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India's foreign policy · Doctrine

Energy Diplomacy

How India uses foreign policy to secure oil, gas, uranium and the technologies of the energy transition: from buying discounted Russian crude to founding the International Solar Alliance.

Overview

India is the world's third-largest energy consumer and imports close to nine-tenths of the crude oil it refines, about half of its natural gas and most of its liquefied petroleum gas. Energy diplomacy is therefore a permanent task of Indian foreign policy, not an occasional one. It has no single doctrinal statement; its principles appear in ministers' speeches and in policy documents, and are usually summarised as availability, affordability and sustainability, to which officials add the diversification of suppliers.

The diplomacy has two faces. The first is defensive: securing supplies at bearable prices from a volatile world market, which is the subject of energy security. The second is constructive: building institutions and partnerships for the transition to clean energy, where India has tried to lead rather than follow.

01Oil diplomacy: the Gulf, Russia and the United States

The Gulf has long been the anchor: Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the UAE supply much of India's crude, and the Gulf hosts millions of Indian workers whose remittances help pay for it. Partnerships with Gulf states now include investment in Indian refining and in strategic reserves, where the UAE's national oil company stores crude in India's underground caverns. India stopped buying Iranian oil in 2019 under American sanctions.

The war in Ukraine transformed the map. Russian crude, under 2 per cent of India's imports before 2022, rose to more than a third as Indian refiners bought at a discount. India argued that a developing country could not be asked to pay more for energy to punish Russia, and did not join the G7 price cap. After the United States sanctioned Rosneft and Lukoil in October 2025 and tied a tariff penalty to Russian purchases, Indian buying fell; the February 2026 framework for an interim trade agreement with Washington removed the penalty, and India committed to larger purchases of American energy.

02Gas, long-term contracts and diversification

For gas, India relies on long-term contracts and a widening set of suppliers. Qatar, the largest, agreed in February 2024 to a twenty-year extension of supplies beginning in 2028; India has also contracted with the United States, the UAE and others, and Indian companies hold upstream stakes abroad, from Mozambique to Russia's Far East. Diversification is the guiding rule: India buys crude from dozens of countries so that no single disruption is fatal, a rule tested again by the closure risks in the Strait of Hormuz in 2026.

03Institutions India built

India's constructive energy diplomacy began with the International Solar Alliance, launched by Narendra Modi and François Hollande at the Paris climate conference on 30 November 2015. Its framework agreement entered into force on 6 December 2017; its headquarters is at Gurugram, the first intergovernmental organisation headquartered in India, and it was opened in 2020 to all UN members. India followed with the Green Grids Initiative–One Sun One World One Grid, launched with the United Kingdom at Glasgow in November 2021, and the Global Biofuels Alliance, launched at the G20 summit in New Delhi on 9 September 2023. India is an association country of the International Energy Agency, not a member.

04Nuclear power, minerals and the transition

The transition creates new dependencies. Nuclear power depends on imported uranium and reactor partnerships, opened by the 2008 waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group and, at home, by the SHANTI Act of December 2025, which allows private participation (see nuclear diplomacy). Solar, batteries and electric vehicles depend on lithium, cobalt and rare earths, whose processing China dominates. India joined the Minerals Security Partnership in 2023, its state-owned KABIL signed for lithium exploration in Argentina in January 2024, and critical minerals now feature in partnerships with Australia, the Quad and, since February 2026, the US-led Pax Silica initiative. The National Green Hydrogen Mission (2023) adds export ambitions to import needs.

05Assessment

India's energy diplomacy has been effective at the defensive task: it has kept supplies flowing through wars and sanctions by buying from all sides. The constructive task is harder. The solar alliance has given India visibility and a platform, but its financing has been modest; the biofuels alliance is young. The underlying tension is between affordability, which pushed India to Russian oil, and alignment with partners whose technology and markets the transition requires. Energy diplomacy is thus a microcosm of strategic autonomy: freedom to choose suppliers, exercised under constant pressure.

06Reading it through IR theory

Realism sees energy diplomacy as the pursuit of a vital material interest under anarchy. Buying from all sides, staying out of the G7 price cap and shifting between Iranian, Russian and American supplies as pressure changed are what a self-help state does when no supplier can be trusted absolutely, and the lens also explains why India adjusted whenever a stronger power raised the cost of defiance. Realism is less helpful on the constructive face of the policy. Susan Strange's concept of structural power adds that control over the structures of production and finance shapes outcomes without any bargain being struck; China's dominance of mineral processing is such a structure, and India's mineral partnerships are an attempt to avoid becoming a rule-taker in the next energy order. Liberal institutionalism explains the International Solar Alliance, the Green Grids Initiative and the Global Biofuels Alliance as efforts to lower the costs of cooperation, aggregate demand and give India a convening role, while the modest financing of these bodies shows the limits of institutions without resources. Constructivism draws attention to status and identity: the solar alliance, the first intergovernmental organisation headquartered in India, presents the country as a leader of the transition rather than only a large consumer and importer. It explains less about the day-to-day trade-off between affordability and alignment, which remains the core dilemma. Together the lenses suggest a state that is defensive and transactional on oil but institution-building and status-conscious on the transition.

07India's options and the way forward

India's energy diplomacy faces four choices. The first is the balance between affordability and alignment: India can continue to buy wherever prices are lowest, accepting periodic friction with sanctioning powers, or align purchases more closely with the partners whose technology and markets the transition requires; the record since 2019 suggests a middle path of buying freely until the cost of defiance becomes too high, which preserves room for manoeuvre but makes policy reactive. The second concerns diversification: long-term gas contracts, upstream stakes abroad and a wide range of crude suppliers spread risk, though long contracts can lock in terms that later prove costly. The third concerns the transition's new dependencies. Mineral partnerships through the Minerals Security Partnership, the Quad and Pax Silica offer supplies outside China at the price of closer association with US-led coalitions, while domestic processing would take time and investment. The fourth is whether to give the solar and biofuels alliances more substantial financing and project pipelines, or to accept that their value is chiefly reputational. On balance, India's energy diplomacy is likely to remain multi-directional, with the transition gradually shifting its central task from securing oil to securing minerals and technology.

Key points

  • India imports close to nine-tenths of its crude oil and about half of its gas.
  • Russian crude rose from under 2 per cent to more than a third of imports after 2022.
  • US sanctions (October 2025) and tariffs reduced Russian purchases; the February 2026 framework removed the penalty.
  • International Solar Alliance: launched 30 November 2015; in force 6 December 2017; headquartered at Gurugram.
  • Global Biofuels Alliance launched at the New Delhi G20 summit, 9 September 2023.
  • Critical minerals are the new frontier: MSP (2023), KABIL in Argentina (2024), Pax Silica (2026).

Debates

Was India's purchase of Russian oil after 2022 prudent diplomacy or a strategic liability?

Prudent: discounted crude saved India billions of dollars, contained inflation and kept global prices lower by keeping Russian oil on the market, which Western governments quietly accepted; India owed no obligation to sanctions it had not voted for.

Liability: the purchases financed Russia's war, invited American tariffs in 2025, and deepened dependence on a partner increasingly tied to China; the cost appeared later, in trade negotiations and in trust.

Do India's energy alliances deliver beyond diplomacy?

Yes: the solar alliance has trained officials, aggregated demand and supported projects in small states, and gives India a voice in setting the transition's agenda.

Not yet: their budgets and project pipelines are small beside multilateral development banks or Chinese finance, and their main output has been declarations; their value is reputational more than material.

Is the Gulf still the anchor of India's energy diplomacy?

Yes: Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the UAE supply much of India's crude, Qatar is its largest gas supplier under a contract extended for twenty years, Gulf partners invest in Indian refining and strategic reserves, and millions of Indian workers in the Gulf tie the relationship to people and remittances as well as oil.

No longer alone: Russian crude rose to more than a third of imports after 2022, India has committed to larger purchases of American energy, and the closure risks in the Strait of Hormuz in 2026 exposed the danger of concentration; the transition is also shifting attention to minerals, from Australia and Argentina to US-led partnerships.

The Gulf remains the anchor in volume and in human ties, but India's diplomacy is now designed to ensure that no anchor becomes a single point of failure.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

2 questions · 2025–2026

  1. 2026 · PSIR II · Q8(a) · 20 marks

    Critically evaluate India-Russia relations in the 21st century. How have both the countries responded to America meddling in their relations in the recent times.

  2. 2025 · GS-II · Q19 · 15 marks

    “Energy security constitutes the dominant kingpin of India’s foreign policy, and is linked with India’s overarching influence in Middle Eastern countries.” How would you integrate energy security with India’s foreign policy trajectories in the coming years?

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Energy Diplomacy in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    India's energy diplomacy seeks affordability, availability and sustainability at once. Examine the trade-offs with reference to the period since 2022.

    How to approach it

    Russian oil and the price cap; US sanctions and tariffs; LNG contracts; transition and minerals.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Assess the International Solar Alliance as an instrument of Indian foreign policy.

    How to approach it

    Origins in 2015, legal status, membership, outputs and limits.

  3. Q3UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Critical minerals have become the oil of the energy transition. Discuss India's diplomatic response.

    How to approach it

    China's processing dominance and export controls; MSP, KABIL, Quad, Pax Silica; domestic mission.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01International Solar Alliance (opens in a new tab). ISA
  2. 02Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (opens in a new tab). Government of India
  3. 03Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell (import data) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas
  4. 04International Energy Agency, India Energy Outlook 2021. IEA
  5. 05Real money: how the war in the Middle East exposed India's dependence on Russian oil (opens in a new tab). Kyiv Independent, 2026
  6. 06Daniel Yergin, The New Map: Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations (2020)