India's neighbourhood · Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security Partnership
India and Maldives
An archipelago astride India's western sea lanes whose politics have swung between "India First" and "India Out". Since 2024 President Mohamed Muizzu has turned from confrontation to reliance on Indian financial support, without giving up his ties with China.
India and Maldives at a glance
- Relationship
- Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security Partnership
- India's neighbourhood
01Geography
The Maldives is a chain of about 1,190 low coral islands grouped in 26 natural atolls, running some 800 kilometres from north to south across the equator in the Arabian Sea; fewer than two hundred of the islands are inhabited. Its land area is tiny but its exclusive economic zone is large, and most of its land lies less than two metres above sea level, which makes climate change a question of national survival.
Its northern atolls lie just south-west of India's Lakshadweep, separated from Minicoy by the Eight Degree Channel, and the One and a Half Degree Channel crosses the south of the chain; both carry much of the shipping between the Gulf and East Asia. Malé, the capital, holds a large share of the population on a small island, which is why bridges, causeways and reclaimed land are the country's largest infrastructure projects and why water and food supplies from India matter in an emergency.
02Political context
Maldives's political system
The Maldives is a unitary presidential republic under the constitution of 2008, which ended thirty years of rule by Maumoon Abdul Gayoom and introduced multiparty elections. The President, directly elected for five years and limited to two terms, is head of state and government; the People's Majlis, a single chamber of 93 members, legislates. Islam is the state religion, and the constitution restricts citizenship to Muslims. The courts have repeatedly been drawn into political conflict, most dramatically when Supreme Court judges were arrested under the state of emergency of February 2018.
Mohamed Muizzu of the People's National Congress has been President since November 2023, and his party won a supermajority in the Majlis election of April 2024. The opposition Maldivian Democratic Party, which governed under Mohamed Nasheed (2008–12) and Ibrahim Mohamed Solih (2018–23), accuses the government of using that majority to weaken checks on the executive. Because India has repeatedly been an issue in Maldivian elections, the country's political cycle is also the rhythm of its relations with India.
Political and diplomatic developments
The turn came quickly. Muizzu attended Modi's swearing-in in June 2024 and made a state visit to India in October 2024, when the two governments adopted a vision for a Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security Partnership and India extended a currency swap and rolled over Maldivian treasury bills. Modi was guest of honour at the 60th anniversary of Maldivian independence on 26 July 2025; the visit produced a line of credit of ₹4,850 crore, an agreement reducing the Maldives' annual repayments on earlier Indian credit, and terms of reference for a free trade agreement.
Maldivian politics remain polarised between Muizzu's camp and the Maldivian Democratic Party, historically closer to India. India's task is to deal with whichever government holds office, without appearing to take sides in a domestic contest that has repeatedly been fought over India itself.
03Historical bilateral relations
India was among the first states to establish relations with the Maldives after its independence in 1965, and the two settled their maritime boundary in 1976. The relationship's defining moment came on 3 November 1988, when mercenaries attempted a coup against President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom: within hours of his request, Indian paratroopers landed in Malé and restored the government in Operation Cactus. India became the first responder in every later emergency, from the 2004 tsunami to the Malé water crisis of December 2014 and the COVID-19 pandemic.
Democratisation in 2008 polarised Maldivian politics, and India's place in it. The cancellation of an Indian company's contract to modernise Malé's airport in 2012 was the first sign. Under President Abdulla Yameen (2013–18) the Maldives joined the Belt and Road Initiative, signed a free trade agreement with China and asked India to remove helicopters it had gifted. In February 2018, when Yameen declared a state of emergency and arrested judges and opposition leaders, the exiled former president Mohamed Nasheed called on India to intervene. India confined itself to statements; the episode showed how far its policy had moved since 1988, and how the memory of Operation Cactus shapes Maldivian fears as well as gratitude. Ibrahim Mohamed Solih's "India First" government (2018–23) reversed course, with Indian finance for the Greater Malé Connectivity Project and a harbour for the Maldivian coast guard at Uthuru Thila Falhu.
Mohamed Muizzu won the presidency in 2023 on an "India Out" campaign, directed at the Indian military personnel who operated helicopters and a Dornier aircraft for medical evacuation and surveillance. They were replaced by Indian civilian technicians by May 2024. Derogatory remarks about Narendra Modi by Maldivian deputy ministers in January 2024 led to their suspension and to a fall in Indian tourism.
Diplomatic timeline
3 events, 1985–2015
The dated events of the Global Political Timeline that involve Maldives. Open an entry to read it in full.
SAARC founded at DhakaDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineThe leaders of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka adopted the SAARC Charter at Dhaka on 8 December 1985; Afghanistan joined in 2007. The charter excludes bilateral and contentious issues and requires unanimity, which kept the association alive but made it ineffective. No summit has been held since Kathmandu in 2014.
Operation Cactus in the MaldivesDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineWhen mercenaries attempted a coup against President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom on 3 November 1988, Indian paratroopers flew to Malé within hours of his request and restored the government; the Navy intercepted the fleeing mercenaries at sea. The operation established India as the region's first responder, and it is remembered in the Maldives with both gratitude and wariness.
SAGAR: Security and Growth for All in the RegionDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineIn a speech in Mauritius on 12 March 2015, Narendra Modi set out SAGAR as India's maritime vision: security for India's mainland and islands, capacity building for maritime neighbours, collective action against threats, sustainable development and a cooperative regional order. In March 2025, again in Mauritius, he extended it as MAHASAGAR.
04Strategic interests
The Maldives lies across the Eight Degree and One and a Half Degree channels, through which much of the shipping between the Gulf and East Asia passes, and its exclusive economic zone adjoins India's around Lakshadweep. A hostile military presence there would be a direct threat to India's western seaboard; Chinese research vessels such as the Xiang Yang Hong 03, which called at Malé in February 2024, are the immediate concern.
For the Maldives, the issue is sovereignty. Many Maldivians resented an Indian military presence, however small, and the secrecy surrounding defence agreements. Muizzu's strategy has been to remove the visible signs of dependence while keeping its substance (Indian finance, food supplies and emergency support) and to diversify, including with China, Türkiye and the Gulf states.
The Maldives illustrates the dilemmas of small states in a contested region. Theorists of small-state behaviour distinguish bandwagoning with the dominant regional power, balancing against it with outside help, and hedging between the two. Malé's governments have tried all three within fifteen years. Muizzu's hedging — symbolic distance from India, material reliance on it — has proved the most sustainable so far, because it allows each patron to believe it is preferred.
05Key agreements
- 1976Maritime boundary agreement
Delimited the maritime boundary between India and the Maldives.
- 2021Agreement on the Uthuru Thila Falhu harbour
Provides for India to develop, support and maintain a harbour for the Maldivian coast guard; criticised in the Maldives for its secrecy.
- 2021Greater Malé Connectivity Project agreements
Financing and construction agreements for the bridge and causeway linking Malé with Villingili, Gulhifalhu and Thilafushi.
- 2024Vision for a Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security Partnership
Adopted during President Muizzu's state visit in October 2024; set out cooperation on development, trade, digital payments, maritime security and capacity building.
- 2025Line of credit and amendatory agreement
Signed during Modi's visit in July 2025: a ₹4,850 crore line of credit and a reduction of annual repayments on earlier credit lines.
- 2025Terms of reference for a free trade agreement
Agreed in July 2025 to launch negotiations on a bilateral free trade agreement.
06Cooperation
Economy, connectivity, defence and technology: where the two work together, where they do not, and where cooperation could grow.
Economic relationship
The Maldives' economy depends on tourism and imports, and its public debt is high: external debt service was projected to exceed US$1 billion in 2026, according to Moody's estimates. India's support has been decisive. The State Bank of India has repeatedly rolled over Maldivian treasury bills, India extended a currency swap of US$400 million and ₹30 billion in October 2024, and in July 2025 an amendatory agreement cut the Maldives' annual repayments on Indian lines of credit by about 40 per cent.
India also supplies essential commodities, among them rice, wheat, sugar, eggs and construction materials, under quotas exempt from its own export restrictions. Indian tourists, who stayed away in 2024, are a significant market, and Indian-funded community projects, from schools to health centres and water systems across the atolls, have built goodwill outside Malé's polarised politics. The proposed free trade agreement, whose terms of reference were agreed in July 2025, would be the Maldives' first with India; Malé already has one with China, in force since January 2025.
India’s merchandise trade with Maldives
2021–22 to 2025–26 · USD billion
- Exports 2025–26
- 0.5
- India to Maldives
- Imports 2025–26
- 0.3
- Maldives to India
- Two-way trade 2025–26
- 0.8
- Exports plus imports
- Trade surplus 2025–26
- 0.2
- Exports exceed imports
- Exports from India
- Imports into India
- Balance: exports minus imports
| Financial year | Exports from India | Imports into India | Balance (exports minus imports) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021–22 | 0.7 | 0.1 | +0.6 |
| 2022–23 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 |
| 2023–24 | 0.9 | 0.1 | +0.8 |
| 2024–25 | 0.6 | 0.1 | +0.5 |
| 2025–26 | 0.5 | 0.3 | +0.2 |
Unit: USD billion. Balance and two-way trade are calculated here from the published exports and imports.
Note: Merchandise trade only; services excluded. Indian financial years (April–March). Figures for 2025–26 are provisional and those for 2021–22 to 2024–25 revised, as published by the Reserve Bank of India from data compiled by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S) of the Department of Commerce. The import figure for 2022–23 (about US$0.5 billion) is an outlier in the published series, against under US$0.1 billion in the years either side; it is reproduced as published.
Official dataSource: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026.
Trade and connectivity
The Greater Malé Connectivity Project, a bridge and causeway linking Malé with neighbouring islands and financed by India, is the largest infrastructure project in the Maldives' history. India has also financed airports, including Hanimaadhoo, water and sanitation projects and community development schemes across the atolls. Digital links have followed: RuPay cards in 2024 and an agreement on UPI in 2025.
Defence and security
Security cooperation survived the "India Out" campaign in altered form. Indian civilian technicians operate the aircraft India provided; the coast guard harbour at Uthuru Thila Falhu is being built; and the Maldivian armed forces train with India in exercises such as Ekuverin and in the trilateral coast guard exercise Dosti with Sri Lanka. India also helped build a coastal radar chain across the atolls, inaugurated in 2019, that links Maldivian surveillance to Indian maritime domain awareness. A 2019 agreement on joint hydrographic surveys was allowed to lapse by Muizzu's government. The Maldives is a founding member of the Colombo Security Conclave. During his July 2025 visit Modi inaugurated a new building for the Maldivian Ministry of Defence, an Indian-funded project.
Opportunities
- A bilateral free trade agreement and deeper tourism links.
- Maritime domain awareness and coast guard cooperation in the Colombo Security Conclave.
- Infrastructure that improves daily life, such as the Greater Malé Connectivity Project.
- Digital payments and local-currency settlement.
- Climate adaptation and renewable energy partnerships.
07Points of disagreement
Border issues
The maritime boundary between the two countries was settled by the agreement of 1976, and there is no territorial dispute. The relevant boundary questions for India are functional: surveillance of the exclusive economic zones, illegal fishing and the movement of Chinese research vessels.
Challenges
- Debt distress that could force the Maldives to choose between creditors.
- Nationalist sentiment against any Indian military presence.
- Chinese research vessels and investment in the archipelago.
- Polarised domestic politics in which India is a campaign issue.
- Climate vulnerability of a low-lying state.
08Regional context
The Maldives is a member of SAARC and of the Colombo Security Conclave and cooperates with India and Sri Lanka in maritime security. Its free trade agreement with China, its purchase of Turkish drones and its courting of Gulf investors are evidence of a diversified foreign policy. As a low-lying island state, it is also a leading voice on climate change, an area in which India and the Maldives share interests in adaptation finance (see climate diplomacy).
09India's diplomatic approach
India's approach since 2023 has been patience: it answered "India Out" by withdrawing its personnel on schedule, ignored provocations and kept financial support flowing. The result has been a remarkable reversal within two years. It is now framed by MAHASAGAR, the extension of the SAGAR doctrine that Modi announced in Mauritius in March 2025, which presents India as a security and development partner for the whole region rather than a patron of particular governments. The case for this approach is that a small state in financial distress will in the end turn to the neighbour that is most reliable, and that pressure would only have confirmed the nationalist narrative.
The case against is that India has rewarded a government that used anti-Indian sentiment to win power, and that support without conditions does not prevent Malé from taking Chinese money too. The deeper question is whether India's influence rests on Maldivian goodwill or Maldivian need; if the latter, it will last only as long as the debt crisis.
10Competing interpretations
Competing perspectives
How the relationship looks from different standpoints. A strong answer weighs them rather than adopting one.
The maritime security reading
A security reading starts from the sea. The Maldives lies across the Eight Degree and One and a Half Degree channels, through which much of the shipping between the Gulf and East Asia passes, and its exclusive economic zone adjoins India's around Lakshadweep, so a hostile military presence there would threaten India's western seaboard directly. Chinese research vessels such as the Xiang Yang Hong 03 are the immediate concern. India's assets are real but quiet: the coastal radar chain inaugurated in 2019, the coast guard harbour at Uthuru Thila Falhu, exercises such as Ekuverin and Dosti, and membership of the Colombo Security Conclave. The worry is erosion. The military personnel left in 2024, the hydrographic survey agreement was allowed to lapse, and the memory of Operation Cactus in 1988 now feeds Maldivian fears of dependence as well as gratitude.
The debt and development reading
An economic reading sees a relationship held together by need. The Maldives depends on tourism and imports, its public debt is high, and India's support has been decisive: it has rolled over treasury bills, extending a currency swap in October 2024 and cutting its annual repayments on Indian credit by about 40 per cent in July 2025. Quotas of rice, wheat, sugar and construction materials exempt from Indian export restrictions, the Greater Malé Connectivity Project and community schemes across the atolls add a layer of everyday dependence and goodwill. The proposed free trade agreement would be the Maldives' first with India, although one with China has been in force since January 2025. The sceptic's question is whether this influence rests on goodwill or on need, because if it rests on need it may last only as long as the debt crisis.
The patience debate in India
Within India, the Maldives policy since 2023 is a test of patience as a strategy. India answered the India Out campaign by withdrawing its military personnel on schedule, ignored provocations and kept financial support flowing, and it now frames its role through MAHASAGAR as a partner for the whole region rather than the patron of particular governments. Supporters argue that a small state in financial distress will in the end turn to its most reliable neighbour, and that pressure would only have confirmed the nationalist narrative. Critics reply that India rewarded a government that used anti-Indian sentiment to win power, and that support without conditions does not stop Malé from taking Chinese money. Indian public opinion has its own voice in the relationship: the fall in Indian tourism after derogatory remarks by Maldivian deputy ministers in 2024 showed that resentment runs both ways.
The view from Malé
Seen from Malé, the issue is sovereignty. Many Maldivians resented an Indian military presence, however small, and the secrecy surrounding defence agreements, and politicians turned fewer than a hundred personnel into a national question and won an election on it. Operation Cactus is remembered as both a rescue and a reminder of dependence. Muizzu's answer has been to remove the visible signs of reliance on India while keeping its substance, Indian finance, food and emergency support, and to diversify towards China, Türkiye and the Gulf, a hedge that lets each patron believe it is preferred. Domestic politics keep India on the ballot, since the opposition Maldivian Democratic Party is historically closer to India. Climate gives the Maldives a priority above all these rivalries, because for a state lying mostly less than two metres above the sea, rising water is the overriding threat.
Reading the relationship through IR theory
Realism treats the Maldives as a textbook small state in a contested region; the strategic section sets out its choices between bandwagoning, balancing and hedging. Its location gives it more leverage than its size suggests, because both India and China want access or at least denial, and Malé can extract benefits from each. Realists would predict, correctly so far, that a small state in fiscal distress will lean towards the patron that can rescue it fastest.
Constructivism explains India Out. Sovereignty in the Maldives is less a legal status than a political identity, constructed against a large neighbour whose intervention of 1988 is remembered as both a rescue and a reminder of dependence. Politicians framed fewer than a hundred Indian military personnel as a threat to the nation, an instance of securitisation, and won an election on it; the same government then de-securitised the relationship once the personnel left and the debt crisis loomed.
Liberal and critical perspectives meet over climate. For the Maldives rising seas are the overriding security threat, which is why it has campaigned for climate finance since Mohamed Nasheed's underwater cabinet meeting of 2009 and why it treats both India and China first as development partners. Dependency theorists add that a tourism economy reliant on imported food, fuel and credit has limited room for manoeuvre whichever capital it turns to.
11Contemporary developments
As of 20 November 2026
The relationship is warmer than at any time since 2023, and dependent on finance. The first round of negotiations on the free trade agreement was held from 29 June to 7 July 2026, with both sides aiming to sign by the end of the year, and the two governments were reported in July to have concluded negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty. The Maldives' debt service obligations peak in 2026, which keeps India's rollovers and swaps central to its stability. Muizzu continues to balance: the free trade agreement with China is in force, and his government cultivates Türkiye and the Gulf. Indian policy is to make itself indispensable without making itself visible.
In September 2026 the Maldives completed repayment of the US$150 million treasury-bill facility that the State Bank of India first subscribed in 2019 and had repeatedly rolled over. According to India's Ministry of External Affairs, the final tranche was settled on 17 September, and India had borne close to US$45 million in interest over the life of the facility, a figure the ministry cited as evidence of its financial support. The repayment closes one of the main arrangements through which India supported the Maldives during its debt crisis, in the year in which the Maldives' debt-service obligations peak.
12UPSC syllabus connections
Syllabus lines
GS-II
India and its neighbourhoodOfficial wording: “India and its neighborhood- relations.”
Where it is taught on this platformPrelims
Current eventsOfficial wording: “Current events of national and international importance.”
Where it is taught on this platform
Quoted in UPSC’s official wording.
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
3 questions · 2024–2026
2026 · PSIR II · Q6(a) · 20 marks
Accelerating of Chinese influence across South Asia is fundamentally reshaping the region’s geopolitical landscape. This is a big foreign policy challenge for India. Analyse.
2026 · PSIR II · Q6(b) · 15 marks
Critically evaluate the important factors of India-Maldives relations on the eve of sixty years of diplomatic ties between the two countries.
2024 · GS-II · Q20 · 15 marks
Discuss the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of Maldives for India with a focus on global trade and energy flows. Further also discuss how this relationship affects India’s maritime security and regional stability amidst international competition ?
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to India and Maldives in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Account for the shift in India–Maldives relations from "India Out" in 2023 to the partnership of 2024–25.
How to approach it
Explain the campaign and its target; the debt crisis; India's patient response; the 2024 and 2025 visits.
- Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Discuss the strategic significance of the Maldives for India's maritime security.
How to approach it
Use the sea lanes and the EEZ; Chinese vessels; the Colombo Security Conclave and SAGAR.
- Q3UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
Does financial assistance buy durable influence in the neighbourhood? Examine with reference to the Maldives.
How to approach it
Weigh goodwill against need; consider China's parallel role; draw a reasoned conclusion about the conditions of durable influence.
- Q4UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
How should India balance respect for the sovereignty of small island states with its own security interests in the Indian Ocean?
How to approach it
Use the Maldives and one other island state; discuss military presence, transparency and capacity building.
- Q5UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Examine the role of debt and development finance in the competition between India and China in the Maldives.
How to approach it
Compare Chinese project loans of the Yameen years with Indian credit lines, swaps and rollovers; assess which builds more durable influence and why.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
13Relevant PSIR topics
Paper II · BUnit 3
India and South AsiaOfficial syllabus: “India and South Asia: (a) Regional Co-operation: SAARC – past performance and future prospects. (b) South Asia as a Free Trade Area. (c) India's "Look East" policy. (d) Impediments to regional co-operation: river water disputes; illegal cross-border migration; ethnic conflicts and insurgencies; border disputes.”
Each line is quoted from the official PSIR syllabus.
Explore further
Concept
PSIR Optional
Timeline
Dictionary
Sources
- 01Ministry of External Affairs, India–Maldives bilateral relations (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
- 02India's Modi announces credit worth $565 million to the Maldives and launches free trade talks (opens in a new tab). Associated Press, 25 July 2025
- 03India signs 6 MoUs with Maldives, extends ₹4,850 crore line of credit (opens in a new tab). News on AIR, 25 July 2025
- 04India steps in with currency swap to ease Maldives economic woes as relations thaw (opens in a new tab). The Wire, October 2024
- 05Maldives eyes India FTA signing by end of 2026, says foreign minister (opens in a new tab). WION, May 2026
- 06India and Maldives conclude first round of free trade agreement negotiations (opens in a new tab). Swarajya, July 2026
- 07Maldives repays USD 150 million loan to India (opens in a new tab). ThePrint, September 2026
- 08India paid USD 45 million in interest: MEA highlights financial backstopping as Maldives clears USD 150 million debt facility (opens in a new tab). Republic World, 18 September 2026
- 09Maldives settles $150 million loan taken from India (opens in a new tab). News Today, 19 September 2026
- 10Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026