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Political Issue Dossier · Global

Reforming the UN Security Council

The Security Council still has the five permanent members of 1945 and has been enlarged only once, in 1965. Almost every state agrees it is unrepresentative; almost none agree on the cure. The dossier explains why the Charter's amendment rule, rival coalitions and the veto have kept reform in negotiation since 2009, and where India stands.

At a glance

Region
Global
Countries most involved
India, Brazil, Germany, Japan, United States, China, Russia, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Pakistan, South Africa, Nigeria
Facts checked to
Mapped
7 actors, 5 stakeholders, 13 dated events
Sources
15 · 12 primary or official
Syllabus lines
UPSC 4 · PSIR 5 · IB 4
How it is examined

The central question

What a reader should be able to answer by the end of the dossier.

Why has reform of the UN Security Council stalled despite near-universal agreement that it is unrepresentative, and which model, if any, could command the majorities and the permanent members' ratifications that the Charter requires?

Contents 19 sections
  1. 01Locator map
  2. 02Background
  3. 03Geography
  4. 04Historical development
  5. 05Actor map
  6. 06Stakeholder map
  7. 07Institutional framework
  8. 08Legal framework
  9. 09Timeline
  10. 10Competing narratives
  11. 11Theories applied
  12. 12Political consequences
  13. 13India’s position
  14. 14Possible solutions
  15. 15Critical evaluation
  16. 16Examination applications
  17. 17Practice questions
  18. 18Sources
  19. 19Connected knowledge

How to read the labels

Facts
Sourced statements of fact.
Attributed
Positions and proposals, in the terms of those who hold them.
Analysis
The platform’s reading of the evidence.
Examination
How the issue maps to the syllabi.

01Locator mapFacts

RUSSIANIGERIA12345678San FranciscoMbabaneNew DelhiBrasíliaBerlinTokyoRome
IndiaOther countries most involved: Brazil, Germany, Japan, United States, China, Russia, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Pakistan, South Africa, NigeriaPlaces named in the dossier
  1. 1. United Nations Headquarters, New York

    Seat of the Security Council and of the General Assembly's intergovernmental negotiations on reform since 2009.

  2. 2. San Francisco

    Where the Charter, with its five named permanent members and the veto, was signed on 26 June 1945.

  3. 3. Mbabane, Eswatini

    The African Union's Ezulwini Consensus of 2005 is named after the valley near the capital where it was adopted.

  4. 4. New Delhi

    India, a G4 member, seeks a permanent seat and has served eight terms as an elected member.

  5. 5. Brasília

    Brazil, a G4 member and the leading Latin American aspirant.

  6. 6. Berlin

    Germany, a G4 member and one of the largest financial contributors to the UN.

  7. 7. Tokyo

    Japan, a G4 member whose candidacy is opposed by some regional neighbours.

  8. 8. Rome

    Italy leads Uniting for Consensus, which opposes new permanent seats.

Boundaries are from Natural Earth’s India point-of-view data and are approximate at this scale; the map is a teaching aid and does not purport to be an authoritative depiction of international boundaries. Markers that would overlap are drawn apart, with a line to the true position.

02BackgroundFacts

The Security Council has primary responsibility for international peace and security, and under Article 25 of the Charter its decisions bind every member. It is the only UN organ that can authorise force and impose binding sanctions. Its composition still reflects 1945: five permanent members named in Article 23 (China, France, Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States), each with a veto under Article 27 over any non-procedural decision.

The Council has been enlarged once. As decolonisation more than doubled the UN's membership, the General Assembly in December 1963 adopted Charter amendments, which entered into force in 1965, raising the Council from eleven to fifteen members and the voting threshold from seven to nine, with the ten elected seats distributed among regions. The permanent five and the veto were untouched. The United Nations now has 193 members, and Africa, with 54 of them, has no permanent seat; nor does Latin America and the Caribbean.

Reform is hard by design. Under Article 108, an amendment needs a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of all members, including all five permanent members. Each permanent member therefore holds a veto over its own reform, and a determined third of the membership can block any model. Formal negotiations, the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN), have run in the General Assembly since 2009 without producing a negotiating text, and in September 2026 the G4, of which India is a member, called the process 'largely ineffective'.

03GeographyFacts

The Council's map of power is a map of 1945. Three of the five permanent members are European or Euro-Atlantic powers; Asia, home to most of humanity, has one permanent seat; Africa and Latin America have none. The ten elected seats follow the pattern fixed in 1963: five from African and Asian states, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America and two from Western Europe and other states. Regional groups decide who stands, so a region's internal rivalries shape who represents it.

Those rivalries are the geography of deadlock. Each aspirant to a permanent seat faces a regional opponent: India faces Pakistan, Brazil faces Argentina and Mexico, Germany faces Italy, and Japan faces opposition within East Asia. Several of these opponents are members of Uniting for Consensus, which exists to block new permanent seats. In Africa, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt have each been mentioned as candidates, which is one reason the African Union negotiates as a bloc and leaves the choice of its permanent members to itself.

Size and representation pull against each other. With 188 states competing for ten elected seats, most states sit on the Council rarely or never; most proposals would raise its size to the mid-twenties, and the Pact for the Future of 2024 asked that the total balance representativeness against effectiveness. Small island developing states, which a 2022 joint call by India and other pro-reform states put at about a fifth of the membership, seek a dedicated seat, as do some Arab and Islamic groupings mentioned in the negotiations.

04Historical developmentFacts

The veto was the price of the UN's founding. At San Francisco in 1945 the great powers made it a condition of membership, and smaller states accepted it in return for a universal organisation. The first and only reform followed decolonisation: General Assembly resolution 1991 A (XVIII) of 17 December 1963 noted that the Council's composition was 'inequitable and unbalanced' and enlarged it to fifteen.

The modern reform debate opened after the Cold War. In 1993 the Assembly created an open-ended working group, and in 1998 resolution 53/30 required a two-thirds majority of the membership for any decision on Council reform. In 2004 Brazil, Germany, India and Japan formed the G4 to seek permanent seats together. In 2005 three blocs tabled rival drafts: the G4 proposed new permanent and elected seats; Uniting for Consensus proposed only elected seats; and the African Union adopted the Ezulwini Consensus, later confirmed in the Sirte Declaration, seeking two permanent seats with all their prerogatives, including the veto, and additional elected seats. The World Summit that year supported 'early reform' but chose no model. In 2007 a cross-regional group of developing countries tabled the draft from which the L.69 group, to which India belongs, takes its name.

In 2008 the Assembly's decision 62/557 moved the issue into Intergovernmental Negotiations in informal plenary, organised around five clusters: categories of membership, the veto, regional representation, size and working methods, and the Council's relationship with the Assembly. The IGN began in 2009 and is renewed each year. In 2022 the Assembly decided by resolution 76/262 to meet whenever a veto is cast, and in 2024 the Pact for the Future set agreed principles for reform. In September 2026 the G4 expressed 'serious reservations' about a 'so-called bridging proposal' presented in the previous session before any text-based negotiations had begun.

05Actor mapFactsAttributed

Who acts on the issue, grouped by kind around it. Each actor’s role is a matter of record; a stated position is the actor’s own.

States2

  • The five permanent members

    Stated positionDivided on models; united in protecting the veto

    China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, each of whose ratification is required for any Charter amendment under Article 108. France, Russia and the United Kingdom have reaffirmed support for India's permanent membership in joint statements of 2025–26, and the United States did so in 2024; China has not.

  • India

    Stated positionPermanent membership in a Council expanded in both categories, through text-based negotiations

    Seeks a permanent seat as a G4 and L.69 member; has served eight elected terms, most recently in 2021–22, and supports Africa's claim to permanent representation.

Institution1

  • UN General Assembly and its Intergovernmental Negotiations

    Hosts the IGN in informal plenary under decision 62/557 (2008), co-chaired by two permanent representatives each session. It adopted the Pact for the Future's reform principles in 2024 and, under resolution 76/262, debates every veto.

International organisation1

  • African Union and its Committee of Ten (C-10)

    Stated positionAt least two permanent seats with all prerogatives, including the veto if it is retained, and additional elected seats

    Speaks for Africa's 54 states under the Common African Position of the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration (2005); the C-10 of heads of state coordinates its diplomacy. Presented its reform model in the IGN during the 80th session (2025–26).

Other actors3

  • G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan)

    Stated positionExpand both permanent and elected categories

    Formed in 2004 to seek permanent seats together and support each other's candidacies. In September 2026 its foreign ministers called the IGN 'largely ineffective' and urged a consolidated model and text-based negotiations.

  • Uniting for Consensus

    Stated positionElected seats only

    A group led by Italy and including Pakistan, Argentina, Mexico, the Republic of Korea and Spain, among others. It opposes new permanent seats and proposes more elected seats, including longer terms, insisting that reform requires the broadest consensus.

  • L.69 group

    A cross-regional group of developing countries from Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean, named after a 2007 draft resolution; India is a member. It supports expansion in both categories and the Common African Position.

06Stakeholder mapAnalysis

Who has a stake in the outcome, and what it is, placed by how much influence each has over the result. The placing is the dossier’s assessment.

Influence

High

  • African states

    Redress what the Pact for the Future calls the 'historical injustice against Africa'. Influence is high: with 54 votes, Africa is the largest regional group and no model can reach two-thirds of the Assembly without most of it.

  • The permanent five

    Preserve their privileges and avoid diluting the veto. Influence is high: each can block ratification of any amendment.

Influence

Medium

  • Small island developing states

    A voice on threats such as sea-level rise and a dedicated or rotating seat. Influence is medium: they hold many votes in the Assembly but little coercive power.

  • Regional rivals of the aspirants

    Prevent a neighbour from gaining permanent status, which would fix a regional hierarchy. Influence is medium: they cannot pass a model but can deny one the two-thirds it needs.

Influence

Low

  • Populations in conflicts the Council fails to address

    Effective collective action when the Council is deadlocked by the veto. Influence is low: they are the subjects of the Council's decisions, not participants in its reform.

07Institutional frameworkFacts

Reform runs through three institutions, each with its own veto points.

The General Assembly owns the process. Under decision 62/557 (2008) the Intergovernmental Negotiations meet in informal plenary, chaired by two co-chairs appointed each session, and have worked from co-chairs' elements papers and models presented by groups rather than from a negotiating text. Every decision on reform needs, under resolution 53/30 (1998), the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the membership, so the Assembly's threshold of 129 votes is the first hurdle for any model.

The Charter's amendment procedure is the second. Article 108 requires adoption by two-thirds of the Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of members, including all permanent members, each through its own constitutional process. Article 109 allows a general conference to review the Charter, but its results face the same ratification rule.

The Security Council itself controls its working methods, which reform-minded states have tried to improve without amendment. The most significant institutional change of recent years came from the Assembly instead: under resolution 76/262 (2022), the Assembly meets within ten working days of any veto to debate it. On 10 November 2026, for example, it scrutinised a veto that had ended the UN's 35-year mission in Western Sahara.

The result is a system in which the forum that wants change cannot impose it, and the states that can block change are those that would lose most from it. The IGN's renewal each year keeps the issue alive without obliging anyone to move.

09TimelineFacts

  1. The UN Charter is signed at San Francisco, with five permanent members holding a veto in an eleven-member Council.

  2. The General Assembly adopts resolution 1991 A (XVIII), enlarging the Council to fifteen members.

  3. The amendments to Articles 23 and 27 enter into force.

  4. The Assembly establishes an open-ended working group on Council reform.

  5. Resolution 53/30 requires two-thirds of the membership for any decision on Council reform.

  6. Brazil, Germany, India and Japan form the G4 to seek permanent seats together.

  7. The African Union adopts the Ezulwini Consensus on Council reform.

  8. The World Summit supports early reform of the Council but endorses no model.

  9. Assembly decision 62/557 launches the Intergovernmental Negotiations, which begin in 2009.

  10. Resolution 76/262 commits the Assembly to debate every veto cast in the Council.

  11. The Pact for the Future sets agreed principles for Council reform in its Action 39.

  12. G4 foreign ministers call the IGN largely ineffective and criticise a 'bridging proposal'.

  13. The Assembly scrutinises a veto that ended the UN mission in Western Sahara after 35 years.

10Competing narrativesAttributed

Each narrative in its holders’ own terms, and attributed to them. A strong answer weighs them against each other rather than adopting one.

01

Representation, legitimacy and contribution

Held bythe G4, including India

The Council's 'eight-decades old architecture' no longer reflects geopolitical reality, so its 'representativeness, legitimacy, credibility and efficacy' are in question. Expansion in both permanent and elected categories is supported by a majority of members and should include states that contribute significantly to peace and security. After eighteen years without results, the G4 argues, the IGN should move to text-based negotiations, and 'consensus is not the benchmark' for decisions on reform.

02

Accountability over status

Held byUniting for Consensus

New permanent seats would create new privileged members accountable to no one and entrench regional hierarchies. More elected seats, some with longer terms, would make the Council more representative while keeping every member answerable to periodic election. Reform affecting every state should rest on the broadest consensus, not on a two-thirds vote engineered by one group.

03

Historical injustice

Held bythe African Union and the Committee of Ten

Africa is the only continent with no permanent seat, though much of the Council's agenda concerns African conflicts. The Common African Position seeks at least two permanent seats with all the prerogatives of current members, including the veto for as long as it exists, and additional elected seats, with the African Union deciding who fills them. Africa will not accept a second-class permanent membership.

04

Restrain the veto first

Held byadvocates of veto reform, including France

The Council's failures stem less from its size than from the veto. Voluntary restraint in cases of mass atrocities, which France has promoted and which India and France agreed in February 2026 to discuss further, and the Assembly's power since 2022 to debate every veto, can improve accountability without waiting for an amendment that the permanent members can block.

11Theories appliedAnalysis

Each theory is applied to the case, not merely defined.

01Realism

For realists from Hans Morgenthau to John Mearsheimer, institutions reflect the distribution of power and change only when it changes. The veto codified the great powers of 1945, and the 1965 enlargement happened because decolonisation altered the Assembly's arithmetic while leaving every permanent member's veto intact. Realism predicts that permanent members will accept reform only if it does not dilute their privileges, which explains why expansion of elected seats is easier to imagine than new vetoes, and why rising powers seek seats less for influence over decisions than for status.

02Legitimacy and authority

Ian Hurd's After Anarchy (2007) argues that the Council's power rests substantially on legitimacy: states comply with it, and seek seats on it, because its authority is widely accepted. On this view an unrepresentative Council slowly loses the symbolic power that makes its decisions effective. The G4's language of 'representativeness, legitimacy, credibility and efficacy' is an argument of exactly this kind, and the Assembly's growing scrutiny of vetoes is a sign that legitimacy is being contested even where formal power is not.

03Veto players

George Tsebelis's Veto Players (2002) shows that the more actors whose agreement is needed for change, and the further apart their preferences, the more stable the status quo. Article 108 creates at least six veto points, the five permanent members and any blocking third of the Assembly, and coalitions such as Uniting for Consensus organise the last. The theory explains why each rival model can block the others without being able to pass itself, which is the IGN's condition.

04The English School: great powers as an institution

Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society (1977) treats the special rights of great powers as an institution of international society, accepted by other states only so long as the great powers are seen to exercise managerial responsibilities for order. The permanent five's privileges were justified in those terms in 1945. When their vetoes block action on major conflicts, as debates under resolution 76/262 now publicise, the bargain behind their status weakens, and aspirants argue that responsibility should be shared with those able to bear it.

12Political consequencesAnalysis

The consequences of continued deadlock are already visible.

Legitimacy erosion. States, especially in the Global South, increasingly describe the Council as unrepresentative, and the Assembly's veto debates have turned each veto into a public accounting.

Forum shifting. States seek outcomes elsewhere: in the General Assembly, in regional organisations such as the African Union, in minilateral groupings, and in coalitions outside the UN. That weakens the Council's role as the centre of collective security without creating a substitute with comparable legal authority.

Paralysis on major conflicts. Where a permanent member or its close partner is involved, the veto prevents binding action, which feeds both the demand for reform and scepticism that reform can happen.

Hardened coalitions. Two decades of rival blocs have made positions identity-defining. The G4 and Uniting for Consensus each define themselves against the other, and the African position, framed as non-negotiable, leaves little room for intermediate models.

If reform did occur, its consequences would depend on the model. New permanent members with vetoes would add veto players and could make decisions harder; elected-only expansion would broaden representation but leave the hierarchy intact; a review clause, which the Pact for the Future asks to be considered, would allow later correction. Any enlargement would also raise questions about working methods in a Council of twenty-five or more.

13India’s positionAttributedAnalysis

India's position, set out in joint statements of the G4 and in bilateral statements published by the Ministry of External Affairs, has five elements. It seeks permanent membership of a reformed Council. It supports expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories, which the G4 says is backed by a majority of members. It supports Africa's claim to permanent representation under the Common African Position, as in the 2022 joint 'Call to Action' it signed with other pro-reform states. It wants the IGN to move to text-based negotiations, and with its G4 partners it holds that consensus is not the benchmark for decision. And it emphasises contribution to international peace and security, a criterion written into Article 23.

Support from permanent members is partial. In statements of 2025–26 France reiterated its 'firm support for India's permanent membership', Russia its 'steadfast support' and the United Kingdom its 'long-standing support', and in September 2024 the United States said it supported permanent membership for India in a reformed Council. China has made no such commitment.

India's claim rests on its population, its economy, eight elected terms and a long record as a contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping. Its obstacles are structural rather than personal: China's veto over ratification, Pakistan's role in Uniting for Consensus, the linking of India's candidacy with those of Germany and Japan, each of which has its own opponents, and the absence of any agreed model. Whether India's interests are best served by holding out for permanent membership, or by accepting an interim model with longer-term seats, is a choice the dossier's evaluation considers.

14Possible solutionsAttributedAnalysis

Each option is attributed to whoever proposed it; the assessment of its merits and weaknesses is analysis.

Possible solutions: each option, who proposed it, and an assessment of its merits and weaknesses
01Expansion in both categoriesG4, supported by the L.69 group

Add new permanent members, including from Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America, alongside more elected seats, with the question of their veto settled in negotiation or deferred to a review. It answers the representation deficit most fully, but needs the permanent five's ratification and faces organised regional opposition.

02Expansion of elected seats only, with longer termsUniting for Consensus

Enlarge the Council through more elected seats, some for longer and renewable terms. It avoids new privileged members and is easier for the permanent five to accept, but leaves the 1945 hierarchy intact and does not meet Africa's or the G4's demands.

03The Common African PositionAfrican Union, Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration (2005)

At least two permanent African seats with all prerogatives, including the veto as long as it exists, and additional elected seats, with the African Union choosing its members. It has the moral force of Africa's exclusion behind it, but new vetoes are the change the permanent five are least likely to ratify.

04An intermediate model with a review clauseIntermediate approaches discussed in the IGN, including the 'bridging proposal' of the 80th session, which the G4 opposed; review clause listed in the Pact for the Future

Create long-term renewable seats now and review the categories after a set period. It may be the only model capable of two-thirds support, but aspirants fear that an interim arrangement would become permanent and that a review would never deliver.

05Restrain the veto without amending the CharterAdvocates of veto restraint, including France; the General Assembly's standing mandate under resolution 76/262

Voluntary commitments not to veto action on mass atrocities and systematic Assembly scrutiny of every veto. It is achievable now, but voluntary restraint binds only those willing to accept it.

15Critical evaluationAnalysis

Council reform is the clearest example in global governance of an institution that almost everyone wants changed and almost no one can change. The deadlock is not a failure of will but a product of design: Article 108 gives the beneficiaries of the status quo a veto over reform, and resolution 53/30 lets any determined third of the membership block a model. Rival coalitions have learned to use both.

Each major model has a strong case and a fatal weakness. The G4's model best matches the distribution of power and contribution, but asks the permanent five, China above all, to ratify the elevation of rivals. Uniting for Consensus offers accountability through election, but would freeze the hierarchy it criticises. The African position has the strongest moral claim, but by insisting on the veto it asks for the one change the permanent five are least likely to accept. An intermediate model with a review clause is the most plausible compromise, which is precisely why aspirants who fear it would become permanent resist it.

For India, the strategic question is whether holding out for permanent membership in a G4 package maximises its chances or postpones them indefinitely. Bilateral support from four permanent members is real but costless while no text exists; China's position and the regional rivalries embedded in Uniting for Consensus are the binding constraints. India's most effective lever may be its alignment with Africa and the L.69 group, which together command most of the votes any reform needs.

The fairest judgement is that reform of membership is unlikely in the near term, while reform of practice, through veto scrutiny, working methods and the Assembly's assertiveness, is already under way. The Council's legitimacy will increasingly depend on the second even as states argue about the first.

16Examination applicationsExamination

UPSC CSE

4 syllabus lines

General Studies and Prelims

GS Paper II. The dossier serves the syllabus line on important international institutions, agencies and fora, their structure and mandate, and the lines on global groupings and agreements involving India and on the effect of other states' policies on India's interests.

Essay. Essays on multilateralism, global governance or India's rise can use the Council to show how institutions lag behind power.

Prelims. Know Articles 23, 27, 108 and 109; the 1963 resolution and the 1965 entry into force; the regional pattern of elected seats; resolution 53/30, decision 62/557 and resolution 76/262; the G4, Uniting for Consensus, the Ezulwini Consensus, the C-10 and L.69; Action 39 of the Pact for the Future; and India's eight elected terms.

Answer craft. Strong answers explain why reform has stalled before arguing for it, distinguish categories of membership from the veto, cite named groups and documents rather than generalities, state India's position with the evidence of permanent members' support, and recognise the strongest counter-arguments, including Africa's insistence on the veto and the case for elected seats.

UPSC CSE · Optional

5 syllabus lines

Political Science and International Relations

Paper II, Part A. The core unit is the United Nations, whose syllabus asks about its envisaged role and actual record and the need for reform. The case also fits the changing international political order, as institutions designed for a bipolar and then unipolar world meet a multipolar one, and key concepts, especially collective security and the balance of power.

Paper II, Part B. In India and the UN system, the syllabus names India's demand for a permanent seat in the Security Council; in India and the Global South, India's alliance with Africa and the L.69 group shows South–South coalition-building.

Thinkers to deploy. Hans Morgenthau and John Mearsheimer on power and institutions; Robert Keohane on why states sustain institutions they cannot easily change; Antonio Gramsci, whose concept of hegemony helps explain how the 1945 order is presented as universal; and Jawaharlal Nehru, whose internationalism shaped India's early commitment to the UN.

IB Diploma Programme

4 syllabus lines

Global Politics

What the guide prescribes. The guide's core content on interdependence names the UN's structure, roles and functions, the Charter, the General Assembly and the Security Council, so the Council's composition and the debate on reform sit squarely in the core. The case also serves power (structural power and the veto), legitimacy (the legitimacy of intergovernmental organisations) and sovereignty (the tension between sovereign equality and the privileges of the permanent five).

Teaching suggestions. The case suits Paper 1 sources work on rival group statements and Paper 2 essays on whether global governance is legitimate. Students can compare the positions of the G4, Uniting for Consensus and the African Union, using each group's own documents, and test realist, liberal and English School explanations of the deadlock. Recent vetoes and the Assembly's debates on them provide current evidence for arguments about legitimacy and power.

17Original practice questionsOriginal

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Why has reform of the UN Security Council stalled despite widespread agreement that it is unrepresentative? Examine with reference to Article 108 and the positions of the major negotiating groups.

    How to approach it

    Explain Article 108 and resolution 53/30; set out the G4, Uniting for Consensus and African positions; show how each blocks the others; assess intermediate models and the Pact for the Future.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Discuss India's case for permanent membership of the Security Council and the principal obstacles to it.

    How to approach it

    Use Article 23's criteria, India's record and permanent members' stated support; identify China's position, regional opposition and the absence of a negotiating text.

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks

    'The legitimacy of the Security Council depends on its representativeness.' Critically examine with reference to theories of legitimacy and power.

    How to approach it

    Contrast realist accounts with Hurd's legitimacy thesis and Bull's great-power bargain; use veto scrutiny under resolution 76/262 as evidence; reach a judgement.

  4. Q4PSIR style15 marks

    Should reform of the veto take priority over expansion of the Security Council's membership? Argue with reference to recent practice.

    How to approach it

    Weigh voluntary restraint and Assembly scrutiny against enlargement; consider Africa's demand for the veto; evaluate feasibility under Article 108.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

18Sources

The dossier’s facts were last checked on . Primary and official documents are listed apart from the material that interprets them.

Primary and official sources

12

Constitutional and statutory texts, Bills, judgments and official reports.

  1. 01PrimaryCharter of the United Nations: Articles 23, 24, 25, 27, 108 and 109 (opens in a new tab). United Nations, 26 June 1945
  2. 02PrimaryGeneral Assembly resolution 1991 (XVIII): Question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (opens in a new tab). United Nations General Assembly, 17 December 1963 · consulted 20 November 2026
  3. 03PrimaryGeneral Assembly resolution 79/1: The Pact for the Future (opens in a new tab). United Nations General Assembly, 22 September 2024 · consulted 20 November 2026
  4. 04PrimaryGeneral Assembly decision 62/557 (2008), with resolution 53/30 (1998), on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council. United Nations General Assembly, 15 September 2008
  5. 05OfficialG4 Joint Ministerial Statement (New York, 22 September 2026) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 24 September 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026
  6. 06OfficialG4 Ministerial Joint Statement (25 September 2025) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 25 September 2025 · consulted 20 November 2026
  7. 07OfficialJoint Statement: A Call to Action for Reform of the UN Security Council (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 23 September 2022 · consulted 20 November 2026
  8. 08OfficialIndia–France Joint Statement (17 February 2026) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 17 February 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026
  9. 09OfficialJoint Statement following the 23rd India–Russia Annual Summit (5 December 2025) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 5 December 2025 · consulted 20 November 2026
  10. 10OfficialIndia–UK Joint Statement (9 October 2025) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 9 October 2025 · consulted 20 November 2026
  11. 11OfficialJoint Fact Sheet: The United States and India Continue to Expand Comprehensive and Global Strategic Partnership (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 21 September 2024 · consulted 20 November 2026
  12. 12OfficialGeneral Assembly Scrutinizes Veto that Ended UN Mission in Western Sahara After 35 Years (GA/12807) (opens in a new tab). United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 10 November 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026

Supporting sources

3

Scholarship, books, press reports and other secondary material.

  1. 01BookIan Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council. Princeton University Press, 2007
  2. 02BookGeorge Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press, 2002
  3. 03BookHedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. Macmillan, 1977

19Connected knowledge

Facts checked to