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Strategic and contemporary issues

Space Diplomacy

From a satellite for South Asia to the Artemis Accords: how India uses a frugal, increasingly commercial space programme as an instrument of partnership, prestige and deterrence.

Overview

India's space programme began as a development project. The Indian National Committee for Space Research was formed in 1962 and the Indian Space Research Organisation in 1969, with the stated purpose of applying space technology to national needs such as communications, weather forecasting and education. The first Indian satellite, Aryabhata, was launched by the Soviet Union in 1975, and the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment of 1975–76 used an American satellite to broadcast to Indian villages. Cooperation with both superpowers was built in from the start.

Half a century later, space serves Indian foreign policy in four ways: as prestige (lunar and solar missions), as partnership (launches, data and joint missions), as regional diplomacy (satellites for neighbours) and as deterrence (military space capabilities). India ratified the Outer Space Treaty in 1982.

01Prestige and capability

India reached Mars orbit at its first attempt in September 2014, launched a record 104 satellites on a single rocket in February 2017, and on 23 August 2023 Chandrayaan-3 made the first landing near the Moon's south pole, a date India now marks as National Space Day. Aditya-L1, launched in September 2023, observes the Sun. These missions were cheap by international standards, and that frugality is part of the message: advanced capability without great-power budgets.

02Space as regional diplomacy

In 2014 Narendra Modi proposed a SAARC satellite. When Pakistan declined to take part, India launched the South Asia Satellite on 5 May 2017 for the other neighbours, offering communications and disaster-management services free of charge. India shares remote-sensing data in disasters, trains scientists from developing countries, and launches small satellites for partners. It joined the BRICS agreement on a virtual constellation of remote-sensing satellites in 2021.

03Partnerships with major powers

India signed the US-led Artemis Accords on 21 June 2023, accepting principles for civil exploration of the Moon and beyond. The NASA–ISRO radar satellite NISAR was launched from Sriharikota on 30 July 2025, and in June–July 2025 Shubhanshu Shukla became the first Indian to visit the International Space Station, on a commercial mission. Russia trained the first group of Indian astronauts for the Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme; France and Japan are partners in Earth observation and lunar exploration. Space also features in the Quad's working groups and in India's technology partnerships.

04Security and governance

On 27 March 2019, in Mission Shakti, India destroyed one of its own satellites in low orbit with a ground-launched missile, becoming the fourth state to demonstrate such a capability. The government stressed that the test was conducted at low altitude to limit debris and was not directed at any country. A Defence Space Agency was created the same year. India supports preventing an arms race in outer space but has not joined the moratorium on destructive anti-satellite missile tests proposed by the United States in 2022, which would have constrained a capability it had only just shown.

05Commercialisation and reform

Since 2020 India has opened the sector to private firms. A promotion and authorisation agency, IN-SPACe, was set up in 2020; NewSpace India Limited markets ISRO launches; the Indian Space Policy 2023 set out the roles of public and private actors; and foreign investment rules were eased in February 2024. A private Indian company flew a sub-orbital rocket in 2022, and ISRO's heavy launcher has carried commercial constellations. The government plans an Indian space station, the Bharatiya Antariksh Station, by 2035. India's share of the global space economy remains small, and commercial success, not prestige missions, will decide whether space becomes a significant export.

06Reading it through IR theory

Realism sees space as another arena of power and status. Mission Shakti demonstrated a counter-space capability, and India's refusal to join the moratorium on destructive anti-satellite tests follows a realist logic: a ban adopted after others have tested freezes their advantage, and a state watching China's counter-space programme expand keeps its options open. Realism says less about why India built its programme on cooperation with both superpowers from the start. Liberal institutionalism explains that cooperation. The Outer Space Treaty, the Artemis Accords and joint missions such as NISAR reduce costs, pool data and set expectations, and orbital debris is a classic collective-action problem that only rules accepted by all can manage. The difficulty is that space governance is dividing between a US-led framework and states that reject it, so that institutional choices become alignments. Constructivism, together with Nye's idea of soft power, highlights prestige and identity. Missions achieved at low cost, such as the landing near the lunar south pole, project the image of a frugal and capable developing country, and the South Asia Satellite, offered free of charge to neighbours, framed technology as a regional public good, an identity rooted in a programme founded for development. Prestige alone, however, does not create a significant export industry, which depends on markets, investment and regulation. A combined reading sees Indian space policy as autonomy-minded realism pursued through cooperative institutions and justified by a developmental identity.

07India's options and the way forward

India's choices concern security, partnerships and commercial growth. On security, joining the moratorium on destructive anti-satellite tests would strengthen India's claim to responsible stewardship and protect an orbital environment on which its own satellites depend, at the cost of formally limiting a capability while China's counter-space programme expands; continued abstention preserves options but sits uneasily with India's support for preventing an arms race in outer space. On partnerships, the Artemis Accords and NISAR tie India more closely to the United States, while Russia's role in astronaut training and cooperation with France and Japan show that diversification remains possible; the trade-off is between depth with the United States and freedom to work with all. On commerce, the reforms since 2020 have opened the sector to private firms, but India's share of the global space economy remains small, and regulatory clarity and investment will matter more than prestige missions. Regionally, the South Asia Satellite shows how space services can serve neighbourhood diplomacy, and similar offers could be extended to other developing countries. On balance, India's space diplomacy is likely to remain multi-directional, with its weight depending increasingly on commercial capability rather than symbolic firsts.

Key points

  • Programme founded for development: INCOSPAR (1962), ISRO (1969), Aryabhata (1975).
  • Chandrayaan-3 landed near the lunar south pole on 23 August 2023.
  • South Asia Satellite launched on 5 May 2017 after Pakistan opted out.
  • Artemis Accords signed on 21 June 2023; NISAR launched on 30 July 2025.
  • Mission Shakti anti-satellite test on 27 March 2019; India has not joined the 2022 test moratorium.
  • Reforms since 2020 opened the sector to private firms; a space station is planned by 2035.

Debates

Should India join the moratorium on destructive anti-satellite missile tests?

Join: debris endangers every state's satellites, India included; joining would strengthen India's claim to responsible stewardship and costs little now that its capability is demonstrated.

Stay out: the moratorium freezes an advantage for states that tested earlier and does not cover non-destructive counter-space weapons; India should not bind itself while China's counter-space programme expands.

Did signing the Artemis Accords compromise India's strategic autonomy in space?

Yes, partly: the Accords are a US-led framework that China and Russia reject, and signing places India in one camp of an emerging lunar rivalry.

No: the Accords are non-binding principles consistent with the Outer Space Treaty; India continues to work with Russia, France and Japan, and gains access to the partnership most likely to deliver lunar missions.

Should India's space programme give priority to prestige missions or to commercial capability?

Prestige: reaching Mars orbit, the Chandrayaan-3 landing and Aditya-L1 have built status and partnerships at low cost, and plans for human spaceflight and a space station sustain India's standing among spacefaring states; prestige also attracts the partners and customers on which commerce depends.

Commerce: India's share of the global space economy remains small, and only commercial success will make space a significant export; IN-SPACe, NewSpace India Limited, the Space Policy of 2023 and eased foreign investment rules point the state towards enabling private firms rather than leading every activity itself.

The two are linked rather than opposed, but the direction of reform since 2020 suggests that the state increasingly sees itself as an enabler of a commercial sector rather than its sole actor.

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Space has become an instrument of Indian foreign policy. Examine with reference to regional, partnership and security dimensions.

    How to approach it

    South Asia Satellite; Artemis, NISAR and Gaganyaan; Mission Shakti; commercial reforms.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Assess the significance of Mission Shakti for India's security and for the governance of outer space.

    How to approach it

    Deterrence and status; debris; the 2022 moratorium; PAROS.

  3. Q3UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Can India's space sector become a significant export industry? Discuss the role of policy reforms since 2020.

    How to approach it

    IN-SPACe, NSIL, Space Policy 2023, FDI rules; private launchers; competition.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01Indian Space Research Organisation (opens in a new tab). Department of Space, Government of India
  2. 02Indian Space Policy 2023. Department of Space, Government of India, April 2023
  3. 03Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (1967)
  4. 04Statement on Mission Shakti (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 27 March 2019
  5. 05The Artemis Accords. NASA, 2020
  6. 06Brian Harvey, Henk H. F. Smid and Théo Pirard, Emerging Space Powers: The New Space Programs of Asia, the Middle East and South America (2010)