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Case study · Southeast Asia · 2013–present

The South China Sea arbitration and its aftermath

A 2016 tribunal under the Law of the Sea Convention rejected China’s expansive maritime claims; a decade later the award stands in law, is rejected by Beijing and is contested on the water.

The case

In January 2013 the Philippines began arbitration against China under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), challenging China’s claim to historic rights within the ‘nine-dash line’ and the legal status of features in the Spratly Islands and at Scarborough Shoal. China refused to take part. It argued that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the dispute concerned territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation, matters it had excluded from compulsory procedures by a declaration in 2006.

The tribunal, with the Permanent Court of Arbitration as registry, issued its award on 12 July 2016. It found that China had no legal basis under UNCLOS to claim historic rights to resources within the nine-dash line beyond those the Convention provides; that none of the Spratly features could generate an exclusive economic zone; that Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal lie within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone; and that China had violated Philippine sovereign rights and caused severe environmental harm through large-scale island-building. It made no ruling on sovereignty over land features, which falls outside UNCLOS.

China declared the award null and void. President Rodrigo Duterte’s government (2016–2022) set it aside in favour of engagement with Beijing, while President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s government has invoked it repeatedly and publicised Chinese coast guard actions. Confrontations at Second Thomas Shoal, where the Philippines keeps a grounded naval vessel, and at Scarborough Shoal escalated in 2024, including a violent clash in June, after which the two governments reached a provisional arrangement on resupply missions. Incidents continued through 2026: Chinese coast guard ships used water cannon near Scarborough Shoal in July, around the award’s tenth anniversary, and Chinese vessels blocked a Philippine resupply mission in September. Both governments said they were working towards a code of conduct between China and ASEAN by the end of 2026.

Actors and stakeholders

  • Republic of the PhilippinesState; claimant and applicant

    Role

    Brought the case after China took control of Scarborough Shoal in a 2012 stand-off. Since 2022 it has made the award central to its diplomacy and adopted a policy of publicising Chinese actions at sea.

    Power and its sources

    Legal and normative power from a binding award; alliance power through its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States; naval and coast guard capacity far smaller than China’s.

  • People’s Republic of ChinaState; claimant

    Role

    Rejects the tribunal’s jurisdiction and award, maintains its extensive claims and has built and fortified artificial islands. It asserts control through coast guard and maritime militia vessels rather than open military force.

    Power and its sources

    Compulsory power at sea, structural power from its economic weight in the region, and the capacity to create facts on the water that a legal ruling cannot reverse.

  • Arbitral tribunal constituted under UNCLOS Annex VIIAdjudicative body (registry: Permanent Court of Arbitration)

    Role

    Decided its own jurisdiction and ruled on maritime entitlements and Chinese conduct. Under UNCLOS its award is final and binding on the parties.

    Power and its sources

    Legal authority without enforcement: UNCLOS provides no mechanism to compel a state to comply.

  • Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)Regional intergovernmental organisation

    Role

    Has negotiated a code of conduct with China since the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties. Its members are divided between claimant states (the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei) and members with closer ties to Beijing.

    Power and its sources

    Convening and norm-setting power, limited by consensus decision-making that lets any member block a strong collective position.

  • United StatesExternal state and treaty ally

    Role

    Conducts freedom-of-navigation operations, has endorsed the award, and has stated that its defence treaty with the Philippines covers armed attacks on Philippine public vessels in the South China Sea.

    Power and its sources

    Hard power and alliance networks; its own failure to ratify UNCLOS weakens its standing when it invokes the Convention.

Through the key concepts

sovereignty

The case separates sovereignty over territory from sovereign rights at sea. The tribunal ruled on maritime entitlements and conduct, not on who owns the features, so the underlying dispute persists in the space the law left open. China’s historic-rights claim and its 2006 declaration express a view of sovereignty that does not submit core claims to third-party judgment; the Philippines treats the award as confirmation of its exclusive economic zone. The guide’s sources of sovereignty pull in different directions here: international law favours Manila, while possession and use of force favour Beijing.

power

Hard law without enforcement meets structural power. China lacks a legal advantage but shapes the regional framework through island-building, a permanent coast guard presence and economic ties, which is Strange’s structural power and resource power converted into control. The Philippines’ legal victory has shifted the terms of the contest without settling it. Grey-zone tactics, coercion kept below the threshold of armed attack, are designed to avoid triggering alliance commitments.

legitimacy

The award is a durable legitimacy resource. It allows the Philippines and others to present Chinese actions as unlawful and to build coalitions in forums where legality counts. China answers by contesting the tribunal’s jurisdiction and composition and by appealing to history, addressing domestic and sympathetic foreign audiences. Each side argues in a different currency to a different audience, which is why the dispute is as much about legitimacy as about reefs.

interdependence

Interdependence restrains and constrains at once. China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009, which limits how far Southeast Asian states will confront it, and during the 2012 stand-off Chinese restrictions on imports of Philippine bananas showed trade used as leverage. The sea lanes also carry a large share of world trade, which gives distant states a stake in freedom of navigation and draws them into the dispute.

Perspectives

Government of the Philippines

The award is final and binding, settles the question of historic rights and shows the rule of law protecting a smaller state against a larger one. Whether China complies is a test of whether international law applies to great powers.

Government of China

The tribunal had no jurisdiction, because the case concerned sovereignty that China never agreed to submit to arbitration. Disputes should be settled by negotiation between the states directly concerned, and China’s rights rest on long historical use.

Realist reading

The episode confirms that law reflects power. The award changed nothing on the water; control is decided by presence and force, and the question that matters is whether the US alliance deters escalation.

Liberal-institutionalist reading

The award raised the costs of China’s position. It narrowed the legal space for historic-rights claims, gave other claimants a reference point and turned each confrontation into a visible breach of a ruling, with reputational costs.

Evaluation

The case is the clearest test in the course of whether international law constrains a powerful state that refuses consent. On the narrow measure of compliance the answer is no: ten years on, China rejects the award and its presence at contested features has grown. That measure misses what the award did. It settled a legal question authoritatively, so that historic-rights claims within the nine-dash line now carry a cost in legitimacy; it gave the Philippines a lasting diplomatic resource and other claimants a reference point; and it turned grey-zone pressure into documented breaches of a ruling.

The fairest judgement is that law shifted the terms of the contest without deciding its outcome. The case also exposes the limits of each lens. Realism explains the facts on the water but not why Beijing invests so heavily in contesting the award’s legitimacy; liberal accounts explain the reputational costs but not why those costs have not changed behaviour.

Questions to take further

  • If a binding ruling is not complied with, has international law failed?
  • Why does China contest the legitimacy of the award rather than simply ignore it?
  • How far does ASEAN’s consensus rule shape what Southeast Asian states can achieve together?
  • Would an enforcement mechanism change the outcome, or only the costs?

Sources

  1. 01The South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of the Philippines v. People’s Republic of China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award of 12 July 2016. Permanent Court of Arbitration, 12 July 2016
  2. 02United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)
  3. 03Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, statement on the award of the arbitral tribunal, 12 July 2016
  4. 04Al Jazeera, ‘Philippines accuses China of using water cannon on vessels for second day’ (opens in a new tab), 24 July 2026
  5. 05USNI News, ‘Chinese Cutters, Warships Block Philippine Resupply Mission to Second Thomas Shoal’ (opens in a new tab), 25 September 2026