefined line. But the Special Representatives' mechanism has existed since 2003, and the eight-point outcome still speaks of advancing negotiations on a framework for a settlement two decades after the 2005 parameters. Agreeing terms of reference is a beginning, not a breakthrough.

The summit also showed how multilateral settings carry bilateral diplomacy. BRICS allowed Xi to come to India without the political weight of a state visit, and allowed India, as chair, to secure an agreed text despite visible divisions among members, as the declaration's reliance on 'respective national positions' on West Asia shows. The language on India's United Nations aspirations had symbolic value, but it repeats wording China and Russia had accepted in the 2022 Beijing declaration.

06India’s interests Analysis

India's first interest is a stable Line of Actual Control that frees military resources and removes the risk of a two-front crisis involving China and Pakistan together. Its second is economic: access to inputs and, selectively, investment, without dependence that China could exploit. Its third is diplomatic: keeping BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as forums in which India's voice counts, while preserving the partnership with the United States that underpins its technology and defence ambitions.

These interests are best served by conditional engagement: steady talks on the boundary, practical cooperation where it is low-risk, and economic openness calibrated to security. The test of the New Delhi meeting will be whether the new expert group and working group agree terms of reference and whether de-escalation follows disengagement.

07Institutional analysis

Institutional implications Analysis

India–China boundary management rests on a layered set of agreements: the 1993 agreement on peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control, the 1996 agreement on military confidence-building measures, the 2005 political parameters and the 2013 border defence cooperation agreement. The crisis of 2020 showed that these instruments assumed restraint they could not enforce. The post-2024 approach adds negotiated patrolling arrangements at specific points and, from August 2026, more meeting points and hotlines between commanders.

On the Indian side, the boundary negotiation is led from the Prime Minister's Office through the National Security Adviser in his role as Special Representative, with the Ministry of External Affairs managing the Working Mechanism and the wider relationship. The concentration of the file at the top of government gives India's China policy coherence, but also makes it sensitive to leaders' assessments of the overall strategic environment, including relations with the United States.

BRICS itself is an institution without a secretariat or binding commitments; its declarations record positions rather than create obligations. Its value to India lies in voice and convening power among major non-Western states, which is why India's chairship in a divided year mattered.

08Theoretical perspectives Analysis

Offensive realism, as developed by John Mearsheimer, predicts intense security competition between a rising great power and its neighbours, since each seeks to maximise relative power under uncertainty. The absence of any agreement to de-escalate the forces both sides moved forward after 2020, and the durability of the China–Pakistan partnership, fit that expectation. On this reading the thaw is a pause in competition, chosen by both sides because each faces more pressing challenges elsewhere.

The liberal tradition offers a different account. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's complex interdependence holds that dense economic and social ties raise the cost of conflict and multiply channels of contact. Yet India's experience of supply-chain dependence also illustrates what Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman call weaponised interdependence (2019): networks that bind states can become instruments of leverage for the state at their centre.

The divergence between the two readouts can be read through Qin Yaqing's relational theory of world politics (2018), which treats relationships rather than discrete issues as the basic unit of international life and favours managing a relationship over resolving a dispute. India's position draws instead on an older logic familiar from Kautilya's mandala: the neighbour is the natural rival, and the neighbour's ally a concern, so the frontier is never only one issue among many.

How the different sides read it

Indian strategic community (border first)

Normalisation without a settled or at least stable border rewards China for the 2020 crisis. Sceptics note that disengagement at friction points is not the same as de-escalation of the large forces both sides moved forward after 2020, and India's Deputy Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen Rahul R. Singh, said in July 2025 that China had given Pakistan live inputs during the conflict of May 2025. India should keep economic openness to China conditional and calibrated.

Chinese official perspective

The boundary is a question left over from history that should not be allowed to define the relationship. Two large developing countries gain more as partners than as rivals, and the relationship should advance on trade, investment and multilateral cooperation while the boundary is negotiated in parallel.

Economic pragmatists in India

India's manufacturing ambitions depend on components, machinery and inputs that China supplies at scale, and selective easing of investment restrictions could support jobs and exports. On this view, a stable relationship with China is an economic necessity, especially when tariffs from the United States have made export markets less predictable.

Advocates of multi-alignment

A managed thaw with China widens India's room for manoeuvre without abandoning its partnership with the United States or the Quad. India's interest is to be indispensable to several centres of power and dependent on none, and engagement with China through BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is part of that hedge.

09Critical evaluation Analysis

The New Delhi meeting settles that normalisation has survived two years of practical steps and a leader's visit to India. It does not settle the order of priorities. The two readouts point in different directions on exactly that question, and India's account said nothing of the Taiwan and Tibet assurances that China's recorded.

The boundary process shows a modest shift, but its limits are plain. Terms of reference are a beginning; the 2005 parameters have not yet yielded an agreed framework; and the eight-point outcome of August 2026 says nothing about de-escalation of the forces both sides moved forward after 2020.

The strongest objection to the thaw is that it rewards China for 2020 without de-escalation, while China's military support for Pakistan, described by India's own Army in July 2025, continues. The strongest objection to scepticism is economic: India's manufacturing depends on Chinese inputs, the trade deficit reached a record in 2025–26, and a managed relationship is the precondition for reducing that dependence on India's terms rather than China's.

10What could happen next Analysis

Analysis, not fact · scenarios and signposts, not predictions

The thaw has mechanisms but not a settlement, and its direction will show first in the boundary talks and along the Line of Actual Control.

  • If the Expert Group on Boundary Delimitation and the Working Group on Border Management agree their terms of reference and begin substantive work, then the 'early and substantial harvest' will have moved from aspiration to process, and the next round of Special Representatives' talks, due to be held in India, will have something concrete to review.
  • If face-offs of the kind reported in Arunachal Pradesh in October 2026 recur or escalate, then India's position that peace in the border areas is the basis of the relationship will be tested in practice, and economic normalisation is likely to slow.
  • If India selectively eases its screening of Chinese investment while the trade deficit keeps widening, then the economic pragmatists' case will have prevailed in policy, and the question will become whether openness reduces dependence or deepens it.
  • If India's relations with the United States sour again, then New Delhi's incentive to sustain the thaw rises; if they improve, the thaw may matter more to Beijing than to New Delhi.

Indicators to watch: meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination and their readouts; any agreement on de-escalation of forces, not only disengagement; patrolling incidents in the eastern sector; changes to India's rules on investment from neighbouring countries; monthly trade data; and how each side's readouts treat Taiwan, Tibet and the boundary.

11Concepts and thinkers

12UPSC GS-II connection Syllabus

13PSIR Paper II connection Syllabus

14IB Global Politics connection Syllabus

15Potential examination questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    India and China now disagree less about whether to normalise their relationship than about how normalisation relates to the boundary. Discuss with reference to the September 2026 summit.

    How to approach it

    Contrast the two readouts; explain why the sequencing matters for leverage; assess the August 2026 Special Representatives' outcome; conclude on what conditional engagement requires.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Describe the principal mechanisms for managing the India–China boundary question. How far have they succeeded since 2020?

    How to approach it

    List the agreements of 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013 and the Special Representatives and Working Mechanism; note the failure of 2020, the October 2024 patrolling arrangements and the August 2026 expert group on delimitation.

  3. Q3PSIR style20 marks

    Analyse India's approach to China through the lenses of realism and complex interdependence.

    How to approach it

    Apply offensive realism and complex interdependence in turn, using the border, the China–Pakistan partnership, trade dependence and BRICS; show what each explains and misses; consider weaponised interdependence as a bridge.

  4. Q4Discussion

    To what extent does economic interdependence restrain conflict between rising powers?

    How to approach it

    Use India and China as the principal case; weigh evidence of restraint (summitry, trade, multilateral cooperation) against evidence of persistent rivalry (deployments, supply-chain leverage); reach a qualified judgement.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

16Sources

Primary and official documents first. Every factual claim was checked against these on 20 November 2026.

Primary and official sources

  1. 01PrimaryBRICS New Delhi Declaration: Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 12 September 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
  2. 02PrimaryEight Points of Outcomes and Consensus for the 25th round of Talks between Special Representatives of India and China on the Boundary Question (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 26 August 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
  3. 03PrimaryAgreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question (2005) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 11 April 2005 · consulted 19 November 2026
  4. 04PrimaryIndia-China Agreement on the Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (2012) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 17 January 2012 · consulted 19 November 2026
  5. 05OfficialPrime Minister's bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping (12 September 2026) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 12 September 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
  6. 06Official25th Round of the Special Representatives Talks on the India-China Boundary Question (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 25 August 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
  7. 07OfficialTranscript of Special Press Briefing on the 18th BRICS Summit (13 September 2026) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 13 September 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
  8. 08OfficialPrime Minister's bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping (Tianjin, 31 August 2025) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 31 August 2025 · consulted 19 November 2026
  9. 09OfficialMeeting of Prime Minister with President Xi Jinping on the margins of the 16th BRICS Summit (Kazan, 23 October 2024) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 23 October 2024 · consulted 19 November 2026
  10. 10OfficialLok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 5714: Patrolling arrangement along LAC (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 4 April 2025 · consulted 19 November 2026
  11. 11OfficialLok Sabha Unstarred Question No. 1227: Status and safeguards of border trade (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 6 February 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
  12. 12OfficialPresident Xi Jinping meets with Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Chinese readout) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 13 September 2026

Supporting sources

  1. 01ScholarshipTrends in International Arms Transfers, 2024 (fact sheet) (opens in a new tab). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2025
  2. 02Press reportModi-Xi meet at BRICS summit: Chinese leader calls ties 'worth cherishing' (opens in a new tab). The Wire, September 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
  3. 03Press reportModi-Xi meeting: India, China readouts differ on border dispute link (opens in a new tab). Outlook, September 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
  4. 04Press reportPM Modi told President Xi that India, China should show sensitivity to each other's core concerns: MEA (opens in a new tab). Morung Express (PTI), September 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
  5. 05Press reportChina used Op Sindoor as live lab to test weapons: Army deputy chief (opens in a new tab). The Tribune, 4 July 2025 · consulted 19 November 2026
  6. 06Press reportChina surpasses US as India's largest trading partner in FY26; trade gap swells to USD 112.16 bn (opens in a new tab). ThePrint (PTI), April 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
  7. 07Press reportChina's Brahmaputra dam and India's concerns (Medog groundbreaking, July 2025) (opens in a new tab). Business Standard, 22 July 2025 · consulted 19 November 2026
  8. 08Press report20 Indian troops dead after clashes with Chinese soldiers near border (opens in a new tab). NPR, 16 June 2020 · consulted 19 November 2026
  9. 09Press reportIndia's imports from China rise to US$65.49 billion in April–August 2026-27 (opens in a new tab). Business Today, 15 September 2026
  10. 10Press reportITBP chief confirms Chinese incursions in Arunachal amid rising frontier tensions (opens in a new tab). Business Today, 23 October 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
  11. 11Press reportChinese troops periodically disturb situation along India–China LAC: MEA (opens in a new tab). Business Standard, 23 October 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
  12. 12Press reportChina has abided by relevant agreements: Chinese foreign ministry issues statement on reported face-off in Arunachal Pradesh (opens in a new tab). Republic World, 26 October 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
  13. 13Press reportIndia–China border face-offs test Modi six years after deadly clash (opens in a new tab). Al Jazeera, 27 October 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026

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