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Political Issue Dossier · South-East Asia and the Indo-Pacific

The South China Sea

Six governments claim features in the South China Sea, one of the world's busiest maritime corridors. A 2016 arbitral award under the Law of the Sea Convention rejected China's claim to historic rights within the dashed line; China rejects the award, ASEAN and China are still negotiating a code of conduct, and outside powers including India now cite the award in their joint statements. The dossier reads the dispute as a contest between law, power and regional diplomacy.

At a glance

Region
South-East Asia and the Indo-Pacific
Countries most involved
China, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, United States, India
Facts checked to
Mapped
7 actors, 4 stakeholders, 13 dated events
Sources
14 · 11 primary or official
Syllabus lines
UPSC 4 · PSIR 7 · IB 6
How it is examined

The central question

What a reader should be able to answer by the end of the dossier.

Can the law of the sea, regional diplomacy or the balance of power settle the competing claims in the South China Sea, and why has India, which is not a claimant, moved from cautious neutrality to endorsing the 2016 arbitral award?

Contents 19 sections
  1. 01Locator map
  2. 02Background
  3. 03Geography
  4. 04Historical development
  5. 05Actor map
  6. 06Stakeholder map
  7. 07Institutional framework
  8. 08Legal framework
  9. 09Timeline
  10. 10Competing narratives
  11. 11Theories applied
  12. 12Political consequences
  13. 13India’s position
  14. 14Possible solutions
  15. 15Critical evaluation
  16. 16Examination applications
  17. 17Practice questions
  18. 18Sources
  19. 19Connected knowledge

How to read the labels

Facts
Sourced statements of fact.
Attributed
Positions and proposals, in the terms of those who hold them.
Analysis
The platform’s reading of the evidence.
Examination
How the issue maps to the syllabi.

01Locator mapFacts

INDONESIAVIETNAMTHAILANDMYANMARLAOS12345678Scarborough ShoalSecond Thomas ShoalMischief ReefFiery Cross ReefWoody IslandNatuna IslandsManilaStrait of Malacca
Countries most involved: China, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, United States, IndiaPlaces named in the dossier
  1. 1. Scarborough Shoal

    Claimed by China, the Philippines and Taiwan; China has controlled access since a 2012 stand-off, which prompted the Philippines' arbitration.

  2. 2. Second Thomas Shoal

    The 2016 tribunal found it a low-tide elevation within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone; China claims it, and resupply missions to a grounded Philippine vessel there have been repeatedly blocked.

  3. 3. Mischief Reef

    Occupied by China since 1995 and built into an artificial island; the tribunal found it a low-tide elevation within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone.

  4. 4. Fiery Cross Reef

    A Spratly feature claimed by several states, turned by China into an artificial island with an airstrip.

  5. 5. Woody Island, Paracel Islands

    The largest of the Paracels and China's main base there; China has controlled the whole group since a 1974 clash with South Vietnam, and Vietnam and Taiwan also claim it.

  6. 6. Natuna Islands

    Indonesian islands; Indonesia claims no disputed features but rejects any overlap of the dashed line with its exclusive economic zone to their north.

  7. 7. Manila

    Capital of the Philippines, which chaired ASEAN in 2026 and hosted the East Asia Summit and a Quad leaders' meeting in November 2026.

  8. 8. Strait of Malacca

    The chokepoint linking the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean, through which much of India's trade with East Asia passes.

Boundaries are from Natural Earth’s India point-of-view data and are approximate at this scale; the map is a teaching aid and does not purport to be an authoritative depiction of international boundaries. Markers that would overlap are drawn apart, with a line to the true position.

02BackgroundFacts

The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea bordered by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam. It contains hundreds of small features, most of them reefs, rocks and shoals, grouped mainly in the Paracel and Spratly Islands, along with fisheries, possible hydrocarbon reserves and sea lanes that carry a large share of world trade. Two kinds of dispute overlap there. One is about sovereignty over land features, which international law decides by title and occupation. The other is about maritime entitlements, the zones of sea and seabed that features and coasts generate under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982.

China claims sovereignty over the features and asserts rights within a dashed line that first appeared on a map published by the Republic of China in 1947 and was circulated by the People's Republic to the United Nations in 2009. Vietnam claims the Paracels and Spratlys; the Philippines claims part of the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal; Malaysia and Brunei claim features or waters in the south; Taiwan's claims mirror Beijing's. Indonesia is not a claimant to features, but its exclusive economic zone off the Natuna Islands overlaps the dashed line.

In 2016 a tribunal constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS, in a case brought by the Philippines, held that China had no legal basis to claim historic rights to resources within the dashed line beyond those UNCLOS provides, and found that none of the Spratly features could generate an exclusive economic zone. China refused to take part and rejects the award. The site's IB case study analyses the arbitration and its aftermath in detail; this dossier sets the case in its legal, regional and Indian context.

03GeographyFacts

The sea's geography makes its disputes unusually hard. Its features are small, scattered and often submerged at high tide, and under UNCLOS their legal status depends on physical character: a low-tide elevation generates no territorial sea of its own, a rock that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life generates a twelve-mile territorial sea but no exclusive economic zone, and only a fully entitled island generates a 200-mile zone and continental shelf. Large-scale land reclamation by China since 2013 has changed the features' appearance but not, in the tribunal's view, their legal status.

The coasts of the littoral states generate exclusive economic zones that overlap one another and the dashed line. The Philippines' zone extends west of Palawan into the Spratlys; Vietnam's runs along its long coastline into the central sea; Malaysia's and Brunei's extend north from Borneo; and Indonesia's runs north of the Natunas. Much of the sea's fishing and potential seabed resources lie in these overlapping areas.

The sea is also a thoroughfare. It links the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean to the East China Sea and the Pacific, so the freedom of navigation of every trading state, including India, depends on how its waters are governed. The Paracels in the north and the Spratlys in the south have been the main sites of confrontation: China has administered the Paracels since 1974 and occupies several Spratly features, some converted into artificial islands with runways, while the Philippines maintains a grounded naval vessel at Second Thomas Shoal and Vietnam occupies more Spratly features than any other claimant.

04Historical developmentFacts

Claims to the islands long predate modern law of the sea, but the present dispute took shape after 1945. The Republic of China's 1947 map showed an eleven-dash line, later reduced to nine; South Vietnam and then a unified Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia advanced competing claims as the region decolonised. China seized the western Paracels from South Vietnam in a clash in January 1974, completing its control of the group, and clashed with Vietnam again in the Spratlys in 1988.

UNCLOS, adopted in 1982 and in force from 1994, created exclusive economic zones and compulsory dispute settlement, but left questions of sovereignty over land to general international law. China ratified it in 1996 and in 2006 made a declaration under Article 298 excluding maritime delimitation and some other disputes from compulsory procedures. In 2002 China and ASEAN signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, a non-binding commitment to self-restraint, and agreed to work towards a code of conduct. In 2009, responding to submissions by Malaysia and Vietnam on their continental shelves, China circulated the nine-dash map to the UN.

After China took control of Scarborough Shoal in a 2012 stand-off, the Philippines began arbitration in January 2013. The tribunal ruled on jurisdiction in 2015 and on the merits on 12 July 2016. Under President Duterte the Philippines set the award aside for engagement with Beijing; under President Marcos Jr. it has made the award central to its diplomacy, while confrontations at Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal have escalated. ASEAN and China adopted a framework for the code in 2017 and a single draft negotiating text in 2018, and set themselves a target of concluding the code in 2026. India's language has moved in step with these events: from 'noting' the award in 2016 to calling it 'final and binding' in 2025.

05Actor mapFactsAttributed

Who acts on the issue, grouped by kind around it. Each actor’s role is a matter of record; a stated position is the actor’s own.

States6

  • China

    Stated positionThe award is null and void; disputes should be settled by the parties directly concerned

    Claims sovereignty over the features and rights within the dashed line, rejects the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction and award, and asserts control through its coast guard, maritime militia and fortified artificial islands.

  • Philippines

    Stated positionThe award is final and binding

    Brought and won the 2016 arbitration; under President Marcos Jr. publicises confrontations at sea, deepens alliances and partnerships, and chaired ASEAN in 2026.

  • Vietnam

    Stated positionUNCLOS is the comprehensive legal framework; a binding code of conduct

    Claims the Paracels and Spratlys and occupies the largest number of Spratly features; it has hosted Indian oil and gas exploration for decades.

  • United States

    Stated positionFreedom of navigation and overflight under international law

    Conducts freedom-of-navigation operations against what it regards as excessive maritime claims, supports the award and is the Philippines' treaty ally; it is not a party to UNCLOS.

  • Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia

    Malaysia and Brunei claim features or waters in the southern sea and prefer quiet diplomacy; Indonesia rejects the dashed line's overlap with its exclusive economic zone without claiming features.

  • India

    Stated positionFreedom of navigation, UNCLOS, peaceful settlement, and a code that does not prejudice third parties

    A non-claimant with trade, energy and strategic interests, partnerships with Vietnam and the Philippines and membership of the Quad. Its statements have moved from noting the award to endorsing it.

International organisation1

  • Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

    Stated positionSelf-restraint under the 2002 Declaration and an effective code of conduct

    Negotiates the code of conduct with China. Its consensus rule means that members with close ties to Beijing can soften collective positions, while its claimant members press for a binding code.

06Stakeholder mapAnalysis

Who has a stake in the outcome, and what it is, placed by how much influence each has over the result. The placing is the dossier’s assessment.

Influence

High

No stakeholder is placed in this band.

Influence

Medium

  • Trading and shipping states, including Japan, South Korea, India and the European Union

    Unimpeded navigation and stable sea lanes. Influence is medium: they shape diplomatic language and naval presence but cannot settle the underlying claims.

  • Energy companies, including India's ONGC Videsh

    Secure rights to explore and produce in disputed or overlapping zones. Influence is medium: their projects create facts and diplomatic stakes, but they are vulnerable to coercion against operations.

  • ASEAN's non-claimant members

    Regional stability and economic ties with China. Influence is medium to high within ASEAN, because consensus lets any member moderate collective statements, but low at sea.

Influence

Low

  • Fishing communities of the littoral states

    Access to traditional fishing grounds, such as Scarborough Shoal, now subject to coast guard control and confrontation. Influence is low: they bear the costs of grey-zone pressure without a voice in negotiations.

07Institutional frameworkFacts

Four institutional frameworks govern the sea, none of them decisively.

UNCLOS defines maritime zones and creates compulsory dispute settlement in Part XV, with Annex VII arbitration as the default forum. Under Article 288(4) a tribunal decides its own jurisdiction, and under Article 296 its decisions are final and binding on the parties. But UNCLOS does not decide sovereignty over land, allows states to exclude some categories of dispute under Article 298, and has no enforcement mechanism.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration served as registry for the 2016 arbitration, as it does for the Indus Waters arbitration; it administers proceedings but enforces nothing.

ASEAN provides the regional framework: the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, the code of conduct negotiations, and forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, where outside powers including India sit with China. ASEAN's consensus rule protects its unity but limits what it can say.

Minilateral and bilateral frameworks have grown alongside. The Quad's foreign ministers, meeting in New Delhi in May 2026, called the award 'a significant milestone and the basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties'; the United States and the Philippines are treaty allies; and the Philippines has built partnerships with Japan, Australia and India, including an India–Japan–Philippines Track 1.5 trilateral dialogue first held in October 2026. These frameworks raise the costs of coercion but also feed China's argument that outside powers are internationalising a regional dispute.

09TimelineFacts

  1. The Republic of China publishes a map with an eleven-dash line, the origin of today's dashed-line claim.

  2. China takes control of the Paracel Islands after a clash with South Vietnam.

  3. UNCLOS is adopted; it enters into force in 1994.

  4. China and ASEAN sign the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.

  5. China circulates the nine-dash map to the UN in response to Malaysian and Vietnamese continental-shelf submissions.

  6. The Philippines institutes arbitration against China under Annex VII of UNCLOS.

  7. The tribunal issues its award; India notes it and calls for respect for UNCLOS.

  8. ASEAN and China adopt a framework for a code of conduct.

  9. India and the Philippines call for adherence to UNCLOS and the 2016 award in a joint statement.

  10. India protests China's 2023 'standard map' as laying claim to Indian territory.

  11. India and the Philippines establish a strategic partnership, calling the award 'final and binding'.

  12. Quad foreign ministers in New Delhi call the award a significant milestone and the basis for resolving disputes.

  13. The East Asia Summit in Manila reaffirms freedom of navigation under UNCLOS; Quad leaders meet in Manila.

10Competing narrativesAttributed

Each narrative in its holders’ own terms, and attributed to them. A strong answer weighs them against each other rather than adopting one.

01

Historic rights and sovereignty

Held byGovernment of China

China's sovereignty over the islands and its rights in the surrounding waters rest on long historical use and were established before UNCLOS. The arbitration concerned sovereignty and delimitation, which China excluded from compulsory procedures in 2006, so the tribunal had no jurisdiction and its award is null and void. Disputes should be resolved by negotiation between the states directly concerned, and outside powers should not interfere.

02

The rule of law at sea

Held bythe Philippines and Vietnam

UNCLOS is the comprehensive legal framework for the oceans, and the award has authoritatively settled that historic-rights claims beyond it have no legal basis. For the Philippines the award is final and binding and a test of whether law protects smaller states; Vietnam, without endorsing the arbitration in the same terms, insists on UNCLOS, non-militarisation and a binding code.

03

ASEAN centrality and managed disagreement

Held byASEAN as an organisation

The region's peace depends on keeping disputes from escalating while economic ties with China deepen. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties and the code of conduct negotiations are the path to managing the disputes, and ASEAN must remain the centre of regional architecture rather than a battleground for outside powers.

04

Freedom of navigation

Held bythe United States, the Quad and other maritime powers

Excessive maritime claims threaten the navigational rights of all states, so they must be contested in practice as well as in law. Quad statements oppose 'dangerous and coercive actions', including the unsafe use of water cannons and the militarisation of disputed features, and support the award as the basis for peaceful settlement.

11Theories appliedAnalysis

Each theory is applied to the case, not merely defined.

01Offensive realism

John Mearsheimer predicts that a rising great power will seek hegemony in its own region and push rival powers out of it, as the United States did in the Western Hemisphere. Applied here, China's island-building, coast guard presence and rejection of the award are moves to establish regional primacy, and American and allied naval activity is balancing. The theory explains the trajectory since 2012 but under-predicts China's investment in contesting the award's legitimacy, which a purely power-based strategy would not need.

02Compliance and reputation in international law

Abram and Antonia Chayes argued that states comply with international law mostly through managed processes of justification, while Andrew Guzman stressed reputation as a cost of violation. The award has produced little compliance on the water, but China's sustained effort to deny the tribunal's legitimacy, and the spread of the award into joint statements by India, Japan, the Quad and others, suggest that the reputational cost is real. Law here works by shaping the terms of argument rather than by compelling behaviour.

03Relational theory

Qin Yaqing's relational theory holds that Chinese foreign policy understands order as the management of relationships rather than the application of rules to discrete actors. On this reading, China's preference for bilateral negotiation and its rejection of third-party adjudication reflect a view of disputes as relationships to be managed, with power differentials acknowledged, rather than cases to be decided. The theory illuminates why rules-based and relationship-based approaches talk past each other, though critics note that relational language can also legitimise the stronger party's preferences.

04Hedging and middle-power strategy

Students of South-East Asian diplomacy describe hedging: states avoid choosing between great powers, combining economic engagement with China and security cooperation with others. Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia hedge; the Philippines has swung between engagement and balancing. India's own approach, deepening ties with claimants and endorsing the award while managing a thaw with China, can be read as hedging by an outside middle power with its own strategic autonomy to protect.

12Political consequencesAnalysis

The dispute's consequences reach well beyond the sea.

Militarisation. Artificial islands with runways, radars and missile systems have changed the military balance in the sea's centre, and coast guard and militia operations have made grey-zone coercion the dominant mode of conflict, designed to stay below the threshold that would trigger alliance commitments.

Law without enforcement. The award stands as an authoritative interpretation of UNCLOS that has narrowed the legal space for historic-rights claims everywhere, but it has not changed control of any feature. That combination is now a reference point for other cases, including the Indus Waters arbitration, in which a state also refuses to appear.

Regional order. ASEAN's unity has been tested repeatedly, and the code of conduct remains unfinished after more than two decades. Claimants have deepened security ties with outside powers, which China cites as evidence of external interference.

For India. Freedom of navigation through the sea and the Strait of Malacca is a direct economic interest, and India's partnerships with Vietnam and the Philippines give it a stake in their maritime rights. The dispute also intersects with India's own relationship with China, which India protested in 2023 for a 'standard map' claiming Indian territory, and with which it has pursued a cautious thaw since 2024.

Global norms. If historic claims can be sustained by presence despite an award, the principle that maritime entitlements derive from land under UNCLOS is weakened; if the award gradually shapes practice, the Convention's authority is strengthened. Which of these happens is the long-term stake.

13India’s positionAttributedAnalysis

India's official position has evolved through documents published by the Ministry of External Affairs. On the day of the award, 12 July 2016, India 'noted' it, supported 'freedom of navigation and over flight, and unimpeded commerce, based on the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the UNCLOS', and urged 'all parties to show utmost respect for the UNCLOS'. In June 2023 India and the Philippines underlined 'adherence to international law, especially the UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Award'. In August 2025 their Declaration on a Strategic Partnership described the award as 'final and binding' and 'a significant milestone and the basis for peacefully resolving disputes', and expressed concern at 'coercive and aggressive actions'. In May 2026 India and Vietnam called for a code of conduct that does not prejudice states outside the negotiations, and India hosted the Quad foreign ministers, who reaffirmed the award as 'a significant milestone'. At the East Asia Summit in Manila in November 2026, the Prime Minister said that ensuring the seas' 'security and freedom of navigation is the responsibility of us all'.

India's interests, analysed rather than stated, are three. It depends on the sea lanes for trade with East Asia; it has energy interests through decades of cooperation with Vietnam; and it has a strategic interest in preventing any single power from dominating the sea routes between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. India is not a claimant, and it has balanced these interests against its relationship with China.

India's credibility on UNCLOS rests partly on its own record: in July 2014 it said it respected the award of an UNCLOS tribunal that delimited its maritime boundary with Bangladesh. That record supports India's advocacy of the 2016 award, though India's rejection of the Indus Waters arbitration shows that its acceptance of third-party adjudication depends on its view of the forum's legitimacy.

14Possible solutionsAttributedAnalysis

Each option is attributed to whoever proposed it; the assessment of its merits and weaknesses is analysis.

Possible solutions: each option, who proposed it, and an assessment of its merits and weaknesses
01A legally binding code of conduct consistent with UNCLOSASEAN claimant states; India in its joint statement with Vietnam (May 2026)

Conclude the code with binding rules on conduct, consistent with UNCLOS and without prejudice to third parties' rights. It would institutionalise restraint, but China is unlikely to accept a code that incorporates the award or constrains its presence, and a weak code could legitimise the status quo.

02Provisional arrangements and joint developmentChina, in Deng Xiaoping's formula of shelving disputes and developing jointly; UNCLOS Articles 74(3) and 83(3) on provisional arrangements

Set sovereignty aside and agree practical arrangements on fisheries and resources pending final settlement. It could reduce confrontation, but claimants fear that joint development inside their own exclusive economic zones would concede the rights the award confirmed.

03Bilateral implementation of the awardThe Philippines, which has sought practical arrangements with China, such as on resupply, while maintaining the award

Use the award as the legal baseline for negotiated arrangements on access and resupply. It keeps law in play while lowering tension, but depends on China treating such arrangements as more than tactical pauses.

04Collective deterrence and freedom-of-navigation operationsThe United States and partners, with Quad support for freedom of navigation

Contest excessive claims in practice and raise the costs of coercion through presence, alliances and capacity-building. It prevents claims from hardening into accepted fact, but risks incidents and strengthens China's narrative of external interference.

05Rules for unplanned encountersWestern Pacific Naval Symposium's Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (2014), proposed for extension to coast guards

Agree communication and safety protocols for navies and coast guards to prevent accidents from escalating. It manages risk rather than resolving the dispute, but is the option most likely to be accepted by all sides.

15Critical evaluationAnalysis

The South China Sea is the clearest current test of whether a global legal order can constrain a great power in its own region. The record supports neither the optimistic nor the cynical answer.

Law has done more than its critics allow. The award has authoritatively interpreted UNCLOS, narrowed the space for historic-rights claims, given the Philippines a durable diplomatic resource and moved outside powers, India among them, towards explicit support. China's heavy investment in denying the award's legitimacy shows that the ruling imposes costs.

Power has done more than legalists hoped. Control of the disputed features has not changed, artificial islands are now military facilities, and grey-zone coercion has continued for a decade after the award. The code of conduct, envisaged since 2002 and targeted for conclusion in 2026, has not yet produced binding rules, and ASEAN's consensus rule limits its collective voice.

India's evolution is best read as calibrated rather than dramatic. It is not a claimant and avoids naming China in bilateral texts, but its language has moved from noting the award to calling it final and binding, in step with its partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam and its role in the Quad. The strongest criticism of India's position is inconsistency: it champions an arbitral award in one dispute while rejecting a Court of Arbitration in the Indus case, and its view that foreign military exercises in an exclusive economic zone need the coastal state's consent is closer to China's than to the United States'. India's answer is that its objection there concerns the tribunal's constitution, not the authority of adjudication; whether other states find that distinction persuasive will affect India's standing as a rule-based power.

The most realistic near-term outcome is management rather than settlement: incident-prevention rules, bilateral arrangements and a code of uncertain force, with the award remaining the legal reference point that neither side can ignore.

16Examination applicationsExamination

UPSC CSE

4 syllabus lines

General Studies and Prelims

GS Paper II. The dossier serves the syllabus lines on groupings and agreements involving India (ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, the Quad), the effect of other countries' policies on India's interests, and international institutions. It also belongs with India's Act East policy and its relations with Vietnam and the Philippines.

GS Paper I. The sea's physical geography, its chokepoints and resources, fits the syllabus on the distribution of key natural resources and important geophysical features.

GS Paper III. Maritime security, sea-lane protection and energy security connect the case to security and infrastructure.

Essay. Essays on international law, the Indo-Pacific or the rise of China can use the case to examine whether rules restrain power.

Prelims. Know the maritime zones of UNCLOS, Article 121(3), Annex VII arbitration, the 2002 Declaration, the claimants, and the locations of the Paracels, Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal. UNCLOS itself was set in PSIR Paper II in 2026; see previous year questions.

Answer craft. Distinguish sovereignty from maritime entitlements, state China's position in its own terms, quote India's official language precisely and show how it has changed, and connect the case to India's interests rather than treating it as distant.

UPSC CSE · Optional

7 syllabus lines

Political Science and International Relations

Paper II, Part A. The case belongs to the regionalisation of world politics, whose syllabus names ASEAN; to the changing international political order, as a site of power transition; to key concepts such as national interest, security and the balance of power; and to approaches, where realist, liberal and constructivist accounts can be tested against the same events.

Paper II, Part B. In India and the global centres of power, the case shapes India's relations with China, the United States and Japan; in India and South Asia, whose syllabus includes India's 'Look East' policy, it illustrates Act East in practice; and recent developments covers India's evolving language on the award.

Thinkers to deploy. John Mearsheimer on regional hegemony; Robert Keohane on institutions and compliance; Alexander Wendt on how competing identities shape the meaning of the same sea; Qin Yaqing on relational approaches to order; and Susan Strange on structural power, as the IB case study develops.

IB Diploma Programme

6 syllabus lines

Global Politics

What the guide prescribes. The case serves the core concepts of sovereignty, power, legitimacy and interdependence, which the guide's core requires students to apply, and the HL global political challenges of borders and security. The site's IB case study is the main resource for the course, with actor analysis, concept applications and inquiry questions; this dossier supplies wider legal and regional context rather than a second case study.

Teaching suggestions. HL students can pair the case with the Indus Waters Treaty to compare how two states, China and India, justify refusing to appear before tribunals, and how the claimant states use the resulting awards. India's changing language on the award also offers a short exercise in reading official sources: students can trace word by word how a non-claimant's position moved between 2016 and 2026.

17Original practice questionsOriginal

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Distinguish between disputes over sovereignty and disputes over maritime entitlements in the South China Sea. How did the 2016 arbitral award address the latter, and why has it not resolved the former?

    How to approach it

    Explain UNCLOS zones and Article 121(3); state what the tribunal decided and did not decide; set out China's jurisdictional objection; assess enforcement limits.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Trace the evolution of India's position on the South China Sea since 2016. What interests explain the change?

    How to approach it

    Quote the 2016, 2023, 2025 and 2026 statements precisely; link the change to Act East, partnerships with Vietnam and the Philippines, and the Quad, while noting India's non-claimant status.

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks

    Does the South China Sea dispute confirm the realist view that international law reflects power? Discuss with reference to the 2016 award and its aftermath.

    How to approach it

    Set offensive realism against compliance and reputation theories; use evidence on the water and in diplomacy; reach a qualified judgement.

  4. Q4PSIR style15 marks

    Assess the role of ASEAN in managing the South China Sea disputes. Is a code of conduct likely to succeed where the 2002 Declaration did not?

    How to approach it

    Explain ASEAN centrality and consensus; assess the Declaration's limits and the code negotiations; consider China's preferences and the question of a binding code.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

18Sources

The dossier’s facts were last checked on . Primary and official documents are listed apart from the material that interprets them.

Primary and official sources

11

Constitutional and statutory texts, Bills, judgments and official reports.

  1. 01PrimaryUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982): Articles 121, 288, 296 and 298 and Annex VII (opens in a new tab). United Nations, 10 December 1982
  2. 02JudgmentThe South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award of 12 July 2016. Permanent Court of Arbitration, 12 July 2016
  3. 03OfficialStatement on Award of Arbitral Tribunal on South China Sea Under Annexure VII of UNCLOS (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 12 July 2016 · consulted 20 November 2026
  4. 04OfficialJoint Statement on the 5th India–Philippines Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 29 June 2023 · consulted 20 November 2026
  5. 05OfficialDeclaration on the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between India and the Philippines (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 5 August 2025 · consulted 20 November 2026
  6. 06OfficialJoint Statement on Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between India and Vietnam (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 6 May 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026
  7. 07OfficialQuad Foreign Ministers' Meeting Joint Statement (New Delhi) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 26 May 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026
  8. 08OfficialEast Asia Summit Declaration on Navigating our Future, Together: Stability and Renewal (Manila) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 17 November 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026
  9. 09OfficialOfficial Spokesperson's response to media queries on the so called 2023 standard map of China (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 29 August 2023 · consulted 20 November 2026
  10. 10OfficialOfficial Spokesperson's response to a question on the award of the Tribunal on the Maritime Boundary Arbitration between India and Bangladesh (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 8 July 2014 · consulted 20 November 2026
  11. 11OfficialPassage of USS John Paul Jones through India's EEZ (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 9 April 2021 · consulted 20 November 2026

Supporting sources

3

Scholarship, books, press reports and other secondary material.

  1. 01BookJohn J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton, 2001
  2. 02BookAbram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements. Harvard University Press, 1995
  3. 03BookQin Yaqing, A Relational Theory of World Politics. Cambridge University Press, 2018

19Connected knowledge

Facts checked to