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Major powers · Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership

India and Russia

India's oldest strategic partner and still a pillar of its defence. The relationship has shifted from arms and diplomatic protection to discounted oil, and India has kept it through Russia's war in Ukraine at the cost of friction with the West.

India (gold) and Russia. Boundaries approximate; India per Natural Earth’s India point-of-view data.

India and Russia at a glance

Relationship
Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership
Major powers
Two-way trade, 2025⁠–⁠26
59.9 USD billion
Merchandise exports plus imports
India's balance, 2025⁠–⁠26
Deficit of 50.9
USD billion; exports 4.5, imports 55.4
Key agreements
8 listed
1971 to 2025
On the timeline
19 events
1917 to 2026
Asked by UPSC
4 questions
2024, 2025, 2026

01Geography

Russia, the largest state in the world by area, stretches across eleven time zones from the Baltic to the Pacific, but it has no border with India. Land routes between the two pass through Central Asia and Afghanistan, through Iran and the Caucasus, or through China, and the traditional sea route from India's west coast to Russia's European ports runs through Suez and the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, or round Europe to the Baltic. That geography explains why trade in goods was always thin, why seaborne oil now dominates the exchange, and why India invests in corridors that bypass Pakistan and Suez: the International North–South Transport Corridor through Iran to the Caspian, and the maritime route from Chennai to Vladivostok in the Russian Far East.

Russia's Arctic coast and the Northern Sea Route give it a polar dimension in which India has taken an interest since its Arctic policy of 2022, and its long land border with China is the geographical basis of both their partnership and India's concern about it.

02Political context

Russia's political system

Russia is a federation with a semi-presidential constitution adopted in 1993, but power is concentrated in the presidency. Vladimir Putin has been President or Prime Minister since 1999; constitutional amendments approved in 2020 reset his count of terms, allowing him to stand in 2024, when he was re-elected for six years, and again in 2030. The President appoints the Prime Minister, Mikhail Mishustin since 2020, with the consent of the State Duma, directs foreign and security policy and chairs the Security Council.

The Federal Assembly consists of the State Duma of 450 deputies and the Federation Council, which represents the regions. In the Duma election of September 2026, a tightly managed vote, the Kremlin's party, United Russia, won 349 seats, its largest total. Organised opposition has been suppressed, the opposition leader Alexei Navalny died in prison in 2024, and independent media operate from abroad. For India this concentration of power means that the relationship is conducted above all between leaders, through the annual summit (see Russia's political system).

Political and diplomatic developments

The annual summit has survived the war in Ukraine. Narendra Modi went to Moscow for the 22nd summit in July 2024 and to Kazan for the BRICS summit that October; Putin came to New Delhi for the 23rd summit on 4–5 December 2025 and returned for the BRICS summit in September 2026, when Modi accepted his invitation to the 24th annual summit in Russia, on dates to be fixed through diplomatic channels.

India's position on Ukraine is the central political fact of the relationship. India has abstained on UN resolutions condemning the invasion, has not joined sanctions, and has called for dialogue and diplomacy while affirming respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. Modi's remark to Putin at Samarkand in September 2022 that "today's era is not of war" was India's sharpest public message; his visit to Kyiv in August 2024, the first by an Indian prime minister, was its clearest signal of balance. India declined to endorse the communiqué of the Swiss-hosted peace summit of June 2024 and has welcomed direct US–Russian contacts since 2025.

Russia supports India's claim to a permanent Security Council seat and its membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and it has largely kept its arms relationship with Pakistan small. One irritant is new: the recruitment of Indian nationals into the Russian army, several of whom were killed, which New Delhi took up at the highest level.

03Historical bilateral relations

The partnership began as a convergence of interests rather than ideology. After Stalin's death, the visit of Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev in 1955 brought Soviet backing on Kashmir at the Security Council, where Soviet vetoes protected India repeatedly, and economic help on Nehru's terms: the Bhilai steel plant was the emblem of state-led industrialisation. The Soviet Union stayed neutral in the 1962 war while agreeing to supply MiG-21s, and in January 1966 Aleksei Kosygin brokered the Tashkent Declaration.

The Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of 9 August 1971, signed as the East Pakistan crisis deepened and Washington and Beijing drew together, gave India a security assurance in all but name: its Article IX provided for immediate consultations if either party were threatened. Soviet vetoes in December 1971 shielded India during the war that created Bangladesh. For two decades Moscow became India's principal arms supplier, on credit and in rupees, and India declined to condemn the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

The Soviet collapse removed the scaffolding. The 1993 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation dropped the security clause, the rupee–rouble debt had to be renegotiated, and under American pressure Russia withheld cryogenic rocket technology in 1993. Vladimir Putin's visit of October 2000 rebuilt the relationship through the Declaration on Strategic Partnership and annual summits; in 2010 it was raised to a "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership". The defining projects of this era were the BrahMos missile joint venture, the Kudankulam nuclear plant, the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and the lease of nuclear-powered submarines.

Diplomatic timeline

19 events, 1917–2026 · 9 turning points

The dated events of the Global Political Timeline that involve Russia. Open an entry to read it in full.

  1. The Bolsheviks seize power in RussiaWorld · Turning point

    On the night of 24–25 October 1917 by the Julian calendar then used in Russia (6–7 November by the Gregorian), the Bolsheviks' Military Revolutionary Committee took over Petrograd, and the Winter Palace, seat of the Provisional Government, fell the following night. The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets vested power in a Council of People's Commissars headed by Lenin. The first state founded on Marxist doctrine dispersed the elected Constituent Assembly in January 1918 and became the Soviet Union in 1922. Its example inspired communist parties across the world and impressed anticolonial nationalists, from M.N. Roy to Jawaharlal Nehru.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  2. Goa, Daman and Diu: Portuguese rule endsDiplomatic

    After Portugal had refused for more than a decade to negotiate the transfer of its Indian territories, Indian forces entered Goa, Daman and Diu on 18 December 1961 in Operation Vijay, and the Governor-General, Manuel António Vassalo e Silva, surrendered on 19 December, since marked as Goa's Liberation Day. At the Security Council a Western draft calling on India to withdraw was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The Twelfth Amendment made the territories a Union territory from 20 December 1961. Portugal recognised Indian sovereignty after its own revolution of 1974, and Goa became a State in 1987.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  3. The Cuban missile crisisWorld

    On 16 October 1962 John F. Kennedy was shown photographs of Soviet missile sites under construction in Cuba. Rejecting an air strike, he announced a naval "quarantine" on 22 October, and after days at the edge of nuclear war Nikita Khrushchev announced on 28 October that the missiles would be dismantled; the United States secretly undertook to remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey, which it did in April 1963. The crisis led to the Moscow–Washington hotline and the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. It coincided with China's attack on India, which began on 20 October.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  4. The India–China warDiplomatic · Turning point

    Chinese forces attacked in the eastern and western sectors on 20 October 1962. After a pause and a second offensive in November, China declared a unilateral ceasefire on 21 November, withdrew from most of the territory it had taken in the east and kept Aksai Chin. The defeat discredited the Forward Policy, led to the resignation of the defence minister, V. K. Krishna Menon, opened India to Western military aid and shaped Indian strategic thinking for decades.

    From history to today

    The war left the boundary undefined and Aksai Chin, which India regards as its territory, under Chinese control; the Line of Actual Control that emerged from it has still not been agreed on the ground. Its memory shaped India's defence build-up, its distrust of Chinese assurances and its reading of the Galwan clash. India rejects China's claim to Arunachal Pradesh, and the Special Representatives are still seeking a settlement.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  5. Tashkent DeclarationDiplomatic

    Brought together by the Soviet Premier, Aleksei Kosygin, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Ayub Khan agreed on 10 January 1966 to withdraw their forces to the positions held before 5 August 1965 and to restore normal relations. Shastri died in Tashkent the following night. The declaration was the high point of Soviet diplomacy in South Asia and a rare instance of India accepting a third party's good offices with Pakistan.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  6. Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and CooperationDiplomatic · Turning point

    Signed on 9 August 1971, as the East Pakistan crisis deepened and the United States and China drew together, the twenty-year treaty committed the parties to consult immediately if either faced attack or the threat of attack (Article IX). It gave India diplomatic cover for the war that December. Critics argued that it compromised non-alignment; its defenders saw non-alignment adapted to a threat.

    From history to today

    The treaty made Moscow India's most dependable great-power partner for two decades and set a pattern of Soviet, then Russian, arms supply that still accounts for a large share of the equipment of India's armed forces. After the Soviet collapse it gave way in 1993 to a treaty without the security clause, and the strategic partnership of 2000 and its annual summits carry on its logic, tested by Russia's war in Ukraine.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  7. Pakistani forces surrender in Dhaka; Bangladesh is bornDiplomatic · Turning point

    After Pakistan's air strikes on Indian bases on 3 December 1971, India went to war in support of the Bangladeshi liberation struggle and recognised Bangladesh on 6 December. On 16 December Pakistani forces in the east surrendered in Dhaka, and about 93,000 soldiers and civilians became prisoners of war. Soviet vetoes blocked ceasefire resolutions at the Security Council, while the United States sent a carrier group into the Bay of Bengal.

    From history to today

    The war created Bangladesh, ended the two-wing Pakistan of 1947 and left India the pre-eminent military power in South Asia; 16 December is marked as Vijay Diwas in India and Victory Day in Bangladesh. India's role in 1971 still underpins its claim to a special relationship with Bangladesh, a claim tested by the fall of Sheikh Hasina in 2024 and by the effort to reset relations after the 2026 election. The Simla Agreement was its diplomatic sequel.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  8. The Berlin Wall fallsWorld · Turning point

    On the evening of 9 November 1989 Günter Schabowski, a member of East Germany's ruling party leadership, mistakenly announced at a televised press conference that new rules allowing citizens to travel to the West took effect immediately. Crowds gathered at the crossings, and that night the border guards opened them. The Wall, built in 1961, had been the emblem of a divided Europe; its fall came amid the revolutions of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe, opened the way to German reunification on 3 October 1990 and was followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

    From history to today

    The Wall's fall began the post-Cold War order: a reunified Germany at the heart of the European Union, the eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO, and a period of American primacy. Russia's grievance over that enlargement became part of its case for the invasion of Ukraine. For India the end of bipolarity forced the rethinking that followed the Soviet collapse, and the turn to multi-alignment.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  9. Dissolution of the Soviet UnionWorld · Turning point

    The Soviet Union ceased to exist on 26 December 1991, removing India's principal arms supplier, its protector at the Security Council and its partner in rupee trade. Coinciding with India's balance-of-payments crisis and economic reforms, the collapse forced a rethinking of foreign policy: the opening to the United States and Israel, the Look East policy and a new treaty with Russia in 1993.

    From history to today

    The collapse ended the bipolar order in which non-alignment had made sense and pushed India towards economic liberalisation and new partners: the United States, Israel and, through Look East, Southeast Asia. Russia's attempt to recover lost status, which many analysts trace through to the invasion of Ukraine, and India's effort to keep Russia close while partnering the West, are still working out the consequences of 1991.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  10. India–Russia Declaration on Strategic PartnershipDiplomatic

    Signed during Vladimir Putin's first visit as President in October 2000, the declaration instituted annual summits and rebuilt a relationship weakened by the Soviet collapse. It was raised to a Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership in 2010, and the annual summits have continued since, including through the war in Ukraine.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  11. The Nuclear Suppliers Group exempts IndiaDiplomatic · Turning point

    On 6 September 2008 the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed by consensus to exempt India from its requirement of full-scope safeguards, allowing civil nuclear trade with a state outside the NPT. The decision followed the IAEA's approval of an India-specific safeguards agreement and India's restatement of its testing moratorium and no-first-use policy. Agreements with France, the United States, Russia and others followed.

    From history to today

    The waiver allowed India civil nuclear trade with France, Russia, the United States and others, including imports of uranium for its safeguarded reactors, without signing the NPT. It opened the way to the export-control regimes: India joined the Missile Technology Control Regime in 2016, the Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017 and the Australia Group in 2018. Membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group itself has been blocked since 2016, chiefly by China; see nuclear diplomacy.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  12. First BRIC summit at YekaterinburgDiplomatic

    The leaders of Brazil, Russia, India and China met as a group for the first time at Yekaterinburg on 16 June 2009, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. South Africa joined in 2010, and the group later created the New Development Bank. For India, BRICS became a forum for the reform of global governance alongside, not against, its Western partnerships; India hosted the 18th summit in 2026.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  13. India becomes a full member of the SCODiplomatic

    India and Pakistan were admitted as full members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation at the Astana summit on 9 June 2017. Membership gave India a seat in a Eurasian security forum led by China and Russia and a platform for engagement with Central Asia. India has used it to press its positions on terrorism and sovereignty, declining to endorse the Belt and Road Initiative in SCO declarations.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  14. Russia invades UkraineWorld · Turning point

    Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 confronted India with a choice between its oldest defence partner and its Western partners. India abstained on the UN resolutions condemning Russia, called for dialogue and diplomacy, and became a large buyer of discounted Russian oil. Modi's remark to Putin in September 2022 that this was not an era of war, and his visit to Kyiv in 2024, marked the limits of Indian neutrality.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  15. United States raises tariffs on Indian goods to 50 per centDiplomatic

    A 25 per cent "reciprocal" tariff on Indian goods took effect on 7 August 2025, and an additional 25 per cent, imposed as a penalty for India's purchases of Russian oil, followed on 27 August — among the highest rates the United States applied to any partner. The tariffs hit textiles, gems and seafood and marked the lowest point in relations in two decades. A framework agreement in February 2026 cut the rate to 18 per cent and suspended the penalty.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  16. Modi visits China for the SCO summitDiplomatic

    Narendra Modi's first visit to China since 2018 took him to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin, where he met Xi Jinping on 31 August 2025. The leaders agreed that their countries were development partners rather than rivals and that differences should not become disputes. Coming weeks after the American tariff increases, the visit was widely read as Indian hedging.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  17. Putin's visit and the 23rd India–Russia summitDiplomatic

    Vladimir Putin's state visit on 4–5 December 2025, his first to India since the war in Ukraine began, produced sixteen agreements and a programme for economic cooperation to 2030. It came weeks after American sanctions on Russia's largest oil companies and amid pressure on India's oil purchases, and it showed India's determination to keep the partnership.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  18. War on Iran and the closure of the Strait of HormuzWorld · Turning point

    A US–Israeli military campaign against Iran began on 28 February 2026. Iran restricted and then closed the Strait of Hormuz, through which a large share of India's oil and gas imports pass, before reopening it during a ceasefire in April. India evacuated thousands of its nationals from Iran by land, deployed its Navy to protect Indian shipping and turned to other suppliers, including Russia. The war also clouded the future of Chabahar and of the India–Middle East–Europe corridor.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
  19. India hosts the 18th BRICS summitDiplomatic

    Leaders of the expanded BRICS met in New Delhi on 12–13 September 2026 under India's chairmanship. Xi Jinping's attendance was his first visit to India since 2019, and he met Narendra Modi on 12 September; Vladimir Putin, who held talks with Modi on 11 September, also attended. India used the chair to press for the reform of global governance; China chairs the group in 2027.

    See it on the Global Political Timeline
Follow Russia across the Global Political Timeline

04Strategic interests

For India the relationship serves four purposes: it sustains an arsenal that is still largely Russian in origin, it supplies energy, it keeps a great power at India's side in a multipolar order, and it gives India a channel to a Russia that would otherwise depend entirely on China. The last purpose has become the most important. The "no limits" partnership that Moscow and Beijing declared in February 2022 is India's nightmare; Indian strategy aims to keep Russia from becoming China's junior partner in Asia.

For Russia, India is a market for arms and oil, a demonstration that the West has failed to isolate it, and a hedge against over-reliance on China. The asymmetry has reversed since 1971: Russia now needs India's market and legitimacy more than India needs Russia's diplomatic protection.

The strongest critique comes from those who see Russia as a declining power whose dependence on China will grow whatever India does, so that Indian investment in the relationship buys less each year while costing goodwill in Washington and Europe. The Indian realist reply is that abandoning Russia would complete its dependence on China, remove India's leverage in any settlement and strip the armed forces of spares and upgrades they cannot yet replace. Both sides agree that the relationship's value is now more political and energy-related than military.

05Key agreements

  • 1971Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation

    Signed on 9 August 1971 for twenty years; Article IX provided for consultations and measures if either party faced attack or the threat of attack.

  • 1993Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation

    Replaced the 1971 treaty on 28 January 1993 without its security clause, adapting the relationship to post-Soviet Russia.

  • 1998Agreement on the BrahMos joint venture

    Created BrahMos Aerospace between DRDO and Russia's NPO Mashinostroyeniya to develop and produce the supersonic cruise missile, now exported.

  • 2000Declaration on Strategic Partnership

    Signed during Vladimir Putin's visit in October 2000; instituted annual summits.

  • 2000International North–South Transport Corridor agreement

    Agreement among India, Iran and Russia, later joined by other states, for a multimodal route from Mumbai through Iran to Russia and Europe.

  • 2010Joint statement elevating ties to a Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership

    Issued during President Dmitry Medvedev's visit in December 2010.

  • 2018S-400 Triumf contract

    Contract for five squadrons of the long-range air defence system, signed in October 2018 despite the threat of American sanctions.

  • 2025Programme for the Development of Strategic Areas of Economic Cooperation until 2030

    Adopted at the 23rd annual summit in New Delhi in December 2025 to broaden trade towards the US$100 billion target, with national-currency settlement and labour mobility among its priorities.

06Cooperation

Economy, connectivity, defence and technology: where the two work together, where they do not, and where cooperation could grow.

Economic relationship

The war turned a thin economic relationship into a large and lopsided one. Before 2022 Russia supplied a small fraction of India's crude; within two years it was the largest single supplier, and bilateral trade rose to record levels, overwhelmingly in India's imports. Indian refiners bought discounted Urals crude and exported refined products, including to Europe.

Sanctions have shaped every stage. Payments have been settled in rupees, dirhams and yuan; Russian exporters accumulated rupee balances they struggled to use, and the Reserve Bank's 2022 framework for rupee trade settlement was an attempt to institutionalise the workaround. The American penalty tariff of August 2025 and US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil in October 2025 led Indian refiners to cut purchases in late 2025. The disruption of Gulf supplies in 2026 reversed that trend: Russia's share of India's crude imports reached a record in July 2026, estimated at between about 51 and 55 per cent depending on the data source, before easing in August.

The 23rd summit tried to broaden the base. It adopted a Programme for the Development of Strategic Areas of Russia–India Economic Cooperation until 2030, aimed at the target of US$100 billion of trade by 2030, with emphasis on national-currency settlement, fertilisers, engineering, pharmaceuticals and the movement of skilled workers. The structural problem remains Indian exports, which are small and constrained by sanctions on Russian banks.

India’s merchandise trade with Russia

2021–22 to 2025–26 · USD billion

Exports 2025–26
4.5
India to Russia
Imports 2025–26
55.4
Russia to India
Two-way trade 2025–26
59.9
Exports plus imports
Trade deficit 2025–26
50.9
Imports exceed exports
  • Exports from India
  • Imports into India
  • Balance: exports minus imports
−75−50−2502550752021–223.39.9−6.62022–233.146.2−43.12023–244.361.2−56.92024–254.963.8−58.92025–264.555.4−50.9ExportsImportsBalance
India’s merchandise trade with Russia, USD billion, by financial year
Financial yearExports from IndiaImports into IndiaBalance (exports minus imports)
2021–223.39.9−6.6
2022–233.146.2−43.1
2023–244.361.2−56.9
2024–254.963.8−58.9
2025–264.555.4−50.9

Unit: USD billion. Balance and two-way trade are calculated here from the published exports and imports.

Note: Merchandise trade only; services excluded. Indian financial years (April–March). Figures for 2025–26 are provisional and those for 2021–22 to 2024–25 revised, as published by the Reserve Bank of India from data compiled by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S) of the Department of Commerce.

Official dataSource: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026.

Trade and connectivity

Geography makes connectivity the relationship's weak point. The International North–South Transport Corridor, agreed by India, Iran and Russia in 2000, links Mumbai to Russia through Iranian ports and the Caspian; its value is that it bypasses both the Suez route and Pakistan, and its weakness is that it runs through Iran, as the 2026 war showed (see connectivity corridors).

The Chennai–Vladivostok maritime corridor, proposed in 2019, connects India to the Russian Far East, where Indian companies hold stakes in oil and gas projects such as Sakhalin-1. India's Arctic policy of 2022 and its interest in the Northern Sea Route add a polar dimension that Russia welcomes as a counterweight to China.

Defence and security

Russia remains the largest source of India's military inventory even as its share of new purchases has fallen. SIPRI's data show Russia's share of India's arms imports falling from about three-quarters in 2009–13 to roughly a third in 2019–23, as India bought from France, the United States and Israel and built more at home. Spares, upgrades and licensed production for the Su-30MKI fleet, T-72 and T-90 tanks and Kilo-class submarines tie the armed forces to Russian industry for decades.

The S-400 air defence system, contracted in 2018 for five squadrons, is the flagship. Three were delivered by 2025 and were reported to have been used in Operation Sindoor; the Kremlin said in September 2026 that Russia was fulfilling its obligations on the remaining two. The United States never imposed sanctions on India under CAATSA for the purchase.

Co-production is the model both sides promote. BrahMos, a joint venture formed under the 1998 agreement, is now exported; AK-203 rifles are made at Korwa in Uttar Pradesh; two Talwar-class frigates built in Russia, INS Tushil (2024) and INS Tamal (2025), joined the Navy. Delivery delays and the war's demands on Russian industry are the recurring complaint.

Technology

Russian technology transfer once filled gaps no one else would: licensed aircraft production, nuclear reactors, submarine technology and help with space. Kudankulam's first two units are operating and four more are under construction; Russia trained the first Indian astronauts selected for Gaganyaan. In civilian digital technology the relationship is thin.

Sanctions have reversed the direction of need. Russia seeks electronics and machine tools that it can no longer buy from the West, and American and European authorities have sanctioned some Indian firms for supplying dual-use goods. India's challenge is to keep defence and nuclear cooperation without becoming a conduit that brings secondary sanctions on its own industry.

Opportunities

  • Co-development and co-production in India, building on BrahMos and the AK-203 line.
  • Civil nuclear cooperation beyond Kudankulam, including smaller reactors.
  • Energy investment in the Russian Far East and the Arctic, linked to the Chennai–Vladivostok route.
  • A diplomatic role in any negotiated settlement of the war in Ukraine.
  • Using Russian interest in India to keep the Russia–China partnership from becoming an alliance against India.

07Points of disagreement

Challenges

  • Russia's growing economic and strategic dependence on China.
  • Secondary sanctions and tariff threats against buyers of Russian oil and suppliers of dual-use goods.
  • Delays in defence deliveries and spares as Russian industry serves its own war.
  • A trade relationship dominated by Indian imports, with payment problems and few Indian exports.
  • A corridor strategy that depends on Iran.

08Regional context

Russia's tilt towards China is the regional fact that most worries India. A revived Russia–India–China (RIC) trilateral, which Moscow promotes, interests New Delhi only as a way to talk to both. In the SCO and BRICS, Russia generally supports India's positions, and it backed India's BRICS chairmanship in 2026.

In Afghanistan, Russia became in July 2025 the first state to recognise the Taliban government, a step India has not taken although it has upgraded its own presence in Kabul. In the Indo-Pacific, Russia criticises the Quad and the Indo-Pacific concept as American constructs, which India answers by stressing that its Indo-Pacific vision is inclusive and that the Quad is not a military alliance.

09India's diplomatic approach

India's approach is compartmentalisation. It declines to condemn Russia while restating the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity; it buys Russian oil on the argument that energy security for its population cannot be subordinated to others' sanctions; it diversifies its arms purchases and builds indigenous capacity while keeping Russian systems supported; and it uses its standing in Moscow, Kyiv and Washington to argue for a negotiated end to the war.

The critique is twofold. Western governments argue that India's purchases finance the war and that its neutrality is not neutral. Some Indian analysts argue the opposite risk: that Russia is becoming less reliable as a supplier, more dependent on China and less useful as a balancer, so that India is preserving a relationship whose strategic returns are falling. India's answer, so far, is that the costs of maintaining the partnership remain lower than the costs of abandoning it.

10Competing interpretations

Competing perspectives

How the relationship looks from different standpoints. A strong answer weighs them rather than adopting one.

The strategic realist's reading

For a realist, Russia has always been a balancing asset for India: against Pakistan and its American patron in 1971, and today against the prospect of a Russia drawn wholly into China's orbit. The no-limits partnership that Moscow and Beijing declared in February 2022 is the outcome Indian strategy most wants to prevent, and keeping a channel open to Moscow is its main instrument. The armed forces add a material reason, since the Su-30MKI fleet, T-72 and T-90 tanks and Kilo-class submarines tie them to Russian spares and upgrades for decades, and the S-400 was reported to have been used in Operation Sindoor. Abandoning Russia, on this view, would complete its dependence on China, remove India's leverage in any settlement and strip the forces of support they cannot yet replace. The relationship's value is now more political and energy-related than military, but it is real.

The energy and sanctions reading

An economic reading sees a thin relationship made large and lopsided by war. Russia went from supplying a small fraction of India's crude before 2022 to being its largest single supplier; Indian refiners bought discounted Urals crude and exported refined products, and Russia's share of India's crude imports reached a record in July 2026 after the disruption of Gulf supplies. The exposure is just as clear. The American penalty tariff of August 2025 and sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil cut purchases for a time, payments move awkwardly through rupees, dirhams and yuan, and some Indian firms have been sanctioned for supplying dual-use goods. Indian exports to Russia remain small and constrained by sanctions on Russian banks, so the US$100 billion target for 2030 depends on broadening a trade dominated by one commodity. On this reading energy security justifies the trade, but others' sanctions set its terms.

The memory of friendship in Indian public life

Inside India the relationship draws on a reserve of trust few other partnerships enjoy. The memory of Soviet vetoes on Kashmir, of the 1971 treaty and war, and of help with steel at Bhilai, with space and with defence sustains a narrative of time-tested friendship that has outlasted the Soviet collapse and survives shifts in material interest. A shared preference for multipolarity and non-interference reinforces it. Critics argue that the narrative now outruns the reality: some Indian analysts see Russia becoming less reliable as a supplier, more dependent on China and less useful as a balancer, and the recruitment of Indian nationals into the Russian army, several of whom were killed, showed a harsher side of the partnership that New Delhi had to raise at the highest level. The constructivist point is that identities and memories lag behind changes in power, which can make policy slow to adapt.

Moscow's view of India

Seen from Moscow, India is a market for arms and oil, a demonstration that the West has failed to isolate Russia and a hedge against over-reliance on China. The asymmetry has reversed since 1971: Russia now needs India's market and legitimacy more than India needs Russian diplomatic protection. Moscow keeps the relationship warm through the annual summit, support for India's claims to a permanent Security Council seat and to membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, backing for India's BRICS chairmanship and a small arms relationship with Pakistan. Its own priorities still diverge. Russia criticises the Quad and the Indo-Pacific concept as American constructs, promotes a revived trilateral with China that interests India only as a way to talk to both, recognised the Taliban government when India had not, and under sanctions now seeks from India the electronics and machine tools it can no longer buy from the West.

Reading the relationship through IR theory

Realism explains why the partnership has outlasted the Cold War, the Soviet collapse and the war in Ukraine. For India, Russia has always been a balancing asset: against Pakistan and its American patron in 1971, and today against the prospect of a Russia drawn wholly into China's orbit. For Russia, India is a large market for arms and energy and proof that it is not isolated. Each partner's value to the other depends on third parties, the United States, China and Pakistan, which is the realist core of the relationship.

Liberal theories have least purchase. Economic interdependence was thin for decades and is now concentrated in one commodity, discounted oil, bought against the grain of Western sanctions, and payment problems show how little institutional infrastructure supports it. Sanctions are themselves a liberal instrument, and India's refusal to join those imposed outside the UN is a statement that it does not accept their legitimacy.

Constructivism explains the persistence of trust in Indian public life. The memory of Soviet vetoes on Kashmir, of 1971 and of help with steel, space and defence, together with a shared preference for multipolarity and non-interference, sustains a narrative of time-tested friendship that survives shifts in material interest. Critics argue that the narrative now outruns the reality, in which Russia's dependence on China is the most important fact about it; the theoretical point is that identities and memories lag behind changes in power, and can make policy slow to adapt.

11Contemporary developments

As of 20 November 2026

The partnership has weathered American pressure and grown more political. At the 23rd summit, on 4–5 December 2025, the two sides exchanged sixteen agreements across defence, trade, health, education and media, adopted the programme for economic cooperation to 2030, and India announced a free 30-day e-tourist visa for Russian nationals; Putin offered "uninterrupted" fuel supplies. Critics noted that much of the long joint statement repeated earlier commitments.

In 2026 the Middle East war made Russian oil more important to India, not less: Russia's share of India's crude imports reached a record in July, while Washington threatened further tariffs on buyers of Russian energy. Putin attended the BRICS summit in New Delhi and held talks with Modi on 11 September 2026 on trade, energy and defence, less than two weeks after both attended the SCO summit in Bishkek, and Modi accepted an invitation to the 24th annual summit in Russia. The war in Ukraine continues: talks between Russia and Ukraine under American mediation resumed in Abu Dhabi in November 2026, the first since February, without producing a ceasefire, and India still calls for dialogue and diplomacy. Two frictions surfaced in official statements in September 2026: India answered the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act passed by the US Congress by restating that it would secure its energy through diversified sourcing and protect its trade interests (17 September), and it again warned its citizens against recruitment into the Russian armed forces (30 September).

12UPSC syllabus connections

Syllabus lines

  1. GS-II

    Developed and developing countries; diaspora

    Official wording: “Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India's interests, Indian diaspora.”

    Where it is taught on this platform
  2. GS-II

    Groupings and agreements

    Official wording: “Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India's interests.”

    Where it is taught on this platform
  3. Prelims

    Current events

    Official wording: “Current events of national and international importance.”

    Where it is taught on this platform

Quoted in UPSC’s official wording.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

4 questions · 2024–2026

  1. 2026 · PSIR II · Q8(a) · 20 marks

    Critically evaluate India-Russia relations in the 21st century. How have both the countries responded to America meddling in their relations in the recent times.

  2. 2025 · GS-II · Q20 · 15 marks

    “The reform process in the United Nations remains unresolved, because of the delicate imbalance of East and West and entanglement of the USA vs. Russo-Chinese alliance.” Examine and critically evaluate the East-West policy confrontations in this regard.

  3. 2025 · PSIR II · Q7(a) · 20 marks

    India continues to invoke its time-tested policy of strategic autonomy vis-à-vis both the United States of America and Russia by rejecting US’ offer of mediation on Kashmir issue and by refusing to criticize Russia in its ongoing war against Ukraine. Comment.

  4. 2024 · PSIR II · Q1(c) · 10 marks

    The expansionist tendencies of the current Russian regime indicate its intentions for the realisation of a Greater Russia on the lines of the Soviet era. Comment.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to India and Russia in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    India's refusal to condemn Russia over Ukraine has been described both as strategic autonomy and as strategic dependence. Critically examine.

    How to approach it

    Explain India's votes and statements; weigh the defence-dependence argument against the energy and balance-of-power arguments; reach a judgement.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    How has the composition of India–Russia trade changed since 2022, and what are its implications for India's energy security and foreign policy?

    How to approach it

    Discuss oil imports, payment issues, the 2025 US penalty tariff and the 2026 Gulf disruption; connect to the 2030 programme.

  3. Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Compare the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 with the India–Russia Treaty of 1993. What does the comparison reveal about the evolution of the relationship?

    How to approach it

    Focus on Article IX and its removal; place each treaty in its strategic context.

  4. Q4UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Discuss the challenges India faces in diversifying away from Russian defence equipment.

    How to approach it

    Use SIPRI trends, legacy fleets, the S-400 and co-production; note the cost and time of indigenisation.

  5. Q5PSIR style15 marks· 250 words

    Assess the implications of the Russia–China partnership for India's foreign policy.

    How to approach it

    Use balance-of-power reasoning; consider RIC, SCO and BRICS; explain why India keeps engaging Moscow despite the partnership.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

13Relevant PSIR topics

  1. Paper II · BUnit 1

    Indian Foreign Policy

    Official syllabus: “Indian Foreign Policy: Determinants of foreign policy; institutions of policy-making; continuity and change.”

  2. Paper II · BUnit 5

    India and the Global Centres of Power

    Official syllabus: “India and the Global Centres of Power: USA, EU, Japan, China and Russia.”

  3. Paper II · BUnit 8

    Recent Developments in Indian Foreign Policy

    Official syllabus: “Recent developments in Indian Foreign policy: India's position on the recent crisis in Afghanistan, Iraq and West Asia, growing relations with US and Israel; vision of a new world order.”

Each line is quoted from the official PSIR syllabus.

Explore further

Political system

Political Issue Dossier

Five-minute module

Sources

  1. 01Joint Statement following the 23rd India–Russia Annual Summit (opens in a new tab). Prime Minister's Office, Government of India, 5 December 2025
  2. 02India and Russia sign 16 agreements as leaders reaffirm strategic partnership at New Delhi summit (opens in a new tab). IndBiz, Ministry of External Affairs, December 2025
  3. 03Putin's India visit concludes with multiple promises of deeper cooperation (opens in a new tab). bne IntelliNews, December 2025
  4. 04President Putin invites PM Modi for 24th India–Russia annual summit (opens in a new tab). The Tribune
  5. 05Modi holds talks with Putin and Iran's president before BRICS summit of 11 nations (opens in a new tab). Associated Press, 11 September 2026
  6. 06Russia fulfilling obligations: Kremlin on remaining S-400 deliveries (opens in a new tab). IANS, 8 September 2026
  7. 07SIPRI Arms Transfers Database and annual fact sheets on international arms transfers (opens in a new tab). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
  8. 08Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between India and the USSR, 9 August 1971. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
  9. 09Harsh V. Pant, Indian Foreign Policy: An Overview. Manchester University Press, 2016
  10. 10PM Modi and Russian President Putin discuss issues of mutual interest during bilateral talks (opens in a new tab). News on AIR, 11 September 2026
  11. 11Russia's share in India's crude imports hits fresh high in July (opens in a new tab). ThePrint, August 2026
  12. 12Full results from Russia's parliamentary election confirm Kremlin's dominance (opens in a new tab). CP24 (Associated Press), 25 September 2026
  13. 13Ukraine holds peace talks with US, Europe as conflict escalates (opens in a new tab). Al Jazeera, 17 November 2026
  14. 14Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026
  15. 15Statement on passage of the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act in the US Congress (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 17 September 2026
  16. 16Advisory for Indians travelling to Russia (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 30 September 2026