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India's foreign policy · Doctrine

Technology Partnerships

Semiconductors, artificial intelligence, critical minerals, digital public infrastructure and space: how technology became a pillar of Indian diplomacy, organised through bilateral 'trusted' partnerships and new coalitions such as Pax Silica.

Overview

Technology moved to the centre of Indian foreign policy around 2020. The clash with China at Galwan in June 2020 was followed by a ban on 59 Chinese apps (29 June 2020), restrictions on investment from countries sharing a land border with India (April 2020) and rules on "trusted sources" for telecommunications. At the same time the pandemic exposed dependence on Chinese supply chains, and the US–China technology rivalry made semiconductors and data matters of national security.

India's response has been to build bilateral technology partnerships with trusted states, to join selected coalitions, and to offer its own model of digital public infrastructure to others. No single document announces this as doctrine; it is set out in joint statements, from the India–US initiative of 2023 to the India–EU Trade and Technology Council and the New Delhi AI Impact Summit of February 2026.

01The United States: from iCET to TRUST

The Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), announced in May 2022 and launched by the two National Security Advisers on 31 January 2023, covered semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum, telecommunications, space, defence innovation and talent. It produced Micron's assembly and test plant at Sanand (announced June 2023), an agreement for co-production of GE jet engines, and the INDUS-X defence innovation bridge. In February 2025 it was renamed TRUST, Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology, with critical minerals and energy added. In February 2026, during the AI Impact Summit in New Delhi, India joined Pax Silica, a US-led declaration on secure supply chains for semiconductors, computing hardware and critical minerals, and signed a joint statement on an AI opportunity partnership.

02Europe, Japan and other partners

The India–EU Trade and Technology Council, announced in April 2022 and the EU's second such council after the one with the United States, first met in May 2023 with working groups on strategic technologies and digital governance, clean energy technologies, and resilient value chains. The India–UK Technology Security Initiative (July 2024) covers telecommunications, semiconductors, AI, quantum and critical minerals. With Japan, India has cooperated on semiconductors and economic security; with Taiwan's PSMC, the Tata group is building India's first commercial fab at Dholera, approved in 2024 under the India Semiconductor Mission (2021).

03India's offer: digital public infrastructure

India's distinctive contribution is not a frontier technology but a model: open, interoperable public platforms for identity, payments and data exchange, built at low cost. The Unified Payments Interface has been linked with systems in Singapore (2023), the UAE and other countries, and Indian payments are accepted in several more. India's G20 presidency secured a framework on digital public infrastructure and a global repository of DPI solutions. India presents DPI as a public good for the Global South; it also extends Indian standards and influence.

04AI and technology governance

India has moved from rule-taker to convener. It chaired the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence and hosted its summit in December 2023, and on 19–20 February 2026 hosted the AI Impact Summit in New Delhi, the first in the series held in a developing country, whose New Delhi Declaration on AI Impact, a non-binding text on inclusive and human-centric AI, was endorsed by more than eighty countries and organisations. Its positions combine openness to investment with assertions of digital sovereignty, on data protection (the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023), platform regulation and the localisation of sensitive data.

05Dependencies and dilemmas

Partnerships have not removed dependence. India still imports a large share of its electronics components from China, depends on Chinese rare-earth magnets (whose export controls in 2025 disrupted Indian manufacturers) and relies on American firms for advanced chips and cloud computing. Talent flows run largely one way: in September 2025 the United States imposed a fee of USD 100,000 on new H-1B visa petitions, most of which go to Indians. The dilemma is that of strategic autonomy in technology: joining trusted coalitions secures access but may bind India to partners' export controls and rivalries.

06Reading it through IR theory

Realism treats technology as a currency of power. The ban on Chinese apps, investment screening and trusted-source rules after Galwan show security concerns overriding cost, and partnerships with the United States, Europe and Japan are a form of balancing in which access to chips, engines and minerals strengthens India against a rival. Realism also predicts the main risk: partners share technology only so far as it serves their own relative position, which would explain why export controls and visa fees persist alongside cooperation. Liberal institutionalism explains the dense architecture of councils, initiatives and summits. Bodies such as the India–EU Trade and Technology Council and the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence lower transaction costs, set standards and let India shape rules it would otherwise have to accept, and India's move from rule-taker to convener at the AI Impact Summit fits that account. Constructivism highlights the social meaning of trust and the spread of models. Which states count as trusted is a judgement about identity and intentions, not only capability, and Anu Bradford's account of competing American, Chinese and European regulatory models suggests that India's digital public infrastructure, open and publicly built, is an attempt to offer a further model to the Global South. Susan Strange's notion of a knowledge structure adds a critical caution: control over advanced chips, cloud computing and standards remains concentrated elsewhere, so partnership may coexist with structural dependence. Together the lenses suggest that India gains access through coalitions but autonomy only through capability of its own.

07India's options and the way forward

India's options balance access, autonomy and influence. Deepening partnerships with the United States through TRUST and Pax Silica offers advanced technology, investment and co-production, but binds India more closely to partners' export controls and to the technology rivalry with China; spreading partnerships across the EU, the United Kingdom, Japan and Taiwanese industry reduces reliance on any single partner while adding coordination costs. Domestically, the semiconductor mission and data-protection law aim to build capability and sovereignty, but fabrication and frontier research need sustained investment and talent that cannot be produced quickly, especially while talent flows run largely one way. In governance, India can continue as a convener on artificial intelligence and a promoter of digital public infrastructure, positioning itself between the American, European and Chinese approaches; this builds influence with the Global South but requires credible answers on data protection and surveillance. Dependence on Chinese components and rare earths remains the most immediate vulnerability, and reducing it will take diversified mineral partnerships and domestic manufacturing over many years. On balance, India's technology strategy is likely to remain one of trusted but plural partnerships, with autonomy measured by the breadth of its options and the growth of its own capacity rather than by self-sufficiency.

Key points

  • Technology became a security issue for India after Galwan (2020) and the pandemic.
  • iCET (launched 31 January 2023) became TRUST in February 2025.
  • India joined the US-led Pax Silica declaration in February 2026.
  • India–EU Trade and Technology Council first met in May 2023; India–UK Technology Security Initiative in July 2024.
  • Digital public infrastructure is India's distinctive offer to the Global South.
  • Dependence on Chinese components and rare earths, and on US chips and visas, persists.

Debates

Should India join US-led technology coalitions or keep a neutral digital stance?

Join: access to advanced chips, investment and talent depends on being inside trusted networks; India's rivalry with China makes neutrality illusory, and coalitions offer a share in setting standards.

Stay flexible: coalitions carry export-control obligations and could make India a junior partner in a technology bloc; India's strength lies in being a market and a builder of open systems for all, including the Global South.

Is digital public infrastructure a global public good or a vehicle of influence?

Public good: DPI is open-source, low-cost and adaptable, and helps poorer countries provide identity, payments and services without dependence on big technology firms.

Influence: exporting Indian platforms spreads Indian standards and companies, creates technical dependence, and raises questions about data protection and surveillance that India's own debates have not settled.

Should India give priority to domestic chip fabrication or to secure supply from trusted partners?

Domestic fabrication: dependence on imported chips is a strategic vulnerability, as the pandemic and the US–China technology rivalry showed; the Dholera fab with Taiwan's PSMC and the support of the India Semiconductor Mission build a base without which partnerships remain a form of dependence.

Trusted supply: fabrication is costly and technologically demanding, and investment such as Micron's plant at Sanand has come in assembly and testing; membership of Pax Silica and partnerships with the United States, Japan and Europe may secure supply more cheaply, while large subsidies risk inefficiency.

The realistic answer is sequencing rather than choice: trusted supply covers present needs while domestic capacity is built gradually, from assembly and testing towards fabrication through partnerships such as that at Dholera.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

1 question · 2025

  1. 2025 · GS-II · Q9 · 10 marks

    India-Africa digital partnership is achieving mutual respect, co-development and long-term institutional partnerships. Elaborate.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Technology Partnerships in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Technology has become a pillar of India's strategic partnerships. Examine with reference to the United States and the European Union.

    How to approach it

    iCET to TRUST; TTC; semiconductors and defence; Pax Silica; limits and frictions.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Assess the role of digital public infrastructure in India's diplomacy with the Global South.

    How to approach it

    G20 framework, UPI linkages, repository; benefits and concerns.

  3. Q3UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    India seeks technological self-reliance through foreign partnerships. Is this a contradiction?

    How to approach it

    Atmanirbhar Bharat and ISM; trusted partners; dependence on China and the US; autonomy as diversification.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

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Sources

  1. 01India–US Joint Statement (TRUST initiative) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 13 February 2025
  2. 02Joint Statement of the first India–EU Trade and Technology Council meeting, Brussels, 16 May 2023
  3. 03India joins US-led initiative to build secure technology supply chains powering AI (opens in a new tab). Arab News (AP), 20 February 2026
  4. 04India's AI Impact Summit closes with the New Delhi Declaration (opens in a new tab). Fortune, 23 February 2026
  5. 05Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (India Semiconductor Mission) (opens in a new tab). Government of India
  6. 06Anu Bradford, Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology (2023)