Paper II · Part B · Unit 4
India and the Global South
From the Group of 77 and the NIEO to the WTO's green rooms and the Voice of the Global South: India's claim to speak for the developing world, and the interests behind it.
Official syllabus
India and the Global South: Relations with Africa and Latin America; leadership role in the demand for NIEO and WTO negotiations.
What the unit asks
The unit joins two subjects: India's relations with Africa and Latin America — linked to India by anti-colonial history, diaspora and development cooperation, and now by trade, energy, minerals and competition with China — and India's leadership in the developing world's economic diplomacy, from the demand for a New International Economic Order to the trade negotiations of GATT and the WTO.
The NIEO is historical, but the examiner expects it linked to India's present Global South diplomacy: the Voice of the Global South summits, the African Union's admission to the G20 and India's WTO positions. The critical question: is India the South's leader, its bridge to the North, or an emerging power pursuing its own interests in Southern language?
01India and the idea of the Global South
The term 'Third World', coined by Alfred Sauvy in 1952, gave way to 'the South' after the Brandt Report (1980) and to 'Global South' in recent decades: a political community of formerly colonised and developing states, not a geographical region. India's claim to belong to and lead it rests on anti-colonial history, the Bandung and NAM legacy, its role in the Group of 77 and its scale as the largest democracy among developing countries.
That claim was renewed in 2023: India convened the first Voice of the Global South summit in January, used its G20 presidency to secure the African Union's permanent membership at the New Delhi summit in September, and convened further summits in 2023 and 2024. Critics note that the South is heterogeneous (least developed countries, oil exporters, emerging powers) and that China competes for the same leadership. See India and the Global South and India's Contribution to the Non-Alignment Movement.
02India and Africa
India's ties with Africa run through Gandhi's years in South Africa (1893–1914), Indian diasporas in East and southern Africa, solidarity with liberation movements and India's early campaign against apartheid at the UN. The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation programme (1964) built a lasting network of trained African officials, and Indian troops have served in many UN missions in Africa, from the Congo in the 1960s to South Sudan.
Since 2008 India–Africa Forum Summits (2008, 2011 and 2015, the last with all African states invited) have institutionalised a partnership of lines of credit, scholarships, tele-education and tele-medicine networks, pharmaceuticals and trade. Energy and minerals, maritime security in the western Indian Ocean (Mauritius, Seychelles, Mozambique), and the International Solar Alliance give it strategic weight. India's model emphasises demand-driven, capacity-building cooperation; critics point to slower delivery than China's FOCAC-backed projects and to periodic attacks on Africans in India that damage goodwill. See SAGAR and MAHASAGAR.
03India and Latin America
Latin America was long distant from Indian priorities, linked mainly by multilateral solidarity in the G77 and NAM, and by Cuba and Mexico as early partners. Relations have grown since the 2000s on economic foundations: oil from Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico; copper and lithium from Chile and Argentina, where an Indian state-owned company signed lithium exploration agreements in 2024; Indian pharmaceuticals, information technology and vehicles in Latin American markets; and a preferential trade agreement with MERCOSUR (in force 2009).
Politically, Brazil is the key partner through IBSA (2003), BRICS and successive G20 presidencies held by India, Brazil and South Africa (2023–25). Dialogue with CELAC and Caribbean states, disaster relief and vaccine diplomacy during the pandemic broadened the relationship. Distance, limited diplomatic presence and the absence of a sustained high-level agenda remain constraints, and China's trade and investment dwarf India's across the region.
04Leadership in the demand for a NIEO
India was central to the developing world's economic campaign. At the first UN Conference on Trade and Development (Geneva, 1964) India helped form the Group of 77; the second UNCTAD was held in New Delhi in 1968, where the principle of a generalised system of preferences for developing-country exports was accepted. Indian economists and diplomats argued for commodity price stabilisation, aid targets, technology transfer, reform of the IMF and World Bank, and the link between special drawing rights and development finance.
The NAM summit at Algiers (1973) and the UN General Assembly's Sixth Special Session (1974) produced the Declaration and Programme of Action on the NIEO, which India championed. Indira Gandhi pressed North–South dialogue at the Cancún summit (1981), but the debt crisis and the neoliberal turn defeated the agenda. India's own later reforms after 1991 changed its economic diplomacy without ending its demand for fairer global rules; see Evolution of the International Economic System.
05India in GATT and WTO negotiations
India, a founding member of GATT (1947) and the WTO (1995), resisted the extension of trade rules to services and intellectual property in the Uruguay Round, accepting them only as part of a final package. At Doha (2001) India and others secured the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, affirming the right to protect access to medicines. India was a founding member of the developing-country G20 formed at Cancún (2003) and of the G33, defending food security and a special safeguard mechanism for farmers; disagreement over that mechanism between India and the United States contributed to the collapse of the July 2008 talks.
At Bali (2013) India insisted on protection for public stockholding for food security, obtaining a 'peace clause' extended indefinitely in 2014. With South Africa it proposed a TRIPS waiver for COVID-19 vaccines (2020), producing a narrower decision in 2022. At Abu Dhabi (2024) India opposed incorporating a plurilateral investment facilitation agreement. India's line has been consistent: policy space for development, food security and multilateralism over plurilateral rule-making.
06Assessing India's leadership
India's claim to leadership has real foundations: a long record in Southern coalitions, development partnerships without the conditionality of Western donors, and the credibility of a large democracy that remains, by income, a developing country. Its G20 presidency showed an ability to broker consensus and put Southern priorities (debt, development finance, digital public infrastructure) on the agenda.
Critics question both the leadership and its purpose. At the WTO developed countries often describe India as obstructionist, and least developed countries have sometimes diverged from India's positions. India's partnerships with the United States and the Quad raise doubts among some Southern states, while China's financial capacity outmatches India's in Africa and Latin America. A balanced view treats India as a bridge power whose Global South diplomacy serves both solidarity and national interest, credible to the extent that it delivers. See Reforming Global Governance.
Debates
Leader of the Global South or self-interested emerging power?
Supporters argue that India's interests and the South's largely coincide (fair trade rules, development finance, reform of global institutions) and that India has led on these for six decades. Sceptics argue that India invokes the South when convenient, has interests that diverge from poorer countries', and competes with other emerging powers rather than leading a bloc. Both are true at different moments; leadership depends on delivery.
Has India's WTO strategy protected development or blocked liberalisation?
Critics say India's vetoes and coalitions stalled the Doha Round and pushed others into plurilateral and regional deals that exclude India. Defenders reply that India protected food security and access to medicines for hundreds of millions, and that the Round failed because rich countries would not cut agricultural subsidies. The dispute reflects different views of what the multilateral trading system is for.
Answer strategy
Treat the unit as two halves joined by one argument. For Africa and Latin America, cover history, institutions (ITEC, India–Africa Forum Summits, IBSA, the MERCOSUR agreement), economic and strategic drivers, and the China comparison. For the NIEO and WTO, give India's coalitions, positions and outcomes with dates: 1964, 1968, 1974, 2001, 2003, 2008, 2013–14, 2020–22, 2024.
End with an assessment of India's leadership. Avoid unsourced trade figures. Common errors: describing the NIEO as if it still operated; omitting the developing-country coalitions (G20 at Cancún, G33); neglecting Latin America.
Readings
- Amrita Narlikar, International Trade and Developing Countries: Bargaining Coalitions in the GATT and WTO
- Amrita Narlikar, New Powers: How to Become One and How to Manage Them
- Rajiv Bhatia, India–Africa Relations: Changing Horizons
- Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World
- David M. Malone, Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy
- David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
7 questions · 2024–2026
2026 · PSIR II · Q5(a) · 10 marks
Describe India’s objections to agricultural negotiations at the World Trade Organisation.
2026 · PSIR II · Q5(e) · 10 marks
Analyse the relevance of India-Brazil economic co-operation in strengthening the bilateral relations between the two countries.
2026 · PSIR II · Q8(c) · 15 marks
Examine India and South-Africa co-operation through bilateral and multi-lateral forums.
2025 · PSIR II · Q7(b) · 15 marks
Trump’s unilateral imposition of reciprocal tariffs on scores of countries poses impending threat to the future of the rule-based multilateral global trading system under the WTO. What options do the WTO members have to salvage the organization?
2025 · PSIR II · Q8(b) · 15 marks
Discuss some of the key drivers of India’s new interests in Africa which might help in developing long-term comparative advantage over China.
2024 · PSIR II · Q5(c) · 10 marks
“Nothing is going to move within the WTO negotiations unless India is on board.” Discuss the main reasons behind India’s increased clout in the WTO.
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to India and the Global South in the PYQ dataset.All 7 in PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
'India's Africa policy has moved from solidarity to strategic partnership.' Examine.
How to approach it
Anti-colonial and anti-apartheid roots; ITEC and peacekeeping; Forum Summits; energy, minerals and maritime interests; China comparison.
- Q2PSIR style10 marks· 150 words
Why have India's relations with Latin America remained comparatively underdeveloped?
How to approach it
Distance and limited presence; trade complementarities in oil and minerals; IBSA and BRICS with Brazil; China's dominance.
- Q3PSIR style15 marks· 200 words
Assess India's leadership role in the developing world's demand for a New International Economic Order.
How to approach it
UNCTAD and G77; New Delhi 1968 and GSP; 1974 Declaration; Cancún; failure and legacy in G20 and climate finance.
- Q4PSIR style20 marks· 250 words
'India's WTO diplomacy has defended policy space for developing countries.' Critically examine.
How to approach it
Uruguay Round resistance; Doha TRIPS declaration; G20 and G33; 2008 collapse; public stockholding peace clause; TRIPS waiver; MC13 positions; critiques.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
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Sources
- 01UPSC, Civil Services Examination Notice: Scheme and Syllabus (Political Science and International Relations) (opens in a new tab). Union Public Service Commission
- 02Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (opens in a new tab)
- 03World Trade Organization, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 November 2001
- 04UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (A/RES/3201 (S-VI)), 1 May 1974
- 05G20 New Delhi Leaders' Declaration, 9 September 2023