Strategic and contemporary issues
Global Conflicts and India's Positions
Russia–Ukraine, the wars in Gaza and with Iran, and conflicts from Myanmar to Sudan: what India has said and done, with dates, and the principles that connect its choices.
Overview
India's positions on distant wars follow a recognisable pattern. It affirms the UN Charter, sovereignty and territorial integrity; calls for dialogue and diplomacy and an end to hostilities; condemns terrorism and attacks on civilians; sends humanitarian aid; evacuates its nationals; and avoids votes that single out a partner it needs. Abstention is its characteristic instrument at the UN: a way of recording concern without joining a coalition. Critics call this fence-sitting; Indian officials call it strategic autonomy in practice.
This entry records India's positions as of 17 November 2026. Indian domestic conflicts and the confrontation with Pakistan are treated under terrorism.
01Russia–Ukraine, since 24 February 2022
India abstained on the Security Council draft condemning the invasion (25 February 2022) and on the General Assembly resolution of 2 March 2022, and has abstained on most later texts. It called for an independent investigation of the killings at Bucha in April 2022, sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and increased purchases of Russian oil. At Samarkand on 16 September 2022 Narendra Modi told Vladimir Putin, in public, that the present era was not one of war. Modi visited Moscow in July 2024 and Kyiv on 23 August 2024; India attended the June 2024 peace conference in Switzerland but did not sign its communiqué. In February 2025, when the United States voted with Russia against a Ukrainian resolution, India again abstained. In August 2025 Washington penalised India's Russian oil purchases with tariffs, lifted in February 2026. As of mid-November 2026, US-mediated talks had resumed in Abu Dhabi on 10 November with a prisoner exchange but no ceasefire.
02Israel and Gaza, since 7 October 2023
Modi condemned the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023 as terrorism. India abstained on the General Assembly resolution of 27 October 2023 because it did not condemn the attack, then voted for the ceasefire resolution of 12 December 2023 and for later texts, and in September 2025 voted for the New York Declaration on a two-state solution. It has reaffirmed support for a sovereign, viable Palestinian state living side by side with Israel, sent aid to Gaza and continued funding for UNRWA. It welcomed the US peace plan announced at the end of September 2025 and the ceasefire that followed in October; the Security Council endorsed the post-war framework in resolution 2803 (17 November 2025).
03Iran: the wars of 2025 and 2026
When Israel and then the United States struck Iran in June 2025, India urged restraint, distanced itself from an SCO statement condemning Israel, and evacuated nationals under Operation Sindhu. A far larger war began on 28 February 2026, when US and Israeli strikes killed Iran's Supreme Leader and Iran retaliated across the Gulf. A ceasefire brokered by Pakistan from 8 April, a memorandum in June and talks on shipping were interrupted by renewed fighting from July, and traffic through the Strait of Hormuz was severely disrupted. India called for dialogue and diplomacy, brought several thousand nationals out of Iran overland through Armenia and Azerbaijan, negotiated passage for Indian-flagged ships, and joined talks on freedom of navigation. The BRICS New Delhi Declaration of September 2026 urged restraint without condemning either side.
04Other conflicts
In Myanmar India engages the military regime and other actors, sent relief after the earthquake of March 2025 (Operation Brahma), and is fencing its border. In Sudan, at war since April 2023, it evacuated nationals under Operation Kaveri and supports African mediation. In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo Indian peacekeepers serve with the UN mission. It welcomed the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace declaration signed in Washington in August 2025, while continuing arms sales to Armenia.
05Reading India's choices
Three readings compete. A realist reading sees interests at work: Russian arms and oil, Gulf energy and the diaspora, Israeli technology, Iranian connectivity. A normative critique notes inconsistency: India invokes territorial integrity over Kashmir and the border with China but would not name Russia as an aggressor. A positional reading sees India cultivating the role of a state that can talk to all sides, and that might mediate, a role it has so far declined to assume formally. The record supports all three; the common thread is the protection of India's freedom of manoeuvre at the price of a smaller voice.
06Reading it through IR theory
The three readings above can be grounded in IR theory. Classical realism offers the strongest account of the pattern. Morgenthau argued that states cannot apply universal moral principles without regard to circumstances, and made prudence, judging actions by their likely consequences, the test of statecraft; abstention, calls for dialogue and the evacuation of nationals are prudence in practice for a state with interests on every side of the wars in Ukraine and West Asia. What realism explains less well is why India invests so heavily in the language of the UN Charter, sovereignty and territorial integrity if interests alone decide. Liberal institutionalism takes that language seriously. On its account India gains from a rules-based order that protects states' borders, and the UN remains the forum in which its votes and statements carry weight. The same lens exposes the normative cost identified by critics: a state that does not defend territorial integrity for others weakens a rule on which it relies itself. Constructivism explains the positional reading. Through repeated practice India has built a role as a state that can talk to all sides, and that identity becomes an interest in its own right, shaping what India will and will not say. Postcolonial perspectives treat sanctions campaigns and condemnations led by powerful states as selective uses of universal language, which is why abstention can be presented as independence rather than evasion. These lenses do not settle whether India's restraint is wisdom or avoidance; they show that it rests on several reinforcing foundations at once.
07India's options and the way forward
India's options lie on a spectrum from silence to mediation. Continuing calibrated abstention preserves relations with Russia, Israel, Iran, the Gulf states and the West, and keeps India able to evacuate nationals and negotiate passage for its ships; its cost is a smaller voice and recurring charges of inconsistency, especially when India invokes territorial integrity over Kashmir and its border with China. A more explicit defence of Charter principles, naming violations whoever commits them, would strengthen India's normative standing but strain relationships it depends on for energy, arms and technology. A third option is facilitation short of formal mediation: using access to Moscow, Kyiv, Tehran and the Gulf capitals to carry messages, support humanitarian arrangements and back talks led by others. This could convert balance into influence at limited risk, though India's insistence on bilateralism in its own disputes limits how far it can advocate third-party roles elsewhere. Humanitarian aid and the protection of nationals will remain constant whichever course is chosen. On balance, India's positions are likely to remain cautious and interest-driven; the more consequential choice is whether it will bear the costs of a more active role in ending conflicts that directly affect its energy, trade and diaspora.
Key points
- Characteristic instrument: abstention at the UN, combined with calls for dialogue and humanitarian aid.
- Ukraine: abstentions since February 2022; Modi told Putin at Samarkand (16 September 2022) that this is not an era of war; Moscow and Kyiv visits in 2024.
- Gaza: condemnation of 7 October; abstention on 27 October 2023; votes for ceasefire texts from 12 December 2023.
- Iran: war from 28 February 2026; evacuations through Armenia and Azerbaijan; diplomacy for Hormuz passage.
- Ukraine talks resumed in November 2026 without a ceasefire.
- Critics see inconsistency; officials see autonomy.
Debates
Is India's abstention on Ukraine principled neutrality or strategic opportunism?
Principled: India opposes the use of force, has said so to Russia's leader in public, and refuses to join a sanctions campaign that would hurt developing countries; abstention keeps it able to speak to both sides.
Opportunistic: India's refusal to name the aggressor coincides with cheap oil and arms dependence; a state that invokes territorial integrity for itself weakens the norm by not defending it for others.
Should India act as a mediator in major conflicts?
Yes: India has access to Moscow, Kyiv, Tehran, Jerusalem and the Gulf capitals, and mediation would convert its balance into influence and status.
No: mediation requires leverage India lacks over the parties and risks blame for failure; India's own insistence on bilateralism in Kashmir sits awkwardly with a mediator's role.
Is India's call for dialogue and diplomacy a policy or the absence of one?
A policy: the call is consistent across Ukraine, Gaza and Iran, reflects a judgement that wars end in negotiation, and keeps channels open: Modi visited both Moscow and Kyiv in 2024, India attended the peace conference in Switzerland without signing its communiqué, and it has sent humanitarian aid to both Ukraine and Gaza.
An absence: urging dialogue without proposals, leverage or follow-through commits India to nothing, and outcomes have been shaped by others, from US-mediated talks on Ukraine to the ceasefire with Iran brokered by Pakistan; declarations that urge restraint without condemning either side express the lowest common denominator rather than a position.
A fair judgement is that dialogue is a policy of positioning rather than resolution. It preserves India's access, but its value depends on whether India eventually converts that access into initiatives of its own.
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
5 questions · 2024–2026
2026 · PSIR II · Q8(b) · 15 marks
India has recognised that West Asia is not a single contest, but a tangle of rivalries, bargains and anxieties. Comment.
2025 · PSIR II · Q7(a) · 20 marks
India continues to invoke its time-tested policy of strategic autonomy vis-à-vis both the United States of America and Russia by rejecting US’ offer of mediation on Kashmir issue and by refusing to criticize Russia in its ongoing war against Ukraine. Comment.
2024 · PSIR II · Q1(c) · 10 marks
The expansionist tendencies of the current Russian regime indicate its intentions for the realisation of a Greater Russia on the lines of the Soviet era. Comment.
2024 · PSIR II · Q1(e) · 10 marks
The changing global order and ongoing regional conflicts, with the global powers taking sides, have jeopardised the progress made towards disarmament in the past. Comment.
2024 · PSIR II · Q8(a) · 20 marks
Critically examine the continuity and change in India’s Palestine policy in the wake of the ongoing Israel-Hamas War.
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Global Conflicts and India's Positions in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
Examine the principles that guide India's positions on the wars in Ukraine and West Asia since 2022.
How to approach it
Charter principles, dialogue, terrorism, humanitarian aid, nationals; votes and visits; consistency debate.
- Q2UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
How has the war involving Iran since February 2026 affected India's interests?
How to approach it
Energy and Hormuz, diaspora, Chabahar and connectivity, relations with the Gulf, Israel and the US.
- Q3PSIR style15 marks· 250 words
Is abstention an effective instrument of Indian diplomacy at the United Nations?
How to approach it
Ukraine and Gaza votes; signalling and flexibility against loss of voice and normative cost.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
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Sources
- 01Statements on Ukraine, Gaza and Iran (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
- 02General Assembly resolutions ES-11/1 (2 March 2022), ES-10/21 (27 October 2023) and ES-10/22 (12 December 2023); Security Council resolution 2803 (17 November 2025). United Nations
- 03US envoys meet Putin in Moscow to discuss Russia–Ukraine war (opens in a new tab). Al Jazeera, 12 November 2026
- 04Timeline: how the US–Israel war with Iran unfolded over 108 days (opens in a new tab). Anadolu Agency, June 2026
- 05March to July: What's different as US–Iran fighting escalates again? (opens in a new tab). Al Jazeera, 13 July 2026