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Core topic · First assessment 2026

Power in global politics

Power as a contested concept: competing definitions from Dahl to Qin, the four prescribed classifications, and how to use them as analytical tools rather than labels.

Prescribed content

  • Definitions and ways of understanding power
  • Classifications of power
  • Hard, soft and smart power
  • Structural and relational power
  • Economic, political, social and cultural power
  • Power to, power over, power with

Overview

Power is the central concept of the course and its most contested. The guide’s initial guidance describes it as the ability to effect change, and adds that it can be seen less as a unitary force than as an aspect of relations among people within a social organisation. Beyond that starting point the guide deliberately does not settle the meaning. It asks students to engage critically with a range of definitions and suggests eleven thinkers whose views may help, from Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault to Joseph Nye and Qin Yaqing.

The prescribed content has two strands: definitions and ways of understanding power, and four classifications of power. The guide is unusually explicit that the classifications must be used to analyse real cases, evaluated as analytical tools and connected to one another, rather than listed or defined in the abstract.

This unit treats the theories as lenses of different focal length rather than rivals to be ranked. Dahl sees the decision, Lukes the agenda, Strange the structure, Foucault the categories in which the agenda is written, and Arendt asks whether coercion counts as power at all. The skill is choosing the lens a case demands and saying where it fails.

Inquiry questions

  • Is power a possession or a relationship?
  • Can power exist where no conflict is ever visible?
  • Is violence the ultimate form of power, or a sign that power has failed?
  • Who decides what counts as knowledge, and with what consequences?
  • Can power grow when it is shared?

01A contested concept

Power is what the philosopher W. B. Gallie called an essentially contested concept: informed people disagree about its meaning, and no quantity of evidence settles the dispute, because the disagreement is partly about values. The IB does not ask candidates to resolve it but to use it, which means recognising that each definition directs attention to different evidence.

Three questions separate the main positions. Does power reside in actors and their capabilities, in structures, or in discourse and knowledge? Must it be observable, as Robert Dahl insisted, or can the greatest power leave no visible trace? And is it something an actor has or something it does? The last question yields the distinction between resource power, the assets an actor possesses, and relational power, the outcomes it achieves. The gap between them is the problem of power conversion. The United States held overwhelming military superiority throughout its twenty years in Afghanistan, yet the Taliban returned to Kabul in August 2021.

A question of the form ‘how powerful is X?’ therefore cannot be answered as posed. It must be reframed: powerful over whom, in which domain, by what means and towards what outcome. Answering the reframed question is the analysis.

02From Dahl to Lukes: the faces of power

Robert Dahl‘s ‘The Concept of Power’ (1957) founded the modern debate: A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something B would not otherwise do. Dahl wanted a definition that could be tested by studying who prevails in observable, contested decisions. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962) pointed to a second face: the power to keep issues off the agenda, so that some grievances never become decisions at all.

Steven Lukes, in Power: A Radical View (1974), added a third dimension: power can shape perceptions and preferences so that people do not object to arrangements that harm them, because those arrangements seem natural. The three dimensions ask of any case who won the decision, what never reached the agenda, and what was never imagined. At COP30 in Belém in November 2025, a large coalition of states pressed for a roadmap away from fossil fuels, but under a consensus rule that lets any party block a decision, the final text contained none. The decisive act was a non-decision that a vote count would not reveal. The third dimension is harder to evidence: the assumption that continued economic growth is not itself negotiable is shared even by those who lose most from climate change.

The third dimension has a well-known difficulty. If people’s real interests differ from the preferences they express, who decides what those interests are? Critics see a risk that analysts substitute their own judgement for that of the people they study. Lukes accepts the difficulty but argues that ignoring the shaping of preferences would leave the most effective forms of power unexamined.

03Hard, soft and smart power

Joseph Nye introduced soft power in 1990 to describe getting others to want the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. Its sources, in his account, are culture, political values, and foreign policies that others see as legitimate. Hard power works through command: the sticks of threats and force and the carrots of payment. Smart power is the deliberate combination of the two so that they reinforce rather than undercut each other, as when a state pairs climate finance with diplomatic pressure.

This is the most frequently misused classification in the course. Soft power is not ‘being nice’, and aid is not automatically soft power. The guide lists economic aid among its examples, and aid can build attraction over time; but aid given on condition that a recipient change its vote is a carrot, an instrument of hard power. The mechanism decides the category, not the instrument. India shows both the strength and the limits of the idea: the UN General Assembly’s proclamation of an International Day of Yoga in 2014, the reach of Indian cinema and a large diaspora give it real attraction, yet attraction does not automatically convert into votes, investment or security.

Three evaluative points recur. Soft power is hard to measure, so claims about it are hard to falsify. It is not controlled by governments, since films, universities and brands attract or repel regardless of foreign ministries. And it is not independent of hard power, because prestige often follows material success. Ukraine after February 2022 showed conversion working the other way: international sympathy was turned into weapons, finance and sanctions on its behalf.

04Structural and relational power

Relational power is A’s power over B in a particular interaction, the kind Dahl measured. Structural power, in Susan Strange‘s States and Markets (1988), is the power to shape the frameworks within which states, firms and people relate to one another: to decide how things shall be done. Strange identified four structures: security, production, finance and knowledge. An actor with no advantage in a particular negotiation can still get its way because it built the arena.

The guide’s examples follow the same line: membership of the UN Security Council is structural power, while alliances and collective civil movements are relational. Control of the payment systems through which international transactions pass, demonstrated when several Russian banks were cut off from the SWIFT messaging network in 2022, is structural power in finance. Export controls on advanced semiconductors and chip-making equipment, imposed by the United States from October 2022 and later aligned with measures by the Netherlands and Japan, exercise structural power over production and knowledge.

Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005) offered a fuller taxonomy. Compulsory power is direct control of one actor by another; institutional power works through rules that favour some actors over time, such as weighted voting in the IMF; structural power constitutes actors’ capacities through relations such as capital and labour; and productive power works through discourse, shaping who counts as ‘developed’, ‘fragile’ or ‘responsible’. Strange’s structural power spans their institutional and structural types, and their productive power overlaps with Lukes’s third dimension. Showing that the frameworks translate into one another is what the guide means by examining their links.

05Economic, political, social and cultural power

The fourth classification sorts power by domain, and is best treated as a set of currencies that do not exchange at a fixed rate. Economic power rests on market size, credit, resources and the capacity to sanction, but interdependence cuts both ways, so sanctions also cost those who impose them. Political power rests on formal authority: a veto, a treaty right, an office or leadership of an alliance. Social power comes from networks, diasporas, reputation and the ability to convene. Cultural power comes from language, media, education, religion and the appeal of a way of life.

The value of the classification lies in the conversion problem it exposes. Economic weight does not automatically buy cultural appeal, and military dominance does not purchase legitimacy. India’s G20 presidency in 2023 showed social and political power at work: the New Delhi summit admitted the African Union as a permanent member of the G20, an outcome achieved by convening and coalition-building rather than economic leverage. Qatar has built a mediating role, including in the talks that produced the 2020 US–Taliban agreement, from assets that exceed its material size. When a question names one currency, the strongest answers test it against the others and show where it fails to convert.

06Power over, power to and power with

This classification asks what kind of relationship power creates. Power over is domination: A prevails against B’s preference, usually in a zero-sum contest, and it is realism’s default. Power to is capacity. Hanna Pitkin, in Wittgenstein and Justice (1972), argued that power is in the first instance a capacity, the wherewithal to do something, and that power over others is only one, relational, form of it. Power with is generated jointly. Mary Parker Follett contrasted it with power over in the 1920s, and Hannah Arendt radicalised it in On Violence (1970): power corresponds to the human ability to act in concert, belongs to a group rather than an individual, and is the opposite of violence, which appears when power is slipping away.

Several thinkers named in the guide extend the classification. bell hooks criticised feminists who sought equal access to domination and argued for redefining power as the capacity to resist and transform, insisting that race, gender and class together shape who is dominated. Eric Liu argues that civic power tends to compound in the hands of those who already hold it and to justify itself, but that citizens can generate new power by organising. Qin Yaqing‘s relational theory treats power as arising from relationships and as shareable, so that it can grow through use; if he is right, realism’s zero-sum premise is a cultural assumption rather than a law of politics.

Applications are concrete. Small island states have little power over anyone, but through the Alliance of Small Island States and wider coalitions they exercised power with others to write the 1.5°C goal into the Paris Agreement. Non-violent movements, as Arendt’s account predicts, can topple governments that keep overwhelming means of violence once soldiers and officials stop obeying.

07Theories of power: capability, institutions, ideas and critique

For realists power is the substance of international politics, because without a government above states it is the means of survival. Hans Morgenthau rooted the pursuit of power in human nature and Kenneth Waltz in the anarchic structure of the system. John Mearsheimer argued in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001) that because no state can be certain of others’ intentions, great powers maximise relative power and seek regional hegemony. The security dilemma is realism’s sharpest insight; durable cooperation, non-state actors and power that works through attraction are its blind spots.

Liberal institutionalists such as Robert Keohane and Nye argue that institutions and interdependence make power positive-sum and that, under complex interdependence, leverage comes from asymmetry: the less dependent party gains. Constructivists add that power’s meaning depends on identity and norms. Anu Bradford’s ‘Brussels effect’, through which EU rules spread worldwide because firms adopt them to keep access to the European market, describes a normative power that neither coerces nor pays.

Critical theories ask whose order is being preserved. Antonio Gramsci‘s hegemony is rule secured through consent, as schools, media and common sense make an order feel natural, so that challenging it requires a counter-hegemonic struggle over ideas. Michel Foucault refused the question of who holds power: power circulates through institutions and practices, produces categories and identities, and is bound up with what a society accepts as knowledge. Walter Mignolo carries this to the global scale, arguing that colonial power persists in the hierarchy of knowledge that decides whose concepts count as universal. These lenses explain compliance without coercion, though they can underrate how much coercion still matters.

08Applying the classifications: state, non-state and digital power

The most examinable comparison in the topic is state against non-state power, and it is often argued badly because candidates pick a side instead of weighing the asymmetry. States hold compulsory and institutional power: they tax, legislate, recognise and use force. Non-state actors more often exercise productive and structural power, as NGOs shape norms and firms shape production and knowledge. Yet no firm or NGO can coerce as a state can, and most depend on states to enforce anything.

Digital technology is where every classification applies at once. Cyber operations are compulsory power by other means, often deniable. Ownership of platforms, cables, chips and cloud infrastructure is structural power over the terms on which others operate. Algorithms that decide what is seen exercise productive power over what is thinkable at scale. The decisive actors are largely private firms that were never granted public authority, which is why the EU AI Act can be read as a contest between regulatory power exercised through market access and the productive power of the firms that build the technology.

The move that earns marks is to name the mechanism rather than the instrument. A tariff is compulsory power, a standard that others copy is normative or productive power, and a voting rule that favours incumbents is institutional power. The same act can belong to different categories depending on how it works.

Forms and theories of power

ClassificationOriginal

Five ways of classifying power, from Nye's hard, soft and smart power to Barnett and Duvall's taxonomy, grouped so that each classification can be read as a lens that reveals some mechanisms and hides others.

  1. 01 · 3 entries

    Nye: hard, soft and smart

    • Hard power

      Getting others to act through command: the sticks of threats and force and the carrots of payment, sanctions relief or aid tied to compliance. The mechanism decides the category, not the instrument: aid given on condition that a recipient change its vote is hard power.

      More detail

      Hard power is the easiest to count, which is why it dominates rankings, but resources do not convert automatically into outcomes. The United States held overwhelming military superiority throughout its twenty years in Afghanistan, yet the Taliban returned to Kabul in August 2021.

    • Soft power

      Getting others to want the outcomes one wants, through attraction rather than coercion or payment. Nye, who introduced the term in 1990, locates its sources in culture, political values and foreign policies seen as legitimate. It is hard to measure and largely outside governments' control.

      More detail

      India's attraction rests on the reach of its cinema, the International Day of Yoga proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in 2014 and a large diaspora, but attraction does not automatically become votes, investment or security. Nye set out the idea at length in Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004).

    • Smart power

      The deliberate combination of hard and soft power so that each reinforces rather than undercuts the other. Nye treats it as a strategy, not a third kind of resource, so the analytical question is whether coercion is spending the attraction that makes cooperation cheap.

      More detail

      Pairing climate finance with diplomatic pressure is a smart-power strategy. Ukraine after February 2022 showed conversion in the other direction: international sympathy was turned into weapons, finance and sanctions on its behalf.

  2. 02 · 3 entries

    Lukes: three dimensions

    • First dimension: decision-making

      Power is visible in observable conflicts over decisions: A prevails over B in a contested choice. This is Robert Dahl's behavioural view (1957). Its strength is that it can be tested; its weakness is that it cannot see issues that never reach the table.

      More detail

      Analytical question: who won the vote or the negotiation, and against whose stated preference? Dahl's definition is that A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something B would not otherwise do.

    • Second dimension: agenda-setting

      Power also works by keeping issues off the agenda, so that some grievances never become decisions at all. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz called this non-decision-making (1962). Procedural rules such as consensus are typical instruments, because they let one actor block without ever losing a vote.

      More detail

      At COP30 in Belém in November 2025 a large coalition pressed for a roadmap away from fossil fuels, but under a consensus rule the final text contained none: the decisive act was a non-decision that a vote count would not reveal.

    • Third dimension: shaping preferences

      The most effective power shapes what people want, so that they accept arrangements that harm them because those arrangements seem natural. Steven Lukes added this dimension in 1974. Critics ask who decides people's real interests; Lukes replies that ignoring preference-shaping hides power's deepest forms.

      More detail

      Analytical question: what was never imagined as a choice? Lukes's argument is in Power: A Radical View (1974; second edition 2005). The assumption that continued economic growth is not negotiable, shared even by those most exposed to climate change, is a standard illustration.

  3. 03 · 2 entries

    Strange: relational and structural

    • Relational power

      The power of A to get B to do something in a particular interaction, the kind Robert Dahl measured. Susan Strange did not dismiss it, but argued that in the world economy it increasingly mattered less than the power to shape the arena in which bargains are struck.

      More detail

      The IB guide's examples treat alliances and collective civil movements as relational power, and membership of the UN Security Council as structural power.

    • Structural power

      The power to shape the frameworks within which states, firms and people relate to one another: to decide how things shall be done. Strange identified four structures, security, production, finance and knowledge. An actor with no edge in a particular negotiation can still prevail because it built the arena.

      More detail

      Strange's argument is in States and Markets (1988). Cutting several Russian banks off from the SWIFT messaging network in 2022 was structural power in finance; US export controls on advanced chips from October 2022, later aligned with Dutch and Japanese measures, were structural power over production and knowledge.

  4. 04 · 4 entries

    Barnett and Duvall: four concepts

    • Compulsory power

      Direct control of one actor by another through interaction: A shapes B's circumstances or actions, whether by force, sanctions or the threat of them. In Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall's taxonomy (2005) it is the concept closest to realism's and Dahl's understanding of power.

      More detail

      A tariff imposed to force a change of policy is compulsory power. Barnett and Duvall stress that non-state actors can exercise it too, as when campaigners use shame and moral authority to compel a government to change course.

    • Institutional power

      Indirect control exercised through the rules and procedures of institutions, which favour some actors over others over time even when no one is giving orders. Weighted voting in the IMF, where the United States holds enough votes to block decisions needing an 85 per cent majority, is the standard example.

    • Structural power (Barnett and Duvall)

      Power that constitutes actors' capacities and identities through their positions in social relations, such as capital and labour. It works not by one actor acting on another but by defining what kind of actor each can be. Strange's structural power spans this type and the institutional one.

      More detail

      The position of commodity exporters in the world economy shapes what their governments can choose before any negotiation begins.

    • Productive power

      Power that works through discourse and systems of knowledge, producing the categories by which actors are known, such as 'developed', 'fragile' or 'responsible'. It is diffuse, owes much to Michel Foucault, and overlaps with Lukes's third dimension, because it shapes what can be thought and said.

      More detail

      Algorithms that decide what billions of people see exercise productive power at scale, which is why regulation of artificial intelligence can be read as a contest over who frames the technology.

  5. 05 · 2 entries

    Economic and normative power

    • Economic power

      Power resting on market size, credit, investment, resources and the capacity to sanction or reward. It is a currency that does not exchange at a fixed rate: interdependence cuts both ways, so sanctions cost those who impose them, and wealth does not automatically buy attraction or legitimacy.

      More detail

      Europe's reliance on Russian gas before 2022 showed how dependence becomes vulnerability, and concern about China's dominance of critical-mineral processing drives much of the politics of battery supply chains.

    • Normative power

      The ability to shape what counts as normal or appropriate in world politics. Ian Manners (2002) applied the term to the European Union, whose influence lies in spreading norms rather than in force. Anu Bradford's 'Brussels effect' describes EU rules adopted worldwide because firms want access to its market.

      More detail

      Critics note that the Brussels effect rests on the size of the European market, so normative and economic power are hard to separate. The EU AI Act is the course's test case.

Sources9
  1. 01International Baccalaureate, Diploma Programme Global politics guide (first assessment 2026). International Baccalaureate Organization, 2024
  2. 02Robert A. Dahl, 'The Concept of Power', Behavioral Science 2:3 (1957)
  3. 03Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power', American Political Science Review 56:4 (1962)
  4. 04Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Macmillan, 1974; 2nd edn, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)
  5. 05Susan Strange, States and Markets (Pinter, 1988)
  6. 06Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (PublicAffairs, 2004)
  7. 07Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power in International Politics', International Organization 59:1 (2005)
  8. 08Ian Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', Journal of Common Market Studies 40:2 (2002)
  9. 09Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World (Oxford University Press, 2020)

Original teaching visual: an analytical summary, not IB material.

Reviewed 20 November 2026

Key ideas

  • Power is an essentially contested concept; each definition directs attention to different evidence.
  • Resource power is what an actor has and relational power what it achieves; the gap between them is the problem of conversion.
  • Power has visible, hidden and radical dimensions: winning decisions, controlling agendas and shaping what seems possible.
  • Structural power sets the frameworks within which others act; the actor that builds the arena often wins without bargaining.
  • Soft power works through attraction and hard power through coercion and payment; the mechanism, not the instrument, decides the category.
  • Power over, power to and power with describe different relationships: domination, capacity and collective action.
  • No single theory explains every case; strong analysis chooses a lens and names its limits.

Common misconceptions

  • The misconception

    Soft power means being nice, and aid is always soft power.

    The correction

    Soft power is attraction that changes what others want. Aid given on conditions is a carrot, an instrument of hard power; it becomes soft power only when it generates genuine attraction to a state’s values or policies.

  • The misconception

    The state with the largest military and economy is the most powerful.

    The correction

    Resources are not outcomes. Power is relational and situational, and resources can fail to convert into influence, as twenty years of US superiority in Afghanistan showed.

  • The misconception

    The theories of power are rivals, and the task is to pick the correct one.

    The correction

    They are lenses of different focal length. Dahl, Lukes, Strange and Foucault see different things in the same case; the skill is choosing the lens a case demands and stating its blind spot.

  • The misconception

    Lukes’s third dimension is just propaganda.

    The correction

    It does not require anyone to lie. Radical power is a property of a shared frame of thought, and those who benefit from it may believe in it as sincerely as those who lose.

  • The misconception

    Foucault means that power is everywhere, so nothing can be done.

    The correction

    Because power runs through everyday practices and forms of knowledge, it can be contested at many points, not only by capturing the state.

  • The misconception

    Listing the four classifications answers a question about them.

    The correction

    The guide asks for the classifications to be used on cases, evaluated as tools and linked to one another. Definitions alone earn little.

How it is assessed

Paper 1 draws its sources from the core topics, and power is the concept most likely to appear. Question 1 (3 marks) may ask you to identify forms of power in a source; question 2 (4 marks) to explain a classification or a claim that uses one; question 3 (6 marks) to compare how two sources portray an actor’s power; and question 4 (12 marks) to evaluate the sources and synthesise them with your own knowledge, for example on whether attraction achieved what coercion could not.

Paper 2 essays are set on the thematic studies, but Section B integrating questions often turn on power: whether the most significant power is invisible, whether soft power outperforms hard power, whether non-state actors now rival states. A strong paragraph names the classification, applies it to a specific recent case, tests it against a rival framework and reaches a judgement.

At HL, Paper 3 responses on challenges such as technology or security depend on locating structural power and identifying who could act on a recommendation. In the engagement project, power is the organising question: who holds it in your issue, how it is exercised, and how stakeholders without it try to build power with others.

Case studies

Practice questions

  1. Q1IB Paper 1 style4 marks

    A source reports that a government has restricted exports of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to a rival state. Explain why this measure can be described as an exercise of structural rather than relational power.

    How to approach it

    Define both terms, using Strange for structural power. Show that the measure works by controlling the production and knowledge structures on which the rival depends, rather than by bargaining over a particular outcome. A further mark can come from noting its compulsory element, or that its effect depends on the absence of alternative suppliers.

  2. Q2IB Paper 1 style6 marks

    Compare and contrast how two sources characterise a state’s soft power, one describing its cultural diplomacy and the other its development assistance.

    How to approach it

    Run the comparison point by point rather than summarising each source in turn. Look for agreement on the sources of attraction and contrast on mechanism: does the assistance described work through attraction or through conditions? Use Nye’s terms precisely and refer briefly to each source.

  3. Q3IB Paper 1 style12 marks

    Using sources on a recent multilateral negotiation and your own knowledge, evaluate the claim that the most significant power in global politics is invisible.

    How to approach it

    Organise around a thesis. Use Lukes’s dimensions and Strange’s structures to show what the sources reveal and conceal, such as consensus rules as agenda control. Weigh each source’s origin and purpose, add your own cases of visible coercion that clearly mattered, and conclude on the conditions under which hidden and structural power outweigh visible power.

  4. Q4IB Paper 2 style15 marks

    Evaluate the view that soft power is more effective than hard power in achieving states’ objectives.

    How to approach it

    Define both and identify the objective in question, since effectiveness depends on the goal. Use developed examples from at least one thematic study, such as aid and cultural diplomacy in development, or sanctions and force in peace and conflict. Address the measurement and conversion problems, consider smart power as a synthesis, and judge the conditions under which each works.

  5. Q5IB Paper 2 style15 marks

    To what extent is power in global politics better understood as ‘power with’ than as ‘power over’?

    How to approach it

    Explain the classification with Pitkin, Follett and Arendt and contrast it with realism. Test both conceptions against cases such as small-state coalitions in climate negotiations, non-violent movements and great-power rivalry. Consider Qin Yaqing’s relational view and feminist critiques, then conclude on where cooperative power is real and where opposed interests constrain it.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not IB examination questions.

Across the handbooks

Where this unit meets the nine original handbooks: the handbook written for it, the others that take it up, and what each shares with it.

  1. 01Framing Global Politics
  2. 02Power
  3. 03Sovereignty
  4. 04Legitimacy
  5. 05Interdependence
  6. 06Theoretical Perspectives
  7. 07Rights & Justice
  8. 08Stakeholders & Actors
  9. 09Nature, Practice & Study
  • Written for this unit
  • Takes up this unit
  • Shares its cases, concepts or thinkers

The handbooks are original to this platform. These links follow each handbook’s syllabus coverage and cross-references.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01International Baccalaureate, Diploma Programme Global politics guide (first assessment 2026). International Baccalaureate Organization, 2024
  2. 02Arjun Agrawal, Global Politics Handbook 02: Power (Publisher’s Edition)
  3. 03Robert A. Dahl, ‘The Concept of Power’, Behavioral Science 2:3 (1957)
  4. 04Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Macmillan, 1974; 2nd edn 2005)
  5. 05Joseph S. Nye Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (PublicAffairs, 2004)
  6. 06Susan Strange, States and Markets (Pinter, 1988)
  7. 07Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics’, International Organization 59:1 (2005)
  8. 08Hannah Arendt, On Violence (Harcourt, 1970)
  9. 09Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice (University of California Press, 1972)
  10. 10Qin Yaqing, A Relational Theory of World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2018)