Core topic · First assessment 2026
Interdependence in global politics
Interdependence as the problem and global governance as the response: international law, the United Nations, IGOs and non-state actors, cooperation and competition, and the networks through which power now flows.
Prescribed content
- Global governance and international law
- The UN: general structure, roles and functions, including the UN Charter, General Assembly and Security Council
- Achievements and limitations of the UN
- Participation of IGOs and non-state actors in global governance
- Cooperation and competition between political actors: treaties, collective security, strategic alliances, economic cooperation
- Global interactions and networks
Overview
A virus in one city closes schools on another continent; attacks on ships in one strait raise prices worldwide; a decision in one capital about chip exports reshapes industries elsewhere. The guide’s initial guidance defines interdependence as mutual reliance between and among groups, organisations, geographic areas and states on access to the resources that sustain living arrangements. The reliance is often economic, but it has security and, increasingly, sustainability dimensions, and globalisation has both deepened it and changed the power relationships within it.
Students often expect this topic to be a chapter on globalisation. In the IB syllabus it is where global governance and international law are learned, because interdependence is the problem and governance is the political response to it. The prescribed content is governance-heavy: global governance and international law; the UN’s structure, roles and functions, including the Charter, the General Assembly and the Security Council, and its achievements and limitations; the participation of IGOs and non-state actors; cooperation and competition through treaties, collective security, strategic alliances and economic cooperation; and global interactions and networks.
The unit’s organising question is simple to state. If there is no world government, how is an interdependent world governed, and why does governance succeed in some domains and fail in others?
Inquiry questions
- Does interdependence restrain conflict or supply new weapons?
- If there is no world government, why do states obey international rules?
- How should the United Nations be judged, and against what alternative?
- Who governs the networks on which states now depend?
- Why does cooperation succeed on some global problems and fail on others?
01Interdependence, dependency and asymmetry
Precise terms prevent confused answers. Interconnection means links exist; interdependence means actors rely on one another, so each is affected by the other’s actions; dependency means reliance runs one way, which is a power relationship rather than interdependence. Asymmetrical interdependence, in which both rely on each other but unequally, is the most useful term of all, because asymmetry is a source of leverage. Globalisation is the process that deepens connection; interdependence is the condition it produces.
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, in Power and Interdependence (1977), split the effects of disruption in two. Sensitivity is how quickly and painfully an actor feels a change; vulnerability is how costly it is to escape by changing arrangements. Only vulnerability is decisive. Europe’s dependence on Russian gas before 2022 illustrates both: prices spiked at once (sensitivity), and replacing pipeline supply with liquefied gas and other sources took expensive years (vulnerability).
The question to ask of any relationship is therefore who could walk away, and at what cost. It explains why energy, semiconductors, food and payment systems are political commodities: not because they are valuable, but because alternatives are slow and costly to build.
02Reading interdependence: liberal, realist and critical accounts
Liberals argue that interdependence restrains conflict, since trade raises the cost of war and institutions make cooperation rational. Realists answer that states care about relative gains and fear that cooperation may benefit rivals more, so interdependence is a vulnerability that will eventually be exploited; Kenneth Waltz warned that close interdependence also multiplies occasions for conflict. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman’s account of ‘weaponised interdependence’ (2019) shows how states that control hubs in global networks, such as financial messaging or dollar clearing, can monitor and cut off others.
Keohane and Nye’s model of complex interdependence specifies conditions: multiple channels connect societies, not only governments; there is no fixed hierarchy of issues, so trade or health can outrank military security; and force is largely irrelevant among closely interdependent states. It describes relations within an integrated bloc well and great-power rivalry poorly, so the evaluative move is to ask where the model holds.
Critical traditions ask why the gains flow so consistently in one direction. Dependency theory argues that what is called interdependence is structured dependency, with poorer states locked into supplying raw materials. Immanuel Wallerstein‘s world-systems theory describes a capitalist world-economy of core, semi-periphery and periphery. Susan Strange adds that the actor who designed the structure rarely needs to leave it. The best answers specify conditions: interdependence restrains when it is symmetric and its gains are widely shared, and enables coercion when it is asymmetric and alternatives are costly.
03Global governance and international law
The guide requires the distinction between government, a formal institution with legal authority over a territory, able to make and enforce binding rules, and governance, the management of common affairs through rules, norms and institutions without a central authority. There is no world government, and this is the structure of the system rather than a temporary gap. Yet there is a great deal of governance: states allocate radio spectrum and airspace, deliver post, settle trade disputes and share disease data. Keohane’s institutionalism explains why: institutions lower the costs of agreement, supply information and lengthen the shadow of the future, so that defection today invites retaliation tomorrow.
National law binds everyone within a territory, is made vertically by a legislature, changes when the legislature acts, and is enforced by courts with compulsory jurisdiction. International law binds states largely by consent, is negotiated horizontally between formal equals, changes slowly through agreement and practice, and relies on reciprocity, reputation and occasionally sanctions. Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists its sources: treaties, international custom, general principles of law, and judicial decisions and the teachings of the most qualified scholars as subsidiary means.
The guide’s examples show the variety of governance. Security Council resolutions bind members; the Basel Accords set capital standards for banks through technical committees most voters never notice; WTO agreements and dispute settlement made trade rules enforceable until the appellate stage was disabled, as the WTO Appellate Body case shows; regional mechanisms range from the EU’s majority voting to ASEAN’s consensus.
04The United Nations: structure, roles and functions
The Charter of 1945 sets out the UN’s purposes (maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations based on equal rights and self-determination, and international cooperation) and its principles, including sovereign equality, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the prohibition of force. Its principal organs are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council (inactive since 1994), the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat.
The General Assembly includes every member, each with one vote. It debates any matter within the Charter, approves the budget and elects members of other organs, but its resolutions on most matters are recommendations. It embodies sovereign equality: legitimacy without much power. The Security Council has fifteen members, five permanent (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and ten elected for two-year terms. It has primary responsibility for international peace and security, its decisions bind all members under Article 25, and under Chapter VII it can impose sanctions and authorise force. Substantive decisions need nine votes and no veto from a permanent member: power without full legitimacy.
The design is a bargain. A body able to act against a great power would never have been joined by great powers, so the five were given a veto to keep them inside, after the League of Nations had seen major powers stay out or leave. The consequence is structural: the Council is weakest precisely when a permanent member is party to a conflict. Members have built workarounds, from the 1950 ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution to a 2022 General Assembly decision that the Assembly meets whenever a veto is cast.
05Achievements and limitations of the UN
The UN’s achievements are easy to undersell. There has been no war between great powers since 1945, though how much credit belongs to the UN rather than to nuclear deterrence is disputed. Membership grew from 51 states to 193 through decolonisation, and the General Assembly gave new states a voice. The UN created a body of norms, from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the Genocide Convention. It invented peacekeeping, which the Charter never mentions, and India has been among its largest troop contributors. Its specialised agencies run technical governance that simply works, the task-centred cooperation that David Mitrany advocated in A Working Peace System (1943), and the World Health Organization coordinated the eradication of smallpox. The guide’s further examples include the UN Development Programme, whose Human Development Report changed how progress is measured, the Human Rights Council, whose Universal Periodic Review examines every member’s record, and the International Court of Justice, whose 2025 advisory opinion on states’ climate obligations is examined in the ICJ climate case study.
The limitations are equally concrete. The veto paralyses the Council when a permanent member is involved, as Russia’s veto of a draft resolution on its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 showed. The permanent membership reflects 1945, with no permanent seat for Africa, Latin America or India, and reform is blocked because the five would have to agree to dilute their own privilege. The UN has no army or tax and can only use what members provide, which leaves it exposed to funding cuts. Enforcement is selective, and Article 2(7) protects domestic jurisdiction.
The decisive evaluative move is choosing the counterfactual. Judged against a world government that has never existed, the UN fails; judged against no UN at all, it succeeds considerably. It performs well where great-power interests converge and the work is technical, and poorly where those interests collide. That is not incompetence but design: the UN is an instrument of states, not an authority above them.
06IGOs and non-state actors in global governance
Global governance is not conducted by states alone, and each type of participant both creates interdependence and helps manage it. Regional organisations produce the densest governance. The EU pools sovereignty and can bind outvoted members; ASEAN works by consensus and non-interference; the African Union‘s Constitutive Act gives it the right to intervene in a member state in grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; Mercosur integrates South American markets. Organisations with a specific scope coordinate one sector: OPEC manages oil supply among producers, and the International Energy Agency holds emergency stocks for consumers and coordinated releases after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Non-state actors are just as central. Multinational companies built the supply chains whose disruption empties shelves. NGOs monitor compliance, name and shame, and sometimes write treaties: the campaigns behind the 1997 landmines convention and the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons were both recognised with the Nobel Peace Prize. Expert bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change shape what negotiators accept as fact. Digital platforms supply infrastructure on which others depend while claiming no governing role.
This produces an accountability gap. The actors that create the most interdependence are often the least accountable for its failures, which carries this topic back into legitimacy.
07Cooperation and competition: treaties, security and economics
Treaties show what governance can and cannot do. The Montreal Protocol (1987) on ozone-depleting substances became the first UN treaty to achieve universal ratification, and its Kigali Amendment (2016) extended it to climate-warming hydrofluorocarbons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) is a bargain in which non-nuclear states forgo weapons and nuclear states undertake to pursue disarmament; it has restrained proliferation more than 1960s forecasts expected, but the slow pace of disarmament weakens its legitimacy, and India, Pakistan and Israel never joined. Climate shows the contrast. The Paris Agreement (2015) traded binding targets for near-universal participation through nationally determined contributions reviewed in five-year cycles, and the United States has twice withdrawn. Elinor Ostrom’s work on governing common resources explains the difference: ozone had few producers, cheap substitutes and easy monitoring, while climate touches every industry and has weak monitoring and no sanctions.
Collective security, in the UN sense, commits members to act against aggression by any state; collective defence commits allies to defend one another against outside attack. The guide lists NATO and the Organization of American States as collective security examples, though NATO’s Article 5 is strictly a collective-defence pledge. Strategic alliances are narrower alignments of interest that dissolve when interests diverge; the guide’s examples include China’s partnerships in Africa and Latin America and India’s 2011 strategic partnership with Afghanistan. Economic cooperation runs from trade agreements to the regulation of international production, and informal cooperation includes technology harmonisation and cultural exchange.
Competition now runs through the same channels. Export controls, investment screening and ‘de-risking’ are attempts to re-engineer interdependence after states discovered that the connections they built could be turned against them.
08Global interactions and networks
The guide asks for networks because their shape has political consequences a list of actors cannot capture. In a distributed network many routes connect the nodes, so cutting one link does little harm. In a hub-and-spoke network traffic passes through a few centres, which is efficient until a hub fails or is closed, and whoever controls the hub holds power. Payment systems, the lithography machines needed for the most advanced chips, undersea cables and a few maritime straits are hubs of this kind, and the shape of the network turned them into instruments of policy.
Three properties follow. Chokepoints are power: the actor at a hub can watch and stop the flow. Contagion travels the links: the networks that carry goods also carry pathogens, financial panics and malware, as COVID-19 and the 2008 financial crisis showed. Efficiency and resilience trade off: single-source suppliers and just-in-time logistics are cheaper and more brittle, as Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping from late 2023, which forced vessels onto the long route around Africa, made plain.
Manuel Castells argued that in the network society, power belongs to those who programme networks and those who connect them, not only to those who command territory. That claim sits uneasily in a syllabus built around states, and it explains why disputes over platforms, data and seabed minerals, such as the case of deep-sea mining, are now central to global governance.
The architecture of global governance
Layered architectureOriginal
Six tiers of global governance, from the UN's universal organs to private standard-setters, showing where binding authority, weighted voting, consensus, pooled sovereignty and informal steering each sit, and why no tier amounts to world government.
01 · 4 entries
The UN system
- General Assembly
Every UN member sits with one vote, embodying sovereign equality. The Assembly debates any matter within the Charter, approves the budget and elects members of other organs, but outside budgetary and internal matters its resolutions are recommendations: legitimacy without much power.
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Workarounds give it leverage: the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution of 1950 lets it meet when the Security Council is deadlocked, and since a 2022 decision it meets whenever a permanent member casts a veto.
- Security Council
Fifteen members, five of them permanent and holding a veto. It has primary responsibility for international peace and security, its decisions bind all members under Article 25, and under Chapter VII it can impose sanctions and authorise force. It is weakest when a permanent member is party to a conflict.
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The veto was the price of keeping the great powers inside after the League of Nations had watched them stay out or leave. Reform is blocked because the five would have to agree to dilute their own privilege.
- Other principal organs
The Economic and Social Council (54 members) coordinates economic and social work; the International Court of Justice settles disputes between consenting states and gives advisory opinions; the Secretariat administers. The Trusteeship Council has been suspended since 1994, when Palau, the last trust territory, became independent.
- Specialised agencies, funds and programmes
Technical bodies with their own constitutions and budgets, such as the WHO, ILO, FAO, UNESCO and ITU, are linked to the UN by agreement; funds and programmes such as UNDP, UNICEF and UNHCR depend on voluntary contributions. They deliver the task-centred cooperation David Mitrany advocated.
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The WHO-coordinated eradication of smallpox, certified in 1980, is the classic success. Because much funding is voluntary and earmarked, donors shape priorities, and the agencies are exposed when major contributors cut back.
- General Assembly
02 · 2 entries
Bretton Woods institutions
- International Monetary Fund
Created at Bretton Woods in 1944 to oversee the international monetary system and lend, on conditions, to members in balance-of-payments difficulty. Votes follow quotas, so the United States, with about 16.5 per cent, can block decisions needing 85 per cent, and by convention a European leads it.
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Conditionality leaves sovereignty formally intact while narrowing policy choices, as Sri Lanka's programme, approved in March 2023 after its default, shows.
- World Bank Group
The second Bretton Woods institution, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, now sits in a group of five that lends to governments, invests in private firms, insures investors and hosts investor–state arbitration. Voting follows shareholding, and by convention an American has led it.
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The International Development Association, added in 1960, gives the poorest countries grants and low-interest credits funded by donor replenishments; affected communities can complain to an independent Inspection Panel created in 1993.
- International Monetary Fund
03 · 2 entries
World Trade Organization
- WTO rules and the Ministerial Conference
Established on 1 January 1995, the WTO administers binding agreements on trade in goods and services and on intellectual property. It decides by consensus, which gives every member, large or small, a blocking power and has made comprehensive rounds such as Doha, launched in 2001, nearly impossible to conclude.
- Dispute settlement and the Appellate Body
Panels and a standing Appellate Body made trade rules enforceable until the United States blocked appointments and the Appellate Body lost its quorum on 11 December 2019. Losing parties can now appeal 'into the void'; an interim arbitration arrangement covers only its participants, which do not include the United States or India.
- WTO rules and the Ministerial Conference
04 · 3 entries
Regional organisations
- European Union
The deepest regional organisation: members pool sovereignty in a Commission, Parliament, Council and Court whose law has direct effect and primacy over national law. Qualified majority voting can bind outvoted members, while foreign policy, taxation and enlargement still require unanimity.
- African Union
Its Constitutive Act (2000) replaced the OAU's strict non-interference with a right to intervene in a member state in grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, and it suspends governments that seize power unconstitutionally. Since 2023 it has been a permanent member of the G20.
- ASEAN
The Association of South-East Asian Nations works by consultation, consensus and non-interference, the 'ASEAN Way'. Its influence comes less from binding rules than from convening others, through the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, and consensus has limited its response to crises such as Myanmar's coup of 2021.
- European Union
05 · 3 entries
Minilaterals and G-groupings
- G7
The steering group of advanced industrial democracies, born at Rambouillet in 1975 after the monetary and oil shocks. It has no charter, secretariat or budget; its decisions are political commitments, made effective through members' weight in the IMF, the World Bank and the Financial Action Task Force it created in 1989.
- G20
Nineteen countries, the European Union and, since the New Delhi summit of 2023, the African Union. Raised to leaders' level in the 2008 financial crisis, it decides by consensus without binding rules, so a leaders' declaration, rather than a chair's summary, has become a measure of a presidency's skill.
- BRICS and the Quad
Two minilaterals with different agendas. BRICS, enlarged from 2024, presses for reform of Western-led institutions and created the New Development Bank; the Quad of Australia, India, Japan and the United States cooperates on Indo-Pacific public goods without a treaty or secretariat. India belongs to both.
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Minilaterals trade universality for speed: small groups can agree where the UN or the WTO cannot, but they decide without most of the states their decisions affect, which raises the problem of input legitimacy.
- G7
06 · 3 entries
Transnational and private governance
- Technical standard-setters
Bodies most voters never notice write rules others follow. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision sets capital standards that national regulators adopt; the International Organization for Standardization, a federation of national standards bodies, publishes standards that firms apply worldwide. Authority comes from expertise and market necessity, not treaty.
- Private and multi-stakeholder governance
Firms, NGOs and mixed bodies govern where states do not. ICANN, a non-profit, coordinates the internet's domain-name system; the Kimberley Process joins states, industry and civil society to certify rough diamonds as conflict-free; schemes such as the Forest Stewardship Council certify supply chains. Accountability is their weakest point.
- NGOs, experts and platforms
Actors without legislative authority also shape governance. NGO coalitions helped write the 1997 landmines convention; the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change shapes what negotiators accept as fact; digital platforms set the rules of online public space while claiming no governing role, which creates an accountability gap.
- Technical standard-setters
Sources7
- 01Charter of the United Nations (1945) (opens in a new tab). United Nations
- 02International Baccalaureate, Diploma Programme Global politics guide (first assessment 2026). International Baccalaureate Organization, 2024
- 03Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (1944, as amended)
- 04Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Dispute Settlement Understanding (1994)
- 05Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) and the ASEAN Charter (2007)
- 06Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984)
- 07David Mitrany, A Working Peace System (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943)
Original teaching visual: an analytical summary, not IB material.
Reviewed 20 November 2026
Key ideas
- Interdependence is mutual reliance; dependency is one-way reliance; asymmetry in interdependence is a source of power.
- Sensitivity is how fast a disruption hurts; vulnerability is how costly it is to escape. Only vulnerability is decisive.
- Government is an institution with authority to command; governance manages common affairs without one, and works better than the absence of world government would predict.
- International law is consent-based and horizontal; its sources are treaties, custom, general principles, and judicial decisions and scholarly writings.
- The UN’s design trades effectiveness against great-power participation: the General Assembly has legitimacy without power, the Security Council power without full legitimacy.
- Cooperation succeeds where the structure of a problem allows it, as with ozone, and stalls where costs are immediate and benefits diffuse, as with climate.
- Network shape matters: hubs are chokepoints of power, links carry contagion, and efficiency is bought at the cost of resilience.
Common misconceptions
The misconception
Interdependence and dependency mean the same thing.
The correction
They are close to opposites. Interdependence implies mutual vulnerability, which can restrain both parties; dependency implies one-sided vulnerability, which empowers one and exposes the other.
The misconception
Global governance fails because it has no enforcement.
The correction
Governance never has command enforcement; that is what distinguishes it from government. The analytical question is why compliance is high in some regimes, such as aviation and ozone, and low in others, such as climate.
The misconception
Interdependence is a topic about globalisation.
The correction
The prescribed content is mainly about governance: international law, the UN, IGOs and non-state actors, treaties and alliances, and networks. Revising globalisation alone means revising the wrong unit.
The misconception
Security Council resolutions and General Assembly resolutions carry the same weight.
The correction
Under Article 25 members agree to carry out the Security Council’s decisions; most General Assembly resolutions are recommendations. Judgments of the International Court of Justice bind the parties to a case.
The misconception
The UN is weak because it is badly run.
The correction
Its weaknesses are largely designed in: it is an instrument of states, built so that great powers would join it. It performs well where their interests converge and poorly where they collide.
The misconception
Cooperation fails because states lack political will.
The correction
That restates the outcome rather than explaining it. Strong answers identify the structure of the collective action problem: who bears the costs, how visible defection is, and whether substitutes or sanctions exist.
How it is assessed
Paper 1 sources on interdependence might be a treaty extract, a Security Council resolution, a trade dispute, a chart of supply-chain dependence or a climate agreement. Identify the asymmetry (who needs whom more), name the network along which an effect travelled, locate the collective action problem, and in question 4 explain why cooperation succeeded or failed by reference to structure rather than will.
Paper 2 questions on the effectiveness of the UN, whether interdependence promotes peace, whether international law is really law, or the role of non-state actors in global governance draw on this unit. Section B integrating questions reward answers that apply one mechanism across themes, for example asymmetric interdependence in both development and conflict, and that judge institutions against a realistic counterfactual.
At HL, the Paper 3 global political challenges are interdependence problems, and recommendations should say which institution could act, on what legal basis and with whose cooperation. In the engagement project, trace your issue outwards: whose decisions elsewhere constrain the local actors you are studying?
Case studies
- GlobalThe WTO Appellate Body impasse
- Pacific Ocean and the global commonsDeep-sea mining and the International Seabed Authority
- Europe, with global reachThe EU AI Act and the contest to govern artificial intelligence
- Pacific (Vanuatu) and globalFrom a Pacific classroom to the World Court: the ICJ climate advisory opinion
Practice questions
- Q1IB Paper 1 style4 marks
A source states that the Paris Agreement relies on nationally determined contributions rather than targets imposed by an international authority. Explain why this arrangement can be described as governance without government.
How to approach it
Define government and governance, then show how the Agreement manages a common problem through pledges, transparency and periodic review rather than command and enforcement. A final mark can come from naming the trade-off: near-universal participation bought at the cost of enforceability.
- Q2IB Paper 1 style6 marks
Compare and contrast two sources’ assessments of the UN Security Council’s response to a recent armed conflict.
How to approach it
Compare point by point: what each source treats as the Council’s purpose, how each explains its action or inaction (the veto, the interests of permanent members, the Charter’s design), and whether each sees workarounds such as General Assembly action as meaningful. Note agreement as well as contrast.
- Q3IB Paper 1 style12 marks
Using the sources and your own knowledge, evaluate the claim that the United Nations is effective only where the interests of the great powers converge.
How to approach it
Weigh the sources’ origins and arguments, then test the claim across domains: technical governance and peacekeeping where interests converge, Security Council paralysis where they collide, and norm-creation that proceeds despite great-power reluctance. Judge against a realistic counterfactual and qualify the claim if the evidence warrants it.
- Q4IB Paper 2 style15 marks
To what extent does economic interdependence reduce the likelihood of conflict between states?
How to approach it
Integrate peace and conflict with development and sustainability. Present the liberal case and the realist reply, use sensitivity and vulnerability to analyse cases such as European energy dependence on Russia before 2022, and consider weaponised interdependence. Conclude by specifying the conditions, such as symmetry and shared gains, under which interdependence restrains conflict.
- Q5IB Paper 2 style15 marks
Evaluate the claim that non-state actors are now indispensable to global governance.
How to approach it
Show what multinational companies, NGOs, expert bodies and platforms contribute in at least one thematic study, then test the claim against the state’s monopoly of binding commitments and enforcement. Address the accountability gap and conclude on the domains in which non-state participation is indispensable and those in which it is marginal.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not IB examination questions.
Across the handbooks
Where this unit meets the nine original handbooks: the handbook written for it, the others that take it up, and what each shares with it.
- 01Framing Global Politics
- 02Power
- 03Sovereignty
- 04Legitimacy
- 05Interdependence
- 06Theoretical Perspectives
- 07Rights & Justice
- 08Stakeholders & Actors
- 09Nature, Practice & Study
- Written for this unit
- Takes up this unit
- Shares its cases, concepts or thinkers
Handbook 05Written for this unit
InterdependenceGlobal Governance, International Law & the Networked World
- Cases in common:
- The WTO Appellate Body impasse,Deep-sea mining and the International Seabed Authority,The EU AI Act and the contest to govern artificial intelligence
- Thinkers in common:
- Robert O. Keohane,Joseph S. Nye Jr.,Susan Strange,Immanuel Wallerstein
Leads on to: Sovereignty in global politicsLegitimacy in global politicsPaper 1: working with sources
Handbook 03Takes up this unit
SovereigntyAuthority · Territory · Legitimacy · Responsibility in an Interdependent World
- Thinker in common:
- Susan Strange
Leads on to: Sovereignty in global politicsLegitimacy in global politicsPeace and conflictPaper 1: working with sources
Handbook 01Shares material with this unit
Framing Global PoliticsSystems and Interactions in Global Politics
- Cases in common:
- Deep-sea mining and the International Seabed Authority,The EU AI Act and the contest to govern artificial intelligence
- Thinkers in common:
- Susan Strange,Joseph S. Nye Jr.
Leads on to: Framing global politicsPower in global politicsLegitimacy in global politicsThe engagement projectPaper 1: working with sources
Handbook 08Shares material with this unit
Stakeholders & ActorsRights and justice: states, courts, NGOs, corporations and the most affected
- Concepts in common:
- Power,Sovereignty,Governance
- Thinkers in common:
- Joseph S. Nye Jr.,Susan Strange,Robert O. Keohane
Leads on to: Legitimacy in global politicsRights and justicePaper 2: the essays
Handbook 02Shares material with this unit
PowerDefinitions, Classifications & Contested Meanings
- Thinkers in common:
- Joseph S. Nye Jr.,Susan Strange
Leads on to: Framing global politicsPower in global politicsTheoretical perspectives in global politicsPaper 1: working with sources
Handbook 06Shares material with this unit
Theoretical PerspectivesAn analytical companion to eight lenses on global politics
- Thinkers in common:
- Kenneth N. Waltz,Robert O. Keohane,Immanuel Wallerstein
Leads on to: Theoretical perspectives in global politicsPaper 1: working with sourcesPaper 2: the essays
Handbook 09Shares material with this unit
Nature, Practice & StudyRights and justice: codification, protection, monitoring, R2P and response
- Concept in common:
- Sovereignty
Leads on to: Sovereignty in global politicsRights and justicePaper 2: the essays
The handbooks are original to this platform. These links follow each handbook’s syllabus coverage and cross-references.
Explore further
Thinker
Organisation
Foreign policy
IB Global Politics
IB case study
Political briefing
- From The Hague to New York: the General Assembly endorses the world court's climate opinion
- Managed thaw: Xi Jinping in New Delhi and the limits of India–China normalisation
- From 50 per cent to a first tranche: India–US trade after the tariff shock
- Water, terror and the law: the Indus Waters Treaty after the Hague award of August 2026
- The Quad in Manila: the leaders' summit returns, with a narrower agenda
Political Issue Dossier
Five-minute module
Insight
Sources
- 01International Baccalaureate, Diploma Programme Global politics guide (first assessment 2026). International Baccalaureate Organization, 2024
- 02Arjun Agrawal, Global Politics Handbook 05: Interdependence (Publisher’s Edition)
- 03Charter of the United Nations (1945) and Statute of the International Court of Justice (opens in a new tab)
- 04Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Little, Brown, 1977)
- 05Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984)
- 06Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, ‘Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion’, International Security 44:1 (2019)
- 07Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (Cambridge University Press, 1990)
- 08Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Blackwell, 1996)






