Case study · West Africa (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) · 2020–2026
The Alliance of Sahel States: juntas, sovereignty and the exits from ECOWAS and the ICC
Military governments in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled French forces and UN peacekeepers, left ECOWAS, turned to Russia and in 2026 notified withdrawal from the ICC: sovereignty asserted against regional and international order.
The case
Between 2020 and 2023 soldiers seized power in Mali (in August 2020 and again in May 2021), Burkina Faso (twice in 2022) and Niger (in July 2023). Each junta justified its coup by the failure of civilian governments to contain the jihadist insurgencies, linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, that had spread across the central Sahel since 2012, killing thousands and displacing millions.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responded as its protocol on democracy and good governance prescribes, with suspension and sanctions, and after the coup in Niger it threatened military intervention to restore the elected president. The juntas turned that pressure into a nationalist cause. They expelled French forces; Mali ended cooperation with the UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSMA, which withdrew by the end of 2023; they welcomed Russian security partners; they signed a mutual defence pact in September 2023 and formed a confederation, the Alliance of Sahel States, in July 2024; and they left ECOWAS, with effect from January 2025. Promised elections were postponed and military rule extended by several years.
In June 2026 Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali notified the UN Secretary-General of their withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Withdrawal takes effect a year after notification, and obligations arising during membership continue. The ICC had been investigating crimes in Mali since 2013 at Mali's own request, and in 2024 it convicted a former Islamist police chief in Timbuktu of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Actors and stakeholders
- Military governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and NigerStates under military rule
Role
Seized power, reoriented foreign and security policy, and led the exits from ECOWAS and the ICC.
Power and its sources
Coercive control of the capitals and nationalist appeal, with limited capacity to defeat the insurgencies.
- ECOWASRegional IGO
Role
Suspended and sanctioned the juntas, threatened intervention in Niger, then negotiated the terms of their departure.
Power and its sources
Economic leverage through sanctions, trade and free movement, weakened by the risk of further exits.
- Jihadist armed groupsViolent non-state actors
Role
Groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State fight the states and govern parts of the countryside.
Power and its sources
Coercion, control of rural territory and, in places, local legitimacy through dispute settlement.
- RussiaExternal power
Role
Security partner through the Wagner Group and later Russian state-linked forces.
Power and its sources
Arms, regime protection and information operations, offered without conditions on governance.
- France and the UNFormer security partners
Role
French counter-terrorism operations and the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission until their withdrawal.
Power and its sources
Military capability, undermined by the juntas' portrayal of them as neo-colonial.
- International Criminal CourtInternational court
Role
Investigates crimes in Mali since 2013; target of the 2026 withdrawals.
Power and its sources
Jurisdiction over crimes in the period of membership, dependent on state cooperation for arrests.
Through the key concepts
The juntas present their exits as recovering sovereignty from neo-colonial tutelage; critics see sovereignty used as a shield for unconstitutional rule and impunity. The paradox is that external sovereignty is asserted loudly while internal sovereignty, effective control of territory, remains weak.
The juntas claim performance and nationalist legitimacy in place of electoral legitimacy; ECOWAS defends procedural legitimacy. The ICC withdrawals draw on a longer African critique that the Court has focused disproportionately on Africa, although Mali itself invited the investigation.
ECOWAS sanctions showed the limits of regional economic coercion when targets have alternative patrons. Russia supplied security without conditions, which reduced the cost of defying both ECOWAS and Western partners.
Landlocked states depend on coastal neighbours' ports and on regional trade and free movement. Leaving ECOWAS raised those costs, and the confederation is an attempt to build an alternative interdependence among three fragile states.
Perspectives
The juntas and their supporters
A decade of French and UN presence failed to stop the insurgencies; ECOWAS served outside interests; the ICC targets Africans; sovereignty must come first.
ECOWAS and advocates of democracy
Coups reverse democratic gains, extended transitions reveal ambitions to stay in power, and exits weaken regional integration for everyone.
Human rights organisations
Leaving the ICC abandons victims of atrocities committed by armed groups and security forces alike, and removes a check on future abuses.
Postcolonial critics
The break expresses real grievances about French influence, but risks replacing one external patron with another.
Evaluation
The case shows the limits of regional and international instruments when rulers decide to leave. ECOWAS's sanctions and threats strengthened the juntas' nationalist narrative and pushed the three states together, and the organisation ended up negotiating the terms of their exit. The juntas' security record has not yet vindicated their claim that sovereignty would bring security, since insurgent violence has remained severe.
The ICC withdrawals, effective from mid-2027, remove the three states from the Court's future jurisdiction but not from obligations arising before then. For the course, the case sets sovereignty as independence against sovereignty as responsibility: the juntas assert the first, while the people they govern depend on the second. See sovereignty and peace and conflict.
Questions to take further
- Did ECOWAS's response to the coups strengthen or weaken regional democracy?
- Is leaving the ICC an assertion of sovereignty or an escape from accountability?
- Why did the juntas' anti-French message find popular support?
- Can a regional organisation enforce democratic norms on members willing to leave it?
Sources
- 01International Criminal Court, statement of the Presidency of the Assembly of States Parties on the withdrawals of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (1 July 2026) (opens in a new tab). ICC, 1 July 2026
- 02Human Rights Watch, 'Sahel countries' withdrawal from ICC betrays victims' (2 July 2026). Human Rights Watch, 2 July 2026
- 03ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001). ECOWAS, 2001