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Paper II · Part B · Unit 8

Recent Developments in Indian Foreign Policy

Afghanistan from 2001 to the Taliban's return, Iraq from 1991 to the Islamic State, West Asia from the Arab uprisings to Gaza, the American and Israeli partnerships, and India's idea of the order it wants.

Official syllabus

Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy: India's position on the recent crisis in Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia, growing relations with US and Israel; vision of a new world order.

What the unit asks

The syllabus line was written when 'recent' meant the wars in Afghanistan (from 2001) and Iraq (from 2003) and the new partnerships with the United States and Israel. Those episodes remain the foundation of the unit. But the examiner expects the story brought to the present: Afghanistan after the Taliban's return in August 2021, West Asia after 7 October 2023 and the Israel–Iran war of 2025, India's Gulf partnerships, and the frictions as well as the depth of the American relationship.

The final phrase, vision of a new world order, asks what India's choices add up to; see Indian Foreign Policy and Changing International Political Order.

01Afghanistan: from partner state to Taliban rule

After 2001 India supported the Bonn process and the Karzai government, and became one of Afghanistan's largest regional donors without sending troops: the Zaranj–Delaram road, the parliament building (2015), the Afghan–India Friendship Dam (2016), scholarships and training. A Strategic Partnership Agreement (2011) was Afghanistan's first with any country. Attacks on Indian missions, including the Kabul embassy bombing of 2008, showed the cost of this presence. The US–Taliban agreement at Doha (2020), which excluded India, foreshadowed the outcome.

When Kabul fell on 15 August 2021 India evacuated its nationals and closed its embassy. Under India's Council presidency, Resolution 2593 (August 2021) demanded that Afghan territory not be used for terrorism. India then moved to pragmatic engagement: humanitarian wheat and medical aid, a technical team in Kabul from 2022, meetings with Taliban ministers and, after the Taliban foreign minister's visit to New Delhi in October 2025, a decision to upgrade its mission. India still does not formally recognise the Taliban government. See Afghanistan.

02Iraq: from the Gulf War to the Islamic State

India's Iraq policy has been shaped by energy, diaspora and non-intervention. In 1990–91 India carried out one of the largest civilian evacuations in history from Kuwait and Iraq; the Chandra Shekhar government's permission for refuelling of American military aircraft during the Gulf War provoked domestic controversy and was withdrawn. India called for a peaceful settlement within the UN framework.

The 2003 invasion, launched without explicit Security Council authorisation, drew a unanimous parliamentary resolution in April 2003 deploring the military action, and in July 2003 the government declined an American request for Indian troops, despite the improving relationship with Washington — an early demonstration of strategic autonomy within partnership. After 2003 Iraq became one of India's largest suppliers of crude oil. The rise of the Islamic State in 2014 led to the rescue of Indian nurses from Tikrit and the later confirmation that thirty-nine Indian workers abducted in Mosul had been killed. See Energy Security.

03West Asia: uprisings, rivalries and wars

During the Arab uprisings India stressed sovereignty and non-intervention: on the Security Council it abstained on Resolution 1973 authorising action in Libya (2011) and opposed externally driven regime change in Syria. It evacuated citizens from Libya and from Yemen (Operation Raahat, 2015). Its interests (energy, millions of workers and their remittances, trade and investment) led to a Link West policy: a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with the UAE (2022), a Strategic Partnership Council with Saudi Arabia (2019), the I2U2 grouping with Israel, the UAE and the United States, and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (2023). See Connectivity Corridors.

After Hamas's attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, India condemned terrorism, called for humanitarian access and restated support for a two-state solution, voting variously on General Assembly resolutions. The Indian Navy deployed against piracy and attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea. During the Israel–Iran war of June 2025, India evacuated its nationals and urged de-escalation, while its Chabahar port investment in Iran faced renewed American sanctions pressure. See Global Conflicts and India's Positions.

04Growing relations with the United States

The partnership's history is in India and the Global Centres of Power. The landmarks are the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (2004), the civil nuclear agreement (2005–08), Major Defence Partner status (2016), the foundational defence agreements (2016–20), the revived Quad and the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership (2020). A technology initiative (2023) was expanded in 2025.

The relationship's drivers (China's rise, technology, defence, diaspora and trade) remain strong, but so do its limits. India has declined alliance obligations, kept close ties with Russia and Iran, and resisted American positions on trade and data. In 2025 steep American tariffs on Indian goods, justified partly by India's purchases of Russian oil, and restrictions affecting skilled migration tested the partnership. The relationship is broad and institutionalised, but asymmetric and exposed to American domestic politics. See United States.

05Growing relations with Israel

India recognised Israel in 1950 but established full diplomatic relations only in January 1992, after the end of the Cold War and the Madrid peace process. Cooperation grew fastest in defence (air defence, surveillance aircraft, drones and missiles), intelligence and counter-terrorism, and agriculture and water management. Prime Minister Modi's visit in July 2017 (the first by an Indian prime minister) was described as 'de-hyphenation': India's relations with Israel and with Palestine would be conducted separately. He visited Ramallah in February 2018.

The partnership coexists with India's support for a Palestinian state, humanitarian aid and, at times, critical votes at the UN. After 7 October 2023 India quickly condemned the attack as terrorism while calling for restraint and humanitarian access in Gaza. Critics argue that India has tilted towards Israel; defenders reply that it pursues interests with both while upholding the two-state position. See Defence Diplomacy.

06Vision of a new world order

India's vision has evolved but kept a core. Nehru imagined a cooperative 'one world' built on the UN, decolonisation and disarmament; the 1970s added economic justice through the NIEO. After the Cold War India sought a multipolar world and, increasingly, a multipolar Asia, rejecting both unipolarity and a China-centred regional order. Its current formulation combines reformed multilateralism (Security Council and Bretton Woods reform), a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific (articulated at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018), maritime cooperation through SAGAR and MAHASAGAR, Global South leadership, climate justice, digital public infrastructure as a global public good and zero tolerance for terrorism. The G20 theme of 2023, Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam ('One Earth, One Family, One Future'), gave it civilisational language.

Critics note gaps between vision and capacity, tensions between Global South solidarity and partnership with the West, and the difficulty of a multipolar order when Asia's balance is shaped by China. See The Changing World Order, Reforming Global Governance and India's Indo-Pacific.

Debates

Has India's West Asia policy tilted, or balanced?

One reading sees a shift from Nehruvian solidarity with the Arab world and Palestine towards Israel, the Gulf monarchies and the United States. Another sees successful balancing: India has strategic partnerships with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran at the same time, a feat few powers manage, and retains the two-state position. The Gaza war tested this balance more than any earlier crisis.

Should India engage the Taliban?

Advocates of engagement argue that Afghanistan's stability, connectivity to Central Asia, counter-terrorism and the welfare of Afghans require dealing with whoever governs Kabul, and that absence cedes ground to Pakistan and China. Critics argue that engagement legitimises a regime that excludes women from public life and has links to terrorist groups. India's course (humanitarian and practical engagement without recognition) tries to capture the benefits of contact without its costs.

Answer strategy

Treat each crisis historically and then update it: Afghanistan 2001–21 and after 2021; Iraq in 1990–91, 2003 and 2014; West Asia from the Arab uprisings to Gaza and the 2025 Israel–Iran war. Then show how the US and Israel partnerships grew while India kept relations with Iran, Russia and the Arab world, and end with India's world-order vision and its feasibility.

Date contemporary claims and avoid unverified figures. Common errors: treating the syllabus's 'recent' crises as current without noting what has changed; ignoring the Gulf; presenting the US and Israel relationships without their limits.

Readings

  • S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World
  • C. Raja Mohan, Modi's World: Expanding India's Sphere of Influence
  • Shivshankar Menon, India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present
  • P. R. Kumaraswamy, India's Israel Policy
  • Harsh V. Pant, India's Afghan Muddle: A Lost Opportunity
  • David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan and Srinath Raghavan (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

9 questions · 2024–2026

  1. 2026 · PSIR II · Q5(b) · 10 marks

    What strategic options can India exercise as a response to the tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan ?

  2. 2026 · PSIR II · Q5(c) · 10 marks

    Discuss the three areas of security co-operation between India and Israel.

  3. 2026 · PSIR II · Q8(b) · 15 marks

    India has recognised that West Asia is not a single contest, but a tangle of rivalries, bargains and anxieties. Comment.

  4. 2025 · PSIR II · Q5(c) · 10 marks

    For India, a multipolar world order would also mean a multipolar Asia. Comment.

  5. 2025 · PSIR II · Q6(b) · 15 marks

    India maintains strong ties with countries that will assure a free and open Indo-Pacific and guarantee greater connectivity with rest of the world. Analyze.

  6. 2025 · PSIR II · Q7(c) · 15 marks

    NonAlignment 2·0 underscores India’s unique aspiration to emerge as a site for an alternative universality. Comment.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Recent Developments in Indian Foreign Policy in the PYQ dataset.All 9 in PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1PSIR style10 marks· 150 words

    Examine India's position on the Iraq war of 2003. What did it reveal about India's approach to its partnership with the United States?

    How to approach it

    Parliamentary resolution and troop refusal; UN authorisation; energy and diaspora; strategic autonomy within a growing partnership.

  2. Q2PSIR style15 marks· 200 words

    'India's Afghanistan policy has moved from non-engagement to pragmatic engagement with the Taliban.' Discuss.

    How to approach it

    Development partnership 2001–21; exclusion from Doha; August 2021; Resolution 2593; aid, technical mission and 2025 upgrade; recognition question.

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks· 200 words

    Assess the transformation of India–Israel relations and its impact on India's policy towards West Asia.

    How to approach it

    1950 recognition to 1992 normalisation; defence and technology; 2017 visit and de-hyphenation; I2U2 and IMEC; Palestine and the Gaza war.

  4. Q4PSIR style20 marks· 250 words

    What is India's vision of a new world order? How far is it realisable?

    How to approach it

    Nehruvian roots; multipolarity; reformed multilateralism; Indo-Pacific and SAGAR; Global South and G20; constraints of capacity, China and alliance politics.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01UPSC, Civil Services Examination Notice: Scheme and Syllabus (Political Science and International Relations) (opens in a new tab). Union Public Service Commission
  2. 02Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India: statements and bilateral briefs (opens in a new tab)
  3. 03UN Security Council Resolution 2593, 30 August 2021
  4. 04UN Security Council Resolution 1973, 17 March 2011
  5. 05G20 New Delhi Leaders' Declaration, 9 September 2023