Strategic and contemporary issues
Supply Chains and Economic Security
From 'China plus one' to Pax Silica: how the pandemic, US–China rivalry, rare-earth export controls and tariffs turned supply chains into foreign policy, and where India fits in the reorganisation.
Overview
For three decades globalisation organised production by cost: components crossed borders many times, and China became the assembly centre of the world. Since about 2018 states have begun to organise supply chains by trust and resilience as well as cost. The pandemic exposed shortages of medicines and equipment; the US–China rivalry turned semiconductors and critical minerals into strategic goods; China's export controls on rare earths in 2025 showed how dependence could be used as leverage; and tariffs returned as a routine instrument.
Political scientists call this the age of weaponised interdependence, a term coined by Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman in 2019 for the use of network chokepoints to coerce. For India the reorganisation is both an opportunity, to attract manufacturing that leaves China, and a vulnerability, since its own industries depend on Chinese inputs.
01India's domestic levers
India has used industrial policy to make itself a destination. Production-linked incentive schemes, launched in 2020 across more than a dozen sectors, reward incremental output in electronics, pharmaceuticals, solar modules, batteries and others; electronics assembly, led by smartphones, grew fastest. The India Semiconductor Mission (2021) subsidises fabrication, assembly and design. In April 2020 India required government approval for investment from countries sharing a land border, a rule aimed at China, and in January 2025 it approved a National Critical Mineral Mission. The aim is less self-sufficiency than reduced concentration of risk.
02Plurilateral frameworks
India has joined several frameworks that pool resilience. The Supply Chain Resilience Initiative with Japan and Australia was launched in April 2021. India joined the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework in 2022, participating in its supply chain, clean economy and fair economy pillars but not in trade; the supply chain agreement entered into force in February 2024. It joined the Minerals Security Partnership in 2023, the Quad launched a critical minerals initiative in July 2025, and in February 2026 India joined Pax Silica, a US-led declaration on secure supply chains for semiconductors, computing hardware and minerals. The EU–India Trade and Technology Council has a working group on resilient value chains.
03Chokepoints: critical minerals and rare earths
China dominates the processing of most critical minerals and the refining of rare earths. From 2023 it imposed export controls on gallium, germanium and graphite; in April 2025 it added several rare earths and magnets, and in October 2025 it announced broader controls, which it suspended for a year after the meeting between the US and Chinese presidents at the end of that month. Indian automobile and electronics manufacturers faced magnet shortages in mid-2025. India's responses include overseas acquisition by the state company KABIL (lithium in Argentina, 2024), partnerships with Australia and Chile, and incentives for domestic processing. Minerals are now what oil was in the twentieth century: a geopolitical commodity.
04Tariffs and trade realignment
In 2025 the United States imposed tariffs on most trading partners; Indian goods faced 50 per cent from August, including a penalty for purchases of Russian oil. In February 2026 the two governments announced a framework for an interim trade agreement that reduced the tariff to 18 per cent, and later that month the US Supreme Court ruled that tariffs imposed under emergency economic powers were unlawful, though other tariff authorities remain. India has meanwhile diversified its agreements: with the UAE and Australia (2022), the EFTA states (2024), the United Kingdom (in force July 2026) and the EU (concluded January 2026).
05Assessment
India has gained a share of electronics and pharmaceuticals production, but the "China plus one" shift has also favoured Vietnam, Mexico and others. Its constraints are familiar: logistics costs, regulatory uncertainty, tariff levels on inputs, skills and the scale of Chinese clusters. And India's own supply chains run through China: much of its electronics, solar and pharmaceutical output relies on Chinese components and ingredients. The policy question is how far to decouple without raising costs that make Indian goods uncompetitive.
06Reading it through IR theory
The reorganisation of supply chains is a test case for IR theory. Liberal accounts explain the era that is ending: production organised by cost delivered absolute gains to participants, and complex interdependence was expected to make coercion costly and rare. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman's idea of weaponised interdependence explains why that expectation failed: networks organised around hubs give the states that control them leverage, as China's rare-earth controls of 2025 showed. Realism explains the response. When states fear that partners will gain more, or will turn dependence into leverage, they attend to relative gains and accept higher costs for security, which is the logic of India's screening of investment from countries sharing a land border and of its subsidies for semiconductors and incentives for mineral processing. Susan Strange's idea of structural power adds that control of the production and knowledge structures shapes outcomes without bargaining, which is why mineral refining and chip design matter more than final assembly. Constructivism draws attention to the word trust. Which partners count as trusted is not a fact of geography or cost but a social judgement shaped by identities and rivalries, and India's membership of the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative, IPEF's supply chain agreement and Pax Silica places it inside a community of trust formed amid the US–China rivalry. That membership brings access, but it may also narrow India's freedom to deal with all sides.
07India's options and the way forward
India's choices concern the depth of decoupling, the instruments of industrial policy and the frameworks it joins. On decoupling, India can reduce dependence on Chinese inputs gradually, through diversification and domestic processing, or more sharply, through tariffs and investment restrictions; the first protects competitiveness, since much Indian electronics, solar and pharmaceutical output relies on Chinese components and ingredients, while the second reduces risk faster at higher cost. On industrial policy, production-linked incentives and the semiconductor mission have attracted assembly, but lasting gains depend on lowering logistics costs, regulatory uncertainty and tariffs on inputs, reforms that are harder than subsidies. On frameworks, the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative, the Minerals Security Partnership and the US-led IPEF and Pax Silica secure access and investment but draw India further into the US–China rivalry, while trade agreements with the UAE, Australia, the EFTA states, the United Kingdom and the EU spread risk across partners. India also competes with Vietnam, Mexico and others for the same investment. On balance, India's realistic aim in the near term is to complement rather than replace China, reducing concentration of risk in critical sectors while remaining open enough to stay competitive; the central trade-off is between security and efficiency, and protection without competition would repeat the costs of past import substitution.
Key points
- Supply chains are now organised by trust and resilience as well as cost.
- 'Weaponised interdependence' (Farrell and Newman, 2019) names the use of chokepoints for coercion.
- India's levers: PLI schemes (2020), the Semiconductor Mission (2021), FDI screening (April 2020), the Critical Mineral Mission (2025).
- Frameworks: SCRI (2021), IPEF supply chain agreement (in force February 2024), MSP (2023), Quad minerals (2025), Pax Silica (2026).
- China's rare-earth controls in 2025 disrupted Indian manufacturers.
- US tariffs of 2025 were reduced under the February 2026 framework; India diversified through new FTAs.
Debates
Can India replace China in global supply chains, or only complement it?
Replace, in parts: India's labour force, market size and political alignment with the West make it the natural destination for trusted production in electronics, pharmaceuticals and defence.
Complement: China's clusters, infrastructure and supplier networks cannot be replicated quickly; India's gains will come in final assembly and selected sectors while it continues to depend on Chinese inputs.
Does economic security justify protectionism?
Yes, within limits: dependence on an adversary for critical inputs is a security risk that markets do not price; targeted protection, screening and subsidies are prudent.
No: economic security can become a cover for rent-seeking; India's past experience with import substitution suggests that protection without competition produces inefficiency, and high tariffs on inputs undermine export competitiveness.
Should India relax its restrictions on Chinese investment to build its manufacturing base?
Relax: much Indian electronics, solar and pharmaceutical output already relies on Chinese components, and Chinese capital and suppliers located in India could deepen local supply networks, reduce imports of finished inputs and help India compete with Vietnam and Mexico for manufacturing leaving China.
Maintain: investment from a rival creates dependence and security risks, China's rare-earth controls of 2025 showed its readiness to turn economic ties into leverage, and relaxing the rule could weaken India's appeal as a trusted alternative to China in the frameworks it has joined.
Because the rule requires government approval rather than imposing a ban, a case-by-case middle path is available: permitting investment in less sensitive sectors where it builds local capacity, while keeping strategic sectors closed.
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
2 questions · 2024
2024 · GS-II · Q9 · 10 marks
‘The West is fostering India as an alternative to reduce dependence on China’s supply chain and as a strategic ally to counter China’s political and economic dominance.’ Explain this statement with examples.
2024 · PSIR II · Q2(a) · 20 marks
“Deglobalisation is displacing globalisation.” Comment.
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Supply Chains and Economic Security in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
Supply chains have become instruments of foreign policy. Examine India's response to the reorganisation of global production since 2020.
How to approach it
PLI and ISM; FDI screening; SCRI, IPEF, MSP, Quad, Pax Silica; limits and dependence on China.
- Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Discuss the significance of critical minerals for India's economic security.
How to approach it
Chinese processing dominance and 2025 controls; KABIL; partnerships; domestic mission.
- Q3PSIR style15 marks· 250 words
Globalisation is being reshaped rather than reversed. Discuss with reference to the responses of developed and developing countries.
How to approach it
Friend-shoring, tariffs, industrial policy; India and other developing economies as beneficiaries and victims.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
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Sources
- 01Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, 'Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion', International Security 44(1) (2019)
- 02Joint Statement of the Trade Ministers of Australia, India and Japan on the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative, 27 April 2021
- 03IPEF Agreement Relating to Supply Chain Resilience, November 2023
- 04International Energy Agency, Global Critical Minerals Outlook. IEA
- 05India joins US-led initiative to build secure technology supply chains powering AI (opens in a new tab). Arab News (AP), 20 February 2026
- 06US Supreme Court strikes down Trump's global tariff: reporting and analysis. Indian and international press, 20 February 2026