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India's foreign policy · Doctrine

India's Indo-Pacific

An inclusive, ASEAN-centred, oceanic conception of the region from the shores of Africa to the Americas, set out by Narendra Modi at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018 and given programmatic form by the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative of November 2019.

Overview

India's official doctrine has two founding texts. In his keynote address to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on 1 June 2018, Narendra Modi described the Indo-Pacific as a natural region, not a strategy or a club of limited members; called for a free, open and inclusive order based on international law, freedom of navigation and the peaceful settlement of disputes; and placed ASEAN at its centre. At the East Asia Summit in Bangkok on 4 November 2019 he launched the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), with seven pillars: maritime security; maritime ecology; maritime resources; capacity building and resource sharing; disaster risk reduction and management; science, technology and academic cooperation; and trade connectivity and maritime transport. The Ministry of External Affairs created an Indo-Pacific division in 2019.

The doctrine is distinctively Indian in three respects: its geography is wider, its membership is inclusive, and it is framed around cooperation rather than containment.

01Genealogy of a region

The term had several authors. The Indian naval analyst Gurpreet Khurana used "Indo-Pacific" in a 2007 article on India–Japan maritime cooperation; Shinzo Abe spoke of the "confluence of the two seas" in India's Parliament the same year, and launched Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific at Nairobi in 2016. The United States renamed its Pacific Command the Indo-Pacific Command in May 2018. ASEAN adopted its own Outlook on the Indo-Pacific in June 2019, and France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the European Union followed with strategies. Each version reflects its author's interests: the American one emphasises competition with China, ASEAN's its own centrality, India's the inclusion of the Indian Ocean on equal terms with the Pacific.

02India's version: wide, inclusive, oceanic

Modi's 2018 address defined the region as stretching from the shores of Africa to those of the Americas, a geography that places the western Indian Ocean, India's primary maritime zone, inside the concept, where early American usage stopped at India's west coast. Inclusiveness is the second marker: India has insisted that no country, China included, is excluded in principle, and that the Indo-Pacific is not directed against anyone. The third is ASEAN centrality, which aligns India with the region's own preference for institutions convened by South-East Asian states.

03Instruments

The doctrine is implemented through several layers: the IPOI pillars, which partners join on a voluntary basis; the Quad and the Malabar naval exercise; logistics agreements with the United States, France, Japan and Australia; maritime domain awareness through the Information Fusion Centre at Gurugram; defence exports, notably BrahMos missiles to the Philippines; and the development of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India joined the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework in 2022 but stayed out of its trade pillar, which shows the limits of its economic engagement. In the Indian Ocean the Indo-Pacific overlaps with SAGAR and MAHASAGAR.

04Contestation

China rejects the concept as a containment strategy; in 2018 its foreign minister dismissed the Quad as sea foam that would soon dissipate. Russia's foreign minister has described the Indo-Pacific as a divisive construct. Some ASEAN members worry that the concept invites great-power rivalry into their region. India has answered by stressing inclusiveness while sharpening its positions on contested waters: in a joint statement with the Philippines in June 2023 it called for adherence to the 2016 arbitral award on the South China Sea, which China rejects. India also has its own legal position that sits uneasily with some partners: it requires consent for foreign military exercises in its exclusive economic zone (see maritime security).

05The Indo-Pacific in 2026

Two developments have tested the doctrine. The second Trump administration's tariffs and transactional approach strained the India–US relationship in 2025 and delayed a Quad leaders' summit India was to host; the Quad foreign ministers met in New Delhi in May 2026, but no leaders' summit had been held since September 2024. And the war around the Strait of Hormuz in 2026 showed that the western end of the Indo-Pacific, often neglected in Pacific-centred strategies, can disrupt the whole region's energy and trade. Both reinforce India's original emphasis: an inclusive, Indian Ocean-inclusive concept is more resilient than a coalition defined by a single adversary.

06Reading it through IR theory

Realism sees the Indo-Pacific as the geography of balancing against China. On Waltz's logic, states respond to a shift in the distribution of capabilities by combining their strength, and the Quad, the Malabar exercise and logistics agreements with the United States, France, Japan and Australia are the instruments such balancing requires; realists therefore read India's insistence on inclusiveness as diplomatic cover. Realism struggles, however, to explain why India has kept the concept open to China in principle and anchored it in ASEAN centrality, choices that reduce its value as an instrument of containment. Liberal institutionalism explains those choices better. A region organised around international law, freedom of navigation and functional cooperation through the pillars of the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, from maritime ecology to disaster risk reduction, provides public goods that bind every power to common rules. Its weakness is that voluntary pillars and forums convened by South-East Asian states have little capacity to restrain a determined power. Constructivism has most to say about the concept itself. The Indo-Pacific is a region made by ideas: the term had several authors, each version reflects its author's interests, and India's version, stretching from the shores of Africa to those of the Americas, writes the Indian Ocean into the region on equal terms with the Pacific. China's and Russia's rejection of the concept shows that a region's meaning is contested rather than given. A combined reading treats India's Indo-Pacific as hedged balancing expressed through an inclusive, institution-centred identity.

07India's options and the way forward

India's choices concern geography, instruments, partners and economics. On geography, it can concentrate resources in the Indian Ocean, where its vital interests and capabilities lie, or invest more in South-East and East Asia, where China's power is projected; the first avoids overextension and the second avoids marginalisation, and the realistic course combines a primary focus on the Indian Ocean with selective presence further east through defence exports, exercises and ASEAN-centred forums. On instruments, the Quad offers capability and coordination but feeds the containment narrative, while the IPOI offers inclusiveness with limited substance; India's interest lies in keeping both, using the second to legitimise the first. On partners, the strain in relations with the United States in 2025 argues for hedging against American unpredictability through France, Japan, Australia and ASEAN states without abandoning the Quad. On economics, staying out of the trade pillar of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework limits India's weight, and deeper economic engagement would require changes in trade policy at home. On balance, an inclusive, Indian Ocean-anchored conception is more resilient than a coalition defined by a single adversary, provided it is backed by capability and economic engagement.

Key points

  • Official doctrine: Shangri-La Dialogue keynote (1 June 2018) and the IPOI launched at the East Asia Summit (4 November 2019).
  • Geography from the shores of Africa to the Americas; the Indian Ocean on equal terms with the Pacific.
  • Inclusive in principle, ASEAN-centred, and framed as cooperation rather than containment.
  • IPOI has seven pillars, joined by partners voluntarily.
  • Contested by China and Russia; sharpened by India's 2023 call for adherence to the South China Sea award.

Debates

Is the Indo-Pacific a containment construct?

Yes: whatever its official language, the concept emerged with the Quad, US strategy documents name China as the pacing challenge, and the region's new military cooperation is directed at Chinese power.

No: India's and ASEAN's versions are explicitly inclusive and built around public goods, from disaster relief to maritime ecology; treating the concept as containment ignores the agency of states that use it to bind every power, China included, to common rules.

Should India's Indo-Pacific policy be Indian Ocean-first?

Yes: India's resources are limited and its vital interests, its trade, energy and diaspora, lie in the Indian Ocean; overextension into the western Pacific risks entanglement in disputes such as Taiwan.

No: China's power is projected from the Pacific, and India's influence depends on being a stakeholder in South-East and East Asia; an Indian Ocean-only posture would cede the region's strategic centre.

Is the Quad still central to India's Indo-Pacific strategy?

Yes: the Quad and the Malabar exercise give the doctrine a substance that the voluntary pillars of the IPOI lack, coordinating naval cooperation with the United States, Japan and Australia; the meeting of Quad foreign ministers in New Delhi in May 2026 showed that the format has survived recent strains.

Less than before: no leaders' summit had been held since September 2024, American tariffs and transactional diplomacy strained relations with India in 2025, and the war around Hormuz in 2026 showed that the western Indian Ocean, often neglected in Pacific-centred strategies, can disrupt the whole region.

The balanced view is that the Quad remains useful but is no longer sufficient. India's Indo-Pacific rests on several layers, from the Quad to the IPOI, ASEAN centrality and SAGAR in the Indian Ocean, so that no single grouping carries the strategy.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

4 questions · 2024–2026

  1. 2026 · GS-II · Q9 · 10 marks

    “IPMDA (Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness) bridges the gap between India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision and the Quad’s collective Indo-Pacific strategy.” Make a critical assessment of the statement focusing on IPMDA.

  2. 2026 · PSIR II · Q4(a) · 20 marks

    QUAD requires more robust architecture than the summit driven mode to tide over the current challenges. Elaborate.

  3. 2025 · PSIR II · Q6(b) · 15 marks

    India maintains strong ties with countries that will assure a free and open Indo-Pacific and guarantee greater connectivity with rest of the world. Analyze.

  4. 2024 · PSIR II · Q5(d) · 10 marks

    Discuss the rationale behind replacing the “Asia-Pacific” strategy with the new term “Indo-Pacific” strategy.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to India's Indo-Pacific in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    India's conception of the Indo-Pacific differs from that of the United States in geography, membership and purpose. Examine.

    How to approach it

    Shangri-La 2018; INDOPACOM and US documents; inclusiveness; ASEAN centrality; the Indian Ocean dimension.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Evaluate the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative as an instrument of Indian foreign policy.

    How to approach it

    Seven pillars; voluntary participation; practical outcomes; comparison with the Quad.

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks· 250 words

    Is the Indo-Pacific a region or a strategy? Discuss with reference to Indian, ASEAN and Chinese perspectives.

    How to approach it

    Constructivist account of regions; competing outlooks; consequences for India's posture.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01Prime Minister's keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1 June 2018
  2. 02Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (brief). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 4 November 2019
  3. 03ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (opens in a new tab). ASEAN, 23 June 2019
  4. 04Gurpreet S. Khurana, 'Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India–Japan Cooperation', Strategic Analysis 31(1) (2007)
  5. 05Rory Medcalf, Contest for the Indo-Pacific: Why China Won't Map the Future (2020)
  6. 06C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (2012)