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Strategic and contemporary issues

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism

Cross-border terrorism as the central security challenge of Indian foreign policy: the long push for a comprehensive UN convention, the use of FATF and UN sanctions, and a doctrine of punitive response stated after Operation Sindoor in May 2025.

Overview

India has faced terrorism for four decades: the Punjab insurgency of the 1980s, militancy in Jammu and Kashmir since 1989, the Mumbai bombings of 1993, the attack on Parliament on 13 December 2001, the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, and attacks at Pathankot and Uri (2016), Pulwama (2019) and Pahalgam, where 26 people, most of them tourists, were killed on 22 April 2025. India's settled position is that much of this violence is organised by groups based in Pakistan and sustained by elements of the Pakistani state, which Pakistan denies.

Counter-terrorism therefore shapes Indian diplomacy at every level: bilateral relations with Pakistan, the neighbourhood, partnerships with the major powers, and normative work at the United Nations.

01Normative diplomacy at the United Nations

India proposed a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism in 1996. Negotiations stalled over definitions: whether to exclude the actions of national liberation movements and of states' armed forces. India's view is that no cause justifies terrorism. The Security Council's sanctions regime under resolution 1267 (1999) lists terrorists linked to Al-Qaida and ISIL; India has used it persistently, but listings require consensus in the committee, and Chinese "technical holds" delayed several, including Masood Azhar, listed only in May 2019. During its 2021–22 Council term India chaired the Counter-Terrorism Committee, which met in Mumbai and New Delhi in October 2022 and adopted the Delhi Declaration on the use of new technologies by terrorists.

02Financial and multilateral tools

India has been a member of the Financial Action Task Force since 2010 and pressed for Pakistan's placement on its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring, where Pakistan stayed from June 2018 to October 2022. It hosted the third "No Money for Terror" ministerial conference in New Delhi in November 2022. Counter-terrorism language features in SCO and BRICS declarations, which India values precisely because China and Pakistan sign or negotiate them, and the Quad created a working group on counter-terrorism in 2023. Bilateral working groups with the United States, the EU and others share intelligence and legal assistance.

03From restraint to punitive response

Through the 2000s India responded to major attacks mainly with diplomacy and mobilisation, as in the standoff of 2001–02. Since 2016 it has used force: strikes across the Line of Control after Uri (29 September 2016), an air strike at Balakot after Pulwama (26 February 2019), and Operation Sindoor after Pahalgam, with strikes on nine sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir on 7 May 2025. After four days of hostilities the two sides' military operations directorates agreed to stop firing on 10 May; India's position is that the understanding was reached bilaterally, without third-party mediation.

In his address of 12 May 2025 Narendra Modi set out what officials have since treated as doctrine: a terrorist attack on India will receive a response on India's terms; India will not tolerate nuclear blackmail; and it will draw no distinction between terrorists and the governments that sponsor them. India also held the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance from 23 April 2025 and sent all-party parliamentary delegations to some thirty countries to present its case. In July 2025 the United States designated The Resistance Front, which claimed the Pahalgam attack, as a foreign terrorist organisation.

04Dilemmas

The punitive doctrine raises three questions. Escalation: each round, from 2016 to 2025, has been larger, and both states are nuclear-armed (see nuclear doctrine). Diplomacy: India's insistence on bilateralism sits uneasily with its campaign for international pressure on Pakistan, and other states have urged restraint on both sides. Rights: counter-terrorism laws such as the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act attract criticism at home and abroad, which adversaries exploit. New threats, drones, encrypted communications, online radicalisation and the link between narcotics and terrorism, require cooperation even with states India distrusts; the SCO's Bishkek Declaration of September 2026 supported cooperation against narco-terrorism and rejected double standards.

05Reading it through IR theory

Realism explains the state dimension of the problem. If, as India holds, groups based in Pakistan are sustained by elements of the Pakistani state, terrorism functions as an instrument of policy, and the shift from restraint to punitive strikes is an attempt at deterrence by punishment, raising the costs to the sponsor rather than only to militants. Glenn Snyder's stability–instability paradox explains why the nuclear balance has not prevented these crises: stability at the strategic level can encourage violence below it, while each side's confidence that escalation will be contained is itself a risk. Realism has less to say about ideology and online radicalisation. Liberal institutionalism illuminates India's multilateral strategy. The 1267 sanctions regime, the FATF's monitoring list and declarations in the SCO, BRICS and the Quad raise the costs of sponsorship by pooling information and pressure, and Pakistan's years under increased monitoring suggest that institutions can impose costs. Their weakness lies in design: consensus rules allowed Chinese holds to delay listings. Constructivism focuses on the politics of definition. The stalled comprehensive convention shows that whether violence is labelled terrorism, resistance or legitimate force is socially contested, and India's insistence that no cause justifies terrorism is an effort to establish a norm. The Copenhagen School's idea of securitisation adds a critical caution: framing an issue as an existential threat can justify emergency measures, a lens that helps explain the criticism that laws such as the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act attract on rights grounds.

06India's options and the way forward

India's options combine deterrence, defence, diplomacy and law. Maintaining the punitive doctrine set out in May 2025 signals that attacks will carry costs for sponsors, but each round has been larger than the last and the doctrine depends on restraint by a nuclear-armed adversary; investing more in defence, intelligence and governance in Jammu and Kashmir may reduce the frequency of attacks at lower escalation risk, though it lacks the signalling value of strikes. Diplomatically, India can continue to use the 1267 regime, the FATF and declarations in the SCO, BRICS and the Quad to isolate sponsors, while recognising that consensus rules allow China to delay listings and that its insistence on bilateralism with Pakistan limits the role it can ask others to play. Normatively, India can keep pressing for the comprehensive convention as a long-term goal while concentrating on narrower instruments on terrorist financing, new technologies and narco-terrorism, where agreement is more attainable, as the Delhi Declaration and the SCO's Bishkek text suggest. Domestically, the credibility of India's case abroad also depends on counter-terrorism laws that withstand scrutiny on rights. On balance, a combination of credible deterrence, stronger defence and patient multilateral work offers the best prospect, with the central trade-off lying between the signalling value of force and the risk of escalation.

Key points

  • India proposed the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism in 1996; it remains stalled over definitions.
  • UN 1267 listings require consensus; Chinese holds delayed several, including Masood Azhar (listed May 2019).
  • Pakistan was on FATF's increased-monitoring list from June 2018 to October 2022.
  • Force since 2016: Uri strikes (2016), Balakot (2019), Operation Sindoor (7 May 2025).
  • 12 May 2025 principles: response on India's terms; no nuclear blackmail; no distinction between terrorists and sponsors.
  • The Indus Waters Treaty has been in abeyance since 23 April 2025.

Debates

Has India's punitive doctrine strengthened deterrence against cross-border terrorism?

Yes: imposing costs on the sponsor rather than only on militants changes the calculus; repeated strikes have shown that the nuclear shadow does not give Pakistan immunity, and the international community has largely accepted India's right to respond.

Not clearly: major attacks recurred after 2016 and 2019; each round escalates, and deterrence by punishment depends on restraint by an adversary whose army gains domestic standing from confrontation. Defence, intelligence and governance in Jammu and Kashmir may matter more.

Should a global convention exclude armed forces and liberation movements from the definition of terrorism?

Exclude: states' armed forces are governed by the laws of war, and peoples under occupation have recognised rights of resistance; without these exclusions many states will not sign.

Do not exclude: deliberate attacks on civilians are terrorism whoever commits them; exclusions create loopholes that sponsors exploit, which is why India insists that no cause justifies terrorism.

Is holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance a legitimate instrument of counter-terrorism?

Legitimate: treaties presuppose good faith, and a state that India holds responsible for sponsoring terrorism cannot expect cooperation to continue unchanged; abeyance imposes a cost without military escalation and is consistent with the stated principle of drawing no distinction between terrorists and the governments that sponsor them.

Questionable: linking a water treaty to terrorism risks harm to people who bear no responsibility for the attacks, weakens India's image as a state that honours its commitments, and could create a precedent that others might invoke in disputes over shared rivers; it may also erode the international acceptance of India's right to respond.

The judgement depends on purpose. As leverage towards verifiable action against terrorist groups, abeyance has a defensible logic; as permanent punishment, its legal and reputational costs could outweigh its coercive value.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

3 questions · 2024–2026

  1. 2026 · PSIR II · Q5(c) · 10 marks

    Discuss the three areas of security co-operation between India and Israel.

  2. 2025 · PSIR II · Q5(b) · 10 marks

    Would you agree with the contention that India’s inclination to lean on a ‘more aggressive hyper-realist posture’ has gained a new momentum in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terrorist strike? Comment.

  3. 2024 · GS-II · Q19 · 15 marks

    ‘Terrorism has become a significant threat to global peace and security.’ Evaluate the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council’s Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) and its associated bodies in addressing and mitigating this threat at the international level.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Examine the evolution of India's response to cross-border terrorism from 2001 to Operation Sindoor in 2025.

    How to approach it

    Coercive diplomacy in 2001–02; restraint after 2008; Uri, Balakot, Sindoor; the May 2025 principles; risks.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Why has the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism remained stalled, and what alternative instruments has India used?

    How to approach it

    Definitional disputes; 1267 and 1373; FATF; SCO, BRICS and Quad; bilateral cooperation.

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks· 250 words

    Terrorism under a nuclear shadow creates a stability–instability paradox. Discuss with reference to India and Pakistan.

    How to approach it

    Glenn Snyder's paradox; crises since 1999; India's 'no nuclear blackmail' stance.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01Prime Minister's address to the nation. Prime Minister's Office, 12 May 2025
  2. 02Statements and briefings on Operation Sindoor (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 7 May 2025
  3. 03Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001). United Nations
  4. 04Delhi Declaration of the Counter-Terrorism Committee special meeting. United Nations, 29 October 2022
  5. 05Financial Action Task Force (opens in a new tab). FATF
  6. 06C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War (2014)