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India's foreign policy · Doctrine

India and the Global South

From Bandung and the New International Economic Order to the Voice of the Global South summits: India's claim to speak for developing countries, the sources of its credibility, and the tension between solidarity and great-power ambition.

Overview

India's Global South diplomacy has an old lineage and a recent official form. The lineage runs from the Asian-African Conference at Bandung (1955) and the Non-Aligned Movement to the Group of 77 (1964) and the 1974 UN declaration on a New International Economic Order. The official form dates from India's G20 presidency. On 12–13 January 2023 India convened the first Voice of the Global South Summit, virtually, with some 125 developing countries, to gather priorities for the G20; a second followed on 17 November 2023 and a third on 17 August 2024, when Narendra Modi proposed a Global Development Compact built on trade for development, capacity building, technology sharing, and concessional finance and grants.

The term "Global South" is itself contested: it groups states as different as Saudi Arabia and Malawi, and is better understood as a political identity, rooted in the experience of colonialism and of under-representation in global institutions, than as an economic category.

01Lineage: from Bandung to the NIEO

In the 1950s and 1960s India was a leading voice of decolonisation and of developing countries' economic demands. It helped found the G77 at the first UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 and hosted the second UNCTAD in New Delhi in 1968. The New International Economic Order, declared by the General Assembly on 1 May 1974, called for fairer terms of trade, control over natural resources and reform of the monetary system. Most of its programme was not realised, but it established the claim that global economic rules were political choices that could be renegotiated.

02India's development partnership model

India presents itself as a partner rather than a donor. The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation programme, launched on 15 September 1964, has trained officials and professionals from across the developing world. Lines of credit through the Export-Import Bank, grants for infrastructure, and disaster and humanitarian relief extend the model. During the pandemic Vaccine Maitri supplied vaccines to many developing countries in 2021. Since 2023 India has offered digital public infrastructure, such as identity and payments systems, as a development public good, and established a Global South centre of excellence, DAKSHIN. The emphasis on demand-driven projects without policy conditions is a deliberate contrast with Western conditionality and with Chinese lending.

03Global South diplomacy since 2023

The G20 presidency was the platform. India used the Voice of the Global South summits to set agendas on debt, food and energy security and development finance, and secured permanent G20 membership for the African Union in September 2023. Brazil and South Africa continued the developing-country presidencies in 2024 and 2025. India has since carried the agenda into BRICS, which it chaired in 2026, into the WTO, where it defends food-security stockholding, and into climate negotiations, where it presses for finance proportionate to developing countries' needs.

04Credibility and contradictions

India's claim rests on solid ground: it is the largest developing democracy, its colonial history is shared by most of the South, and its positions, refusing to condemn Russia in ways the West demanded, defending policy space at the WTO, resonated with many developing states. But the claim has limits. India competes with China for Southern leadership, and China's financial resources are far larger. India's ties with the United States and Europe make some suspect it of being a bridge that leads in one direction. Its own interests diverge from those of the least developed countries on trade, fisheries and climate. And leadership invites the question of whom India represents when it speaks.

05The concept in theory

Postcolonial scholarship, drawing on writers such as Edward Said and Frantz Fanon, reads the Global South as a demand for epistemic and political recognition, not only for resources. Dependency and world-systems approaches read it as the periphery of a capitalist world economy. Realists see a rhetorical resource that rising states use to build coalitions for their own status. India's diplomacy draws on all three registers: it speaks the language of justice, criticises structures, and pursues influence.

06Reading it through IR theory

The perspectives above can be extended from the concept to India's conduct. Realism predicts the tension this entry identifies: as a state's power grows, its interests diverge from those of weaker partners, so Southern leadership is likely to be valued instrumentally, as a source of votes and bargaining weight in institutions where India seeks a larger place, and to be contested by China, a rival claimant with far greater resources. Liberal institutionalism explains why the G20 presidency mattered. Institutions amplify weaker states' voices when they act together, and India used its presidency to carry priorities gathered at the Voice of the Global South summits into the G20 and to secure permanent membership for the African Union. The lens also shows the limit: institutions amplify coalitions only while their members agree, which divergent interests on trade, fisheries and climate make difficult. Constructivism fits the entry's own definition of the Global South as a political identity. Such identities are made through shared memories of colonialism and present grievances about representation, and a claim to speak for the South depends on others recognising it, which is why the question of whom India represents remains open. Wallerstein's idea of a semi-periphery adds a critical twist: India sits between core and periphery, sharing grievances with the South while competing for a place among the powers, which may make it a broker of the existing system rather than its challenger. Solidarity and ambition are not opposites, but other developing states will watch their balance closely.

07India's options and the way forward

India's options turn on how it balances solidarity, delivery and ambition. One course is to deepen delivery, expanding training, credit lines, digital public infrastructure and disaster relief under the Global Development Compact; this builds credibility through results but is limited by financial resources far smaller than China's. A second is agenda leadership in institutions, carrying Southern demands on debt, development finance, food security and climate finance into the G20, BRICS, the WTO and climate negotiations; this raises India's profile but exposes it when its own interests diverge from those of poorer states, as on trade, fisheries and climate. A third is to present India as a bridge between the South and the West, using its ties with the United States and Europe to broker outcomes; this can deliver results but invites the suspicion that the bridge leads in one direction. A further choice concerns China: competing for leadership risks dividing the South, while cooperation in BRICS strengthens collective bargaining at the cost of India's distinct voice. On balance, India's claim will be judged by what it delivers and by its willingness to represent interests other than its own, especially where doing so costs India something.

Key points

  • Lineage: Bandung (1955), NAM (1961), G77 and UNCTAD (1964), NIEO (1974).
  • Official form: Voice of the Global South summits of January 2023, November 2023 and August 2024.
  • Global Development Compact (August 2024): trade, capacity building, technology, concessional finance.
  • Partnership model: ITEC (1964), credit lines, disaster relief, digital public infrastructure.
  • AU membership of the G20 (2023) is the signature achievement.
  • Constraints: competition with China, ties with the West, and divergent Southern interests.

Debates

Can a state seeking great-power status credibly lead the Global South?

Yes: leadership requires capacity; India's growth, technology and diplomatic reach let it deliver for others, and its own development challenges keep its interests aligned with the South's.

No: as India seeks a permanent Security Council seat and closer ties with the G7, its priorities diverge from those of poorer states; leadership becomes a means of status, and other developing countries notice.

Is the Global South a coalition or merely a category?

Coalition: on representation in international institutions, climate finance, debt and trade rules, developing states repeatedly act together, and the G77 remains the largest negotiating bloc at the UN.

Category: the group spans oil exporters and small islands, democracies and autocracies, China and the least developed countries; it agrees on grievances, not programmes, and fragments when choices become concrete.

Should India compete or cooperate with China for leadership of the Global South?

Compete: India's demand-driven partnership model, offered without policy conditions, differs deliberately from Chinese lending, and its standing as the largest developing democracy gives it a distinct voice; developing countries benefit from having a choice of partners, and leaving the field to China would let one power define the South's agenda.

Cooperate: rivalry divides developing countries and weakens their bargaining on representation, climate finance and trade rules, where they gain most by acting together; China's financial resources are far larger, so open competition on resources is one India cannot win.

The likeliest course combines the two: competition over models of partnership, and cooperation on shared institutional demands in forums such as BRICS.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

9 questions · 2024–2026

  1. 2026 · GS-II · Q10 · 10 marks

    “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.

  2. 2026 · PSIR II · Q5(a) · 10 marks

    Describe India’s objections to agricultural negotiations at the World Trade Organisation.

  3. 2026 · PSIR II · Q5(e) · 10 marks

    Analyse the relevance of India-Brazil economic co-operation in strengthening the bilateral relations between the two countries.

  4. 2026 · PSIR II · Q8(c) · 15 marks

    Examine India and South-Africa co-operation through bilateral and multi-lateral forums.

  5. 2025 · GS-II · Q9 · 10 marks

    India-Africa digital partnership is achieving mutual respect, co-development and long-term institutional partnerships. Elaborate.

  6. 2025 · PSIR II · Q3(c) · 15 marks

    Global South-sensitive model of globalization would prevent the danger emanating from overcentralized globalization. Discuss.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to India and the Global South in the PYQ dataset.All 9 in PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    India's Global South diplomacy combines solidarity with self-interest. Examine with reference to the Voice of the Global South summits and India's G20 presidency.

    How to approach it

    Agenda-setting, AU membership, DPI; status and competition with China; divergent interests.

  2. Q2PSIR style15 marks· 250 words

    Discuss India's leadership role in the demand for a New International Economic Order and its relevance today.

    How to approach it

    G77, UNCTAD II, 1974 declaration; why it stalled; continuities in today's demands on finance and representation.

  3. Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Evaluate digital public infrastructure as an instrument of India's development partnership.

    How to approach it

    G20 framework, adoption abroad, low cost; risks of dependence and data governance.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01Voice of the Global South Summits: Chair's summaries and Prime Minister's addresses (January 2023, November 2023, August 2024) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
  2. 02Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (General Assembly resolution 3201 (S-VI)). United Nations, 1 May 1974
  3. 03Independent Commission on International Development Issues (Brandt Commission), North–South: A Programme for Survival (1980)
  4. 04Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World (2007)