Strategic and contemporary issues
The Changing World Order
From the unipolar moment to a contested multipolarity: US–China rivalry, Russia's war, the return of tariffs and spheres of influence, and India's bet on a multipolar world in which Asia, too, is multipolar.
Overview
The liberal international order built after 1945 and extended after 1991 combined American primacy with open markets, alliances and multilateral institutions. Its critics always noted that it was less liberal, less international and less orderly than its name suggested, but it provided the framework within which India grew from the 1990s. By the mid-2020s each of its pillars was under strain: American primacy faced a peer competitor in China; Russia's invasion of Ukraine broke the post-Cold War settlement in Europe; and the United States itself, under the second Trump administration, imposed sweeping tariffs and withdrew from institutions it had created.
India's official reading is that the world is becoming multipolar and that this is desirable, provided Asia does not become unipolar under China. Its diplomacy is designed to hasten the first and prevent the second.
01Diagnosing the order
Theorists disagree about what is happening. Power-transition theory, from A. F. K. Organski, predicts danger when a rising power approaches a dominant one; Graham Allison's "Thucydides trap" popularised the idea for US–China relations. Structural realists such as John Mearsheimer expect security competition between the two. Liberal institutionalists, following Robert Keohane and G. John Ikenberry, argue that institutions can outlast the hegemony that created them. Others deny that the world is becoming multipolar at all: Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth argue that American advantages remain exceptional. Amitav Acharya describes a "multiplex" world of many actors and overlapping orders, and Ian Bremmer a "G-Zero" world in which no one leads.
02US–China rivalry
Rivalry is now structural. Trade conflict since 2018, American controls on advanced semiconductors from October 2022, competition over Taiwan and the South China Sea, and duelling standards in technology have produced partial decoupling. Tariffs between the two rose to extraordinary levels in April 2025 before a truce in May and a summit in Busan at the end of October 2025. China offers its own frameworks for order: the Global Development Initiative (2021), Global Security Initiative (2022), Global Civilization Initiative (2023) and, announced at the SCO's Tianjin summit in September 2025, a Global Governance Initiative.
03Russia, Europe and the end of the post-Cold War settlement
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 ended the assumption that borders in Europe would not be changed by force. It drove Finland and Sweden into NATO, pushed Europe to rearm, and deepened Russia's partnership with China, declared in February 2022 to have "no limits", and its reliance on Iran and North Korea, whose troops fought for Russia in 2024–25. Nearly five years later the war continues while talks proceed.
04The United States as disrupter
The most consequential change since 2025 has come from the order's principal architect. The second Trump administration imposed tariffs on almost every trading partner from April 2025, withdrew from the World Health Organization and, again, from the Paris Agreement, cut funding to UN bodies, treated alliances transactionally, excluded South Africa from its G20 year, and in February 2026 joined Israel in war with Iran. Its own Supreme Court struck down tariffs imposed under emergency powers. The result is not American withdrawal but American unpredictability, which allies and partners, India among them, now price into every decision.
05Middle powers and the Global South
In this fluid order, middle powers hedge. Gulf states, Türkiye, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa and India deal with all major powers, join new groupings such as an enlarged BRICS, and resist pressure to choose. Analysts in 2012 called such states "global swing states". Their behaviour is the clearest evidence of multipolarity, whatever the distribution of material power.
06India's reading and strategy
India's strategy has four elements: strategic autonomy and multi-alignment, to keep options open; reformed multilateralism, to gain a share of institutional power; partnerships with the United States, Japan, Europe and Australia to prevent Chinese dominance in Asia; and leadership of the Global South to widen its coalition. The bet is that multipolarity rewards a large, independent state. The risk is that a harsher bipolar contest, or a world without rules, would expose a country with an unsettled border with China and a hostile nuclear-armed neighbour.
07Reading it through IR theory
The theories above diagnose the order; they can also be turned on India's response to it. Realism reads the aim of a multipolar world with a multipolar Asia as balancing. Mearsheimer's offensive realism expects a rising China to seek regional hegemony, and India's partnerships with the United States, Japan, Europe and Australia are the counterweight that expectation calls for. Yet Waltz held that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar ones, which implies that the multipolarity India welcomes is also the more uncertain order, with more powers whose alignments can shift. Liberal institutionalism reminds India that it grew within the open markets and institutions of the liberal order. On Keohane's argument that institutions can outlast the hegemony that created them, reformed multilateralism is a bid for a larger share of a system India wants to preserve rather than overturn; the lens is weaker when the hegemon itself withdraws from institutions it built. Constructivism treats polarity as partly a social fact: middle powers' refusal to choose sides is evidence of multipolarity whatever the distribution of material power. Wendt's distinction between cultures of anarchy in which states are enemies, rivals or friends suggests that the decisive question is whether US–China relations harden from rivalry into enmity. Constructivism says less about when material power overrides such understandings, which is the risk India faces on an unsettled border with China. Each lens captures one dimension of India's bet: a counterweight to China, a stake in institutions, and a reading of multipolarity as something states make by their conduct.
08India's options and the way forward
India's options are best understood as wagers on how the order will settle. If multipolarity consolidates, the present course of multi-alignment, reformed multilateralism and Global South leadership maximises leverage, and the main task is to turn attention into institutional power. If a sharper US–China bipolarity emerges, the cost of keeping all options open will rise, and India would face pressure to lean more decisively towards the partners that help balance China in Asia, at some cost to its standing in the Global South and to the practice of dealing with all major powers. If the order drifts towards a world without rules, of tariffs and spheres of influence, India's priority would shift towards self-help: capability on its own borders and resilience in its economy. These scenarios are not exclusive, and a prudent strategy hedges across them, combining investment in national capability with defence of the institutions that protect middle powers. The central trade-off is between flexibility and commitment: flexibility protects autonomy but earns limited trust, while commitment buys support at the price of choice. On balance, India's bet on multipolarity is rational but not risk-free, and its success depends less on the eventual shape of the order than on how quickly India's own capabilities grow.
Key points
- The liberal international order is strained by US–China rivalry, Russia's war and US unilateralism.
- Theories differ: power transition, structural realism, liberal institutionalism, continued unipolarity, multiplexity.
- China offers its own frameworks, from the GDI (2021) to the Global Governance Initiative (2025).
- Russia's war ended the post-Cold War European settlement and deepened its ties with China.
- Since 2025 the United States has disrupted the order it built, through tariffs and withdrawals.
- India's bet: a multipolar world without a unipolar Asia.
Debates
Is the world becoming multipolar or bipolar?
Bipolar: in military power, technology and economic size, the United States and China stand far above all others; middle powers' choices matter at the margin.
Multipolar: power is diffusing to India, the Gulf, Europe and others; middle powers' refusal to choose sides, and the growth of groupings outside Western control, show that bipolar discipline cannot be imposed.
Does the decline of the liberal order serve or harm India?
Serves: an order built by and for the West gave India a junior place; its fragmentation opens space for India to shape new rules and claim status.
Harms: India's growth relied on open markets, institutions and stable sea lanes; a world of tariffs, spheres of influence and force favours stronger states and leaves India facing China without reliable rules.
Is American unpredictability now a greater challenge for India than Chinese power?
Yes: tariffs on almost every trading partner, withdrawals from international bodies and a transactional approach to alliances unsettle both the partnerships India relies on to balance China and the open markets within which it grew; a partner whose policy can change abruptly complicates every long-term plan, and India now prices that uncertainty into each decision.
No: unpredictability is a matter of policy, which can change with administrations and is checked by institutions, as the Supreme Court's ruling against tariffs imposed under emergency powers showed; China's power is structural and present on India's unsettled border.
The stronger answer is that the two challenges compound each other. American unpredictability matters most because it weakens India's hedge against a Chinese power that is not going away.
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
7 questions · 2024–2026
2026 · PSIR II · Q3(a) · 20 marks
NATO, the oldest surviving collective security system, is facing challenge of transactional coercion from its own biggest member. What future does NATO have amidst such developments ?
2026 · PSIR II · Q3(c) · 15 marks
Does power transition theory reflect the dynamics of US-China relations ?
2025 · GS-II · Q10 · 10 marks
“With the waning of globalization, post-Cold War world is becoming a site of sovereign nationalism.” Elucidate.
2025 · PSIR II · Q4(c) · 15 marks
“Trump’s return to the White House is a jolt to push the European Union to invest in its own defence and economic and technological revival.” Comment.
2025 · PSIR II · Q5(c) · 10 marks
For India, a multipolar world order would also mean a multipolar Asia. Comment.
2024 · PSIR II · Q1(e) · 10 marks
The changing global order and ongoing regional conflicts, with the global powers taking sides, have jeopardised the progress made towards disarmament in the past. Comment.
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to The Changing World Order in the PYQ dataset.All 7 in PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
The international order is changing in ways that both create opportunities and impose risks for India. Discuss.
How to approach it
US–China, Russia, US unilateralism, middle powers; India's four-part strategy; risks of bipolarity and disorder.
- Q2PSIR style15 marks· 250 words
Assess competing theoretical explanations of the changing world order.
How to approach it
Power transition, structural realism, liberal institutionalism, multiplex world; evidence for each.
- Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
What does India mean by a 'multipolar world with a multipolar Asia'?
How to approach it
Opposition to unipolarity globally and regionally; partnerships to balance China; coalition-building.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
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Sources
- 01G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (2011)
- 02Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order (2014)
- 03Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? (2017)
- 04Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century (2016)
- 05Daniel M. Kliman and Richard Fontaine, Global Swing States: Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey and the Future of International Order (2012)
- 06Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on International Relations Entering a New Era, 4 February 2022
- 07Statements on a multipolar world (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India