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India and the World

India's relationships drawn on the map: the neighbourhood and the major powers with their profiles, the strategic corridors India is building, and the groupings through which it works.

India Neighbourhood profiles Major-power profiles

Boundaries are from Natural Earth’s India point-of-view data and are approximate at this scale; the map is a teaching aid and does not purport to be an authoritative depiction of international boundaries. Grouping membership is shown for full members only, as of November 2026. Corridor lines join their named nodes in order and are schematic, not exact alignments.

Connectivity and geoeconomics

Strategic corridors

The routes through which India seeks access to its neighbourhood, Eurasia and Europe, each with how far it exists on the ground and why it matters to India.

  • Operational
  • Partly operational
  • Under construction
  • Proposed
  • Stalled
  1. KathmanduKakarbhittaSiliguriBanglabandhaDhakaAgartala
    1. Kathmandu
    2. Kakarbhitta
    3. Siliguri
    4. Banglabandha
    5. Dhaka
    6. Agartala

    01Land corridorStalledChecked to 19 November 2026

    Bangladesh–Bhutan–India–Nepal Motor Vehicles Agreement

    A sub-regional agreement signed in 2015 to let passenger and cargo vehicles cross the borders of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal without transshipment. Bhutan's upper house rejected it in 2016, and the other three have yet to bring it into operation.

    Why it matters to India

    For India the agreement is a way to make its eastern neighbourhood work as an economic unit without waiting for SAARC. It would let Nepali and Bhutanese goods reach Bangladeshi ports, Bangladeshi trucks reach Nepal and the North-East, and Indian goods cross Bangladesh to Tripura and Assam, shortening journeys that now run round through the Siliguri Corridor. It complements the rail, waterway and port links India has built with Bangladesh and Nepal and the sub-regional power trade that began in 2024.

    Its stalling shows that connectivity in India's neighbourhood depends on the politics of every partner, not only on the region's largest state.

    The full analysis and sources

    The BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement is a framework rather than a road. It would allow passenger, private and cargo vehicles registered in one country to enter the others under permits, along routes the parties agree, without goods being unloaded and reloaded at the border. The route drawn here is one illustrative chain, from Kathmandu through the Indian corridor between Kakarbhitta and Banglabandha to Dhaka and on to Agartala; Bhutan's link would run from Thimphu through Phuentsholing to the plains.

    The agreement was a product of SAARC's failure. When Pakistan blocked a South Asia-wide motor vehicles agreement at the Kathmandu summit of November 2014, India turned to the four eastern members, and their transport ministers signed the BBIN agreement at Thimphu on 15 June 2015. Bhutan's upper house, the National Council, declined to ratify it in November 2016, reflecting concern about heavy traffic, pollution and competition for Bhutanese transporters; in 2017 Bhutan agreed that the other three could proceed without it. Bangladesh, India and Nepal then negotiated the operating rules: in March 2022 they finalised an enabling memorandum for implementing the agreement among themselves, and in April 2025 the text of a protocol on permits and customs procedures for passenger and cargo vehicles was reported finalised. The agreement had not entered into operation by November 2026, as far as this profile could verify.

    The obstacles are those of the region in miniature: disputes over customs guarantees and insurance, concern among transporters and governments about competition and road safety, weak road and border infrastructure, and the politics of each relationship, above all the deterioration of India–Bangladesh ties after August 2024, in the course of which India withdrew, in April 2025, the transshipment facility for Bangladeshi exports. Without the agreement, goods moving among the four are usually transferred between trucks at the border, which adds time and cost (see SAARC and connectivity corridors).

    Sources

    1. 01OfficialMinistry of External Affairs, Government of India (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
    2. 02Press reportBBIN motor vehicle pact to be signed today (opens in a new tab). Business Standard (ANI), 15 June 2015 · consulted 19 November 2026
    3. 03Press reportBBIN countries agree on protocol for regional vehicle movement (opens in a new tab). Jago News 24, 13 April 2025 · consulted 19 November 2026
    4. 04Press reportIndia, Bangladesh, Nepal finalise MoU for implementation of BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement (opens in a new tab). Chanakya Forum, March 2022 · consulted 19 November 2026

    RelationshipsIndia and BangladeshIndia and BhutanIndia and Nepal

  2. Kandla (Deendayal Port)ChabaharZahedanZaranjDelaramKandaharKabul
    1. Kandla (Deendayal Port)
    2. Chabahar
    3. Zahedan
    4. Zaranj
    5. Delaram
    6. Kandahar
    7. Kabul

    02Multimodal corridorPartly operationalChecked to 19 November 2026

    Chabahar port route

    India's gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan: an Iranian port on the Gulf of Oman where an Indian state company runs a terminal, linked by road to the highway India built in Afghanistan, and exposed at every turn to American sanctions and to war.

    Why it matters to India

    Chabahar is India's answer to Pakistan's refusal of transit. It gives Indian goods, aid and investment a route to Afghanistan and, through Iran's railways and the International North–South Transport Corridor, to Central Asia, and it gives Afghanistan an outlet to the sea that does not depend on Pakistan, which matters more since the Afghanistan–Pakistan conflict closed border crossings. It is also a strategic foothold on the Makran coast near the entrance to the Gulf.

    The cost is exposure. India's position at Chabahar depends on decisions in Washington and on the course of a war in Iran that India does not control, which is why the project has become a symbol of the limits of strategic autonomy for a country without the means to shield its partners from sanctions.

    The full analysis and sources

    Chabahar is Iran's main port on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz, on the Makran coast of Sistan-Baluchestan a short distance west of Pakistan's Chinese-built port at Gwadar. Its Shahid Beheshti terminal is operated by India Ports Global Limited, an Indian state company. From the port, goods travel north by road to Zahedan, cross into Afghanistan at Milak and Zaranj, and follow the 218 km Zaranj–Delaram highway, built by India's Border Roads Organisation and handed over in 2009, to Afghanistan's ring road; a railway from Chabahar to Zahedan is being built by Iran. Indian cargo has sailed from west-coast ports such as Kandla and Mumbai. The line drawn here is schematic.

    India and Iran first agreed to develop Chabahar in 2003, and the plan revived after the nuclear agreement of 2015. In May 2016 India and Iran signed a contract for the Shahid Beheshti terminal, and on 23 May 2016 India, Iran and Afghanistan signed the Agreement on the Establishment of an International Transport and Transit Corridor. The first Indian wheat for Afghanistan passed through the port in 2017. In November 2018 the United States exempted the project from its sanctions on Iran, on the ground that it served Afghanistan's reconstruction; India Ports Global took over the terminal's operations in December 2018, and on 13 May 2024 it signed a ten-year operating contract with Iran's Ports and Maritime Organization.

    The route has carried Indian food aid and commercial cargo, but in modest volumes, and its legal and political footing has eroded. The United States revoked the 2018 exemption with effect from 29 September 2025; a six-month waiver followed, running until 26 April 2026, and no extension had been confirmed in reporting available in November 2026. The war that began with US and Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026 disrupted shipping in the region, India's Union Budget for 2026–27 made no allocation for the project, and reports suggested India was considering transferring its stake in the free-zone company to an Iranian entity until sanctions eased. The Ministry of External Affairs has said India remains engaged with all stakeholders and has not decided to leave.

    Chabahar sits at the meeting point of every difficulty in India's westward connectivity: American sanctions on Iran, which deter financiers and shipping lines; war in and around Iran; insecurity in Sistan-Baluchestan; Taliban rule in Afghanistan, which India engages without recognising; and Pakistan's denial of the shorter overland route. It is also a marker in a competition of ports with Gwadar, a short distance to the east (see Afghanistan and connectivity corridors).

    Sources

    1. 01PrimaryAgreement on the Establishment of an International Transport and Transit Corridor among India, Iran and Afghanistan (23 May 2016)
    2. 02OfficialMinistry of External Affairs, Government of India (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
    3. 03Press reportIs India's Chabahar dream in Iran dead? (opens in a new tab). Al Jazeera, 29 April 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
    4. 04Press reportIndia engaging with US to ensure Chabahar projects continue under conditional sanctions waiver: MEA (opens in a new tab). The Tribune, 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
    5. 05Press reportMEA: India granted US sanctions waiver for Chabahar port (opens in a new tab). News on AIR, 30 October 2025 · consulted 19 November 2026
    6. 06Press reportIndia may temporarily divest its stake in Chabahar port as US sanctions waiver expires (opens in a new tab). Outlook Business, 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026

    RelationshipsIndia and AfghanistanIndia and PakistanIndia and United StatesIndia and China

  3. ChennaiStrait of MalaccaSingapore StraitTaiwan StraitKorea StraitVladivostok
    1. Chennai
    2. Strait of Malacca
    3. Singapore Strait
    4. Taiwan Strait
    5. Korea Strait
    6. Vladivostok

    03Maritime corridorOperationalChecked to 19 November 2026

    Chennai–Vladivostok (Eastern) Maritime Corridor

    A direct sea route between Chennai and Russia's main Pacific port, proposed in 2019 and declared operational in 2024, which links India to the energy and resources of the Russian Far East without passing through Suez.

    Why it matters to India

    The corridor gives India direct access to the energy and mineral resources of the Russian Far East, where Indian companies hold stakes in Sakhalin-1 and Indian buyers take Russian crude and coal, and a route to Russia that avoids Suez and the Red Sea. It extends India's maritime presence into the western Pacific, gives the Act East and Indo-Pacific policies a northern arm, and offers Russia a partner in its Far East other than China.

    It is a small project with a large symbolic purpose: to show that India's ties with Russia need not run only through Europe or through Iran.

    The full analysis and sources

    The Eastern Maritime Corridor, as India's shipping ministry calls it, is a direct sea route between Chennai and Vladivostok, Russia's principal port on the Pacific, through the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea and the Sea of Japan. It was proposed in a memorandum of intent signed during Narendra Modi's visit to Vladivostok for the Eastern Economic Forum on 4 September 2019, when he also announced an Act Far East policy towards the Russian Far East. The intermediate points drawn here are schematic; ships may also route east of Taiwan.

    The corridor needs no new infrastructure: it uses existing ports and commercial shipping, and its purpose is to make a direct service between India's east coast and the Russian Far East regular and economical. An official estimate of 2023 put the sailing time at about 24 days, against some 40 days for cargo moving between Indian ports and Russia's European ports by way of Suez. The shipping minister, Sarbananda Sonowal, said on 18 November 2024 that the corridor was operational and carrying cargo such as crude oil, food and machinery; detailed volumes have not been published.

    Its value depends on the cargo and on politics. Crude oil, coal and fertilisers from the Russian Far East and Siberia can justify the voyage, while Western sanctions on Russian banks, shipping and insurance complicate payment and cover. The route crosses the South China Sea, where Chinese claims are contested, and its use rises and falls with Russia's place in India's energy imports (see Russia and Indo-Pacific).

    Sources

    1. 01PrimaryMemorandum of Intent on the development of maritime communications between Chennai and Vladivostok (4 September 2019)
    2. 02OfficialMinistry of External Affairs, Government of India (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
    3. 03Press reportChennai–Vladivostok maritime corridor becomes operational (opens in a new tab). LatestLY (PTI), 18 November 2024 · consulted 19 November 2026
    4. 04Press reportIndia–Russia Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor talks gain pace (opens in a new tab). Business Standard, 12 September 2023 · consulted 19 November 2026

    RelationshipsIndia and RussiaIndia and China

  4. MumbaiFujairahAbu DhabiRiyadhHaifaPiraeus
    1. Mumbai
    2. Fujairah
    3. Abu Dhabi
    4. Riyadh
    5. Haifa
    6. Piraeus

    04Multimodal corridorProposedChecked to 31 August 2026

    India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor

    A proposed corridor of shipping, railways, power cables, hydrogen pipelines and data links from India through the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula to the eastern Mediterranean and Europe, launched at the New Delhi G20 summit of 2023 and slowed ever since by war in West Asia.

    Why it matters to India

    For India, IMEC promises a faster and more resilient route to Europe, its largest export market, and an alternative when the Red Sea and Suez are disrupted. It deepens India's partnerships with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, leading suppliers of its energy and home to millions of Indian workers, and places India at the start of a corridor backed by the United States and the European Union, a stake in an alternative to the Belt and Road without joining a bloc.

    The India–EU free trade agreement concluded in January 2026 gives the corridor a commercial purpose it lacked in 2023. Whether that purpose is realised depends on a region whose wars India cannot end.

    The full analysis and sources

    The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was launched by a memorandum of understanding on its principles, signed on 9 September 2023 on the margins of the G20 summit in New Delhi by India, the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, France, Germany, Italy and the European Union. It envisages two corridors: an eastern one joining India to the Gulf by sea, and a northern one carrying goods by rail across the Arabian Peninsula and Jordan to ports on the eastern Mediterranean, Israel's Haifa the most often cited, and on by sea to Europe. Alongside the transport links the memorandum foresees electricity cables, pipelines for clean hydrogen and high-speed data cables. The memorandum names no ports, so the route drawn here is one schematic possibility among several discussed, from Mundra and Mumbai to Fujairah, Haifa, Piraeus and Marseille.

    The corridor's timing was unlucky. Within a month the Hamas attack on Israel of 7 October 2023 and the war in Gaza made links through Jordan and Israel politically and physically harder; Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping strengthened the case for an alternative to Suez while making the region more dangerous; and the war that began with US and Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026 disrupted the Gulf itself. India and the UAE signed an intergovernmental framework agreement on the corridor in February 2024, and work on the India–UAE segment has begun with digital customs and logistics platforms. In February 2026 the External Affairs Minister, S. Jaishankar, said the corridor was progressing, but not at the pace first expected, because of the conflict in West Asia.

    IMEC's obstacles are political more than technical. It needs a durable peace in Gaza, normal relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, safe Gulf shipping and finance on a scale none of the signatories has committed. Much of the railway in the UAE and Saudi Arabia exists or is planned, but the links to Jordan and Israel and the integration of customs regimes do not. Supporters present it as a network of digital, energy and logistics links that can grow segment by segment rather than a single railway to be built at once; critics see a geopolitical answer to China's Belt and Road with too little money behind it (see connectivity corridors).

    Sources

    1. 01PrimaryMemorandum of Understanding on the Principles of an India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (New Delhi, 9 September 2023)
    2. 02OfficialMinistry of External Affairs, Government of India (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
    3. 03ScholarshipThe India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (backgrounder) (opens in a new tab). Middle East Institute, June 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
    4. 04Press reportTop Indian diplomat says IMEC progressing but not at pace initially expected (opens in a new tab). Anadolu Agency, February 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
    5. 05Press reportIMEC gets a Trump boost as the India–Middle East–Europe trade route remains a work in progress (opens in a new tab). ThePrint, 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026

    RelationshipsIndia and United StatesIndia and European UnionIndia and FranceIndia and Germany

  5. MorehKalewaMonywaMandalayMeiktilaMyawaddyMae Sot
    1. Moreh
    2. Kalewa
    3. Monywa
    4. Mandalay
    5. Meiktila
    6. Myawaddy
    7. Mae Sot

    05Land corridorUnder constructionChecked to 31 July 2026

    India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway

    A road of about 1,360 km from Moreh in Manipur through Myanmar to Mae Sot in Thailand, agreed in 2002 as the backbone of India's land link with South-East Asia and still unfinished, its Myanmar sections caught in civil war.

    Why it matters to India

    The highway is the land spine of the Act East policy: a road that would link Manipur and the North-East to Myanmar's heartland and to Thailand, and in time to the wider ASEAN market, turning the North-East from a periphery into a gateway. It would also give India a physical presence in a region where China's roads, railways and pipelines are advancing.

    Its delays have become a symbol of the gap between India's connectivity ambitions in South-East Asia and its capacity to deliver them in a neighbour at war.

    The full analysis and sources

    The Trilateral Highway is meant to give India a motorable road to South-East Asia. From Moreh in Manipur it crosses into Myanmar at Tamu, runs south through Kalewa and Yagyi to Monywa and Mandalay, and continues by Meiktila to the Thai border at Myawaddy, opposite Mae Sot, from where Thailand's highways reach Bangkok. Ministers of the three countries agreed on the project at a meeting in Yangon in April 2002. India took responsibility for two sections in Myanmar, the upgrading of the Kalewa–Yagyi road and the reconstruction of 69 bridges on the Tamu–Kyigone–Kalewa road, while Thailand financed works near its own border.

    Progress has been slow for two decades, delayed by difficult terrain, problems of finance and contracting, and insecurity. The coup of February 2021 and the civil war that followed placed much of the route in Sagaing region in contested territory, and violence in Manipur since 2023 has disrupted the Indian end at Moreh. The military government claimed in July 2026 to have retaken Kalewa, a claim resistance groups dispute. During Min Aung Hlaing's visit to India in mid-2026 the two governments agreed to accelerate the work, and Indian estimates have spoken of completion around 2027.

    Even a finished road would not by itself make a corridor. The three governments have yet to conclude a motor vehicles agreement that would let trucks and buses cross the two borders freely, and proposals to extend the highway to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam remain ideas (see Myanmar and Act East policy).

    Sources

    1. 01OfficialMinistry of External Affairs, Government of India (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
    2. 02Press reportIndia and Myanmar agree to accelerate work on the superhighway to Thailand (opens in a new tab). The Star, 1 June 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
    3. 03Press reportResistance rejects regime's claim of control over India trade route (opens in a new tab). The Irrawaddy, July 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
    4. 04OtherIndia–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway (opens in a new tab). Housing.com, 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026

    RelationshipsIndia and MyanmarIndia and China

  6. MumbaiBandar AbbasTehranBandar AnzaliAstrakhanMoscow
    1. Mumbai
    2. Bandar Abbas
    3. Tehran
    4. Bandar Anzali
    5. Astrakhan
    6. Moscow

    06Multimodal corridorPartly operationalChecked to 15 October 2026

    International North–South Transport Corridor

    A network of sea, rail and road links from India's west coast through Iran to the Caspian and Russia, agreed in 2000 to bypass both Pakistan and the Suez Canal, and still incomplete because of a missing railway in northern Iran, sanctions and war.

    Why it matters to India

    The corridor serves three Indian aims: a route to Russia, Central Asia and northern Europe that does not depend on Pakistan or on the Suez Canal and the Red Sea; cheaper transport for a trade with Russia that now includes large purchases of oil and fertiliser; and a place in Eurasian connectivity that offers an alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative. Linked to Chabahar, it would also give Afghanistan and Central Asia access to the sea through India's partners rather than through Pakistan.

    The difficulty is that each of these aims runs through states under sanctions, which makes the INSTC as much a test of India's strategic autonomy as an instrument of it.

    The full analysis and sources

    The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a network rather than a single road. Cargo leaves Indian ports such as Mumbai by sea for Bandar Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz, crosses Iran by road or rail, and reaches Russia by one of three branches: west of the Caspian through Azerbaijan, across the Caspian from Iranian ports such as Bandar Anzali to Astrakhan, or east of it through Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. From Russia it can continue to northern Europe. Its promise is a shorter and cheaper route between India and Russia than the sea passage through Suez, and one that avoids Pakistan. The line drawn here follows the trans-Caspian branch and is schematic.

    India, Iran and Russia signed the founding agreement at St Petersburg on 12 September 2000, and it entered into force in 2002; states of the Caucasus, Central Asia and West Asia later joined. For two decades the corridor existed mostly on paper. Dry runs organised in 2014 showed savings in time and cost, India acceded to the Ashgabat Agreement on a Central Asian transit corridor in 2018, and after Western sanctions closed Russia's routes to Europe in 2022 Russian shipments to India began to use the corridor.

    The weakest link is in Iran. The western branch still lacks a railway of about 162 km between Rasht and Astara on the Azerbaijani border. Russia and Iran signed an agreement in May 2023 under which Russia would finance most of its construction, but land acquisition and the war have delayed it, and in October 2026 Russian officials said construction was expected to begin in 2027 and take about three years. Cargo moves on the other branches and by road, in modest volumes.

    Three obstacles define the corridor. American sanctions on Iran deter banks, insurers and shipping lines; Western sanctions on Russia since 2022 complicate payments at the other end; and the war that began with US and Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026, with the closure and then restriction of the Strait of Hormuz, put the southern gateway itself at risk. A corridor meant to make India less dependent on one chokepoint begins at another (see connectivity corridors and Russia).

    Sources

    1. 01PrimaryAgreement on the International North–South Transport Corridor (St Petersburg, 12 September 2000)
    2. 02OfficialMinistry of External Affairs, Government of India (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
    3. 03Press reportRussia, Iran hope to begin construction of Rasht–Astara railway in 2027 (opens in a new tab). Interfax, 15 October 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026
    4. 04Press reportRussia's Transportation Ministry expects construction to be completed on Rasht–Astara railway section (opens in a new tab). Interfax, 2023 · consulted 19 November 2026

    RelationshipsIndia and RussiaIndia and AfghanistanIndia and Pakistan

  7. KolkataSittwePaletwaLawngtlai
    1. Kolkata
    2. Sittwe
    3. Paletwa
    4. Lawngtlai

    07Multimodal corridorPartly operationalChecked to 31 July 2026

    Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project

    India's sea, river and road route from Kolkata to Mizoram through Myanmar's Rakhine and Chin states: the port at Sittwe has operated since 2023, but the road that would complete the corridor runs through territory held by the Arakan Army.

    Why it matters to India

    Kaladan would give Mizoram and the wider North-East a second route to the sea, through a Myanmar port rather than through the Siliguri Corridor or Bangladesh, and shorten the journey between Kolkata and Mizoram considerably. It is a central project of the Act East policy and of India's development partnership with Myanmar, and a counterweight to China's port and pipelines at Kyaukphyu further down the Rakhine coast.

    Its delay carries a cost beyond Mizoram: critics in the region and in India cite it as evidence that India announces corridors faster than it completes them.

    The full analysis and sources

    The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project links Kolkata by sea to Sittwe, at the mouth of the Kaladan river in Myanmar's Rakhine State. From Sittwe, cargo is to move upriver by inland waterway to Paletwa in Chin State, and from Paletwa by a road of about 110 km to Zorinpui on the Mizoram border, joining the Indian road network towards Lawngtlai. It was conceived to give India's North-East a route to the sea that does not depend on the Siliguri Corridor or on transit through Bangladesh, and India has financed it as development assistance to Myanmar.

    India and Myanmar signed the framework agreement and its protocols on 2 April 2008. Work on the port at Sittwe and the inland water terminal at Paletwa was slow, held back by changes of design, the remoteness of the terrain and insecurity, and the road through the Chin hills fell years behind schedule. Sittwe port was inaugurated on 9 May 2023, when a ship from Kolkata docked there, and in 2024 the Indian government approved India Ports Global Limited, which also runs India's terminal at Chabahar, to operate it.

    The waterway components are complete, but the corridor cannot work without the Paletwa–Zorinpui road, and that road runs through the heart of Myanmar's civil war. The Arakan Army took Paletwa in January 2024 and controls most of Rakhine State; the government in Naypyidaw cannot guarantee security along the route; and a Rakhine news outlet reported in March 2026 that the Arakan Army itself was working on road construction from Paletwa towards the Indian border. India's Minister of Ports, Shipping and Waterways has said the whole project would be operational by 2027.

    Kaladan shows the limits of connectivity diplomacy conducted only with sovereign governments: the state that signed the agreement no longer controls the territory through which the road must pass. Completing it means working with the Arakan Army and Chin authorities as well as with Naypyidaw, securing a route in a war zone and keeping a river channel open that needs regular dredging (see Myanmar and Act East policy).

    Sources

    1. 01PrimaryFramework Agreement between India and Myanmar on the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (2 April 2008)
    2. 02OfficialMinistry of External Affairs, Government of India (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
    3. 03Press reportKaladan project: India flags off shipment for Sittwe port in Myanmar (opens in a new tab). Business Standard, 4 May 2023 · consulted 19 November 2026
    4. 04Press reportIndia–Myanmar Kaladan waterway to open in May, but real gains only when 110-km road is completed (opens in a new tab). ThePrint, April 2023 · consulted 19 November 2026
    5. 05Press reportKaladan corridor: a strategic dream marred by ground realities (opens in a new tab). The Assam Tribune, 2026 · consulted 19 November 2026

    RelationshipsIndia and MyanmarIndia and BangladeshIndia and China