India's neighbourhood
India and Bangladesh
The neighbour India helped create in 1971 and with which it shares its longest land border. After Sheikh Hasina's fall in 2024 and a BNP landslide in February 2026, the relationship is being rebuilt on new terms, with the Ganges water treaty due to expire in December 2026.
India and Bangladesh at a glance
- Relationship
- India's neighbourhood
01Geography
Bangladesh occupies most of the delta of the Ganges (Padma), the Brahmaputra (Jamuna) and the Meghna, which reach the Bay of Bengal through its territory. India surrounds it on three sides: five Indian states, West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram, share with it India's longest land border, and Myanmar adjoins it in the south-east. Fifty-four rivers cross from India into Bangladesh, so almost every decision about water upstream is felt downstream, in a country where floods, cyclones and rising seas are national security questions.
Its location between India's mainland and its North-East is the strategic fact. The Siliguri Corridor, about twenty kilometres wide at its narrowest, runs just beyond Bangladesh's northern border, and the shortest routes from Kolkata to Agartala and Shillong cross Bangladeshi territory. Its ports, Chattogram and Mongla, and the deep-sea port under construction at Matarbari, are the nearest outlets to the sea for India's landlocked north-eastern states.
02Political context
Bangladesh's political system
Bangladesh is a unitary parliamentary republic under the constitution of 1972. Executive power lies with the Prime Minister, who commands a majority in the Jatiya Sangsad, a single chamber of 350 members (300 elected from single-member constituencies and 50 seats reserved for women); the President, elected by parliament, is head of state with largely formal powers. The Fifteenth Amendment of 2011 abolished the caretaker system under which neutral administrations had overseen elections, and its absence was at the centre of the disputed elections of 2014, 2018 and 2024. The army, which ruled directly or indirectly for much of 1975–90 and backed the caretaker government of 2007–08, remains an arbiter of last resort.
After Sheikh Hasina's fall, an interim government led by Muhammad Yunus as Chief Adviser governed from August 2024 until the BNP government of Tarique Rahman took office in February 2026. The interim government banned the activities of the Awami League in May 2025, and the party did not contest the election of 12 February 2026. A referendum held the same day approved the July National Charter, a package of constitutional reforms that includes an upper house of 100 members chosen by proportional representation; the BNP disputes the powers proposed for that chamber, and implementation is incomplete.
Political and diplomatic developments
The interim government of Muhammad Yunus (August 2024–February 2026) was the low point. Attacks on Hindus and other minorities during the unrest drew sharp Indian statements; Bangladesh formally sought Hasina's extradition, and in November 2025 its International Crimes Tribunal sentenced her to death in absentia for the crackdown on the protests. Yunus's remarks in Beijing in March 2025, presenting Bangladesh as the "guardian" of the sea for India's landlocked Northeast, caused offence in New Delhi. The two leaders met only once, at the BIMSTEC summit in Bangkok in April 2025.
The February 2026 election, held with the Awami League barred from campaigning, gave the BNP a large majority, and Tarique Rahman was sworn in as Prime Minister on 17 February 2026. India had prepared the ground: the External Affairs Minister went to Dhaka for Khaleda Zia's funeral on 31 December 2025 and handed Rahman a letter from Modi. Modi congratulated Rahman and invited him to India; the Lok Sabha Speaker represented India at the swearing-in. The BNP's secretary general said ties would not be held "captive" to any single issue, including Hasina's presence in India.
Hasina's presence is the hardest political question. The 2013 extradition treaty allows a request to be refused for an offence of a political nature, though it excludes murder and several other violent crimes from that category, and where an accusation is judged not to have been made in good faith; India has not acted on Dhaka's request; for the BNP government it remains a public demand, for India a question of principle and of obligation to a long-standing partner.
03Historical bilateral relations
India's part in the birth of Bangladesh is the founding fact of the relationship and a source of its ambivalence. India sheltered about ten million refugees in 1971, armed the Mukti Bahini, recognised Bangladesh on 6 December 1971 and fought the war that ended with the Pakistani surrender in Dhaka on 16 December. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace of 19 March 1972 and the Land Boundary Agreement of 16 May 1974 followed. The assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on 15 August 1975 ended that first phase; the military governments that followed cultivated Pakistan, China and the Gulf, and Bangladesh took its grievance over the Farakka barrage to the UN General Assembly in 1976.
The 1996 Ganges Water Treaty, signed by Sheikh Hasina and H. D. Deve Gowda for thirty years, showed that the hardest issue could be settled when Dhaka and New Delhi wanted it. Relations under the BNP governments of Khaleda Zia (1991–96, 2001–06) were cooler, with India accusing Dhaka of sheltering insurgent groups from the Northeast.
Hasina's return in 2009 opened fifteen years of the closest cooperation in the relationship's history. Bangladesh handed over insurgent leaders, opened its territory and ports to Indian transit, imported Indian electricity and implemented the Land Boundary Agreement in 2015. Both governments called it a golden chapter. Its critics in Bangladesh saw India as the patron of an increasingly authoritarian government re-elected in disputed polls in 2014, 2018 and January 2024. When a student-led uprising forced Hasina to flee to India on 5 August 2024, the price of that identification became clear.
Diplomatic timeline
7 events, 1971–2024 · 1 turning point
The dated events of the Global Political Timeline that involve Bangladesh. Open an entry to read it in full.
Pakistani forces surrender in Dhaka; Bangladesh is bornDiplomatic · Turning point
After Pakistan's air strikes on Indian bases on 3 December 1971, India went to war in support of the Bangladeshi liberation struggle and recognised Bangladesh on 6 December. On 16 December Pakistani forces in the east surrendered in Dhaka, and about 93,000 soldiers and civilians became prisoners of war. Soviet vetoes blocked ceasefire resolutions at the Security Council, while the United States sent a carrier group into the Bay of Bengal.
See it on the Global Political TimelineFrom history to today
The war created Bangladesh, ended the two-wing Pakistan of 1947 and left India the pre-eminent military power in South Asia; 16 December is marked as Vijay Diwas in India and Victory Day in Bangladesh. India's role in 1971 still underpins its claim to a special relationship with Bangladesh, a claim tested by the fall of Sheikh Hasina in 2024 and by the effort to reset relations after the 2026 election. The Simla Agreement was its diplomatic sequel.
India–Bangladesh Land Boundary AgreementDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineIndira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman signed the agreement on 16 May 1974 to settle undemarcated segments, exchange enclaves and resolve adverse possessions. Bangladesh ratified it promptly; India, which needed a constitutional amendment under the principle laid down in the Berubari reference of 1960, did not implement it for four decades. The 2011 protocol and the 100th Amendment of 2015 finally gave it effect.
SAARC founded at DhakaDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineThe leaders of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka adopted the SAARC Charter at Dhaka on 8 December 1985; Afghanistan joined in 2007. The charter excludes bilateral and contentious issues and requires unanimity, which kept the association alive but made it ineffective. No summit has been held since Kathmandu in 2014.
Ganges Water Treaty with BangladeshDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineSheikh Hasina and H. D. Deve Gowda signed the treaty on 12 December 1996, settling a dispute over the dry-season flow at the Farakka barrage that had soured relations for two decades. It shares the flow from January to May for thirty years and expires in December 2026; its renewal became the leading issue between India and Bangladesh's new government in 2026.
BIMSTEC foundedDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineThe Bangkok Declaration of 6 June 1997 created an economic grouping of Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand, later joined by Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan and renamed the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. Neglected for two decades, it became India's preferred regional platform after SAARC stalled, and its charter was adopted in 2022.
India and Bangladesh exchange enclavesDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineAt midnight on 31 July 2015, 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves in India were exchanged, ending one of the world's most complex boundary anomalies. The exchange implemented the 1974 Land Boundary Agreement after the 100th Amendment to the Constitution and the exchange of instruments of ratification during Modi's visit to Dhaka in June 2015. Residents chose their nationality.
Sheikh Hasina flees to IndiaDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineA student-led uprising forced Sheikh Hasina to resign and fly to India on 5 August 2024, ending fifteen years of Awami League rule and of unusually close India–Bangladesh cooperation. An interim government under Muhammad Yunus took office on 8 August. Relations fell to their lowest point in decades before the BNP's election victory in February 2026 opened the way to a reset.
04Strategic interests
Bangladesh wraps around India's Northeast, lies astride the Bay of Bengal and controls the ports that could make the Northeast an outward-facing economy. Cooperation against insurgent groups after 2009 transformed security in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. A hostile or unstable Bangladesh would reverse those gains and press on the Siliguri Corridor.
China is Bangladesh's largest source of imports and its main arms supplier; it built a submarine base at Pekua and has proposed a large project on the Teesta river. The interim government also restored ties with Pakistan, easing visas and trade. India's concern is less any single project than a Bangladesh that defines itself against India.
The Bangladeshi critique of India is specific: deaths at the border, unresolved river-sharing, non-tariff barriers, Indian rhetoric about migrants and the perception that New Delhi chose a party over a people. Indian policy-makers accept some of this; their counter is that India's investments in power, transit and credit have benefited Bangladesh's growth more than any other partner's.
05Key agreements
- 1972Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace
Signed on 19 March 1972 for 25 years; lapsed in 1997.
- 1972Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade
Allows vessels of each country to use designated river routes through the other; periodically renewed and expanded.
- 1974Land Boundary Agreement and Protocol
Signed on 16 May 1974; with the 2011 protocol, settled the land boundary, enclaves and adverse possessions. Implemented in 2015 after the 100th Constitutional Amendment.
- 1996Ganges (Ganga) Water Treaty
Signed on 12 December 1996 for thirty years; shares the dry-season flow at Farakka between 1 January and 31 May according to a formula with guaranteed minimums in the leanest periods. Expires in December 2026.
- 2013Extradition Treaty
Provides for the extradition of accused and convicted persons; extradition may be refused for an offence of a political nature, a category from which murder and other serious violent crimes are excluded.
- 2018Agreement on the use of Chattogram and Mongla ports
Allows Indian goods to transit through Bangladeshi ports to and from India's Northeast.
06Cooperation
Economy, connectivity, defence and technology: where the two work together, where they do not, and where cooperation could grow.
Economic relationship
Bangladesh is India's largest trading partner in South Asia, and India is among Bangladesh's largest trading partners and its main source of imported electricity. Indian lines of credit worth several billion dollars since 2010 have financed railways, roads and ports. The Rampal (Maitree) power plant, the Adani plant at Godda that supplies Bangladesh, and the Friendship Pipeline carrying diesel from Siliguri to Parbatipur since 2023 are the backbone of energy interdependence; Bangladesh also buys Nepali power through India.
Trade became a weapon in 2025. In April India withdrew the transshipment facility that allowed Bangladeshi exports to move through Indian land ports to third countries, and in May it restricted the import of garments and some other goods through land ports to two seaports. Bangladesh had earlier curbed yarn imports through land ports. A proposed comprehensive economic partnership agreement, discussed before 2024, is on hold.
India’s merchandise trade with Bangladesh
2021–22 to 2025–26 · USD billion
- Exports 2025–26
- 10.6
- India to Bangladesh
- Imports 2025–26
- 1.8
- Bangladesh to India
- Two-way trade 2025–26
- 12.4
- Exports plus imports
- Trade surplus 2025–26
- 8.8
- Exports exceed imports
- Exports from India
- Imports into India
- Balance: exports minus imports
| Financial year | Exports from India | Imports into India | Balance (exports minus imports) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021–22 | 16.2 | 2.0 | +14.2 |
| 2022–23 | 12.2 | 2.0 | +10.2 |
| 2023–24 | 11.1 | 1.8 | +9.3 |
| 2024–25 | 11.5 | 2.0 | +9.5 |
| 2025–26 | 10.6 | 1.8 | +8.8 |
Unit: USD billion. Balance and two-way trade are calculated here from the published exports and imports.
Note: Merchandise trade only; services excluded. Indian financial years (April–March). Figures for 2025–26 are provisional and those for 2021–22 to 2024–25 revised, as published by the Reserve Bank of India from data compiled by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S) of the Department of Commerce.
Official dataSource: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026.
Trade and connectivity
The Hasina years restored links severed in 1965: the Haldibari–Chilahati and Akhaura–Agartala railways, the Maitree Setu over the Feni river to Tripura, inland waterway routes under the 1972 protocol, and the 2018 agreement allowing Indian goods to transit through Chattogram and Mongla ports to the Northeast. Bangladesh's goods reached Nepal and Bhutan through India.
Much of this slowed after August 2024. Passenger trains and buses were suspended, Indian visa services were restricted, and the transshipment facility was withdrawn. The infrastructure remains; the political will to use it is what the new governments must rebuild (see connectivity corridors).
Defence and security
The border, at 4,096.7 km India's longest, is policed by the Border Security Force and the Border Guard Bangladesh. Deaths of Bangladeshi nationals in BSF firing are the most enduring grievance in Bangladesh; smuggling, cattle trade and irregular migration are India's. Disputes over fencing near the zero line flared in January 2025, and Bangladesh protested in 2025 what it called push-ins of people India said were undocumented migrants.
Counter-terrorism cooperation was one of the gains of 2009–2024, as was coordination against human trafficking and counterfeit currency. Whether the BNP government sustains it is India's first security test of the new relationship.
Opportunities
- A renewed, basin-wide water agreement that includes climate adaptation and data sharing.
- Restoring transit through Chattogram and Mongla for the Northeast.
- Electricity trade linking Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Bhutan.
- A comprehensive economic partnership agreement before Bangladesh leaves LDC status, a step now deferred to November 2029.
- A fresh start with an elected government that has a clear mandate.
07Points of disagreement
Border issues
The land boundary was settled by the Land Boundary Agreement of 1974 and its 2011 protocol, implemented after Parliament passed the Constitution (One Hundredth Amendment) Act, 2015. At midnight on 31 July 2015, 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves in India were exchanged and their residents chose their nationality. The constitutional route was required because the Supreme Court had held in the Berubari reference of 1960 that ceding territory needs an amendment under Article 368.
The maritime boundary was settled by arbitration under UNCLOS: the award of 7 July 2014 gave Bangladesh 19,467 of the 25,602 sq km in dispute in the Bay of Bengal, about three-quarters, and India accepted it. The 54 shared rivers remain the unresolved frontier. The Teesta agreement, ready in 2011, has been blocked by West Bengal's objections, and the Ganges treaty expires in December 2026.
Challenges
- Renewal of the Ganges Water Treaty before December 2026, and the stalled Teesta agreement.
- The extradition demand for Sheikh Hasina.
- Border killings, fencing disputes and irregular migration.
- Mutual trade restrictions imposed in 2025 and the suspension of connectivity links.
- Growing Chinese and renewed Pakistani influence in Dhaka.
- Protection of Hindus and other minorities.
08Regional context
Bangladesh hosts the secretariat of BIMSTEC, and its cooperation is essential to India's Act East policy and to Bay of Bengal connectivity. It hosts about a million Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, a burden that shapes its relations with every neighbour. The BBIN framework and electricity trade with Nepal and Bhutan show what sub-regionalism can achieve; Bangladesh's balancing among India, China, Pakistan, the United States and Japan shows the competition India faces.
09India's diplomatic approach
India's official line is that its relationship is with the people of Bangladesh, not with any party. In practice it invested heavily in one government for fifteen years and paid for it in 2024. Since then India has moved from wariness to a firm but open posture: it pressed concerns about minorities, used trade restrictions to signal displeasure, and then reached out to the BNP before the election.
Two debates shape the way forward. The first is about leverage: some argue India should use its economic weight to insist on security cooperation and minority protection; others warn that coercion feeds the anti-Indian nationalism that is the BNP's political temptation. The second is about water: renewing the Ganges treaty on terms Bangladesh can present as fair, and finally settling the Teesta, would do more for the relationship than any connectivity project, but both depend on West Bengal. The state government's objections blocked the Teesta agreement in 2011; since May 2026 the state has been governed by the BJP, the party in power in New Delhi, which removes a partisan obstacle but not the state's own claims on the water.
10Competing interpretations
Competing perspectives
How the relationship looks from different standpoints. A strong answer weighs them rather than adopting one.
The security planner's reading
For India's security planners Bangladesh is first a question of geography. It wraps around the Northeast, lies beside the Siliguri Corridor and holds the ports nearest to India's landlocked north-eastern states, so its alignment matters more than its size. The cooperation that dismantled insurgent camps after 2009 transformed security in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram, and the planner's fear is its reversal. Memory sharpens the fear: India accused earlier BNP governments of sheltering insurgent groups, the interim government restored ties with Pakistan, and China remains Bangladesh's main arms supplier and the builder of its submarine base at Pekua. On this reading the decisive question is whether the BNP government sustains counter-terrorism cooperation, and concessions on water or trade should follow evidence that it does rather than precede it.
The interdependence reading
An economic reading sees a relationship whose material foundations outlasted the political rupture of 2024. Bangladesh is India's largest trading partner in South Asia, and Indian electricity, the Friendship Pipeline and lines of credit for railways, roads and ports give both sides a stake in stability; Bangladesh's purchases of Nepali power through India show how far sub-regional links can reach. The lesson of 2025 is that the same links can become instruments of pressure, as India's withdrawal of the transshipment facility and its curbs on land-port trade, which came after Bangladesh had restricted yarn imports, made plain. Economists of this school warn that coercion feeds the nationalism it fears, and argue that the deferral of Bangladesh's graduation from least-developed-country status to November 2029 leaves time to revive the shelved economic partnership agreement and restore transit through Chattogram and Mongla.
The domestic politics of India's Bangladesh policy
Within India, Bangladesh policy is shaped by domestic politics as much as by diplomacy. Water is the clearest case: West Bengal's objections blocked the Teesta agreement in 2011, and renewing the Ganges treaty, like settling the Teesta, depends on the state. The BJP's victory there in May 2026 removes a partisan obstacle without removing the state's own claims on the water. Irregular migration has been framed in Indian politics as a threat to the nation, a framing Bangladeshis hear as hostility, and attacks on Hindus and other minorities during the unrest drew sharp statements from New Delhi, so issues that Dhaka treats as bilateral irritants are also questions of domestic politics in India. Sheikh Hasina's presence adds a further layer: for India it is a matter of principle and of obligation to a long-standing partner, which helps explain why Dhaka's extradition request has not been acted upon.
Dhaka's view of India
Seen from Dhaka, India's part in the birth of Bangladesh is the founding fact of the relationship and also a source of its ambivalence. The Bangladeshi critique is specific: deaths at the border in BSF firing, unresolved river-sharing, non-tariff barriers, Indian rhetoric about migrants and the perception that New Delhi chose a party over a people during the Hasina years, a perception her presence in India keeps alive. The BNP's Bangladeshi nationalism, more Islamic in tone than the Awami League's Bengali and secular narrative, gives India a different place in the national story. Yet Dhaka's choices point to hedging rather than hostility. Its new government has made a fair Ganges agreement the measure of the relationship, its leaders say ties will not be held captive to any single issue, and like other small states it cultivates China, Pakistan, the United States and Japan to widen its room for manoeuvre.
Reading the relationship through IR theory
Realism reads the relationship as asymmetry managed by hedging. India is the regional great power and surrounds Bangladesh on three sides; Bangladesh, like other small states, seeks room by cultivating China, Pakistan, the United States and Japan, and each government in Dhaka has set that balance according to its domestic needs. India's security interest in a friendly government, demonstrated by the insurgent camps dismantled after 2009, explains why it invested so heavily in one.
Liberal accounts stress interdependence: power trade, transit, ports and the Friendship Pipeline gave both countries stakes in each other during the Hasina years. The events of 2025 show the limits of that reading. The withdrawal of the transshipment facility and the curbs on land-port trade on both sides were cases of weaponised interdependence, in which links built for cooperation become instruments of pressure.
Constructivism explains why the same facts are read so differently in the two capitals. Bangladesh has two competing national narratives: a Bengali and secular nationalism associated with the Awami League and the memory of 1971, and a Bangladeshi nationalism, more Islamic in tone, associated with the BNP. India's place in each is different. In Indian politics irregular migration has been subject to securitisation, framed as a threat to the nation, which Bangladeshis hear as hostility. Scholars of shared rivers add the idea of hydro-hegemony, developed by Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner (2006): the dominant riparian's power rests not only on its position upstream but on its capacity to set the agenda and terms of negotiation, which is precisely what Dhaka contests over the Ganges and the Teesta.
11Contemporary developments
As of 20 November 2026
The new government in Dhaka has made water the test of the relationship. BNP leaders say ties with India will depend on a new Ganges agreement before the 1996 treaty expires in December 2026. Dhaka wants a treaty that takes account of climate change and the whole basin and has floated a guarantee clause for minimum flows; it has also approved a Padma barrage project that it says requires no consultation with India. India's foreign ministry has said the issues belong to the Joint Rivers Commission, the standing bilateral mechanism, and according to an AFP report in late October 2026 Bangladesh said India had not yet responded to its request to open negotiations on renewal.
Two developments have changed the context. In West Bengal, whose government blocked the Teesta agreement in 2011, the BJP won the state election of May 2026, placing the state under the same party as the Union government. And at Dhaka's request the UN General Assembly decided at the end of October 2026 to defer Bangladesh's graduation from least-developed-country status by three years, to November 2029, which eases the timetable for any trade agreement with India. Political contact has resumed, but the agenda is crowded: Hasina's presence in India, trade restrictions on both sides, the border and the protection of minorities. Tarique Rahman, invited by Modi in February 2026, had not visited India by the end of October.
12UPSC syllabus connections
Syllabus lines
GS-II
India and its neighbourhoodOfficial wording: “India and its neighborhood- relations.”
Where it is taught on this platformGS-II
Groupings and agreementsOfficial wording: “Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India's interests.”
Where it is taught on this platformPrelims
Current eventsOfficial wording: “Current events of national and international importance.”
Where it is taught on this platform
Quoted in UPSC’s official wording.
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
4 questions · 2025–2026
2026 · PSIR II · Q5(d) · 10 marks
Discuss the main features of the land-boundary agreement between India and Bangladesh.
2026 · PSIR II · Q6(a) · 20 marks
Accelerating of Chinese influence across South Asia is fundamentally reshaping the region’s geopolitical landscape. This is a big foreign policy challenge for India. Analyse.
2026 · PSIR II · Q7(a) · 20 marks
How does illegal cross border migration pose challenges to India’s security ? Discuss the steps taken by the government in this direction and their effectiveness.
2025 · PSIR II · Q5(a) · 10 marks
China’s growing footprint and a tangible shift in power dynamics in Bangladesh has weakened India’s leverage in Dhaka. Comment.
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to India and Bangladesh in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
The Ganges Water Treaty of 1996 expires in December 2026. Discuss the issues involved in its renewal and their significance for India–Bangladesh relations.
How to approach it
Explain Farakka and the sharing formula; Bangladesh's demands (climate, basin, guarantee); West Bengal's role; link to Teesta.
- Q2UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
"India's relationship with Bangladesh must be with its people, not with a party." Examine this principle in the light of developments since August 2024.
How to approach it
Assess the Hasina years and their legacy; India's response to the interim government; outreach to the BNP; the Hasina extradition question.
- Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
How did the Land Boundary Agreement of 2015 demonstrate the interaction between India's Constitution and its foreign policy?
How to approach it
Refer to Berubari (1960), Article 368 and the 100th Amendment; describe the enclave exchange.
- Q4UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Discuss the importance of Bangladesh for the development of India's Northeast.
How to approach it
Cover ports, rail, waterways and power; note the 2025 setbacks; connect to Act East and BIMSTEC.
- Q5UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Assess the role of China in India–Bangladesh relations.
How to approach it
Use the Teesta proposal, defence supplies and trade; consider Bangladesh's balancing strategy.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
13Relevant PSIR topics
Paper II · BUnit 3
India and South AsiaOfficial syllabus: “India and South Asia: (a) Regional Co-operation: SAARC – past performance and future prospects. (b) South Asia as a Free Trade Area. (c) India's "Look East" policy. (d) Impediments to regional co-operation: river water disputes; illegal cross-border migration; ethnic conflicts and insurgencies; border disputes.”
Each line is quoted from the official PSIR syllabus.
Explore further
PSIR Optional
Polity & Governance
Amendment
Organisation
Foreign policy
IB Global Politics
Political briefing
Political Issue Dossier
Timeline
Sources
- 01Ministry of External Affairs, India–Bangladesh bilateral relations (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
- 02Treaty between India and Bangladesh on Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka, 12 December 1996. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
- 03Constitution (One Hundredth Amendment) Act, 2015. Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice
- 04Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration (Bangladesh v. India), Award of 7 July 2014 (opens in a new tab). Permanent Court of Arbitration, 7 July 2014
- 05Tarique Rahman sworn in as new Bangladesh prime minister (opens in a new tab). Al Jazeera, 17 February 2026
- 06In Dhaka for Khaleda Zia's funeral, Jaishankar meets Tarique Rahman (opens in a new tab). ThePrint, 31 December 2025
- 07Bangladesh presses India for new deal before Ganges water treaty expires (opens in a new tab). Khaleej Times (AFP), October 2026
- 08Fakhrul: India ties hinge on Ganges treaty renewal (opens in a new tab). Dhaka Tribune, 2026
- 09Bangladesh seeks guarantee clause in renewed Ganges treaty (opens in a new tab). Deccan Chronicle, 2026
- 10Srinath Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh. Harvard University Press, 2013
- 11Bangladesh's LDC graduation postponed by 3 years to November 2029 (opens in a new tab). Prothom Alo, October 2026
- 12We have Joint Rivers Commission, structured bilateral mechanism to address issues related to shared waterways: MEA on Ganges water sharing treaty (opens in a new tab). The Tribune, 2026
- 13'Yes' wins in referendum on July Charter implementation (opens in a new tab). Dhaka Tribune, February 2026
- 14Suvendu Adhikari sworn in as West Bengal's first BJP Chief Minister (opens in a new tab). Outlook, 9 May 2026
- 15PM Modi invites Bangladesh PM Tarique Rahman to visit India (opens in a new tab). News on AIR, 18 February 2026
- 16Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026
- 17Official visit of H.E. Dr. Khalilur Rahman, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh, to India (April 07–09, 2026) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 7 April 2026