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Strategic and contemporary issues

Reforming Global Governance

India's case for 'reformed multilateralism': a permanent seat on the Security Council, a larger voice in the Bretton Woods institutions, development banks fit for global challenges, and a trade system with its umpire restored.

Overview

"Reformed multilateralism" is India's official shorthand for a demand that runs across every major institution: that the bodies built in 1944–45 be reshaped to reflect the world of the 2020s. Narendra Modi put the argument to the General Assembly on 26 September 2020, asking how long India would be kept out of the UN's decision-making structures; India framed its 2021–22 Security Council term around the same idea, and its 2023 G20 presidency around reform of the international financial institutions.

The demand has a principled and a self-interested side. The principle is legitimacy: institutions that exclude Africa, Latin America and the most populous state from permanent decision-making lose authority. The interest is status and influence: India wants a share of the power the institutions confer. The two are compatible, but critics note that India's demands focus on India's place more than on the institutions' performance.

01The Security Council

The core demand is a permanent seat. India pursues it with Brazil, Germany and Japan in the G4, which proposes expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories, and with a broader group of developing countries known as the L.69. The obstacles are structural: any amendment needs the consent of all five permanent members (Article 108), regional rivals in the Uniting for Consensus group oppose new permanent seats, and the African Union insists on its own common position. Intergovernmental negotiations since 2009 have not produced a negotiating text. The details are in the Security Council entry.

02Bretton Woods and development finance

In the IMF the 16th review of quotas agreed a 50 per cent increase without changing shares, and had still not taken effect in 2026; realignment towards emerging economies awaits a new formula. In the World Bank shareholding and the convention of an American president persist. India's G20 presidency pressed a reform agenda for multilateral development banks, based on an independent experts' report co-convened by N. K. Singh and Lawrence Summers, calling for much larger lending through better use of capital. India has also joined new institutions without abandoning the old: it is a founder of the New Development Bank and a founding member and the second-largest shareholder of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which began operations in 2016.

03Trade, technology and climate

At the WTO India seeks restoration of the Appellate Body, a permanent solution on public stockholding for food security and protection of special and differential treatment, while resisting plurilateral agreements adopted outside consensus. On technology it supported the Global Digital Compact of 2024 and convened the AI Impact Summit of February 2026, arguing for governance that includes developing countries. On climate it argues that finance must match need, and objected strongly to the finance goal adopted at Baku in 2024 (see climate diplomacy).

04The Pact for the Future and UN80

The Pact for the Future, adopted on 22 September 2024, commits members to intensify efforts on Council reform, to "redress the historical injustice" against Africa, and to reform the international financial architecture. Its commitments are general and its timetable absent. The Secretary-General's UN80 Initiative, launched in March 2025 in the middle of a cash crisis, pursues efficiency and consolidation rather than redistribution of power. India supports managerial reform but warns that cuts should not substitute for governance reform.

05Obstacles and strategies

Three forces work against reform. Incumbency: those who hold power in an institution can veto its redistribution. Retrenchment: the United States withdrew from the WHO (effective January 2026) and the Paris Agreement, and has cut funding to UN bodies, so that the leading power is reducing its commitment just as others seek a larger share. Alternatives: China's initiatives, culminating in a Global Governance Initiative announced in September 2025, offer reform on Chinese terms. India's strategy is to build coalitions issue by issue (the G4, IBSA, BRICS, the G20's developing-country presidencies), to work inside existing institutions while joining new ones selectively, and to present itself as a bridge between established and rising powers.

06Reading it through IR theory

Realism reads institutions as reflections of power. Mearsheimer argued that international institutions have little independent effect and mirror the distribution of capabilities, so a demand for reform is a demand for power, and incumbents will concede it only when exclusion becomes more costly than accommodation. The lens explains the obstacles well: the consent of all five permanent members required under Article 108, and regional rivals who oppose new permanent seats. It explains less well why rising states invest so heavily in arguments from legitimacy. Liberal institutionalism explains India's preference for reform over exit. On Keohane's account, institutions persist because they lower the costs of cooperation, so states with a stake in them seek a larger share rather than abandoning them, and India's support for the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank reflects the view that competition can act as a lever on incumbents. The lens tends to underestimate distributive conflict over votes and seats. Constructivism treats legitimacy as the currency of the debate: an institution's authority depends on being seen as representative, which is why India's case stresses the exclusion of Africa, Latin America and the most populous state. Critical theorists in the tradition of Gramsci would add that admitting new members to the top table can strengthen an existing hegemony by co-opting them, a risk for India's claim to speak for those who remain outside. Each lens clarifies a different obstacle, and together they explain why reform is slow.

07India's options and the way forward

India's options combine reform from inside, alternatives outside and coalitions across issues. On the Security Council, pressing for a permanent seat through the G4 keeps the goal alive against obstacles India cannot remove alone; accepting a permanent seat without a veto, if one were offered, would bring continuity and agenda influence but create a second class of permanent members. In the Bretton Woods institutions, India can press for a new quota formula and for larger lending by development banks, building on the experts' report of its G20 presidency, while using the NDB and AIIB as complements and sources of leverage. At the WTO, its priorities on the Appellate Body, public stockholding for food security and special and differential treatment protect developing countries' policy space, but set it against plurilateral agreements adopted outside consensus. Across all of these, coalition-building with Africa and other developing states strengthens the legitimacy argument, but requires India to champion reforms that serve others as well as itself. On balance, reform is likely to be incremental and uneven across institutions; India's influence will depend on combining patience with the selective use of alternatives, and on being seen to reform institutions for all rather than only for itself.

Key points

  • 'Reformed multilateralism' is India's official frame; Modi's UNGA address of 26 September 2020 set out the grievance.
  • Security Council reform via the G4 and the L.69; blocked by Article 108 and regional rivals.
  • IMF 16th quota review: 50 per cent increase without realignment, not yet effective in 2026.
  • India is a founder of the NDB and a founding member and second-largest shareholder of the AIIB.
  • Pact for the Future (2024) and UN80 (2025): commitments without timetables; efficiency rather than redistribution.
  • US retrenchment and China's initiatives complicate the reform agenda.

Debates

Should India accept a permanent seat without a veto?

Yes: permanence brings continuity, information and agenda influence; a seat without veto would still be a historic gain, and insisting on the veto guarantees no reform at all.

No: a permanent seat without the veto creates a second class of permanent members and entrenches inequality; India would bear responsibility without power, and the existing five would keep their privilege.

Reform from within or build alternatives?

From within: existing institutions have legal authority, universal membership and expertise; alternatives fragment governance and, in practice, enlarge China's influence.

Build alternatives: incumbents reform only when they face competition; the NDB and AIIB pushed the World Bank to change, and parallel institutions give rising states leverage and options.

Should India give priority to Security Council reform or to reform of the international financial institutions?

Security Council first: a permanent seat is the clearest recognition of status and the core of India's demand; institutions that exclude Africa, Latin America and the most populous state lose authority, and progress elsewhere would not substitute for a voice on questions of war and peace.

Financial institutions first: Council reform is blocked by Article 108, regional rivals and the African Union's own common position, and negotiations since 2009 have produced no text; quota realignment and development-bank reform are more attainable, deliver resources to India and other developing countries, and build coalitions that may later support Council reform.

The priorities need not be exclusive, but diplomatic capital is finite. A sequence that banks achievable financial reforms while keeping the Council claim alive is the more realistic course.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

5 questions · 2024–2026

  1. 2026 · GS-II · Q10 · 10 marks

    “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.

  2. 2025 · GS-II · Q20 · 15 marks

    “The reform process in the United Nations remains unresolved, because of the delicate imbalance of East and West and entanglement of the USA vs. Russo-Chinese alliance.” Examine and critically evaluate the East-West policy confrontations in this regard.

  3. 2025 · PSIR II · Q2(b) · 15 marks

    The withdrawal of the United States of America from the World Health Organization is set to have far-reaching impacts on global health. Reimagining the existing WHO is vital for the global health agenda. Discuss.

  4. 2024 · PSIR II · Q5(a) · 10 marks

    “India must strive to become a semi-permanent member of the UNSC, rather than a permanent member without the right to veto.” Comment.

  5. 2024 · PSIR II · Q6(c) · 15 marks

    Discuss the potential role that India could play as the leader of the Global South in realising the goal of establishing a new international economic order in the 21st century.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Reforming Global Governance in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    'Reformed multilateralism' combines a claim to legitimacy with a claim to power. Examine India's approach to the reform of global institutions.

    How to approach it

    UNSC, IMF and World Bank, WTO; principle and interest; coalitions; obstacles.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Evaluate the significance of India's G20 presidency for the reform of multilateral development banks.

    How to approach it

    Experts' report, capital adequacy, scale of lending; follow-up under later presidencies.

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks· 250 words

    Assess the prospects of Security Council reform in the light of the Pact for the Future.

    How to approach it

    Negotiating groups and positions; Article 108; the Pact's commitments; India's options.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01Prime Minister's address to the 75th session of the UN General Assembly (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 26 September 2020
  2. 02Pact for the Future (General Assembly resolution 79/1). United Nations, 22 September 2024
  3. 03Strengthening Multilateral Development Banks: The Triple Agenda (Report of the G20 Independent Experts Group), 2023
  4. 0416th General Review of Quotas: Frequently Asked Questions (opens in a new tab). IMF
  5. 05Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers (2006)
  6. 06Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order (2014)