Skip to content

Case study · South and Central Asia · 2021–present

Afghanistan under the Taliban: control without recognition

Five years after retaking Kabul, the Taliban govern the whole country but are formally recognised by a single state, a case that separates effective control, domestic acceptance and international legitimacy.

Checked to November 2026legitimacysovereigntypower

The case

The Taliban took Kabul on 15 August 2021 as US-led forces completed a withdrawal agreed with them in Doha in February 2020, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan collapsed. The movement restored the Islamic Emirate, which governs by decree under its supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, without a constitution or elections. It has barred girls from secondary school since March 2022 and women from universities since December 2022, restricted women’s work, including for NGOs and the UN, and in 2024 issued a law on the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice that codified many restrictions. In July 2025 the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Akhundzada and the Taliban’s chief justice on charges of gender-based persecution.

Recognition has followed a distinctive path. For almost four years no state recognised the Taliban government, though many dealt with it: China accepted the credentials of a Taliban-appointed ambassador in January 2024, and several neighbours and Gulf states host Taliban-appointed diplomats. In July 2025 Russia became the first state to recognise the government formally, having earlier removed the Taliban from its list of terrorist organisations. As of November 2026 it remained the only one, although engagement had widened: a Taliban delegation met EU officials in Brussels in June 2026, which the European Commission said did not amount to recognition, and Central Asian states signed trade agreements with Kabul. The UN coordinates humanitarian aid through its mission in Kabul and has convened meetings of special envoys in Doha, while its Credentials Committee has repeatedly deferred a decision on Afghanistan’s representation.

Actors and stakeholders

  • The Taliban (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan)De facto government

    Role

    Controls the whole territory and administers it through ministries, courts and a supreme leader whose decrees are final. It seeks recognition and the release of frozen central-bank reserves while rejecting conditions on women’s rights as interference.

    Power and its sources

    Coercive power and effective control; religious and ideological authority among its supporters; growing leverage from neighbours’ interests in security, trade and migration.

  • Afghan women and girlsMost affected stakeholders

    Role

    Excluded from education beyond primary level and from much public life. Protests inside the country have been suppressed, while women’s rights advocates in exile lobby governments and international bodies.

    Power and its sources

    Little power over the Taliban; moral authority and transnational advocacy networks that shape how other governments frame recognition.

  • Russian FederationRecognising state

    Role

    Recognised the Taliban government in July 2025, presenting the decision as serving counter-terrorism and regional stability.

    Power and its sources

    Can confer formal recognition and, as a permanent member of the Security Council, shape or block collective UN responses.

  • China, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian neighboursEngaging states

    Role

    Engage pragmatically on security, trade, transit and migration while, so far, withholding formal recognition. Pakistan’s relations with Kabul have been strained by cross-border militancy.

    Power and its sources

    Economic and transit leverage; their engagement supplies a measure of external legitimacy short of recognition.

  • United NationsIntergovernmental organisation

    Role

    Coordinates humanitarian aid, maintains a political mission in Kabul, administers sanctions that restrict travel by Taliban leaders, and decides through its Credentials Committee who represents Afghanistan.

    Power and its sources

    Gatekeeper of formal representation and of large flows of aid; its decisions depend on agreement among member states.

  • International Criminal CourtInternational court

    Role

    Issued arrest warrants in July 2025 for the Taliban’s supreme leader and chief justice for gender-based persecution.

    Power and its sources

    Authority without enforcement; the warrants restrict travel to states parties and add to the Taliban’s delegitimation.

Through the key concepts

legitimacy

Beetham’s conditions diagnose the case precisely. Legal validity is contested: power was taken by force and the former constitution was set aside rather than amended. Shared beliefs are partial: the Taliban justify their rule by religion, victory over foreign occupation and restored security, claims some Afghans accept, but their position on women’s education has been criticised by many Muslim-majority states and religious authorities. Expressed consent cannot be measured, since there are no elections and dissent is suppressed, so acquiescence cannot be told apart from acceptance. The Taliban lean on performance claims, such as reduced large-scale violence and revenue collection, and on identity and ideology rather than procedure.

sovereignty

The case isolates the difference between recognising a state and recognising a government. Afghanistan’s statehood and UN membership are not in question; what is contested is which authority represents it. The Taliban meet the traditional effective-control test for recognising governments, and their domestic sovereignty is greater than any Kabul government’s for decades, yet their international legal standing remains limited, which restricts access to assets, credit and institutions. Russia’s decision shows recognition as a political choice made for strategic reasons rather than a legal consequence of control.

power

Twenty years of US-led military superiority did not convert into the intended political outcome, a stark example of the gap between resource power and relational power. Since 2021 outside actors’ main leverage has been withholding: recognition, frozen reserves, aid and sanctions. That leverage has not changed Taliban policy on women, which suggests either that the Taliban value ideological consistency above external legitimacy or that leverage weakens as neighbours engage regardless.

Perspectives

The Taliban

They won a war against foreign occupation, govern the whole country and have restored security. Recognition is owed to the effective government, and conditions on women’s rights are interference in internal and religious affairs.

Afghan women’s rights advocates and many Western governments

Recognition would reward a system that UN experts and activists describe as gender persecution, or gender apartheid, and would abandon those most affected. Engagement should be conditional on rights.

Regional engagers

Isolation has not changed Taliban behaviour and has worsened humanitarian conditions and security risks. Pragmatic engagement on trade, transit and counter-terrorism serves regional stability.

Legal and realist readings

On the effective-control doctrine the Taliban have a strong claim to be recognised as the government. Recognition follows control in the end; withholding it mainly expresses disapproval.

Evaluation

Afghanistan is the cleanest split in the course between internal control and external legitimacy, and it tests whose acceptance counts. The Taliban have more effective control than any Afghan government in decades and, since July 2025, a foothold of formal recognition. Broad recognition is still withheld, and the cost is real: limited access to frozen assets, credit and international institutions weakens the performance on which their claims partly rest.

Withholding recognition has not changed policy on women, so its value is better judged as upholding a standard than as producing an outcome. The visible trend is engagement that stops short of recognition. If formal recognition follows, the case will support the realist view that control eventually prevails, and it will show that external legitimacy can be negotiated without internal consent, an uncomfortable conclusion for the idea that recognition rewards good government.

Questions to take further

  • Should recognition of a government depend on effective control, on how it treats its population, or on both?
  • Can a government be accepted by part of its population while most states deny it recognition?
  • Has withholding recognition achieved anything for Afghan women and girls?
  • What would count as evidence of consent in a state without elections?

Sources

  1. 01UN Security Council resolution 2721 (2023) on Afghanistan, December 2023
  2. 02International Criminal Court, Situation in Afghanistan: arrest warrants for Haibatullah Akhundzada and Abdul Hakim Haqqani, July 2025
  3. 03Asharq Al-Awsat, ‘Russia Becomes First Country to Formally Recognize Taliban’s Latest Rule in Afghanistan’ (opens in a new tab), July 2025
  4. 04Al Jazeera, ‘Taliban secures pragmatic global alliances without formal recognition’ (opens in a new tab), 20 August 2026