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Case study · South-east Asia (Myanmar, Bangladesh) and The Hague · 2017–2026

The Gambia v Myanmar: the Rohingya genocide case at the World Court

A small West African state with no Rohingya population sued Myanmar under the Genocide Convention. The Court delivered its judgment on the merits on 19 November 2026; the case shows how far law can travel when politics is blocked.

The case

In August 2017, after attacks by a Rohingya armed group, Myanmar's armed forces launched 'clearance operations' in northern Rakhine State. More than 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh within months, joining earlier refugees in the camps around Cox's Bazar. A UN fact-finding mission reported in 2018 that senior generals should be investigated and prosecuted for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Rohingya had already been stripped of citizenship under Myanmar's 1982 citizenship law: in Hannah Arendt's phrase, a people without the right to have rights.

In November 2019 The Gambia, backed by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, brought a case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice under the Genocide Convention, to which both states are parties. In January 2020 the Court ordered provisional measures requiring Myanmar to prevent genocidal acts and preserve evidence. In July 2022 it rejected Myanmar's preliminary objections, holding that any party to the Convention may invoke another party's responsibility, because the obligations are owed to all parties together (erga omnes partes). By orders of 3 July 2024 and 25 July 2025 the Court admitted declarations of intervention by eleven states under Article 63 of its Statute, which allows parties to a convention to intervene when its construction is in question. Hearings on the merits, with witness testimony, ran from 12 to 29 January 2026, and the Court delivered its judgment on the merits on 19 November 2026 (press release 2026/30). The UN's release of the Secretary-General's statement that day was headed 'Hailing International Court of Justice Judgment that Myanmar Committed Genocide against Rohingya, Secretary-General Implores Government to Fully Comply with Ruling'. The judges appended seventeen opinions and declarations, among them a joint dissenting opinion of Vice-President Sebutinde, Judges Tomka, Abraham, Xue and Nolte and Judge ad hoc Kress.

Meanwhile the military seized power in February 2021 and Myanmar descended into civil war. Most Rohingya remain in camps in Bangladesh or confined in Rakhine. Other routes have opened in parallel: the International Criminal Court is investigating deportation into Bangladesh, an ICC state party, and in November 2024 its prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant for the military's commander-in-chief, Min Aung Hlaing.

Actors and stakeholders

  • The GambiaState (applicant)

    Role

    Brought the case without any injured nationals, asserting obligations owed to all parties to the Convention.

    Power and its sources

    Legal standing rather than material power, amplified by the backing of the OIC and later by intervening states.

  • MyanmarState (respondent); military-led government since 2021

    Role

    Denies genocide, presenting the 2017 operations as counter-insurgency, and contested the Court's jurisdiction.

    Power and its sources

    No court can compel it directly, and permanent members of the Security Council have resisted strong measures. Its participation nonetheless concedes the Court's authority over the dispute.

  • The RohingyaMost affected group

    Role

    Survivors' testimony and documentation underpin the case; they have no standing of their own before the ICJ.

    Power and its sources

    Moral authority and evidence; statelessness leaves them without a government to press their claim.

  • BangladeshHost state

    Role

    Hosts most Rohingya refugees and, as an ICC state party, provides the territorial link for the ICC's investigation.

    Power and its sources

    Control of territory, camps and access; it bears a burden allocated by geography rather than responsibility.

  • International Court of JusticePrincipal judicial organ of the UN

    Role

    Ordered provisional measures, upheld jurisdiction and delivered its judgment on the merits on 19 November 2026.

    Power and its sources

    Judgments are final and binding on the parties, but the Court has no enforcement capacity; recourse lies with the Security Council.

  • UN Security CouncilIGO organ

    Role

    Formally the enforcer of ICJ judgments. Its first resolution on Myanmar, in December 2022, called for an end to violence; China and Russia abstained.

    Power and its sources

    The only body able to compel compliance, constrained by the veto.

Through the key concepts

sovereignty

Myanmar's sovereignty is limited by its own earlier consent: by joining the Genocide Convention it accepted that disputes about the Convention could go to the ICJ. The case shows the positivist account of international law at work, and its limits, since consent to jurisdiction is not consent to enforcement.

legitimacy

The Court's authority is legal-rational: it depends on being seen to apply rules impartially. Myanmar's participation, the witness hearings and the broad group of interveners strengthen that legitimacy. Critics point to selectivity, since some states intervening here have taken different positions in other genocide cases, an argument that attacks the judges' consistency rather than the evidence.

power

The Gambia had no leverage over Myanmar, so it moved the dispute to a forum where material power counts least. The weak borrowed the authority of law. Yet enforcement returns the question to the Security Council, where material power counts most.

interdependence

Obligations owed to all parties create a legal interdependence: every party has an interest in every other's compliance. The 2022 ruling on standing opened a route other states have since used, in Ukraine's case against Russia (2022) and South Africa's against Israel (2023).

Perspectives

The Gambia and the intervening states

The prohibition of genocide protects humanity as a whole, so any party may, and should, hold another to account.

Myanmar's government

The 2017 operations were a response to insurgent attacks; the evidence does not meet the strict standard for genocidal intent; the case interferes in internal affairs.

Rohingya advocates

A judgment matters, but recognition without citizenship, safe return and accountability for named commanders would leave the injustice in place.

Realist sceptics

The Court cannot enforce its rulings, the junta has powerful patrons, and nothing on the ground will change because of a judgment.

International lawyers

The Court's earlier genocide judgments set a demanding standard, requiring genocidal intent to be the only reasonable inference from a pattern of conduct; the case tests whether that standard can ever be met for mass expulsion.

Evaluation

Judged as enforcement, the case has so far achieved little: the provisional measures of 2020 did not prevent the coup or improve the Rohingya's position, and the Court cannot compel compliance. Judged as law-making and record-building, it has achieved a great deal. It established that a state with no injured nationals can enforce obligations owed to all parties, it produced an evidentiary record tested through witnesses, and it opened a route others have followed.

The judgment of 19 November 2026 decides whether Myanmar is responsible for committing, or for failing to prevent and punish, genocide. The UN's release of the Secretary-General's statement presents it as a finding that Myanmar committed genocide. If that is the holding, the judgment goes further than the Court's Bosnia judgment of 2007, which held Serbia responsible only for failing to prevent and punish genocide at Srebrenica, and makes the Convention a more usable instrument. Its weight as precedent will depend on its reasoning on genocidal intent and on the points the joint dissent contests. The broader lesson concerns the division of labour between law and politics. The Court can declare; only states can act. See rights and justice.

Questions to take further

  • Why did the ICJ route reach a hearing when the Security Council and ICC routes stalled?
  • Does a state with no material interest in a dispute gain or lose legitimacy by bringing it?
  • What would compliance with a judgment against Myanmar look like, and who could secure it?
  • Should the standard for proving genocidal intent differ in cases of mass expulsion?

Sources