Skip to content

Paper II · Part B · Unit 5

India and the Global Centres of Power

Five relationships, one strategy: how India partners the United States, Europe and Japan, manages China and keeps Russia close, without becoming anyone's ally.

Official syllabus

India and the Global Centres of Power: USA, EU, Japan, China and Russia.

What the unit asks

The syllabus names five centres of power, and each relationship has its own history and logic. Together they reveal India's grand strategy: multi-alignment in a world where its principal security challenge (China) is also a major economic partner, its most important new partner (the United States) is an unpredictable one, and its oldest partner (Russia) is drawing closer to China.

The examiner expects each relationship to be treated through history, current agenda and tensions, with dated landmarks, and an analysis of how the five interact — the US–China rivalry shapes India's options with both, the Russia–China partnership constrains India–Russia ties, and Europe and Japan offer technology and investment without the baggage of alliance. Country detail is on the platform's IR pages: United States, European Union, Japan, China and Russia.

01The strategic frame: multi-alignment and hedging

India's approach to the great powers combines balancing (building military and technological capacity, with partners, against the threat posed by China) with hedging: avoiding alliance commitments, keeping ties with Russia and engaging China economically. The doctrinal labels have changed (non-alignment, strategic autonomy, multi-alignment) but the logic is continuous: maximise options in a system India cannot dominate. See Strategic Autonomy and Multi-Alignment.

Theory helps. Stephen Walt's balance of threat explains why China's proximity and the border dispute, not American power, drive Indian alignment choices. Realists expect India to move closer to the United States as China rises; liberal institutionalists stress interdependence with China and the value of plural forums; constructivists stress India's identity as a civilisational state seeking status, not a junior partner. The India's Indo-Pacific is the geographic frame in which most of these relationships now meet.

02India and the United States

Dennis Kux called India and the United States 'estranged democracies' in the Cold War: the American alliance with Pakistan, the 1971 dispatch of the USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal and sanctions after the nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998 defined the relationship. Tanvi Madan shows that China shaped it throughout. Transformation began after 1998: the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (2004), the defence framework (2005) and the civil nuclear agreement, announced in July 2005 and completed with the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver of September 2008.

Since then the United States designated India a Major Defence Partner (2016); the two signed the foundational defence agreements LEMOA (2016), COMCASA (2018) and BECA (2020), revived the Quad (2017), and launched critical and emerging technology initiatives (2023). The relationship was upgraded to a Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership in 2020. Frictions persist (trade, immigration, Russia) and sharpened in 2025 when Washington imposed steep tariffs on Indian goods, partly citing India's purchases of Russian oil.

03India and the European Union

India established relations with the European Economic Community in the early 1960s and a Strategic Partnership with the EU in 2004. The EU is one of India's largest trading partners and sources of investment, yet the relationship has long underperformed: negotiations for a Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (2007–13) stalled over market access, data, intellectual property and mobility, before being relaunched as a free trade agreement in 2022 alongside agreements on investment protection and geographical indications.

New instruments include the Trade and Technology Council (2022), a connectivity partnership (2021) and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor announced at the G20 in 2023. Frictions include the EU's carbon border adjustment mechanism and its criticism of India's position on Ukraine. Much of the strategic content runs through member states: France, India's partner since 1998 in defence, nuclear energy, space and the Indian Ocean; Germany; and, after Brexit, the United Kingdom, with which India signed a trade agreement in 2025. See France and Connectivity Corridors.

04India and Japan

Japan is the great power with which India has the fewest disputes. Shinzo Abe's speech to the Indian Parliament in August 2007, 'Confluence of the Two Seas', anticipated the Indo-Pacific idea; the relationship became a Special Strategic and Global Partnership in 2014. Japan has long been India's largest bilateral source of development assistance, financing the Delhi Metro, industrial corridors and the Mumbai–Ahmedabad high-speed rail project.

The partnership extends to security and technology: a civil nuclear cooperation agreement (2016), Japan's permanent participation in the Malabar naval exercise (2015), a 2+2 ministerial dialogue (2019), the Quad, and supply-chain cooperation with Australia (2021). Japan's investment in India's North-East links it to the Act East policy. Constraints include Japanese business caution about India's regulatory environment and the slow pace of flagship projects. For India, Japan is a source of capital and technology and a fellow democracy balancing China without the volatility of American politics. See Japan.

05India and China

India recognised the People's Republic in 1950 and signed the Panchsheel agreement in 1954; the border war of 1962 turned friendship into rivalry. Normalisation followed Rajiv Gandhi's visit in 1988, with agreements on maintaining peace along the Line of Actual Control (1993, 1996), Special Representatives talks (2003) and political parameters for a boundary settlement (2005). Trade grew rapidly, leaving India with a large deficit and dependence on Chinese inputs.

Rivalry intensified with China's partnership with Pakistan, including the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor through territory India claims, the Belt and Road Initiative, and China's presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Stand-offs at Depsang (2013) and Doklam (2017) culminated in the Galwan clash of June 2020, the first fatal clash in decades. India restricted Chinese investment and apps. An October 2024 patrolling arrangement and leaders' meetings at Kazan (2024) and the SCO summit in Tianjin (2025) began a cautious thaw. The relationship combines competition, limited cooperation and confrontation. See China.

06India and Russia

The Soviet Union was India's principal partner from the 1960s: the source of most of its defence equipment, its veto shield on Kashmir at the Security Council and its partner in the 1971 treaty. After 1991 the relationship was rebuilt through a 1993 friendship treaty, a Declaration on Strategic Partnership (2000) and its upgrade to a Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership (2010), with annual summits, the BrahMos missile joint venture, the Kudankulam nuclear plant and, in 2018, the S-400 air-defence purchase.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 tested the partnership. India abstained on UN resolutions condemning Russia, increased imports of discounted Russian crude, and called for dialogue; Prime Minister Modi told President Putin at Samarkand in September 2022 that this was not an era of war. Concerns include Russia's growing dependence on China, delays in defence deliveries, payment difficulties and Western pressure. India values Russia as a hedge, a supplier and a voice that prevents a single Eurasian bloc. See Russia and Energy Security.

Debates

Partner or ally of the United States?

Advocates of closer alignment argue that China's threat and India's need for technology and capital justify deeper defence integration. Advocates of autonomy reply that American policy is volatile (as 2025's tariffs showed) that alliance would alienate Russia and the Global South, and that India gains more by remaining a sought-after swing state. Indian policy has so far chosen partnership without alliance.

Can India both balance and engage China?

One view holds that the 2020 clash ended the illusion of managed rivalry and that India must decouple economically and balance militarily. Another holds that geography and trade make total decoupling impossible, and that India should combine deterrence on the border with selective economic engagement and dialogue, as the 2024–25 thaw suggests. The disagreement is about risk: dependence versus escalation.

Answer strategy

Treat each relationship with the same structure (history, drivers, institutions and agreements, current agenda, tensions, outlook) and then compare. The interactions are the analytical payoff: China drives India's ties with the United States and Japan; Russia–China ties constrain India–Russia relations; Europe offers technology without alliance.

Anchor each with dates: 1971, 2005–08, 2016–20 for the United States; 2004 and 2022 for the EU; 2007 and 2014 for Japan; 1962, 2017, 2020 and 2024 for China; 1971, 2000 and 2022 for Russia. Use theory (balance of threat, hedging) and Indian practitioners' accounts. Common errors: treating the five separately without comparison; describing India–Russia ties as if 2022 changed nothing; and stating trade figures without sources.

Readings

  • Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941–1991
  • Tanvi Madan, Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped US–India Relations During the Cold War
  • Shyam Saran, How India Sees the World: Kautilya to the 21st Century
  • Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy
  • Harsh V. Pant, The US–India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics
  • S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

13 questions · 2024–2026

  1. 2026 · PSIR II · Q4(a) · 20 marks

    QUAD requires more robust architecture than the summit driven mode to tide over the current challenges. Elaborate.

  2. 2026 · PSIR II · Q6(a) · 20 marks

    Accelerating of Chinese influence across South Asia is fundamentally reshaping the region’s geopolitical landscape. This is a big foreign policy challenge for India. Analyse.

  3. 2026 · PSIR II · Q6(c) · 15 marks

    “The mother of all deals” is a transformative milestone in Indo-EU trade relations. Elaborate on the new Security and Defence partnership.

  4. 2026 · PSIR II · Q8(a) · 20 marks

    Critically evaluate India-Russia relations in the 21st century. How have both the countries responded to America meddling in their relations in the recent times.

  5. 2025 · PSIR II · Q5(c) · 10 marks

    For India, a multipolar world order would also mean a multipolar Asia. Comment.

  6. 2025 · PSIR II · Q5(e) · 10 marks

    Historical ties between India and Japan grew into a ‘special strategic and global partnership’. Comment.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to India and the Global Centres of Power in the PYQ dataset.All 13 in PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1PSIR style20 marks· 250 words

    'India–US relations have moved from estrangement to strategic partnership, but not to alliance.' Discuss.

    How to approach it

    Cold War estrangement; nuclear deal; defence agreements and Quad; frictions over trade and Russia; strategic autonomy as the limit.

  2. Q2PSIR style10 marks· 150 words

    Examine the significance of Japan in India's Act East and Indo-Pacific strategy.

    How to approach it

    Abe's 2007 speech; partnership upgrades; development finance; nuclear agreement; Malabar and Quad; North-East.

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks· 200 words

    'Competition, cooperation and confrontation coexist in India–China relations.' Examine.

    How to approach it

    Border agreements and stand-offs; trade dependence; Pakistan and CPEC; Galwan and its aftermath; the 2024–25 thaw; multilateral cooperation in BRICS and SCO.

  4. Q4PSIR style15 marks· 200 words

    How has the Russia–Ukraine war affected India–Russia relations?

    How to approach it

    India's UN votes and position; oil imports; defence supply delays; Russia–China alignment; Western pressure; India's hedging rationale.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01UPSC, Civil Services Examination Notice: Scheme and Syllabus (Political Science and International Relations) (opens in a new tab). Union Public Service Commission
  2. 02Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India: bilateral briefs (opens in a new tab)
  3. 03India–United States Joint Statement, 18 July 2005
  4. 04Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control, 1993
  5. 05Tanvi Madan, Fateful Triangle, 2020