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Case study · Syria and Germany · 2011–2025

Universal jurisdiction: Syria's torturers in German courts

When vetoes closed every international route to accountability for Syria, survivors, NGOs and German prosecutors opened a national one. The convictions show what universal jurisdiction can do, and what it cannot.

Checked to 19 November 2025sovereigntylegitimacypower

The case

From 2011 the Syrian government met protest with mass detention, torture and killing in a network of intelligence prisons. The crimes were extensively documented, by survivors, by Syrian and international NGOs, by a defecting military photographer's images of detainees' bodies and by UN investigators, but the international routes to accountability were closed. Syria is not a party to the Rome Statute, and in May 2014 Russia and China vetoed a Security Council resolution that would have referred the situation to the International Criminal Court. In December 2016 the General Assembly created an International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to collect and preserve evidence for future prosecutions.

The route that opened was national. Germany's Code of Crimes against International Law allows its courts to try genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes wherever they were committed. Survivors who had reached Germany as refugees identified officials who had also come to Europe, and lawyers and NGOs such as the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights helped bring complaints. In February 2021 the Higher Regional Court in Koblenz convicted a junior intelligence officer of aiding and abetting crimes against humanity, the first verdict anywhere on Syrian state torture; in January 2022 the same court sentenced Anwar Raslan, a former colonel in Syrian general intelligence, to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity. In June 2025 the Higher Regional Court in Frankfurt sentenced a doctor who had worked in military hospitals in Homs and Damascus to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity and war crimes. On 19 November 2025 a trial of five men over the siege of the Yarmouk camp opened in Koblenz; it includes a charge of starving civilians as a method of warfare, the first such charge under the German code.

The Assad government fell in December 2024. The convictions came before its fall and did not depend on it.

Actors and stakeholders

  • Syrian survivors and refugeesMost affected; witnesses and complainants

    Role

    Identified perpetrators living in Europe, filed complaints and testified.

    Power and its sources

    Testimony is their only resource, and it is vulnerable: the Frankfurt court reported attempts to intimidate witnesses' relatives.

  • NGOs and lawyersCivil society

    Role

    Organisations such as ECCHR and Syrian legal groups built complaints, prepared witnesses and kept the cases visible.

    Power and its sources

    Legal expertise, evidence and credibility; no prosecutorial power of their own.

  • German federal prosecutor and courtsNational prosecuting authority and judiciary

    Role

    Opened structural investigations into crimes in Syria and brought cases to trial.

    Power and its sources

    Binding jurisdiction over defendants physically present in Germany.

  • UN Security CouncilIGO organ

    Role

    Failed to refer Syria to the ICC after vetoes by Russia and China in 2014.

    Power and its sources

    The veto closed the international criminal route but could not reach national courts.

  • Assad government (until December 2024)State

    Role

    Perpetrator of systematic detention and torture; denied the crimes.

    Power and its sources

    Protected senior officials while in power; could not protect those who travelled.

  • International, Impartial and Independent MechanismUN evidence mechanism

    Role

    Collects, preserves and shares evidence with national prosecutors.

    Power and its sources

    An archive and analytical capacity, without powers of prosecution.

Through the key concepts

sovereignty

Universal jurisdiction dispenses with the usual links of territory and nationality: the gravest crimes are treated as offences against humanity as a whole. It does not abolish sovereignty so much as extend one state's jurisdiction, and it stops at the immunity of serving heads of state.

legitimacy

The trials draw legitimacy from fair procedure and the central role of victims. They are challenged as selective, since European courts mostly try defendants from elsewhere, and as distant, conducted in a foreign language far from the society they concern.

power

This is the boomerang in judicial form. Survivors with no power in Syria borrowed the jurisdiction of a foreign state; the veto that blocked the ICC could not reach Koblenz.

Perspectives

Survivors and human rights advocates

Justice delayed is not justice denied: the trials established a judicial record of the system of torture and showed perpetrators that leaving Syria did not make them safe.

Critics of selective justice

Universal jurisdiction is exercised mainly by European courts against defendants from the Global South, and the architects of the crimes remain untried.

Advocates of national ownership

After Assad's fall, accountability should be anchored in Syria, through Syrian institutions and with Syrian victims, rather than in foreign courts.

Prosecutors

Courts can try only those within reach, but structural investigations and shared evidence build cases that may reach more senior figures later.

Evaluation

Measured against the scale of the crimes, a handful of convictions is small, and none of those convicted gave the orders. Measured against the alternatives available between 2014 and 2024, it is remarkable: the only criminal accountability for Syrian state torture came from a third state's courts, driven by refugees and NGOs.

Universal jurisdiction proved valuable because it needs no Security Council, no ratification by the violating state and no consent from the perpetrators' government. Its limits are just as clear: it reaches only those who travel, it stops at the immunity of serving leaders, and it invites the charge of selectivity. After December 2024 the question is how foreign trials, the UN mechanism's archive and any Syrian process will fit together. See rights and justice.

Questions to take further

  • Is universal jurisdiction a form of global justice or of selective justice?
  • Should trials of former Syrian officials now take place in Syria rather than abroad?
  • What did the 2014 veto change, and what could it not prevent?

Sources

  1. 01European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, 'Trial opens in Koblenz over crimes in Syria: the siege of Yarmouk in focus' (November 2025) (opens in a new tab). ECCHR, November 2025
  2. 02Al Jazeera, 'German court convicts Syrian doctor of crimes against humanity' (16 June 2025) (opens in a new tab). Al Jazeera, 16 June 2025
  3. 03UN General Assembly resolution 71/248 establishing the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (2016). United Nations, 21 December 2016
  4. 04Arjun Agrawal, Global Politics Handbook 09: Nature, Practice & Study