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India's foreign policy · Doctrine

Neighbourhood First

India's declared priority for its immediate neighbours since 2014: connectivity, development finance and crisis support offered from a position of asymmetry, tested by Chinese competition and by political upheaval in almost every neighbouring capital.

Overview

Neighbourhood First was signalled rather than proclaimed. When Narendra Modi was sworn in on 26 May 2014 the leaders of all SAARC countries, Pakistan's Prime Minister among them, attended at India's invitation; his first visit abroad was to Bhutan, on 15–16 June 2014. The Ministry of External Affairs has since described a "Neighbourhood First" policy built on connectivity, trade, development partnership and people-to-people ties. BIMSTEC leaders were invited to the 2019 swearing-in, and leaders from seven neighbouring and Indian Ocean states to that of 9 June 2024.

The policy has a long genealogy: Nehru's treaties with Bhutan (1949) and Nepal (1950), Indira Gandhi's assertion of regional primacy, and I. K. Gujral's doctrine of non-reciprocal generosity (1996–97). Its distinctive premise is that India's size obliges it to give more than it receives, and that a secure neighbourhood is the condition of India's wider ambitions.

01Instruments

The policy works through five instruments. Development finance: lines of credit and grants for roads, rail, power and housing across the region. Energy integration: hydropower imports from Bhutan and Nepal, electricity exports to Bangladesh and, since 2024, the first trilateral power flow from Nepal to Bangladesh through Indian lines. Connectivity: rail links, inland waterways and border infrastructure (see connectivity corridors). Crisis support: relief after Nepal's 2015 earthquake, Vaccine Maitri from January 2021, about USD 4 billion for Sri Lanka in its 2022 economic collapse, and a currency swap for the Maldives in October 2024. Settlement of disputes: the Land Boundary Agreement with Bangladesh, implemented through the 100th Constitutional Amendment in 2015, which exchanged enclaves that had existed since Partition.

02The China factor

Since the 2010s China has become the region's largest alternative financier and builder. Sri Lanka leased the Hambantota port to a Chinese company for 99 years in 2017; Nepal, the Maldives and Bangladesh joined the Belt and Road Initiative; Chinese research and survey vessels became frequent visitors to the Indian Ocean. Neighbouring governments use the competition to bargain, which is rational for them and uncomfortable for India. India's responses combine security red lines, conveyed privately, with faster delivery of its own projects and partnerships with Japan and others. The competition has made Neighbourhood First less a policy of generosity than one of contestation.

03Upheaval, 2021–2026

Almost every neighbour has changed government in unusual circumstances since 2021. The Taliban took Kabul in August 2021; India reopened a technical mission in 2022 and, after a visit by the Taliban foreign minister in October 2025, upgraded it. Myanmar's military seized power in 2021 and the country fell into civil war. Sri Lanka's economic crisis toppled its President in 2022; the National People's Power government elected in 2024 signed a defence cooperation memorandum with India in April 2025. In the Maldives, a campaign against Indian military personnel helped elect Mohamed Muizzu in 2023; relations recovered after 2024, and Modi was chief guest at Maldivian independence celebrations in July 2025. Sheikh Hasina fell in Bangladesh in August 2024 and took refuge in India; the Bangladesh Nationalist Party won the election of February 2026 and Tarique Rahman became Prime Minister. In Nepal, youth-led protests in September 2025 brought down the government, and the Rastriya Swatantra Party won the election of March 2026 by a landslide.

04The Pakistan exception

Pakistan is formally a neighbour and practically outside the policy. After the attacks at Uri (2016), Pulwama (2019) and Pahalgam (April 2025), India's response moved from diplomatic isolation to military strikes, culminating in Operation Sindoor in May 2025, and to holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance. India's position is that dialogue cannot proceed while cross-border terrorism continues and that issues are bilateral, without third-party mediation (see terrorism). The exception shapes the region's institutions: it is a principal reason SAARC is frozen and BIMSTEC has been revived.

05Assessment

The policy's strengths are real: India is the first responder in regional crises, energy trade with Bhutan and Nepal is a model of interdependence, and the boundary settlement with Bangladesh removed a source of friction. Its weaknesses are structural. Asymmetry breeds suspicion of a "big brother". Domestic politics intrude: West Bengal's objections have blocked a Teesta water agreement since 2011, and rhetoric about migrants damages Indian standing in Bangladesh. Projects are often slow. Above all, India has tended to invest in particular leaders and parties, and has paid when they fell, as in Bangladesh in 2024. The lesson most analysts draw is that the policy must engage societies and oppositions, not only governments.

06Reading it through IR theory

Realism sees Neighbourhood First as the management of asymmetry by a regional power that seeks primacy and wants to deny rivals a foothold, and the small states respond as realists predict, by bargaining between India and China. Kautilya's mandala theory, in which the immediate neighbour is a natural rival and the neighbour's neighbour a natural ally, captures the pattern uncomfortably well: for a small state whose dominant neighbour is India, an outside power such as China is the obvious counterweight. Kautilya's ranking of means, from conciliation and gifts to division and force, also suggests why development finance and crisis support come first in India's repertoire. Liberal approaches explain why India gives more than it receives, as an investment in interdependence: hydropower from Bhutan and Nepal, electricity exports to Bangladesh and the boundary settlement create shared stakes that raise the cost of hostility. They also highlight domestic constraints, captured in Robert Putnam's idea of two-level games: West Bengal's objections to a Teesta agreement show that a deal abroad must also be ratified at home. Constructivism focuses on perception and identity. The Gujral doctrine of non-reciprocity sought to change India's image from dominant power to generous elder, and the suspicion of a big brother shows how far identity, not only interest, shapes neighbours' responses. The fall of governments with which India had identified itself, as in Bangladesh in 2024, supports the constructivist point that relationships rest on societies' perceptions as well as on agreements between governments.

07India's options and the way forward

India's choices concern what it offers, to whom, and how it handles China and Pakistan. On delivery, faster completion of credit-line projects and continued energy integration would do more for India's standing than new announcements, since slowness is a recurring weakness; this depends as much on implementation at home as on diplomacy abroad. On engagement, recent upheavals argue for broad contacts with oppositions, civil society, students and business as well as governments, though this carries a risk of accusations of interference. On China, India can compete project by project, convey security red lines privately and partner with Japan and others, accepting that neighbours will continue to bargain between the two; seeking to exclude China altogether would run against neighbours' interest in having alternatives. On Pakistan, India can maintain its position that dialogue cannot proceed while cross-border terrorism continues, which protects its security stance but leaves SAARC frozen and regional cooperation channelled through BIMSTEC and bilateral ties. Domestic politics, from water-sharing to rhetoric about migrants, will continue to constrain policy. On balance, Neighbourhood First is likely to remain a policy of contestation as well as generosity, and its success will depend on reliability, respect for smaller states' sensitivities and engagement with societies as well as governments.

Key points

  • Signalled in May 2014 by inviting SAARC leaders to the swearing-in; first visit abroad to Bhutan.
  • Draws on the Gujral doctrine of non-reciprocity towards smaller neighbours.
  • Instruments: credit lines, energy integration, connectivity, crisis support and boundary settlement.
  • China's financing has turned the neighbourhood into a competitive space.
  • Regime change in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh and Nepal since 2021 has tested it.
  • Pakistan is the exception: no dialogue while cross-border terrorism continues.

Debates

Should India engage neighbouring governments or neighbouring societies?

Governments: states deal with states; India's leverage lies in agreements with those in power, and engaging oppositions risks accusations of interference.

Societies: the fall of friendly governments in Bangladesh and elsewhere showed the cost of identification with incumbents; broad-based engagement with parties, civil society, students and business makes relationships survive changes of government.

Is the Pakistan exception compatible with a 'neighbourhood first' policy?

Compatible: a policy of priority to neighbours cannot oblige India to reward a state that uses terrorism as policy; isolating Pakistan protects the rest of the region's cooperation.

Incompatible: excluding the second-largest state in South Asia freezes regional institutions and leaves the neighbourhood's central conflict unmanaged, making the policy sub-regional rather than regional.

Should India use its economic leverage over neighbours to secure its strategic interests?

Yes: asymmetry in energy, trade and transit gives India leverage that neighbours already offset by bargaining with China; conveying red lines and attaching expectations to support protects interests such as limiting Chinese port control and research-vessel activity in the region.

No: overt pressure confirms the big-brother image, pushes neighbours towards alternative financiers and contradicts the non-reciprocity of the Gujral doctrine; generosity in crises, such as the support for Sri Lanka in its 2022 collapse and the currency swap for the Maldives in 2024, has helped restore strained relationships.

India's record suggests that leverage works best when it is held in reserve and rarely displayed, while visible generosity builds the goodwill that makes red lines acceptable.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

12 questions · 2024–2026

  1. 2026 · GS-II · Q20 · 15 marks

    “China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has transformed South Asia from a regional space into a theatre of great power competition.” Analyse the strategic implications of the BRI for India’s security and regional influence in South Asia.

  2. 2026 · PSIR II · Q5(d) · 10 marks

    Discuss the main features of the land-boundary agreement between India and Bangladesh.

  3. 2026 · PSIR II · Q6(a) · 20 marks

    Accelerating of Chinese influence across South Asia is fundamentally reshaping the region’s geopolitical landscape. This is a big foreign policy challenge for India. Analyse.

  4. 2026 · PSIR II · Q6(b) · 15 marks

    Critically evaluate the important factors of India-Maldives relations on the eve of sixty years of diplomatic ties between the two countries.

  5. 2026 · PSIR II · Q7(b) · 15 marks

    The island of Kachchatheevu remains an intractable issue in India-Srilanka relations. Comment.

  6. 2025 · PSIR II · Q5(a) · 10 marks

    China’s growing footprint and a tangible shift in power dynamics in Bangladesh has weakened India’s leverage in Dhaka. Comment.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Neighbourhood First in the PYQ dataset.All 12 in PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Political upheaval in India's neighbourhood since 2021 has exposed the limits of the Neighbourhood First policy. Critically examine.

    How to approach it

    Country cases from Afghanistan to Nepal; identification with incumbents; China's competition; what has worked.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Evaluate energy integration as an instrument of India's neighbourhood policy.

    How to approach it

    Bhutan and Nepal hydropower, exports to Bangladesh, the trilateral flow of 2024; risks of asymmetry.

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks· 250 words

    To what extent does the Gujral doctrine remain relevant to India's relations with its smaller neighbours?

    How to approach it

    Non-reciprocity and non-interference; continuities in credit and crisis support; departures in security and towards Pakistan.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01Neighbourhood First Policy (briefs and annual reports) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
  2. 02The Constitution (One Hundredth Amendment) Act, 2015 (opens in a new tab). Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice
  3. 03Bangladesh election results 2026: Who won, who lost, what's next? (opens in a new tab). Al Jazeera, 13 February 2026
  4. 04Nepal ex-rapper's party wins election in landslide after Gen Z protests (opens in a new tab). ThePrint (Reuters), March 2026
  5. 05I. K. Gujral, Continuity and Change: India's Foreign Policy (2003)
  6. 06S. D. Muni, India's Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension (2009)