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Case study · Global · 2016–present

The WTO Appellate Body impasse

Since December 2019 the WTO’s appeals body has been unable to hear cases because appointments have been blocked; the episode shows how an institution can be disabled by procedure rather than abolished.

The case

The World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (1995) created a two-tier system. Panels hear disputes, and a standing Appellate Body of seven members, serving four-year terms renewable once, hears appeals on points of law. Members appoint Appellate Body members by consensus in the Dispute Settlement Body, and a panel report that has been appealed cannot be adopted until the appeal is decided. For two decades it was one of the busiest systems of international adjudication, and developing countries won cases against far larger economies.

Successive US administrations objected to how the Appellate Body worked: that it exceeded the 90-day limit for appeals, let members finish cases after their terms expired, issued opinions not needed to resolve disputes, treated its reports as precedent and, above all, created obligations members had never accepted, notably in cases on trade remedies and subsidies. The United States blocked the reappointment of one member in 2016 and, from 2017, all appointments. The Appellate Body lost its quorum in December 2019 and has had no members since November 2020. A proposal to launch selection processes, backed by around 130 members, has been blocked at successive meetings of the Dispute Settlement Body.

Since then a losing party can appeal a panel report ‘into the void’, leaving it unadopted. The EU, China and other members created the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) in 2020 as a substitute among its participants, around 60 WTO members by 2026, but the United States and India have not joined. Ministers at the 12th Ministerial Conference in 2022 committed to a fully functioning system by 2024, a target that was missed. The 14th Ministerial Conference, held in Yaoundé in March 2026, did not restore the Appellate Body, and reform discussions were returned to Geneva under the Dispute Settlement Body.

Actors and stakeholders

  • United StatesWTO member

    Role

    Blocks appointments and argues that reform must come before any restoration. It has itself appealed adverse panel reports into the void, including rulings in 2022 on its steel and aluminium tariffs.

    Power and its sources

    Institutional power: the consensus rule gives it an effective veto over appointments. Market power: as the largest import market it can bear the costs of a weaker system longer than most members.

  • European UnionSupranational WTO member

    Role

    A leading architect of the MPIA and of proposals to restore two-tier adjudication. In 2021 it amended its own enforcement regulation so that it can retaliate when a partner appeals into the void.

    Power and its sources

    Market and regulatory power, and the coalition-building capacity to create a parallel institution.

  • ChinaWTO member

    Role

    Participates in the MPIA and defends binding adjudication, while being the respondent in many disputes over subsidies and trade remedies whose rulings fed US objections.

    Power and its sources

    Economic weight as the largest trader in goods; an interest in a system that constrains unilateral measures against it.

  • IndiaWTO member

    Role

    Favours restoring the Appellate Body for all members rather than a club alternative and has not joined the MPIA. It has also appealed panel reports into the void, including in a dispute over its sugar subsidies.

    Power and its sources

    Leadership among developing members and blocking power in consensus-based negotiations.

  • Developing and smaller membersCoalition of states

    Role

    Back the proposal to launch selection. They depend most on rules-based adjudication to discipline larger trading partners.

    Power and its sources

    Numbers and legitimacy, but little leverage when a large member withholds consensus.

Through the key concepts

interdependence

Dispute settlement is a public good in an interdependent trading system: it lets members resolve disputes through rules rather than retaliation and makes commitments credible. Without binding appeals, disputes drift back towards bilateral bargaining, where differences in market size decide outcomes. The episode coincides with states re-engineering interdependence through security exceptions, export controls and subsidies, and the absence of an appellate check lowers the legal cost of doing so.

power

The case is a textbook example of Lukes’s second dimension and of what Barnett and Duvall call institutional power. No treaty was torn up and no vote was taken: one member used a consensus rule to starve an institution of judges. The most egalitarian decision rule protects whoever benefits from the status quo. Strange’s point applies too: a leading power that built an institution can reshape it by withdrawing support.

legitimacy

The US complaint is a legitimacy argument: that appointed adjudicators created obligations states never accepted, an input deficit. Defenders reply that the Appellate Body’s output legitimacy, consistent rulings that let small states win against large ones, was its justification. The MPIA tries to rebuild legitimacy by consent among willing members, but as a club it lacks the universality that gave the original system its authority.

sovereignty

The impasse revives the tension between binding adjudication and sovereign autonomy. The United States argues that it never consented to the interpretations the Appellate Body adopted; the system’s defenders reply that accepting compulsory jurisdiction in 1995 was itself an exercise of sovereignty. Security exceptions sharpen the question: in 2019 a panel in the Russia – Traffic in Transit dispute held that the national security exception is not entirely self-judging.

Perspectives

United States

The Appellate Body overreached, disregarded its own rules and imposed obligations members never negotiated, and WTO rules are poorly suited to non-market economies. Restoring it unchanged would reward that conduct.

European Union and MPIA participants

Binding two-tier adjudication is the core of a rules-based trading system. An interim arrangement among willing members preserves the rule of law until the full system returns.

India and many developing members

Dispute settlement matters most to weaker members, so it should be restored for everyone rather than replaced by a club, and its restoration should not be traded for concessions in other negotiations.

Realist reading

Institutions survive only while the most powerful members find them useful. The impasse shows a leading power reclaiming freedom of action as its relative position changed.

Evaluation

The impasse is the best case in the syllabus of an institution disabled by procedure rather than abolished. Its lesson cuts against two easy conclusions. Against the claim that the WTO is dead: panels still sit, most members comply with rulings they do not appeal, and the MPIA shows members building governance by consent when the universal route is blocked. Against the claim that the problem is purely American obstruction: concerns about overreach and procedure have been shared in part by other members, and a perceived legitimacy deficit can disable an institution as surely as a veto.

The judgement that best fits the evidence is that the trading system has moved from rule-based adjudication towards a hybrid, in which law still structures most disputes but the most powerful members can opt out of final judgment. Whether that is a pause or a lasting change depends on reform talks that the Yaoundé conference left unresolved.

Questions to take further

  • Can an institution remain legitimate if any member can disable it by withholding consent?
  • Does the MPIA strengthen the rule of law in trade or fragment it?
  • Who loses most when binding appeals disappear, and why?
  • Was the Appellate Body’s record of results a sufficient answer to the charge that it exceeded its mandate?

Sources

  1. 01Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 2, 1994)
  2. 02Office of the United States Trade Representative, Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, February 2020
  3. 03World Trade Organization, MC12 Outcome Document (June 2022), June 2022
  4. 04Regulation (EU) 2021/167 amending Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 on the exercise of the Union’s rights to enforce international trade rules, February 2021
  5. 05World Economic Forum, ‘MC14 in Yaoundé: What the WTO delivered, what it did not, and why it matters’ (opens in a new tab), April 2026