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The Quad in Manila: the leaders' summit returns, with a narrower agenda

On 17 November 2026 the leaders of Australia, India, Japan and the United States held their first Quad summit since September 2024 and launched a maritime surveillance collaboration, a business leaders' forum and enhanced cybersecurity cooperation. The meeting restored the grouping's highest tier after the summit India was due to host in 2025 failed to take place, but its joint text named no adversary and was far narrower than the agendas of 2021–24.

Event: Published: By Arjun Agrawal

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17 November 2026 · 20 November 2026
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01Executive summary Facts

President Donald Trump and Prime Ministers Anthony Albanese, Narendra Modi and Takaichi Sanae met in Manila on 17 November 2026, during Trump's state visit to the Philippines and the ASEAN summit. Their joint press release opposed unilateral changes to the status quo by force or coercion, expressed grave concern about economic coercion through arbitrary export restrictions, condemned terrorism 'including cross-border terrorism' and reaffirmed ASEAN centrality. It welcomed an Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration, under which the members' P-8 and P-3C patrol aircraft are scheduled to fly a maritime exercise together in 2027, for the first time in a Quad context, and announced a Quad Business Leaders' Forum and enhanced cybersecurity cooperation. For India the summit revived a forum that had been dormant at leaders' level since 2024, on an agenda of maritime awareness, supply chains, cables and technology that suits its priorities. Two days later the American, Russian and Chinese leaders met in Shenzhen, a reminder that Washington's diplomacy in Asia now runs on several tracks at once.

02Background Facts

The Quad began as an improvised core group of the four navies that coordinated relief after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004. A first quadrilateral dialogue in 2007 lapsed after Australia withdrew in 2008. Officials of the four countries revived it in Manila on 12 November 2017, on the margins of the ASEAN summits, and it was raised to leaders' level in March 2021 with a virtual summit, followed by meetings in Washington (September 2021), Tokyo (May 2022), Hiroshima (May 2023) and Wilmington (September 2024).

In those years the leaders built a broad agenda: vaccines during the pandemic, climate, critical and emerging technologies, infrastructure, cable connectivity and, from Tokyo, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness. The breadth was deliberate. By offering public goods to the region, the four sought to show that the Quad was more than a security arrangement aimed at China, while insisting that it was not an alliance. The Wilmington Declaration recorded that India would host the next summit in 2025.

That summit did not take place. India's relations with the United States deteriorated sharply in 2025, when Washington raised tariffs on most Indian goods to 50 per cent, half of it as a penalty for India's purchases of Russian oil, and were only partly repaired by the trade framework of February 2026 (see the briefing on India–US trade). Foreign ministers continued to meet. The leaders' return in Manila, in a year when India also hosted China's President at the BRICS summit (see the briefing on India–China relations), therefore tested whether the grouping's informality had preserved it through a crisis between two of its members.

03Political actors Facts

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and India
Returned to a Quad summit after the 2025 rupture with Washington, with interests in maritime domain awareness in the Indian Ocean, secure undersea cables, supply chains and language on cross-border terrorism.
President Donald Trump and the United States
Combined the summit with a state visit to the Philippines and commercial and defence deals across Southeast Asia, and promoted American 'Super Intelligence' technology; two days later met the Russian and Chinese leaders in Shenzhen.
Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae and Japan
Marked the tenth anniversary of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision first set out by Abe Shinzo in 2016.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Australia
Expanded its contribution to the Quad's cable partnership to cover electricity cables.
The Philippines and ASEAN
Host and regional chair; the release's reaffirmation of ASEAN centrality speaks to Southeast Asian concern about being drawn into great-power rivalry.
China
Unnamed in the release, but the state whose conduct much of its language on coercion, the status quo and export restrictions addresses; Chinese officials have long described the Quad as an exclusive grouping aimed at containment.

04Timeline Facts

  1. December 2004

    The four navies form a core group to coordinate relief after the Indian Ocean tsunami.

  2. 2007

    A first Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is held; it lapses after Australia withdraws in 2008.

  3. 12 November 2017

    Officials of the four countries revive the Quad in Manila.

  4. 12 March 2021

    The first leaders' summit is held virtually.

  5. 24 September 2021

    The leaders meet in person for the first time, in Washington.

  6. 24 May 2022

    The Tokyo summit launches the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness.

  7. 21 September 2024

    The Wilmington summit records that India will host the next summit in 2025.

  8. 2025

    No leaders' summit is held; India–US relations are strained by tariffs.

  9. 17 November 2026

    The leaders meet in Manila and launch a maritime surveillance collaboration, a business forum and enhanced cyber cooperation.

  10. 19 November 2026

    The US, Russian and Chinese leaders meet in Shenzhen and issue a declaration on strategic stability and UN reform.

05Main developments

What happened Facts

On 17 November 2026 President Donald J. Trump of the United States, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India and Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae of Japan met for a Quad Leaders' Summit in Manila. The meeting took place during a two-day visit by Trump to the Philippines, the 2026 chair of ASEAN, for a state visit and the ASEAN summit. Their joint press release, published by the White House, marked 'nearly a decade since the Quad was revived' and the tenth anniversary of the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, 'first articulated by the late Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan in 2016'.

The leaders stated that they 'strongly oppose any destabilizing or unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo, including by force or coercion', and expressed 'grave concerns about economic coercion, including through arbitrary export restrictions'. They committed themselves to securing critical supply chains, protecting freedom of navigation and overflight, and ensuring 'open, safe, and resilient maritime transit corridors in the Indo-Pacific'. They condemned 'terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations, including cross-border terrorism', committed to strengthening the Quad's counter-terrorism cooperation, and reaffirmed their support for ASEAN centrality and unity.

Four initiatives followed. An Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration is to enhance information sharing and maritime domain awareness; the release states that in 2027 the members' P-8 and P-3C patrol aircraft are scheduled to fly in a maritime exercise 'for the first time in a Quad context'. An inaugural Quad Business Leaders' Forum is scheduled for early 2027. The Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience is to expand, with Australia's contribution extended to electricity cables and new undersea cable projects in the Indian Ocean welcomed. And, citing a rapid increase in the number and scale of cyber incidents in the region, the leaders announced enhanced cybersecurity cooperation. They also affirmed a 'Super Intelligence Accelerator' announced earlier by their foreign ministers at a meeting in Atlanta, to support access to and deployment of trusted artificial intelligence; a footnote records that 'Super Intelligence', the American term, refers in Australia, India and Japan to artificial intelligence.

The release named no country. It made no reference to climate change, health security or the vaccine and cancer initiatives of earlier summits, and it announced no host or date for the next leaders' meeting.

What changed Facts

  1. Leaders' track restored. The four leaders met for the first time since September 2024, after the summit India was to host in 2025 did not take place.
  2. Towards operational maritime cooperation. A Maritime Surveillance Collaboration on information sharing and maritime domain awareness, with a first Quad-context exercise of P-8 and P-3C patrol aircraft scheduled for 2027.
  3. Economic and technological security. Language on economic coercion and arbitrary export restrictions, critical supply chains, an AI accelerator, a business leaders' forum, cable connectivity and cybersecurity.
  4. Counter-terrorism. An explicit condemnation of cross-border terrorism, a formulation India has long sought in multilateral texts.
  5. A narrower agenda. No reference to climate, health or the vaccine and cancer initiatives that featured in 2021–24, and no announced host for the next summit.

Why it matters Analysis

The first significance is survival. The Quad has no treaty, charter, secretariat or budget, and its leaders' meetings depend on the four governments' wish to hold them. A year in which the United States imposed punitive tariffs on India might have ended it at the top level; instead, the leaders returned. That supports the view that informal minilateral groupings are durable precisely because they demand little, but it also shows that their highest tier is contingent on relations between the United States and each partner.

The second is the change of content. The Manila text is about maritime surveillance, cables, cyber incidents, export restrictions, supply chains, artificial intelligence and business deals. The planned patrol-aircraft exercise is a step towards operational cooperation in a grouping that has always denied being an alliance, and the language on economic coercion reflects the members' experience of supply-chain leverage. What has gone is the public-goods agenda of vaccines and climate through which the Quad had sought to show the region that it offered more than security. Whether the narrower Quad is stronger, because more focused, or weaker, because less attractive to Southeast Asian and Pacific states, is the central analytical question the summit raises.

The third is context. Two days after Manila, the White House published a declaration issued by the American, Russian and Chinese heads of state after a trilateral summit in Shenzhen, committing them to strategic stability, to reform of the United Nations 'as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council', to a dialogue on nuclear risks and to the view that the International Criminal Court 'must not abuse' its jurisdiction. For India the sequence is instructive. The Quad matters to New Delhi as part of a balance in Asia, but the United States is simultaneously negotiating with the powers the Quad's language implicitly addresses, and talking of UN reform in a format from which India is absent.

06India’s interests Analysis

India's interests in the Quad are concrete. Maritime domain awareness in the Indian Ocean, where India is the resident power, benefits directly from shared surveillance and data; secure undersea cables carry its digital economy; diversified supply chains for critical minerals and electronics reduce dependence on China; and the condemnation of cross-border terrorism gives India a text it can cite after the Pahalgam attack of 2025.

India's broader interest is balance. It values the Quad as one of several partnerships that widen its options, alongside BRICS, which it chaired in 2026, and a managed thaw with China. The 2025 tariff dispute and the Shenzhen meeting show the limits of relying on any single partner. The Quad serves India best as a practical coalition that delivers capabilities, not as a commitment that would constrain its strategic autonomy.

07Institutional analysis

Institutional implications Analysis

The Quad works through leaders' summits, foreign ministers' meetings, senior officials and working groups, and its initiatives are announced jointly and carried out through the members' own agencies and budgets. That design keeps costs low and commitments flexible, but it means that initiatives such as the maritime surveillance collaboration depend on national follow-through rather than on a common institution. The summit created no new body.

The new maritime initiative sits alongside other arrangements. The Malabar naval exercise has included all four navies since 2020, and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness of 2022 already shares commercial satellite data with regional states. In India, the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region, set up by the Navy at Gurugram in 2018, exchanges maritime information with partner countries and is the natural point of contact for any shared Quad picture.

The summit's setting, on the margins of ASEAN meetings in Manila, also reflects an institutional choice. By reaffirming ASEAN centrality, the four signal that they see the Quad as complementary to the ASEAN-led architecture of the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, not a substitute for it.

08Theoretical perspectives Analysis

Realist theory reads the Quad as balancing. Kenneth Waltz expected states to balance against concentrations of power, and Stephen Walt refined the idea as balancing against threat, combining power, proximity and perceived intentions. The Quad's refusal to name China and its preference for surveillance, cables and supply chains over military commitments fit what T.V. Paul and others have called soft balancing: coordination short of alliance that raises the costs of coercion without provoking open confrontation.

Liberal institutionalists, following Robert Keohane, would stress the value of an institution, even an informal one, in lowering the costs of cooperation and sustaining expectations through a crisis between members. The Quad's survival of the India–US rupture of 2025 supports that reading, as does the shift to concrete, technical initiatives that create habits of cooperation among officials.

Constructivists add that the 'Indo-Pacific' is itself a constructed region. As Alexander Wendt argued, 'anarchy is what states make of it', and the idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific, which the Manila text traces to Abe Shinzo in 2016, has shaped how four very different states define a shared space and a shared purpose. The narrowing of the agenda in 2026 is, on this view, a change in the identity the Quad projects: from a provider of regional public goods to a coalition for technological and maritime security.

How the different sides read it

India's official approach

The Quad is an issue-based partnership, not an alliance. It gives India access to maritime awareness, technology and supply-chain cooperation without military obligations, and it sits alongside BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in a strategy of multi-alignment. The Manila text's condemnation of cross-border terrorism and its focus on the Indian Ocean serve India's priorities.

The US administration

Partners should carry more of the burden and buy American: the Manila visit combined the Quad with arms sales, trade deals and exports of American artificial intelligence technology. On this view the Quad is one instrument among many, valuable insofar as it advances American commercial and strategic interests.

China

Beijing has long portrayed the Quad as an exclusive bloc designed to contain it and as a threat to regional stability, and prefers ASEAN-led and Chinese-sponsored frameworks. Language on 'unilateral' changes to the status quo and 'arbitrary export restrictions' will be read in Beijing as directed at it, whether or not it is named.

Sceptics in India

The 2025 tariffs showed that the United States can impose heavy costs on India regardless of the Quad, and the Shenzhen meeting shows that Washington will deal directly with Beijing and Moscow over India's head. India should value the Quad's practical cooperation without treating it as a guarantee.

09Critical evaluation Analysis

The summit settles that the Quad has survived a crisis between two of its members and that its leaders' track continues. It also shows a clear choice of agenda: maritime surveillance, technology, supply chains, cables and cyber security, with a first operational exercise in prospect.

It does not settle the grouping's regularity or its purpose. No host or date for the next summit was announced; the initiatives depend on national budgets and follow-through; and the meaning of the Quad for India depends on a United States that, within the same week, negotiated with China and Russia on strategic stability and UN reform.

The strongest objection is that the Quad remains declaratory, has shed the public-goods agenda that broadened its appeal, and depends on the priorities of one member. The strongest reply is that its informality is the reason it survived, and that maritime surveillance, cables and cyber cooperation are capabilities that matter to India whatever happens at summit level.

10What could happen next Analysis

Analysis, not fact · scenarios and signposts, not predictions

The Manila summit shows that the Quad can survive a crisis; whether it can grow depends on follow-through and on the United States' wider diplomacy.

  • If the planned patrol-aircraft exercise takes place and the surveillance collaboration produces a shared maritime picture, then the Quad will have acquired its first operational layer, and India's Information Fusion Centre at Gurugram is likely to become more central to the region's maritime information networks.
  • If a host and date for the next leaders' summit are announced, particularly if India hosts, then the leaders' track will regain the regularity it lost in 2025; if not, its highest tier will remain dependent on American interest from year to year.
  • If the trilateral meeting of the American, Russian and Chinese leaders in Shenzhen develops into a regular channel, then the Quad's value as a balancing coalition will be diluted, and India's incentive to hedge, including through its thaw with China, will grow.
  • If China responds to the Manila text with economic or diplomatic pressure on any member, then the Quad's language on coercion and export restrictions will face its first practical test.

Indicators to watch: announcements on the next summit; the next foreign ministers' meeting; the conduct of the Malabar exercise and of the planned patrol-aircraft exercise; cable projects in the Indian Ocean; Chinese official statements on the Quad; the conclusion of the India–US trade agreement; and ASEAN statements on great-power competition.

11Concepts and thinkers

12UPSC GS-II connection Syllabus

13PSIR Paper II connection Syllabus

14IB Global Politics connection Syllabus

15Potential examination questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    The Manila summit restored the Quad's leaders' track but narrowed its agenda. Examine what this means for India's Indo-Pacific strategy.

    How to approach it

    Compare the 2021–24 agenda with the 2026 text; identify the gains for India (maritime awareness, cables, supply chains, counter-terrorism language) and the risks (dependence on US priorities, loss of public-goods appeal); place the Quad within India's multi-alignment, including BRICS.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Explain the importance of maritime domain awareness for India's security, with reference to recent Quad initiatives.

    How to approach it

    Define maritime domain awareness; refer to the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region, the 2022 Indo-Pacific Partnership and the 2026 surveillance collaboration; note threats such as illegal fishing, piracy and grey-zone activity.

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks

    Is the Quad best understood as balancing, institution-building or identity-making? Discuss.

    How to approach it

    Apply realist (balance of power and threat, soft balancing), liberal institutionalist and constructivist accounts in turn; use the Manila text and the 2025 crisis as evidence; reach a judgement on which explains most.

  4. Q4Prelims style

    Which of the following were announced at the Quad Leaders' Summit in Manila in November 2026: (a) an Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration; (b) a permanent Quad secretariat; (c) a Quad Business Leaders' Forum?

    How to approach it

    (a) and (c) only. The Quad has no secretariat, and none was announced in Manila.

  5. Q5Discussion

    Can a coalition that names no adversary function as a balance of power?

    How to approach it

    Use the Quad as the main case; consider soft balancing and the role of ambiguity in reassuring third states; compare with a formal alliance such as NATO; assess how the US engagement with China and Russia affects the Quad's purpose.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

16Sources

Primary and official documents first. Every factual claim was checked against these on 20 November 2026.

Primary and official sources

  1. 01PrimaryQuad Leaders' Summit Joint Press Release (opens in a new tab). The White House, 17 November 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026
  2. 02PrimaryU.S.-Russia-China Heads of State Declaration Toward Peace (opens in a new tab). The White House, 19 November 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026
  3. 03PrimaryThe Wilmington Declaration: Joint Statement from the Leaders of Australia, India, Japan and the United States. The White House, 21 September 2024
  4. 04OfficialFact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Secures Historic Economic Deals for American Workers and Strengthens America's Leadership in Asia (opens in a new tab). The White House, 18 November 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026

Supporting sources

  1. 01ScholarshipT.V. Paul, 'Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy', International Security 30(1), 2005
  2. 02BookStephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances. Cornell University Press, 1987
  3. 03Press reportQuad leaders oppose unilateral actions, announce new maritime surveillance and cybersecurity initiatives in Manila (opens in a new tab). Republic World, 17 November 2026
  4. 04Press reportTrump, other Quad leaders to meet in Manila on Nov 17, sources say (opens in a new tab). Khaleej Times (Reuters), November 2026
  5. 05Press reportPM Modi says India's growth and ASEAN's prosperity are linked (opens in a new tab). Outlook, 17 November 2026
  6. 06Press report49th ASEAN Summit begins in Manila under Philippine chairmanship (opens in a new tab). All India Radio News, 15 November 2026

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