Case study · Pacific Ocean and the global commons · 2021–present
Deep-sea mining and the International Seabed Authority
Who may mine the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, under whose rules, and who speaks for ecosystems and future generations that have no seat at the table?
The case
The seabed beyond national jurisdiction, which the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea calls ‘the Area’, covers roughly half of the ocean floor, and the Convention declares it and its mineral resources the common heritage of mankind. The International Seabed Authority (ISA), based in Kingston, Jamaica, organises and controls mineral activities there on behalf of all states. It has issued exploration contracts to state agencies and to companies sponsored by states, many of them in the Clarion–Clipperton Zone of the Pacific, where polymetallic nodules containing nickel, cobalt, manganese and copper lie on the abyssal plain. It has not yet adopted the exploitation regulations, known as the Mining Code, that commercial mining would require.
In June 2021 Nauru, sponsor of a subsidiary of The Metals Company, invoked a provision of the 1994 Implementation Agreement that obliges the ISA Council to complete the regulations within two years. The deadline passed in July 2023 without a code. Meanwhile a growing group of states, around forty by 2026 on campaigners’ counts and including France, Germany, Chile, Costa Rica, Palau, Fiji and the United Kingdom, called for a moratorium or precautionary pause until the science is better understood.
In April 2025 the United States, which has never ratified UNCLOS, ordered an accelerated process to license seabed mining under its own Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980. The Metals Company’s US subsidiary applied, and the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) found its consolidated application, covering some 65,000 square kilometres of the Clarion–Clipperton Zone, in full compliance with the Act’s information requirements, a determination the company announced on 1 May 2026. NOAA then took public comments on the application, in a period that closed on 19 October 2026, before deciding whether to certify it; certification, an environmental impact statement and any decision on a licence and permit were still to come. The ISA Council’s two 2026 sessions, in March and July, again ended without an agreed code.
Actors and stakeholders
- International Seabed AuthorityIGO established under UNCLOS
Role
Regulates exploration, is drafting the exploitation regulations and must reconcile its mandate to organise mining with its duty to protect the marine environment. Its Secretary-General since 2025, Leticia Carvalho, has emphasised environmental protection and criticised unilateral licensing.
Power and its sources
Legal authority over the Area among its members, but dependent on agreement within a 36-member Council and without means of enforcement against non-parties.
- Sponsoring states and contractorsStates and companies
Role
Nauru and Tonga sponsor subsidiaries of The Metals Company; China, India, Japan, South Korea and Russia, among others, hold exploration contracts through state agencies or firms. Proponents argue that minerals for the energy transition and revenue for small states justify moving to exploitation.
Power and its sources
Procedural leverage, as Nauru showed, together with technical capacity and investment; for small island states, sponsorship brings revenue and diplomatic weight.
- States calling for a moratorium or precautionary pauseCoalition of states
Role
Argue that exploitation should not begin until its environmental effects are understood and robust rules exist. Several Pacific members present the ocean as a shared heritage and a source of identity.
Power and its sources
Enough weight in the ISA to block a code they judge inadequate; normative power drawn from precaution and scientific uncertainty.
- United StatesNon-party state acting under domestic law
Role
Licenses seabed mining under a 1980 statute, presenting access to critical minerals as a national security priority and treating seabed mining as a freedom open to all states.
Power and its sources
Capital, technology and market power, and the ability to create a rival legal pathway that bypasses the ISA.
- The Metals CompanyTransnational company
Role
The most advanced would-be miner in the Clarion–Clipperton Zone; in 2025 it turned from the ISA route to the US licensing route.
Power and its sources
Capital, exploration data and the ability to choose between regulatory systems.
- Scientists, civil society and Pacific communitiesEpistemic community and civil society
Role
Research deep-sea ecosystems, document how little is known about them and campaign for precaution; Pacific voices stress cultural relationships with the ocean.
Power and its sources
Knowledge and moral authority exercised through influence on states rather than direct decision-making. The ecosystems and future generations they speak for are stakeholders with no agency of their own.
Deep-sea mining: a stakeholder map
Relationship mapOriginal
Who acts and who is affected in the contest over mining the seabed beyond national jurisdiction: states, an international authority, a company, coalitions and scientists, and stakeholders such as ecosystems and future generations that cannot act for themselves.
Who connects to whom
UNCLOS and the common heritage principle
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea declares the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, 'the Area', and its mineral resources the common heritage of mankind, to be managed on behalf of mankind as a whole. A 1994 Implementation Agreement reshaped Part XI and contains the two-year rule that Nauru later invoked.
Connects to 02 International Seabed Authority,06 United States government,10 Ecosystems and future generations
Nauru and Tonga (sponsoring states)
Small Pacific island states that sponsor subsidiaries of The Metals Company. In June 2021 Nauru invoked the two-year rule to press the Council to finish the Mining Code; the deadline passed in July 2023 without one. Sponsorship promises revenue and diplomatic weight, but carries legal responsibilities and political risk.
Connects to 02 International Seabed Authority,05 The Metals Company
China, India, Japan, South Korea and Russia, among others, hold ISA exploration contracts through state agencies or firms. Their interest in eventual access to seabed minerals gives them a stake in an agreed code, while their positions on its timing and on precaution vary.
Connects to 02 International Seabed Authority
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India holds an ISA contract to explore polymetallic nodules in the Central Indian Ocean Basin.
A transnational company and the most advanced would-be miner in the Clarion–Clipperton Zone of the Pacific. In 2025 it turned from the ISA route, sponsored by Nauru and Tonga, to licensing under US law, showing a firm's power to choose between regulatory systems.
Connects to 02 International Seabed Authority,03 Nauru and Tonga (sponsoring states),06 United States government
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Its US subsidiary's consolidated application covers some 65,000 square kilometres of the zone. By August 2026 the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration had found it compliant with the application requirements but had issued no permit.
Never a party to UNCLOS, the United States ordered an accelerated process in April 2025 to license seabed mining under its Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980, presenting critical minerals as a national security priority. It thereby opened a rival legal pathway that bypasses the ISA.
Connects to 01 UNCLOS and the common heritage principle,02 International Seabed Authority,05 The Metals Company
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Most ISA members regard unilateral licensing as contrary to international law; the question is whether rules that many states treat as customary law bind a non-party.
Moratorium and pause coalition
A growing group of states, around forty by 2026 on campaigners' counts and including France, Germany, Chile, Costa Rica, Palau, Fiji and the United Kingdom, calls for a moratorium or precautionary pause until the science is better understood. Within the ISA it has enough weight to block a code it judges inadequate.
Connects to 02 International Seabed Authority,08 Scientists and civil society,09 Pacific communities
An epistemic community of marine scientists, with environmental NGOs, documents how little is known about deep-sea ecosystems and campaigns for precaution. It has knowledge and moral authority but no vote, so it works by shaping what states and the ISA accept as evidence.
Connects to 02 International Seabed Authority,07 Moratorium and pause coalition,10 Ecosystems and future generations
Pacific peoples and indigenous voices present the ocean as a shared heritage and a source of identity rather than a resource frontier, and object that decisions have been taken without adequate consultation. Their claim suggests a non-territorial idea of stewardship that sits uneasily with sovereignty.
Connects to 07 Moratorium and pause coalition,10 Ecosystems and future generations
Ecosystems and future generations
Stakeholders with interests but no agency: abyssal ecosystems where scientists warn that harm from mining may be irreversible, and future generations who will inherit the consequences. Neither has a seat in the ISA or a voice in US licensing, so others must speak for them.
Connects to 01 UNCLOS and the common heritage principle,08 Scientists and civil society,09 Pacific communities
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This is the case's sharpest lesson for the course's distinction between actors and stakeholders: those most affected are the ones that cannot act.
Sources5
- 01United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), Part XI, and the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI (1994)
- 02International Seabed Authority (opens in a new tab)
- 03IISD Earth Negotiations Bulletin, summary report of the 31st session of the ISA Council (Part II) (opens in a new tab), July 2026
- 04Executive Order 'Unleashing America's Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources'. The White House, 24 April 2025
- 05Ocean News & Technology, 'NOAA Determines TMC USA's Consolidated Deep-Seabed Mining Application is in Full Compliance' (opens in a new tab), May 2026
Original teaching visual: an analytical summary, not IB material.
Reviewed 20 November 2026
Through the key concepts
Demand for nickel, cobalt and manganese for batteries ties the seabed to the energy transition and to anxieties about supply chains concentrated in a few countries, notably China’s dominance of mineral processing. Proponents present the seabed as a way to diversify supply; opponents reply that recycling, new battery chemistries and land-based supply are changing fast. The governance problem is a commons problem in Elinor Ostrom’s sense, but at depths of several thousand metres monitoring is difficult, sanctions are untested and the boundary includes every state.
The Area lies beyond any state’s sovereignty by design: the common heritage principle replaces first come, first served with collective management. The US route challenges that design by treating licensing under domestic law as sufficient, raising the question of whether a non-party is bound by UNCLOS rules that many states regard as customary law. For small Pacific states sponsorship is a sovereign choice that can bring revenue, while their peoples’ relationships with the ocean suggest an alternative, non-territorial idea of stewardship.
The case shows agenda power at work. Nauru used a procedural rule to force the timetable; moratorium supporters have used the ISA’s practice of consensus to stop a code they consider premature; and the United States used structural power to open a parallel path. Lukes’s second dimension asks what stays off the agenda: within ISA negotiations the default question has long been how to mine rather than whether to.
The ISA’s legitimacy depends on being seen as a credible regulator rather than a promoter of mining, a tension built into its mandate. Most ISA members regard unilateral licensing as illegitimate under international law, while its supporters argue that the ISA’s delay has undermined the Authority itself. Future generations and deep-sea ecosystems have no voice in either forum, the starkest example in the course of stakeholders who cannot act.
Perspectives
Proponents of mining (The Metals Company, sponsoring states, the US government)
Seabed nodules can supply minerals for the energy transition with less land disturbance than some terrestrial mining, diversify supply chains away from dominant producers and bring revenue to small island states.
Moratorium supporters and many scientists
The deep sea is among the least understood environments on Earth. Mining risks irreversible harm to biodiversity and ecosystem functions before they are understood, and the case for urgency weakens as battery technology changes.
The ISA Secretariat and multilateralists
The common heritage regime must be completed through agreed rules. Unilateral licensing undermines UNCLOS, the same framework that protects navigation and coastal rights for every state.
Pacific civil society and indigenous voices
The ocean is a shared heritage and source of identity rather than a resource frontier, and decisions have been taken without adequate consultation of the communities most closely connected to it.
Evaluation
The case illustrates the framing unit’s central distinction almost perfectly. The actors are states, an IGO, a company and coalitions; the stakeholders include ecosystems and future generations that cannot act at all. Global governance has worked in one sense: no commercial mining has taken place under ISA authority, because states with enough weight have insisted on precaution.
That outcome is fragile. The US licensing route shows how a powerful non-party can bypass a multilateral regime, and the ISA is squeezed between those who call it too slow and those who call it too close to industry. The most defensible judgement is that the regime’s survival depends less on the text of the Mining Code than on whether states continue to treat the common heritage principle as binding once a profitable alternative exists.
Questions to take further
- Who should speak for ecosystems and future generations in global governance?
- Is the common heritage principle compatible with licensing by states that are not party to UNCLOS?
- Does the case show global governance working, by preventing premature mining, or failing, by allowing a unilateral route?
- How far do small island states gain power through sponsorship, and at what risk?
Sources
- 01United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), Part XI, and the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI (1994)
- 02International Seabed Authority (opens in a new tab)
- 03IISD Earth Negotiations Bulletin, summary report of the 31st session of the ISA Council (Part II) (opens in a new tab), July 2026
- 04Mongabay, ‘UN regulator delays deep sea mining rules but extends criticized exploration contract’ (opens in a new tab), July 2026
- 05Executive Order ‘Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources’. The White House, 24 April 2025
- 06Ocean News & Technology, ‘NOAA Determines TMC USA’s Consolidated Deep-Seabed Mining Application is in Full Compliance’ (opens in a new tab), May 2026
- 07NOAA, ‘NOAA advances review of first-ever deep seabed mining commercial recovery application’ (opens in a new tab). National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2026