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Strategic and contemporary issues

Energy Security

Available, affordable and sustainable energy for the world's most populous country: India's import dependence, the shocks of 2022 and 2026, strategic reserves, and the energy transition as a security strategy.

Overview

The International Energy Agency defines energy security as the uninterrupted availability of energy at an affordable price. For India the definition needs two additions. Access: until recently hundreds of millions of Indians lacked electricity or clean cooking fuel, which the Saubhagya electrification scheme (2017) and the Ujjwala cooking-gas scheme (2016) addressed. And sustainability: India's climate commitments (see climate diplomacy) require the energy system to change as it grows.

This entry treats the vulnerabilities and the policies that manage them; the foreign-policy instruments used to secure supplies are discussed under energy diplomacy.

01Import dependence and chokepoints

India imports close to nine-tenths of its crude oil, about half of its natural gas and a large share of its liquefied petroleum gas. Most crude and gas come from West Asia through the Strait of Hormuz, and imports from Russia, Africa and the Americas cross other chokepoints. Price shocks pass quickly into inflation, the current account and the fiscal deficit, since the state subsidises cooking gas and fertiliser and manages fuel prices. The two shocks of the 2020s, the war in Ukraine from 2022 and the war around Hormuz from February 2026, showed both vulnerabilities: the first through prices, the second through physical disruption of shipping.

02Buffers: reserves and diversification

India's strategic petroleum reserves, underground caverns at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur with a capacity of 5.33 million tonnes, hold only days of consumption; a second phase at Chandikhol and Padur was approved in 2021, and the UAE's national oil company stores crude in the Mangaluru caverns under a 2018 arrangement. The larger buffer is diversification: Indian refiners buy crude from dozens of countries and can switch grades and suppliers quickly. That flexibility allowed the surge of discounted Russian crude after 2022 and the shift away from Russia after US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil in October 2025; in the Hormuz crisis of 2026 it allowed refiners to seek cargoes from outside the Gulf while India negotiated safe passage for its ships.

03The transition as security strategy

Domestic renewable energy is also an import-substitution strategy. Non-fossil sources passed half of India's installed electricity capacity in 2025, five years ahead of the 2030 target, and the third nationally determined contribution approved in March 2026 aims at 60 per cent by 2035. The National Green Hydrogen Mission (2023) seeks to replace imported fossil fuels in industry, and the SHANTI Act of December 2025 opened nuclear power to private investment towards a target of 100 gigawatts by 2047. Coal remains the backbone of electricity generation and a domestic resource, which is why India resists rapid coal phase-out commitments in climate negotiations.

04New dependencies

The transition does not end dependence; it relocates it. Solar modules, batteries and electric motors depend on polysilicon, lithium, cobalt, graphite and rare earths whose processing China dominates, and China's export controls of 2025 showed that these inputs can be withheld (see supply chains). Grids that rely on variable renewables need storage, interconnection and cybersecurity. Energy security in the 2030s will depend as much on mineral supply chains and technology as on oil tankers.

05The geopolitics of supply

Sanctions have repeatedly narrowed India's options: on Iran in 2019, when India stopped Iranian purchases, on Venezuela, and on Russia, where US measures in 2025 combined sanctions with tariff penalties on India. Each time India has argued that a developing country cannot accept higher energy costs for policies it did not choose, and has adjusted when the cost of defiance became too high. In 2026 the war in West Asia reversed the pressure: the United States eased some restrictions on oil markets to contain prices. Energy security therefore turns on India's bargaining power with suppliers, sanctioning powers and shipping lanes at once.

06Reading it through IR theory

Realism treats energy security as a problem of self-help. A state that imports most of its oil cannot rely on markets or partners in a crisis, so it builds reserves, diversifies suppliers and keeps a domestic resource to fall back on; the lens explains India's caution about rapid coal phase-out and its readiness to buy discounted crude whatever its partners preferred. Liberal theory adds analytical precision. Keohane and Nye distinguished sensitivity, how much a state is affected by changes elsewhere, from vulnerability, how costly it is to adjust when those changes persist. The shock of 2022, transmitted through prices, tested India's sensitivity; the Hormuz crisis of 2026, a physical disruption of shipping, tested its vulnerability, and diversification rather than reserves holding only days of consumption proved the larger buffer. Sanctions on Iran, Venezuela and Russia illustrate a harsher form of interdependence, in which control of markets and finance becomes an instrument of coercion. Constructivism, and the Copenhagen School's idea of securitisation, ask how energy comes to be treated as a security issue at all: presenting supply as an existential matter can move choices about coal, subsidies or discounted crude out of normal political debate. A human security perspective, finally, recalls that for India the definition includes access to electricity and clean cooking fuel for the poor, a dimension that state-centred theories tend to omit. Together the lenses show why India's energy security cannot be reduced to tankers and reserves.

07India's options and the way forward

India's options combine buffers, diversification and transition. Expanding strategic reserves would lengthen the cover they provide, and commercial arrangements of the kind made with the UAE's national oil company can share the cost, but storage alone cannot offset a prolonged disruption. Diversification remains the more flexible buffer, yet it depends on freedom to buy from sanctioned suppliers, which brings India into periodic conflict with sanctioning powers; the realistic course has been to buy freely until the cost of defiance rises too high, a pattern that preserves options but leaves policy reactive. The energy transition offers the most durable reduction in exposure to chokepoints, but it relocates dependence to minerals and equipment processed mainly in China, so it requires parallel investment in domestic manufacturing and diversified mineral supply. Coal presents a further trade-off between security of supply, which favours a domestic resource, and climate commitments, which require its decline. Finally, energy security is also a question of access and affordability for poor households, which limits how far prices can be allowed to rise in a shock. On balance, India's energy security will rest on a portfolio rather than a single solution, and the transition changes the nature of its dependence before it reduces it.

Key points

  • India imports close to nine-tenths of its crude oil and about half of its gas.
  • Strategic reserves of 5.33 million tonnes at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur; a second phase approved in 2021.
  • Diversification of suppliers is the main buffer, tested by the Ukraine war and the 2026 Hormuz crisis.
  • Non-fossil sources passed half of installed capacity in 2025; the 2035 target is 60 per cent.
  • The transition relocates dependence to critical minerals processed mainly in China.
  • Sanctions on Iran, Venezuela and Russia have repeatedly constrained India's choices.

Debates

Should India prioritise affordability over alignment with Western sanctions?

Affordability: India's per capita energy use is low and its poor are price-sensitive; buying discounted oil is a duty to citizens, and sanctions India did not vote for at the UN do not bind it.

Alignment: the costs of defiance, tariffs, restricted finance and lost technology partnerships, can exceed the savings; energy security also depends on good relations with the powers that control finance and sea lanes.

Does the energy transition reduce India's vulnerability or relocate it?

Reduces: sunlight and wind cannot be embargoed; once built, renewable capacity cuts import bills and exposure to chokepoints such as Hormuz.

Relocates: equipment and minerals are imported, mostly from China; without domestic manufacturing and diversified mineral supplies, India would exchange dependence on Gulf oil for dependence on Chinese supply chains.

Should India expand its strategic petroleum reserves or rely on diversification?

Expand reserves: caverns holding only days of consumption are thin cover for a country that imports close to nine-tenths of its crude; a disruption affecting several chokepoints at once could outpace the search for new cargoes, and reserves buy time for diplomacy, such as negotiating safe passage for Indian ships.

Rely on diversification: refiners' ability to switch grades and suppliers proved the larger buffer in both 2022 and 2026; reserves are capital-intensive and could become less useful if the transition reduces oil demand, and the same funds could accelerate renewable capacity that cuts import dependence permanently.

The two are complements rather than alternatives. The approved second phase and the UAE storage arrangement point to a middle course in which reserves cover the opening days of a crisis while diversification carries the rest.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

3 questions · 2024–2026

  1. 2026 · PSIR II · Q8(b) · 15 marks

    India has recognised that West Asia is not a single contest, but a tangle of rivalries, bargains and anxieties. Comment.

  2. 2025 · GS-II · Q19 · 15 marks

    “Energy security constitutes the dominant kingpin of India’s foreign policy, and is linked with India’s overarching influence in Middle Eastern countries.” How would you integrate energy security with India’s foreign policy trajectories in the coming years?

  3. 2024 · GS-II · Q20 · 15 marks

    Discuss the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of Maldives for India with a focus on global trade and energy flows. Further also discuss how this relationship affects India’s maritime security and regional stability amidst international competition ?

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Energy Security in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    The crises of 2022 and 2026 exposed different dimensions of India's energy insecurity. Examine.

    How to approach it

    Price shock and sanctions in 2022; physical disruption at Hormuz in 2026; reserves and diversification; lessons.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Assess the adequacy of India's strategic petroleum reserves.

    How to approach it

    Capacity and coverage; Phase II; commercial models with foreign partners; comparison with IEA norms.

  3. Q3UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Critical minerals are the new oil. Discuss with reference to India's energy transition.

    How to approach it

    Mineral needs of solar, batteries and EVs; Chinese processing and controls; India's partnerships and domestic mission.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell (data on imports and consumption) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas
  2. 02Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited (capacity and phase II). Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas
  3. 03International Energy Agency, India Energy Outlook 2021. IEA
  4. 04West Asian War Daily Bulletin (Takshashila Institution tracker) (opens in a new tab). Takshashila Institution, 27 March 2026
  5. 05Real money: how the war in the Middle East exposed India's dependence on Russian oil (opens in a new tab). Kyiv Independent, 2026