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India's foreign policy · Doctrine

Multi-Alignment

Simultaneous partnerships with rival powers and groupings, chosen issue by issue: the working method of Indian diplomacy since the 2010s, more a scholarly label than a declared doctrine.

Overview

No Indian government has proclaimed a doctrine of multi-alignment. The term was popularised by commentators, notably Shashi Tharoor in Pax Indica (2012), to describe what India was already doing: building close partnerships with several powers at once, including powers hostile to each other, without committing to any. Ministers have used related language, such as issue-based coalitions and engagement with all poles, and S. Jaishankar's writing describes the method in detail. Treat multi-alignment as an analytical description of practice that official policy broadly accepts, and strategic autonomy as the goal that practice serves.

The method is visible in India's memberships. It sits in the Quad with the United States, Japan and Australia, and in the SCO and BRICS with China and Russia; it attends G7 outreach and leads Global South summits; it partners Israel, the Arab Gulf states and Iran; it promotes both the India–Middle East–Europe corridor and the International North–South Transport Corridor through Iran and Russia.

01The logic

Multi-alignment rests on a structural judgement: that the world after the unipolar moment is becoming multipolar, and that a rising state gains most by keeping its options open while others compete for its favour. Each partnership is valued for what it delivers on a specific issue: technology and defence from the United States and France, energy and arms from Russia, investment and markets from Japan, the Gulf and Europe, votes and legitimacy from the Global South. India's leverage grows with each additional option. The approach resembles hedging, the strategy scholars such as Kuik Cheng-Chwee have described in South-East Asian responses to China, but it is pursued by a larger state with ambitions of its own.

02An architecture of overlapping groups

The method has produced a dense web of small formats: the I2U2 grouping of India, Israel, the UAE and the United States (first summit July 2022); trilaterals with France and the UAE and with Japan and Australia; the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative with Japan and Australia (2021). These coexist with older formats, such as the Russia–India–China trilateral, that are dormant but not abandoned. The density is itself a strategy: it allows India to shift weight between formats as circumstances change, without the costs of exit.

03West Asia as a test

India's policy in West Asia, often called de-hyphenation, is the clearest case. Relations with Israel have grown in defence and technology since full diplomatic ties in 1992; relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia have become strategic partnerships; Iran remains a partner for connectivity through Chabahar. The wars since October 2023 tested this. India condemned the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023, abstained on an early General Assembly resolution that did not mention it, then voted for later ceasefire resolutions and for the New York Declaration on a two-state solution in September 2025. During the war that began with US and Israeli strikes on Iran in February 2026 it called for dialogue, evacuated its nationals, and negotiated passage for Indian ships through the Strait of Hormuz. Balance was preserved, but at the price of saying little.

04Russia and the West

The war in Ukraine produced the costliest test. India abstained on resolutions condemning Russia, increased purchases of Russian oil and continued annual summits with Moscow, while deepening defence and technology cooperation with the United States and concluding trade agreements with the United Kingdom and the European Union. When Washington imposed a tariff penalty in August 2025, India adjusted at the margin rather than choosing a side. The episode showed both the method's resilience and its dependence on partners' tolerance.

05Limits and costs

Multi-alignment has three limits. Trust: partners who are offered issue-by-issue cooperation offer the same in return, and none feels bound to India in a crisis. Coercion: secondary sanctions and tariffs can raise the price of keeping all options open, as American policy did in 2019 and 2025. Capacity: managing dozens of partnerships strains a small diplomatic service and risks breadth without depth. A sharper bipolar confrontation between the United States and China would compress the space the method needs.

06Reading it through IR theory

Realism explains multi-alignment as hedging under uncertainty. In a system moving away from the unipolar moment, a rising state maximises security and leverage by avoiding commitments that could entangle it, balancing the power that threatens it while keeping channels open to others. Realism also predicts the method's main vulnerability, noted above: a sharper bipolar confrontation between the United States and China would compress the space between the poles. Kautilya's six measures of statecraft, which include a double policy of peace with one king and hostility towards another, offer an older Indian vocabulary for the same flexibility. Liberal institutionalism helps explain the architecture. Small, issue-specific formats such as I2U2 and the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative are cheap to create, demand little sovereignty and let India cooperate where interests coincide, much as Keohane and Nye described relations without a fixed hierarchy of issues under complex interdependence. Their weakness is that they generate little of the trust that more durable institutions build. Constructivism points to identity and reputation. Multi-alignment expresses the self-image of a large state that will not be anyone's junior partner, and its success depends on partners believing that India's choices are principled rather than opportunistic. That belief is a social fact that can erode, which is why trust heads the list of the method's limits.

07India's options and the way forward

India's options can be framed by how much flexibility it is willing to trade for depth. Continuing broad multi-alignment maximises leverage while the world remains fluid, but it spreads a small diplomatic service thinly and offers partners only conditional loyalty, which they reciprocate. A narrower version would concentrate on a few core relationships, with the United States and France for technology and defence, Japan, the Gulf and Europe for investment and markets, and Russia for energy and arms, while using other formats more sparingly; this gains depth and trust at the cost of some options. A third possibility, forced rather than chosen, is closer alignment with one side if US–China confrontation sharpens; India's technology and market ties to the West and its border with China would shape the direction, but the costs, including the loss of Russian supplies and of standing in the Global South, would be considerable. Coercion adds a constraint: secondary sanctions and tariffs raise the price of keeping all options open, so India's capacity to absorb such pressure matters as much as diplomatic dexterity. On balance, multi-alignment is a rational method for a rising state in a fluid order, but its sustainability depends on India's growing weight, on partners' tolerance and on the absence of a crisis that forces a choice.

Key points

  • A scholarly and journalistic label for practice, not a doctrine proclaimed by government.
  • Simultaneous partnerships with rival powers, chosen issue by issue.
  • Memberships span the Quad and the SCO, BRICS and G7 outreach, IMEC and the INSTC.
  • Resembles hedging but serves a rising state's ambitions rather than a small state's survival.
  • Tested hardest by the Ukraine war and the West Asian wars since 2023.
  • Vulnerable to trust deficits, coercion and a tightening of US–China bipolarity.

Debates

Is multi-alignment hedging by another name?

Yes: like South-East Asian states, India avoids firm commitments, spreads risk and keeps channels open to all powers; the label adds little analytical content.

No: hedging is a survival strategy of weaker states facing a dominant neighbour; India uses its partnerships to build capabilities and status, shape institutions and lead coalitions. Multi-alignment is hedging plus ambition.

Can multi-alignment survive a sharper US–China confrontation?

Doubtful: in a crisis over Taiwan or a technology war, both sides would demand choices; India's technology and market ties to the West would make neutrality costly, and its border with China would make alignment dangerous.

Possibly: a confrontation would raise India's value as a swing state, giving it more leverage, and India's own rivalry with China means Washington would tolerate Indian ties with Russia as the price of a counterweight in Asia.

Does multi-alignment buy autonomy at the price of voice?

Yes: in West Asia and over Ukraine India preserved its relationships by saying little, abstaining on key resolutions and calling for dialogue; a state that avoids positions on the major conflicts of its time cannot shape their outcomes or the norms that emerge from them, and partners learn to discount its views.

No: voice is not only public statement. India leads Global South summits, attends G7 outreach and promotes corridors in several directions, and quiet diplomacy with every side allowed it to evacuate nationals and negotiate passage for its ships through the Strait of Hormuz; a committed ally would have lost that access.

The fairer verdict is that multi-alignment converts voice into access. Whether the exchange is worthwhile depends on the issue, and on how long partners are prepared to tolerate it.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

5 questions · 2024–2026

  1. 2026 · PSIR II · Q7(c) · 15 marks

    India has adopted multi-alignment to fulfill its core values and interests in International relations. Discuss.

  2. 2025 · PSIR II · Q5(c) · 10 marks

    For India, a multipolar world order would also mean a multipolar Asia. Comment.

  3. 2025 · PSIR II · Q7(a) · 20 marks

    India continues to invoke its time-tested policy of strategic autonomy vis-à-vis both the United States of America and Russia by rejecting US’ offer of mediation on Kashmir issue and by refusing to criticize Russia in its ongoing war against Ukraine. Comment.

  4. 2025 · PSIR II · Q7(c) · 15 marks

    NonAlignment 2·0 underscores India’s unique aspiration to emerge as a site for an alternative universality. Comment.

  5. 2024 · PSIR II · Q8(c) · 15 marks

    “India has of late, chosen to debunk non-alignment in its pursuit of multi-alignment.” Comment.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Multi-Alignment in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Multi-alignment allows India to be a partner of many and an ally of none. Critically examine its benefits and costs.

    How to approach it

    Leverage and options against trust and coercion; cases from West Asia and Ukraine; capacity limits.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Examine India's simultaneous membership of the Quad and the SCO as an expression of multi-alignment.

    How to approach it

    Purposes of each; how India manages contradictions; what each membership protects.

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks· 250 words

    Assess India's policy of 'de-hyphenation' in West Asia since 2023.

    How to approach it

    Israel, the Gulf and Iran; UN votes; the 2026 war and Hormuz; balance at the cost of voice.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01Shashi Tharoor, Pax Indica: India and the World of the Twenty-first Century (2012)
  2. 02S. Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World (2020)
  3. 03Kuik Cheng-Chwee, 'The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China', Contemporary Southeast Asia 30(2) (2008)
  4. 04Joint Statement of the I2U2 Leaders' Virtual Summit, 14 July 2022
  5. 05Statements on West Asia and Ukraine (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India