India's neighbourhood
India and Afghanistan
A historic partner India cannot reach overland, whose Taliban rulers India once shunned and now engages. Since 2025 New Delhi has upgraded its mission in Kabul to an embassy and accepted a Taliban chargé d'affaires, without formally recognising the regime.
India and Afghanistan at a glance
- Relationship
- India's neighbourhood
01Geography
Afghanistan is a landlocked state where South, Central and West Asia meet. It borders Pakistan to the east and south along the Durand Line, Iran to the west, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to the north across the Amu Darya, and China at the tip of the Wakhan corridor, the narrow north-eastern panhandle that Anglo-Russian boundary settlements of the 1890s left as a buffer between British India and the Russian empire. The Hindu Kush runs across the centre of the country, dividing a north that looks to Central Asia from a south and east that open onto the Indus plains through passes such as the Khyber.
Geography sets India's problem. The shortest routes from India to Kabul cross Pakistan, which denies transit, so Indian goods travel by air or by sea to Iran's Chabahar port and then by road through Zaranj, on the Iranian border, to the highway India built to Delaram. India's map places Gilgit-Baltistan, the part of Jammu and Kashmir adjoining the Wakhan and under Pakistan's illegal occupation, within the Union Territory of Ladakh, which is the basis of India's position that it shares a boundary with Afghanistan.
02Political context
Afghanistan's political system
Since August 2021 Afghanistan has been ruled by the Taliban as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, a government that only Russia has formally recognised. Authority rests with the movement's supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, who has led the Taliban since 2016 and governs by decree from Kandahar. A cabinet in Kabul, headed by an acting prime minister, Mohammad Hasan Akhund, runs the ministries, and provincial governors answer to the leadership rather than to any elected body. The constitution of 2004 is not applied, there is no legislature and there are no elections; courts apply the movement's reading of Hanafi jurisprudence.
Social policy is the regime's defining feature abroad. Decrees since 2021 have excluded girls from secondary school and women from universities, from most paid work and from much of public life, and a law on the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice, issued in August 2024, codified many of these rules. Differences between the Kandahar leadership and ministers in Kabul who favour wider international engagement are visible, but they have not changed policy. For India this means that the ministers it deals with in Kabul are not the final authority, which sits with a leadership that rarely meets foreign officials.
Political and diplomatic developments
Engagement with the Taliban began within weeks: India's ambassador in Doha met a Taliban representative on 31 August 2021. In November 2021 India hosted a regional security dialogue of national security advisers on Afghanistan, which Pakistan and China declined to attend. In June 2022 India returned to Kabul with a "technical team" to oversee humanitarian aid, sending wheat, medicines and vaccines.
Contact rose steadily in 2025. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met the Taliban's acting foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, in Dubai in January; after the Taliban condemned the Pahalgam attack, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar spoke to Muttaqi by telephone in May, the first ministerial contact. Muttaqi visited India in October 2025 under a UN travel-ban exemption, the Taliban committed not to allow Afghan territory to be used against India, and India announced that its technical mission would become an embassy; the upgrade took effect on 21 October 2025. In January 2026 a Taliban-appointed diplomat, Mufti Noor Ahmad Noor, arrived to take charge of the Afghan embassy in New Delhi as chargé d'affaires.
India has not recognised the Taliban government. It continues to call for an inclusive government and for the rights of women and girls, whose exclusion from secondary and higher education and much public life is the main reason most states withhold recognition. Russia, which recognised the Taliban government in July 2025, has gone further than India.
03Historical bilateral relations
The relationship is old and warm at the level of peoples, and it has survived a succession of regimes in Kabul. A Treaty of Friendship was signed on 4 January 1950. India maintained relations with the monarchy, with Daoud's republic and with the Soviet-backed governments of the 1980s; when the mujahideen took Kabul and then the Taliban seized power in 1996, India closed its embassy and supported the Northern Alliance alongside Russia and Iran. The hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 to Kandahar in December 1999, which ended with India releasing Masood Azhar and two others in a deal brokered with the Taliban present, fixed the Taliban in Indian memory as an arm of Pakistan.
After 2001 India became one of Afghanistan's largest regional development partners, with commitments of more than US$3 billion: the Zaranj–Delaram highway, the Afghan–India Friendship Dam at Salma, the Parliament building opened in 2015, power lines, hospitals and thousands of scholarships. The Strategic Partnership Agreement of October 2011, Afghanistan's first with any country, committed India to train Afghan security forces. India paid a price: the bombing of its embassy in July 2008 and attacks on its consulates were attributed by Indian and American officials to Pakistan-backed networks.
The American withdrawal ended this phase. India was not a party to the US–Taliban agreement signed in Doha in February 2020. When the Taliban took Kabul on 15 August 2021, India evacuated its diplomats and citizens and closed its embassy. Under India's presidency, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2593 on 30 August 2021, demanding that Afghan territory not be used to threaten or attack any country or to shelter terrorists.
Diplomatic timeline
4 events, 1985–2025 · 1 turning point
The dated events of the Global Political Timeline that involve Afghanistan. Open an entry to read it in full.
SAARC founded at DhakaDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineThe leaders of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka adopted the SAARC Charter at Dhaka on 8 December 1985; Afghanistan joined in 2007. The charter excludes bilateral and contentious issues and requires unanimity, which kept the association alive but made it ineffective. No summit has been held since Kathmandu in 2014.
The September 11 attacksWorld · Turning point
Al-Qaeda hijackers flew airliners into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001; a fourth aircraft crashed in Pennsylvania, and almost 3,000 people were killed. NATO invoked its collective-defence clause for the first time, and Security Council resolution 1373 of 28 September, adopted under Chapter VII, obliged every state to criminalise the financing of terrorism and deny safe haven to terrorists. The American-led war in Afghanistan began on 7 October. For India, which had proposed a comprehensive convention against terrorism in 1996, the new regime still lacked an agreed definition, and Pakistan became a frontline American ally.
See it on the Global Political TimelineFrom history to today
The attacks built the counter-terrorism architecture that states still use: binding obligations under resolution 1373 monitored by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, sanctions lists and standards against terrorist financing. The war in Afghanistan that they began ended with the Taliban's return in 2021. India has used this architecture to seek listings of Pakistan-based terrorists and chaired the Counter-Terrorism Committee in 2022, though the comprehensive convention it proposed remains stalled over the definition of terrorism.
Taliban take Kabul; Security Council adopts Resolution 2593Diplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineThe Taliban entered Kabul on 15 August 2021 as American forces withdrew, and India evacuated its diplomats and citizens and closed its embassy. On 30 August, under India's presidency, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2593, demanding that Afghan territory not be used to threaten or attack any country or to shelter terrorists. India returned with a technical team in 2022 and upgraded it to an embassy in 2025.
India upgrades its mission in Kabul to an embassyDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineDuring the visit of the Taliban's acting foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, to New Delhi in October 2025, India announced that its technical mission in Kabul would become an embassy; the upgrade took effect on 21 October. India did not recognise the Taliban government, but the step, taken as Afghanistan and Pakistan fought along the Durand Line, marked a decisive change from the policy of 2021.
04Strategic interests
India's interests are concrete: that Afghan soil should not shelter groups that target India, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, or the Islamic State's Khorasan province; that Pakistan should not gain the "strategic depth" in Afghanistan its army has long sought; that India should keep access to Central Asia; and that the goodwill India built among Afghans over two decades should not be lost.
The Taliban's quarrel with Pakistan has changed the board. Pakistan accuses Kabul of harbouring the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and has carried out air strikes in Afghanistan; Afghan and Pakistani forces fought along the Durand Line in October 2025 and intermittently since. Pakistan alleges Indian backing for militants on its soil, which India rejects. The Taliban, once seen in New Delhi as Pakistan's proxy, now seek India as a partner against Pakistani pressure.
The opposing view deserves weight. Critics argue that engaging a regime that bars women from education legitimises it and sits uneasily with India's democratic identity, and that the Taliban's assurances on terrorism are untested. Supporters reply that absence has never protected Indian interests in Afghanistan, that engagement is not recognition, and that humanitarian aid reaches Afghans only through those who control the country.
05Key agreements
- 1950Treaty of Friendship
Signed on 4 January 1950; the foundation of diplomatic relations.
- 2003Preferential Trade Agreement
Reduced tariffs on Afghan dry fruits and other products entering India.
- 2011Agreement on Strategic Partnership
Signed on 4 October 2011, Afghanistan's first strategic partnership; covered political, security, trade and development cooperation, including training of Afghan security forces.
- 2016Agreement on the Establishment of an International Transport and Transit Corridor (Chabahar)
Signed by India, Iran and Afghanistan on 23 May 2016 to develop the Chabahar route to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
- 2025Joint statement on the visit of the Afghan acting foreign minister
Issued during Amir Khan Muttaqi's visit in October 2025; recorded the Afghan commitment not to allow its territory to be used against India and India's decision to upgrade its mission in Kabul.
06Cooperation
Economy, connectivity, defence and technology: where the two work together, where they do not, and where cooperation could grow.
Economic relationship
Trade is small and constrained by geography. Pakistan denies India overland transit, so goods move by air freight corridors, first opened in 2017, or through Iran's Chabahar port, where India operates the Shahid Beheshti terminal. Afghan dry fruits and fresh produce reach Indian markets; Indian pharmaceuticals and food reach Afghanistan. India's assistance since 2021 has been humanitarian: tens of thousands of tonnes of wheat, medicines, vaccines and relief after the Herat earthquake of 2023 and the Kunar earthquake of 2025. The Taliban have invited Indian investment in mining and infrastructure, and the long-stalled TAPI gas pipeline was discussed again during Muttaqi's visit.
India’s merchandise trade with Afghanistan
2021–22 to 2025–26 · USD billion
- Exports 2025–26
- 0.3
- India to Afghanistan
- Imports 2025–26
- 0.7
- Afghanistan to India
- Two-way trade 2025–26
- 1.0
- Exports plus imports
- Trade deficit 2025–26
- 0.4
- Imports exceed exports
- Exports from India
- Imports into India
- Balance: exports minus imports
| Financial year | Exports from India | Imports into India | Balance (exports minus imports) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021–22 | 0.6 | 0.5 | +0.1 |
| 2022–23 | 0.4 | 0.5 | −0.1 |
| 2023–24 | 0.4 | 0.6 | −0.2 |
| 2024–25 | 0.3 | 0.7 | −0.4 |
| 2025–26 | 0.3 | 0.7 | −0.4 |
Unit: USD billion. Balance and two-way trade are calculated here from the published exports and imports.
Note: Merchandise trade only; services excluded. Indian financial years (April–March). Figures for 2025–26 are provisional and those for 2021–22 to 2024–25 revised, as published by the Reserve Bank of India from data compiled by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S) of the Department of Commerce.
Official dataSource: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026.
Trade and connectivity
Chabahar is India's answer to Pakistan's denial of transit: a sea route to Iran, then road and rail to Afghanistan and Central Asia, built under the trilateral agreement of 2016 among India, Iran and Afghanistan and linked to the International North–South Transport Corridor. Its viability depends on American sanctions policy towards Iran (the exemption granted in 2018 was revoked with effect from 29 September 2025, and the six-month waiver that followed ran until 26 April 2026) and, since 2026, on the war in Iran. The closure of Afghanistan–Pakistan crossings during their conflicts has pushed Afghan traders towards Iranian and Central Asian routes, increasing the value of Chabahar to Kabul (see connectivity corridors).
Defence and security
Counter-terrorism is the core of India's engagement. Resolution 2593 remains the international benchmark, and India judges the Taliban by whether groups that target India can operate from Afghanistan. The Taliban's ban on poppy cultivation from 2022 sharply reduced opium production, according to UNODC surveys, though methamphetamine and trafficking networks persist. The Islamic State's Khorasan province, an enemy of both the Taliban and India, has carried out attacks in Afghanistan and abroad. India has no security cooperation with the Taliban beyond diplomatic assurances and the protection of its mission.
Opportunities
- Restored diplomatic presence that allows India to protect its interests and its earlier investments.
- A Taliban government seeking partners beyond Pakistan.
- Humanitarian and health assistance that sustains Afghan goodwill.
- Trade through Chabahar and air corridors, and possible investment in mining.
- Regional diplomacy with Central Asia, Russia and Iran on stability and counter-terrorism.
07Points of disagreement
Border issues
India's official position is that it shares a boundary of 106 km with Afghanistan along the Wakhan corridor, in Gilgit-Baltistan, which is part of the Union Territory of Ladakh and currently under Pakistan's illegal occupation. This is why India regards itself as a neighbour of Afghanistan and treats Pakistan's denial of transit as the obstruction of a natural link.
Afghanistan's own border problem is the Durand Line of 1893, which no Afghan government, including the Taliban, has accepted as an international boundary. Pakistan treats it as the settled frontier; the disagreement underlies the fighting between the two since 2025.
Challenges
- Terrorist groups in Afghanistan, from those targeting India to the Islamic State's Khorasan province.
- The legitimacy problem of a regime that excludes women from education and public life.
- Lack of overland access and dependence on a Chabahar route exposed to US sanctions and war in Iran.
- Pakistani hostility to any Indian role, sharpened by the Afghanistan–Pakistan conflict.
- Limited leverage: aid and recognition are India's main instruments.
08Regional context
Afghanistan sits at the junction of South and Central Asia. India works on it through the United Nations, the Moscow Format of regional consultations and its dialogues with the Central Asian republics, Russia and Iran. Afghanistan's place in the SCO, as an observer and since 2025 a partner, has been dormant since 2021, and its seat in SAARC is unused. China has engaged the Taliban economically and diplomatically; Pakistan's leverage has fallen. The region's consensus — engagement without recognition, on counter-terrorism and humanitarian grounds — is the space India now occupies, slightly ahead of most democracies and behind Russia.
09India's diplomatic approach
India's approach has moved in four years from closure to humanitarian presence to calibrated normalisation. It combines aid that reaches the Afghan population, diplomatic presence in Kabul, insistence on counter-terrorism assurances and support for UN positions on inclusive government and women's rights. The approach is deliberately reversible: an embassy can be downgraded, and recognition has not been given.
The test is whether engagement produces the outcomes India wants. The Taliban's assurances on terrorism and its rift with Pakistan suit India; its treatment of women and its ties with other jihadist groups do not. A policy that engages without endorsing is defensible, but it requires India to keep saying publicly what it thinks of the regime's social policies while it deals with the regime.
10Competing interpretations
Competing perspectives
How the relationship looks from different standpoints. A strong answer weighs them rather than adopting one.
The security realist's reading
For a realist, India's turn towards the Taliban is the logic of Kautilya's mandala at work: a movement long treated in New Delhi as an instrument of Pakistan has become useful because its quarrel with Islamabad is real. Pakistani air strikes, fighting along the Durand Line and the closure of crossings push Kabul to look for other partners, and an Indian presence in Kabul helps deny Pakistan the strategic depth its army has long sought. The hawk adds a caution drawn from memory. The hijacking of IC-814 and the bombing of the embassy in 2008 are reminders of what Afghan soil has meant for India, the Taliban's assurances on terrorism remain untested, and the Islamic State's Khorasan province has carried out attacks in Afghanistan and abroad. Engagement is justified, on this view, only while it stays reversible.
The development and connectivity reading
An economic reading starts from what India built and what geography denies it. Two decades of roads, a dam, a parliament building, power lines, hospitals and scholarships, backed by commitments of more than US$3 billion, earned India goodwill among Afghans, and humanitarian aid since 2021 has kept that goodwill alive. Trade nonetheless remains small because Pakistan refuses overland transit, leaving India dependent on air freight and on Chabahar, a route exposed to American sanctions on Iran and to the war there. On this reading the ceiling of the relationship is set less by the character of the regime than by access. Taliban invitations to invest in mining and infrastructure, and renewed talk of the TAPI pipeline, will mean little until goods move reliably, which ties India's Afghanistan policy to American sanctions policy towards Iran.
The normative critique within India
Inside India the engagement is contested on grounds of identity as well as interest. Critics argue that dealing with a regime that bars girls from secondary school and women from universities and most paid work lends it legitimacy and sits uneasily with India's democratic identity, and that calls for an inclusive government lose force once an embassy has reopened. Public memory sharpens the objection, since the IC-814 hijacking, which ended with the release of Masood Azhar, fixed the Taliban in Indian minds as an arm of Pakistan. Defenders answer that engagement is not recognition, that absence never protected Indian interests and that aid reaches Afghans only through those who control the country. The domestic test is whether the government keeps saying in public what it thinks of the regime's treatment of women while it deals with the regime.
The view from Kabul
Seen from Kabul, India is a partner of growing value that still withholds what the Taliban want most. Recognition confers legitimacy as well as recording control, and India, which has accepted a Taliban chargé d'affaires but not recognised the government, stands behind Russia on that measure. What India offers instead is useful: humanitarian aid, an embassy that signals a return to normal dealings, a possible investor in mining and infrastructure, and a sea route through Chabahar that matters more each time the crossings with Pakistan close. India is also a counterweight to a neighbour whose claimed frontier, the Durand Line, no Afghan government has accepted. Yet authority sits with the leadership in Kandahar rather than with the ministers in Kabul who favour wider engagement, and the differences between them have not changed the policies on women that keep most states from recognising the regime.
Reading the relationship through IR theory
Realism explains most of India's course since 2021. A state that long treated the Taliban as an instrument of Pakistan now engages it because the Taliban's quarrel with Islamabad has made it useful. The logic is the balance of power; the older Indian vocabulary is Kautilya's mandala, in which the neighbour's neighbour is a natural friend. Pakistan's pursuit of strategic depth in Afghanistan and India's effort to deny it are a textbook case of security competition conducted by proxy.
Liberal institutionalism draws attention to the rules that frame the engagement. Resolution 2593 gives India a multilateral benchmark for judging the Taliban; the Security Council's 1988 sanctions regime, which lists Taliban leaders, required an exemption before Amir Khan Muttaqi could travel to India; and aid delivered through UN agencies lets India help Afghans without dealing only with the regime.
Constructivism explains why recognition matters so much to both sides. Recognising a government is a social act that confers legitimacy as well as recording control, which is why the Taliban seek it. Most states withhold it, citing above all the exclusion of women and the absence of an inclusive government, and India's formula of engagement without recognition is an attempt to pursue interests without endorsing the regime's values. Feminist scholars in the tradition of J. Ann Tickner add that the condition of Afghan women is not a side issue in these calculations but the clearest test of what security means for the people who live in the country.
11Contemporary developments
As of 20 November 2026
India now has an embassy in Kabul and the Taliban a chargé d'affaires in New Delhi, Mufti Noor Ahmad Noor, who took charge of the Afghan embassy in January 2026, but India has not recognised the Taliban government. Engagement has continued below the level of recognition: the visit of Afghanistan's agriculture minister, Mawlawi Ataullah Omari, on 7–12 July 2026 was, by the Ministry of External Affairs' count, the fourth ministerial visit from Afghanistan since October 2025, and the two foreign ministries held the fourth round of their Joint Committee in New Delhi on 9 July 2026, reviewing humanitarian aid, development projects, trade, visas and connectivity. The defining regional development is the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan. India condemned Pakistani air strikes on Afghan territory repeatedly in 2026: in February and March; at the end of June, when the Ministry of External Affairs called strikes in Paktia, Paktika and Kunar an assault on Afghanistan's sovereignty and a direct threat to regional peace; and again in late September and early October. Pakistan's foreign office has rejected the Indian statements and accuses India of backing militants on its soil, which India denies.
Humanitarian aid continues, but the route for trade has narrowed: the six-month American waiver for India's operations at Chabahar ran out on 26 April 2026 without a confirmed extension, and the war in Iran has disrupted the corridor. The Taliban's restrictions on women remain the obstacle to wider international acceptance, and India's position on recognition is unchanged.
12UPSC syllabus connections
Syllabus lines
GS-II
India and its neighbourhoodOfficial wording: “India and its neighborhood- relations.”
Where it is taught on this platformGS-II
Groupings and agreementsOfficial wording: “Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India's interests.”
Where it is taught on this platformPrelims
Current eventsOfficial wording: “Current events of national and international importance.”
Where it is taught on this platform
Quoted in UPSC’s official wording.
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
1 question · 2026
2026 · PSIR II · Q5(b) · 10 marks
What strategic options can India exercise as a response to the tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan ?
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to India and Afghanistan in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
Examine the evolution of India's policy towards the Taliban government since August 2021.
How to approach it
Trace closure, the technical team, the 2025 contacts and the embassy upgrade; weigh the case for engagement against the normative critique.
- Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
How has the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan affected India's strategic options in the region?
How to approach it
Explain the TTP and Durand Line issues; India's statements in 2026; risks of being drawn into Pakistan's narrative.
- Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Discuss the significance of UN Security Council Resolution 2593 for India's interests in Afghanistan.
How to approach it
State its demands; India's presidency; how India uses it as a benchmark.
- Q4UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
Can India pursue its interests in Afghanistan without recognising the Taliban regime? Discuss.
How to approach it
Distinguish recognition of states and governments; compare Russia's recognition; assess what India gains and loses by withholding it.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
13Relevant PSIR topics
Paper II · BUnit 3
India and South AsiaOfficial syllabus: “India and South Asia: (a) Regional Co-operation: SAARC – past performance and future prospects. (b) South Asia as a Free Trade Area. (c) India's "Look East" policy. (d) Impediments to regional co-operation: river water disputes; illegal cross-border migration; ethnic conflicts and insurgencies; border disputes.”
Paper II · BUnit 8
Recent Developments in Indian Foreign PolicyOfficial syllabus: “Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy: India's position on the recent crisis in Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia, growing relations with US and Israel; vision of a new world order.”
Each line is quoted from the official PSIR syllabus.
Explore further
Thinker
PSIR Optional
Organisation
Foreign policy
IB Global Politics
Timeline
Dictionary
Sources
- 01Ministry of External Affairs, India–Afghanistan relations (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
- 02UN Security Council Resolution 2593 (2021) (opens in a new tab). United Nations, 30 August 2021
- 03India upgrades technical mission in Kabul to embassy with immediate effect (opens in a new tab). ThePrint, 21 October 2025
- 04India restores embassy in Afghanistan as ties improve (opens in a new tab). Dawn, October 2025
- 05India's pragmatic turn in Taliban-era Afghanistan (opens in a new tab). Takshashila Institution, 12 January 2026
- 06India strongly condemns Pakistan's deadly air strikes in Afghanistan (opens in a new tab). IANS, 14 March 2026
- 07India condemns Pakistani aggression against Afghanistan (opens in a new tab). The Week, 22 September 2026
- 08India condemns Pakistan air strikes in Afghanistan as Taliban threaten retaliation (opens in a new tab). KabulNow, February 2026
- 09Avinash Paliwal, My Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal. Hurst, 2017
- 10India strongly condemns air strikes by Pakistan on Afghan territory: MEA (opens in a new tab). News on AIR, 29 June 2026
- 11Taliban diplomat to take charge of Afghanistan embassy in New Delhi (opens in a new tab). KabulNow, January 2026
- 12India engaging with US to ensure Chabahar projects continue under conditional sanctions waiver: MEA (opens in a new tab). The Tribune, 2026
- 13Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026
- 14Visit of Minister of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock of Afghanistan to India (July 07–12, 2026) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 12 July 2026
- 15India–Afghanistan Joint Committee Meeting (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 9 July 2026