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India's foreign policy · Doctrine

Defence Diplomacy

Military relationships, exercises, training, equipment and industrial partnerships as instruments of foreign policy: India's shift from a buyer's diplomacy to an emerging exporter's, with defence exports at a record ₹38,424 crore in 2025–26.

Overview

Defence diplomacy is the peacetime use of armed forces and defence industry to build relationships, reassure partners and shape the security environment. India has no single doctrinal text on it; its principles are found in Ministry of Defence annual reports, the navy's maritime strategy (2015), and policies on defence production and exports. Its instruments include joint exercises, training of foreign personnel, defence attachés, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping, gifts and lines of credit for equipment, logistics agreements, co-development and arms exports.

The shift since the mid-2010s is from buyer to partner and seller. India remains among the world's largest arms importers, but its exports rose to ₹23,622 crore in 2024–25 and a record ₹38,424 crore in 2025–26, according to the Ministry of Defence, exceeding the ₹35,000 crore target for 2025 set in the draft defence production and export policy of 2020.

01Partnerships with major powers

With the United States the relationship moved from estrangement after 1998 to designation of India as a Major Defence Partner (2016) and a set of foundational agreements on logistics (2016), communications (2018) and geospatial cooperation (2020). An agreement of June 2023 provided for co-production of jet engines in India, and a ten-year framework for the defence partnership was signed in October 2025. Russia remains the largest source of India's installed equipment, from fighter aircraft to the S-400 air defence system, and a partner in the BrahMos joint venture, though its share of Indian imports has fallen sharply over the past decade. France supplies Rafale aircraft, 36 for the air force and 26 naval variants ordered in April 2025, and Scorpène submarines, and is valued as a partner that does not attach political conditions. Israel, the United Kingdom, Japan and Australia complete the circle.

02Exports and capacity building

The Philippines' purchase of BrahMos shore-based missiles (contract January 2022; first deliveries April 2024) was India's first major export of a strategic weapon system and a signal in the South China Sea. Armenia has bought Indian artillery and air-defence systems. Smaller packages, patrol vessels, aircraft, coastal radars and training, support partners in the Indian Ocean under SAGAR, often financed by defence lines of credit. Training is an older instrument: an Indian military training team has served in Bhutan since the early 1960s, and officers from across Asia and Africa attend Indian staff colleges. Exports now also serve industrial policy, giving Indian manufacturers scale.

03Security partnerships in the Indian Ocean

The navy is the most active instrument. Since 2017 it has kept ships on mission-based deployments across the ocean; since 2008 it has escorted shipping against piracy in the Gulf of Aden; since June 2019 Operation Sankalp has protected Indian shipping in the Gulf, and in 2024 the navy rescued merchant crews from pirates and from Houthi attacks in the Arabian Sea and Red Sea. The Information Fusion Centre at Gurugram (2018) hosts liaison officers from partner navies. New formats extend the reach: the first ASEAN–India maritime exercise (2023) and the first Africa–India Key Maritime Engagement, co-hosted with Tanzania in April 2025.

04Assessment

Defence diplomacy has strengthened India's partnerships and its claim to be a security provider. Its constraints are industrial and bureaucratic: delayed deliveries, limited production capacity, the continuing dependence on imported engines and components, and procedures that make India a slow seller. There is also a strategic tension. Diversifying suppliers protects strategic autonomy, but it complicates logistics and interoperability, and each major partnership carries political expectations. The confrontation with Pakistan in May 2025, in which indigenous missiles and air-defence systems were used, was presented by the government as a demonstration of Indian systems to prospective buyers.

05Reading it through IR theory

Realism reads defence diplomacy as balancing by other means. Waltz distinguished internal balancing, building one's own strength, from external balancing through alliances, and India combines the first, through domestic production and exports, with a version of the second that stops short of alliance: foundational agreements with the United States, Rafales from France and an installed Russian base kept in service. Arms transfers also extend influence, since buyers depend on suppliers for decades of training, spares and upgrades. What realism leaves out is why India prizes partners that attach no political conditions, and why status as a supplier matters to it. Liberal institutionalism explains the growing web of agreements and exercises. Logistics and communications agreements, liaison officers at the Information Fusion Centre and regular exercises lower the costs of cooperation and build habits of interoperability; their limit is that cooperation remains contingent on the political expectations each partnership carries. Constructivism emphasises identity and reputation. Training foreign officers, responding first in disasters and rescuing merchant crews are practices through which India performs the role of a security provider, and the shift from buyer to seller is also a change in how India sees itself and wishes to be seen. The government's presentation of the May 2025 confrontation as a demonstration of Indian systems to prospective buyers shows identity and marketing merging. None of the lenses removes the industrial constraint of delayed deliveries and imported components.

06India's options and the way forward

India's choices in defence diplomacy involve three trade-offs. The first is between diversification and coherence: buying from Russia, France, the United States and Israel protects against embargoes, but a mixed inventory raises costs and complicates interoperability, so concentrating co-production with fewer partners in each category is one way to recover coherence without returning to dependence. The second is between exports and domestic needs: expanding sales, as the record figures for 2025–26 encourage, binds partners to India through training and spares, but production capacity is limited and a reputation for delays could damage the relationships exports are meant to build. The third is between depth with the United States and continuity with Russia: the ten-year framework and jet-engine co-production offer technology, while the installed Russian base cannot be replaced quickly and the BrahMos venture remains valuable. In the Indian Ocean, capacity building, training and disaster response support partners under SAGAR at lower cost and risk than arms sales. On balance, India's defence diplomacy is likely to remain multi-directional, and its credibility will depend less on the number of partnerships than on whether domestic industry can deliver on time.

Key points

  • No single doctrinal text: principles appear in MoD reports, the 2015 maritime strategy and export policy.
  • Exports: ₹23,622 crore (2024–25) and a record ₹38,424 crore (2025–26), per the Ministry of Defence.
  • United States: Major Defence Partner (2016), three foundational agreements, ten-year framework (October 2025).
  • Russia remains the largest installed base; France the partner without political conditions.
  • BrahMos to the Philippines (2022 contract) was the first major strategic export.
  • The navy's deployments, IFC-IOR and new exercises with ASEAN and Africa extend India's reach.

Debates

Should India make arms exports a central tool of foreign policy?

Yes: exports bind partners to India for decades of training, spares and upgrades, finance domestic industry and reduce the cost of India's own procurement; they are how established powers build influence.

No: India's industrial capacity is needed for its own forces, exports can entangle India in partners' conflicts, and a reputation for delays could damage relationships; capacity building and training may yield more influence at lower risk.

Does diversification of suppliers enhance or dilute strategic autonomy?

Enhances: no single supplier can halt Indian operations through an embargo, and competition among suppliers improves terms and technology transfer.

Dilutes: a mixed inventory raises costs, complicates maintenance and interoperability, and multiplies the partners whose political sensitivities India must manage; true autonomy lies in domestic production.

Do India's foundational agreements with the United States amount to an alliance in all but name?

Yes: agreements on logistics, communications and geospatial cooperation, designation as a Major Defence Partner, co-production of jet engines and a ten-year framework create the interoperability and technological dependence typical of allies, and, as with every major partnership, they carry political expectations of support.

No: the agreements are functional arrangements that India has matched with partnerships elsewhere. It still relies on Russia for much of its installed equipment, values France as a partner that attaches no political conditions, and diversifies suppliers precisely so that no single partnership determines its choices.

The relationship is best described as a deepening partnership with alliance-like features in particular domains, whose political meaning will be tested by the expectations it raises rather than by its legal form.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

3 questions · 2026

  1. 2026 · PSIR II · Q5(c) · 10 marks

    Discuss the three areas of security co-operation between India and Israel.

  2. 2026 · PSIR II · Q6(c) · 15 marks

    “The mother of all deals” is a transformative milestone in Indo-EU trade relations. Elaborate on the new Security and Defence partnership.

  3. 2026 · PSIR II · Q8(a) · 20 marks

    Critically evaluate India-Russia relations in the 21st century. How have both the countries responded to America meddling in their relations in the recent times.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Defence Diplomacy in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    India's defence diplomacy has shifted from that of a buyer to that of a partner and seller. Examine with examples.

    How to approach it

    Foundational agreements and co-production; export figures; BrahMos; training and HADR; limits of capacity.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Assess the role of the Indian Navy as an instrument of Indian foreign policy in the Indian Ocean.

    How to approach it

    Mission-based deployments, anti-piracy, Sankalp, IFC-IOR, exercises; SAGAR; capacity constraints.

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks· 250 words

    How has India's defence relationship with Russia changed since 2014, and why?

    How to approach it

    Declining import share, continuing installed base, S-400, diversification to the US and France; sanctions risk.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01Ministry of Defence reports record defence exports of ₹38,424 crore in FY 2025-26 (opens in a new tab). All India Radio News (Ministry of Defence data), 2 April 2026
  2. 02Ministry of Defence, Annual Reports (opens in a new tab). Ministry of Defence, Government of India
  3. 03Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (2015). Indian Navy
  4. 04SIPRI, Trends in International Arms Transfers (fact sheets). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
  5. 05Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization (2010)
  6. 06Anit Mukherjee, The Absent Dialogue: Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Military in India (2019)