Strategic and contemporary issues
Connectivity Corridors
INSTC, Chabahar, IMEC, the Trilateral Highway and Kaladan: India's corridor diplomacy as an answer to geography and to the Belt and Road Initiative, and why sanctions, wars and coups keep interrupting it.
Overview
Geography explains India's interest in corridors. Pakistan denies India overland transit to Afghanistan and Central Asia; the North-East is joined to the rest of India by the narrow Siliguri corridor; and India's trade with Europe depends on the Suez route. China's Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, made connectivity a field of strategic competition. India responded by refusing to join the BRI, articulating principles for connectivity, and promoting corridors of its own, west through Iran, north through the Caucasus to Russia, across the Gulf to Europe, and east through Bangladesh and Myanmar.
The common problem is that each corridor runs through territory India does not control, and most run through states that are sanctioned, at war or politically unstable.
01The Belt and Road and India's objections
India's position was set out in a statement by the Ministry of External Affairs on 13 May 2017, on the eve of the first Belt and Road Forum, which India declined to attend, as it declined the forums of 2019 and 2023. Connectivity initiatives, it said, must be based on universally recognised international norms, good governance, the rule of law, openness, transparency and equality; must follow financial responsibility so as not to create unsustainable debt; must respect environmental standards; and must respect sovereignty and territorial integrity. The last point is decisive: the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, launched in 2015, passes through territory of the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh that is under Pakistan's illegal occupation, and no country, in India's view, can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty. India has accordingly stood apart from paragraphs endorsing the BRI in SCO declarations. The "debt trap" critique of Chinese lending, which India has echoed, is contested by scholars such as Deborah Brautigam, who argue that the evidence of deliberate entrapment is thin.
02Westward: INSTC and Chabahar
The International North–South Transport Corridor, agreed by India, Iran and Russia in 2000 and later joined by states of the Caucasus, Central Asia and West Asia, is a 7,200-kilometre route of sea, rail and road from Mumbai to Bandar Abbas and on to the Caspian and Russia. A missing rail link between Rasht and Astara in Iran, for which Russia and Iran signed an agreement in 2023, limits it. India joined the Ashgabat Agreement on a Central Asian transit corridor in 2018.
At Chabahar, on Iran's coast beyond Pakistan's reach, India signed a trilateral transit agreement with Iran and Afghanistan on 23 May 2016; an Indian state company has run the Shahid Beheshti terminal since December 2018 and signed a ten-year contract on 13 May 2024. A US sanctions exception granted in 2018 was revoked with effect from 29 September 2025, a further short-term waiver ran until April 2026, and the war of 2026 has put operations in doubt. Chabahar shows the corridor dilemma most sharply: a strategic asset hostage to another state's sanctions.
03The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor
IMEC was launched by a memorandum on principles signed on 9 September 2023 on the sidelines of the New Delhi G20 summit by India, the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, France, Germany, Italy and the European Union. It envisages an eastern corridor from India to the Gulf and a northern corridor from the Gulf through Jordan and Israel to Europe, with rail, ports, electricity cables, hydrogen pipelines and data links. India and the UAE signed an intergovernmental framework on it in February 2024. The war in Gaza, a month after launch, and the war involving Iran in 2026 slowed it; in February 2026 S. Jaishankar said the corridor was advancing more slowly than expected because of conflict in West Asia. Work on the India–UAE segment, beginning with digital and customs integration, was reported in 2026.
04Eastward: Kaladan and the Trilateral Highway
The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, under a framework agreement with Myanmar of 2 April 2008, links Kolkata by sea to Sittwe, then by river and road to Mizoram. Sittwe port began operating in May 2023, but the road section through Chin and Rakhine states runs through areas controlled by the Arakan Army in Myanmar's civil war. The India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway, agreed in 2002 to run some 1,360 kilometres from Moreh in Manipur to Mae Sot in Thailand, remains incomplete for the same reasons, compounded by violence in Manipur since 2023. Through Bangladesh, progress has been steadier: the Agartala–Akhaura rail link opened in November 2023, though the Bangladesh–Bhutan–India–Nepal Motor Vehicles Agreement (2015) stalled when Bhutan did not ratify it.
05Assessment
India's corridor diplomacy has the right principles and the wrong geography. Its standards, transparency, sustainability and respect for sovereignty, are attractive alternatives to opaque lending; but its corridors depend on partners under sanctions (Iran, Russia), at war (Myanmar, the Gulf) or politically volatile, and on finance India cannot supply alone. Partnerships with Japan, the EU and the Gulf, and the reframing of corridors as flexible networks of digital, energy and logistics links rather than single routes, are attempts to reduce that dependence.
06Reading it through IR theory
Realism sees corridors as instruments of geoeconomic competition. A rising China extends influence through infrastructure, and India's refusal to join the Belt and Road, its objection to a corridor through territory it regards as its own, and its promotion of rival routes follow the logic of denying a competitor advantage. Realism also predicts the corridors' fragility: routes through other states' territory are hostage to those states' alignments and to great-power sanctions, as Chabahar shows. Liberal and functionalist thinking explains the corridors' promise. Mitrany's functionalism held that cooperation organised around specific needs, such as transport, power and communications, could build a web of shared interests that makes conflict costly, and IMEC's combination of rail, ports, electricity cables, hydrogen pipelines and data links is functionalist in design. The record exposes functionalism's blind spot: politics has repeatedly interrupted technical cooperation, from sanctions on Iran to the coup in Myanmar and the stalling of the sub-regional motor vehicles agreement when Bhutan did not ratify it. Constructivism draws attention to the contest over norms. India's principles of 2017 (transparency, financial responsibility, environmental standards and respect for sovereignty) seek to define what legitimate connectivity looks like and to cast opaque lending as its opposite. The dispute over the debt-trap narrative, which scholars such as Deborah Brautigam contest, shows that the meaning of infrastructure is itself argued over. Norms, however, do not build railways; finance does, and that is where India's position is weakest.
07India's options and the way forward
India faces three broad choices. The first is to persist with the existing portfolio, accepting that routes through Iran, Russia and Myanmar will advance only when sanctions ease or wars end; this keeps strategic options alive but ties capital to projects that others can interrupt. The second is to reweight towards corridors with more reliable partners, above all IMEC and maritime and digital links with the Gulf and Europe, at the cost of ceding ground in Central Asia and Myanmar, possibly to China. The third, which the reframing of corridors as flexible networks already suggests, is modular: advancing the segments that are politically feasible, such as digital and customs integration with the UAE or rail links through Bangladesh, while keeping larger routes open for better times. Finance is the binding constraint in every case, so partnerships with Japan, the European Union and Gulf states matter as much as diplomacy with transit countries. India's principles on transparency, debt sustainability and sovereignty remain an asset, but they persuade only when matched by delivery. On balance, India's corridor strategy is likely to remain a portfolio of hedges rather than a single grand route, and it is better judged by incremental gains than by comparison with the scale of the Belt and Road.
Key points
- India's objections to the BRI were set out by MEA on 13 May 2017; CPEC violates India's sovereignty.
- INSTC: agreed by India, Iran and Russia in 2000; about 7,200 km; the Rasht–Astara rail gap persists.
- Chabahar: trilateral agreement (23 May 2016); ten-year terminal contract (13 May 2024); US exception revoked from 29 September 2025.
- IMEC: memorandum of 9 September 2023 at the New Delhi G20; slowed by wars in Gaza and with Iran.
- Kaladan (2008) and the Trilateral Highway (2002) are stalled by Myanmar's civil war.
- Corridors depend on territory India does not control and on states that are sanctioned or at war.
Debates
Is IMEC a viable alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative?
Yes, as a network: IMEC combines rich partners, Gulf capital and European markets, and its digital and energy components can advance even when rail links lag; it offers standards that differ from Chinese lending.
Not yet: it has no dedicated financing institution, runs through the world's most volatile region and depends on Saudi–Israeli normalisation that the wars since 2023 have postponed; the BRI has a decade's head start and state banks behind it.
Should India keep investing in Chabahar under the threat of sanctions?
Yes: Chabahar is India's only route to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan, and abandoning it would cede the port to China; American exceptions have been granted before and may return.
Reconsider: sanctions risk exposes Indian firms and banks, the war of 2026 has damaged Iran's capacity, and capital could be redirected to IMEC and maritime routes with more reliable partners.
Does India's refusal to join the Belt and Road Initiative still serve its interests?
Yes: the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor runs through territory India regards as its own, so participation would compromise its position on sovereignty; standing apart has also allowed India to articulate principles of transparency and debt sustainability that distinguish its own offer.
Not entirely: abstention repeatedly sets India apart in forums such as the SCO, leaves it with little say over projects that shape its region, and rests partly on a debt-trap critique that scholars such as Deborah Brautigam regard as weakly evidenced.
The sovereignty objection makes formal participation implausible. The real question is whether India's alternatives can be financed and delivered quickly enough to make abstention costless.
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
5 questions · 2024–2026
2026 · GS-II · Q20 · 15 marks
“China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has transformed South Asia from a regional space into a theatre of great power competition.” Analyse the strategic implications of the BRI for India’s security and regional influence in South Asia.
2026 · PSIR II · Q6(a) · 20 marks
Accelerating of Chinese influence across South Asia is fundamentally reshaping the region’s geopolitical landscape. This is a big foreign policy challenge for India. Analyse.
2026 · PSIR II · Q8(b) · 15 marks
India has recognised that West Asia is not a single contest, but a tangle of rivalries, bargains and anxieties. Comment.
2025 · PSIR II · Q6(b) · 15 marks
India maintains strong ties with countries that will assure a free and open Indo-Pacific and guarantee greater connectivity with rest of the world. Analyze.
2024 · GS-II · Q10 · 10 marks
Critically analyse India’s evolving diplomatic, economic and strategic relations with the Central Asian Republics (CARs) highlighting their increasing significance in regional and global geopolitics.
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Connectivity Corridors in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
India's connectivity diplomacy has the right principles but the wrong geography. Critically examine with reference to INSTC, Chabahar and IMEC.
How to approach it
Principles of 2017; sanctions on Iran and Russia; West Asian wars; finance; flexible networks.
- Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Examine India's objections to the Belt and Road Initiative.
How to approach it
MEA statement of May 2017; CPEC and sovereignty; debt and transparency; the counter-argument on debt traps.
- Q3UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
Why have the Kaladan project and the Trilateral Highway been delayed, and what does this mean for the Act East Policy?
How to approach it
Myanmar's coup and civil war, Arakan Army control, Manipur; Bangladesh routes as alternatives.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
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Sources
- 01Official Spokesperson's response to a query on participation of India in the OBOR/BRI Forum (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 13 May 2017
- 02Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles of an India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, 9 September 2023
- 03IMEC Backgrounder 2026 (opens in a new tab). Middle East Institute, June 2026
- 04Chabahar Port: India in talks with US as sanctions waiver nears April 26 expiry (opens in a new tab). Outlook Business, April 2026
- 05Deborah Brautigam, 'A critical look at Chinese "debt-trap diplomacy": the rise of a meme', Area Development and Policy 5(1) (2020)