India's neighbourhood
India and Myanmar
India's land bridge to Southeast Asia, sharing a 1,643 km border with four north-eastern states. Since the 2021 coup India has dealt with whoever holds Naypyidaw, while civil war, refugees and the Arakan Army's advance have unsettled its frontier and its corridors.
India and Myanmar at a glance
- Relationship
- India's neighbourhood
01Geography
Myanmar, the largest state of mainland South-East Asia, is a horseshoe of hills around the central valley of the Irrawaddy. Its western ranges, the Patkai, the Naga and Chin hills and the Arakan Yoma, form the 1,643 km border with Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram: forested, thinly roaded and home to peoples who live on both sides of it. Beyond them lie the plains of Sagaing and Mandalay, through which the Trilateral Highway is meant to run towards Thailand.
To the west, the Rakhine coast faces the Bay of Bengal. Sittwe, at the mouth of the Kaladan river, is the port India built for its corridor to Mizoram; Kyaukphyu, further south, is the terminus of the oil and gas pipelines to China's Yunnan province. Myanmar also borders Bangladesh, China, Laos and Thailand, which makes it the land bridge between South Asia, China and South-East Asia. In the Andaman Sea, Myanmar's Coco Islands lie a short distance north of India's Andaman Islands, and construction there has long drawn Indian scrutiny.
02Political context
Myanmar's political system
Myanmar is governed under the constitution of 2008, drafted under military rule. It reserves a quarter of the seats in both houses of the Union Parliament for serving officers appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, gives the military control of the ministries of defence, home affairs and border affairs, and requires the support of more than three-quarters of parliament for constitutional amendment, an effective military veto. The President is chosen by an electoral college of parliamentarians from three vice-presidents.
After the coup of 1 February 2021 the military ruled under emergency powers through a State Administration Council and successor bodies, and the National League for Democracy was dissolved in 2023. Elections held in three phases in December 2025 and January 2026, with most opposition forces excluded and large parts of the country outside the state's control, gave the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party a majority. On 3 April 2026 parliament elected Min Aung Hlaing President by 429 of 584 votes; he had named Ye Win Oo, a former intelligence chief, to succeed him at the head of the armed forces. The National Unity Government and most ethnic armed organisations reject the new order, and the state does not control large parts of its territory.
Political and diplomatic developments
The military has sought legitimacy through elections. Polls held in phases from late December 2025 into January 2026, with most opposition forces excluded and large parts of the country outside the state's control, gave the army-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party a dominant majority. On 3 April 2026 the new parliament elected Senior General Min Aung Hlaing as President by 429 of 584 votes; he gave up command of the armed forces, constitutionally incompatible with the presidency, to General Ye Win Oo. The National Unity Government, formed by elected representatives ousted in 2021, rejects the outcome.
India has engaged the new order quickly. The Minister of State for External Affairs, Kirti Vardhan Singh, was due in Naypyidaw from 8 April 2026, and Min Aung Hlaing made his first official visit to India as President from 30 May to 3 June 2026, beginning at Bodh Gaya and holding talks with Narendra Modi in New Delhi before meeting business leaders in Mumbai. The two had met earlier at the BIMSTEC summit in Bangkok in April 2025, days after India's relief operation for the earthquake of 28 March 2025. India also keeps lines open to other stakeholders, including some ethnic armed organisations whose territory borders India.
03Historical bilateral relations
Burma was governed as part of British India until 1937, and the two nationalist movements knew each other well; Nehru and U Nu shared a commitment to non-alignment and Asian solidarity, and the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1951 and a boundary agreement in 1967. Ne Win's coup of 1962 and the nationalisations that followed drove out much of the Indian community, and Burma withdrew into isolation.
India's policy since then has swung between principle and proximity. After the crushing of the democracy movement in 1988 India backed Aung San Suu Kyi, who received the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding. By the early 1990s the needs of counter-insurgency in the Northeast, the growth of Chinese influence and the Look East policy led New Delhi to engage the junta. The quasi-civilian transition after 2010 and the National League for Democracy's government from 2016 allowed India to combine both instincts, until the Rohingya crisis of 2017 and the coup of 1 February 2021 forced choices again. During the Rohingya exodus India sent relief to the refugees in Bangladesh while signing a development programme for Rakhine State with Naypyidaw, an attempt to address the crisis without condemning the army.
After the coup India voiced concern, called for the release of detained leaders and for the restoration of democracy, and abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution of June 2021. It kept working with the military authorities, on the argument that a vacuum on its border would be filled by insurgents and by China.
Diplomatic timeline
2 events, 1997–2014
The dated events of the Global Political Timeline that involve Myanmar. Open an entry to read it in full.
BIMSTEC foundedDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineThe Bangkok Declaration of 6 June 1997 created an economic grouping of Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand, later joined by Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan and renamed the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. Neglected for two decades, it became India's preferred regional platform after SAARC stalled, and its charter was adopted in 2022.
Look East becomes Act EastDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineAt the ASEAN–India summit in Nay Pyi Taw on 12 November 2014, Narendra Modi presented the Act East policy, signalling a shift from economic engagement to a strategic and connectivity agenda in Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific, with India's Northeast as the gateway. ASEAN–India relations became a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2022.
04Strategic interests
Myanmar matters to India for three reasons. It borders Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram, where insurgent groups have long used camps in Sagaing region; it is India's only land route to Southeast Asia and the hinge of the Act East policy; and it is where China seeks access to the Bay of Bengal through the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor and the deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu.
The civil war has made all three harder. Ethnic armed organisations and resistance forces hold much of the periphery; China has used its influence over armed groups in the north to broker ceasefires on its own terms; and the Arakan Army controls most of Rakhine State, including the areas through which India's Kaladan project runs.
The case against India's approach is normative and practical: that engaging the military legitimises a regime that has committed grave abuses, and that India risks backing the losing side as the army's territorial control shrinks. The case for is that India cannot choose its neighbour's government, that its border security depends on cooperation with whoever controls the state, and that disengagement would hand Myanmar to China. A middle course — working with Naypyidaw while building ties with the forces that hold the borderlands — is what India has gradually adopted.
05Key agreements
- 1951Treaty of Friendship
Committed the two newly independent states to perpetual peace and friendship.
- 1967India–Burma boundary agreement
Defined the land boundary, which was later demarcated by a joint commission.
- 2008Framework agreement on the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project
Provides for the Kolkata–Sittwe–Paletwa–Mizoram corridor built with Indian finance.
- 2018Agreement on land border crossing
Regulated the movement of people with passports and visas through designated crossings such as Moreh–Tamu and Zokhawthar–Rih.
06Cooperation
Economy, connectivity, defence and technology: where the two work together, where they do not, and where cooperation could grow.
Economic relationship
Economic ties are modest. Myanmar supplies pulses, timber products and other commodities, a rupee–kyat settlement mechanism is in place, and Indian companies hold stakes in offshore gas fields. The Shwe gas fields are the cautionary tale: although ONGC Videsh and GAIL hold stakes in them, their gas has flowed since 2013 through a pipeline to China, which offered the infrastructure India could not. The war, sanctions on Myanmar's state enterprises and the collapse of its currency have depressed investment. Myanmar's rare earths, mined in areas controlled by armed groups in Kachin State, have drawn interest from Indian planners seeking to diversify away from Chinese supply.
India’s merchandise trade with Myanmar
2021–22 to 2024–25 · USD billion
- Exports 2024–25
- 0.6
- India to Myanmar
- Imports 2024–25
- 1.5
- Myanmar to India
- Two-way trade 2024–25
- 2.1
- Exports plus imports
- Trade deficit 2024–25
- 0.9
- Imports exceed exports
- Exports from India
- Imports into India
- Balance: exports minus imports
| Financial year | Exports from India | Imports into India | Balance (exports minus imports) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021–22 | 0.9 | 1.0 | −0.1 |
| 2022–23 | 0.8 | 1.0 | −0.2 |
| 2023–24 | 0.7 | 1.1 | −0.4 |
| 2024–25 | 0.6 | 1.5 | −0.9 |
Unit: USD billion. Balance and two-way trade are calculated here from the published exports and imports.
Note: Merchandise trade only; services excluded. Indian financial years (April–March). DGCI&S data as published in the Statistical Appendix of the Economic Survey (Tables 6.4A and 6.4B), taking each year from the latest edition that reports it in full: 2023–24 and 2024–25 from the Economic Survey 2025–26, 2022–23 from the 2024–25 edition and 2021–22 from the 2023–24 edition. Full-year figures for 2025–26 were not yet available in that series, whose 2025–26 edition covers April–November 2025 only.
Official dataSource: Economic Survey 2025–26, Statistical Appendix, Tables 6.4(A) and 6.4(B): Imports from and Exports to Regions and Countries (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of Finance, Government of India, 29 January 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026.
Trade and connectivity
Connectivity is where Indian ambition and Myanmar's conflict collide. The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project links Kolkata by sea to Sittwe, by river to Paletwa and by road to Mizoram; Sittwe port was inaugurated in May 2023, but the Arakan Army's capture of Paletwa in early 2024 left the road segment hostage to the war. The India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway, from Moreh to Mae Sot, has been delayed for years by construction problems and insecurity.
Both projects were designed to give the Northeast an outlet that does not depend on the Siliguri Corridor, which is why their delay matters beyond Myanmar (see connectivity corridors). Operating them now requires dealing with the armed groups that hold the routes as much as with Naypyidaw.
Defence and security
Security cooperation has rested on a bargain: India supports Myanmar's armed forces and Myanmar acts against Indian insurgents on its soil. The two armies conducted coordinated operations against camps in 2019, and India transferred a Kilo-class submarine to the Myanmar Navy in 2020. In June 2015 India carried out a cross-border strike against militants who had ambushed its soldiers in Manipur.
The war has added new threats: refugees from Chin State in Mizoram and Manipur, Myanmar soldiers fleeing into India, cross-border drug and arms trafficking that feeds the conflict in Manipur, and cyber-fraud centres along the Thai border where Indians have been trafficked. In March 2025 the Indian Air Force flew home hundreds of Indians rescued from such centres.
Opportunities
- Completing Kaladan through engagement with all parties that control the route.
- Humanitarian and disaster assistance that builds goodwill across communities.
- Cooperation with ASEAN and BIMSTEC on a political settlement.
- Critical-mineral cooperation that diversifies supply away from China.
- Border haats and regulated crossings that serve divided communities.
07Points of disagreement
Border issues
The 1,643 km boundary, defined by the 1967 agreement, runs through hills inhabited by communities — Naga, Kuki, Chin, Mizo — who live on both sides. A Free Movement Regime allowed residents to cross within a band on either side without visas. In February 2024 the Union government announced that it would end the regime and fence the entire border. The decision is defended as essential for security after the violence in Manipur since 2023; it is opposed by the governments and civil society of Mizoram and Nagaland, who see it as dividing kin.
Challenges
- A civil war that leaves India's connectivity projects in territory held by armed groups.
- Refugees, drugs and arms crossing into Mizoram and Manipur.
- Chinese leverage over both the military government and northern armed groups.
- The legitimacy deficit of a government formed through exclusionary elections.
- Opposition in Mizoram and Nagaland to fencing and the end of free movement.
08Regional context
Myanmar is a member of ASEAN and BIMSTEC, and ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus of April 2021 remains the regional framework for its crisis, though ASEAN has kept Myanmar's military leaders out of its summits' political level. India supports ASEAN's efforts while pursuing its own channels, and works with Myanmar in the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation framework launched in 2000. The Rohingya, about a million of whom are refugees in Bangladesh, link Myanmar's crisis to India's relations with Dhaka; India supports their safe and sustainable return.
09India's diplomatic approach
India describes its policy as support for a Myanmar-led and Myanmar-owned transition, humanitarian assistance for all communities, and cooperation on border security and connectivity. In practice this means steady engagement with the military-led state, disaster relief (Operation Brahma in 2025), and widening contact with other actors.
The policy is easier to defend than to admire. It has protected India's immediate interests on the border, but it has not delivered Kaladan, it has not prevented China's advances and it has cost India standing with Myanmar's democratic movement. A Myanmar governed in fact by many authorities requires an Indian policy that deals with many authorities. In the vocabulary of international relations, India has long treated Myanmar as a unitary sovereign while the reality on its border is fragmented sovereignty: the state that signs agreements in Naypyidaw no longer controls the territory through which those agreements must be carried out.
10Competing interpretations
Competing perspectives
How the relationship looks from different standpoints. A strong answer weighs them rather than adopting one.
The border security realist's reading
For a realist, India's Myanmar policy is a border policy. Myanmar shares 1,643 km of frontier with Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram, insurgent groups have long used camps in Sagaing, and the relationship rests on a bargain: India supports Myanmar's armed forces and Myanmar acts against Indian insurgents on its soil, as in the coordinated operations of 2019. The transfer of a Kilo-class submarine in 2020 and the swift engagement with the government formed after the 2025–26 elections follow the same logic. The realist adds that India cannot choose its neighbour's government, that its border security depends on whoever controls the state, and that disengagement would hand Myanmar to China, which already seeks access to the Bay of Bengal through Kyaukphyu. The weakness of the bargain is that the army no longer controls much of the border it is meant to secure.
The connectivity and Act East reading
An economic reading treats Myanmar as India's land bridge to South-East Asia and the hinge of the Act East policy, and finds the ledger disappointing. The Kaladan project reached Sittwe port in 2023, but the Arakan Army's capture of Paletwa in 2024 left its road segment hostage to the war, and the Trilateral Highway has been delayed for years. Both were meant to give the Northeast an outlet that does not depend on the Siliguri Corridor. The Shwe gas fields remain the cautionary tale: Indian companies hold stakes, yet the gas has flowed to China through a pipeline India could not match. Rupee and kyat settlement, rare earths in Kachin State and trade in pulses offer openings, but on this reading India's corridors run through territory held by armed groups, so delivering them means dealing with those groups as much as with Naypyidaw.
The view from India's borderlands
Inside India, Myanmar policy is also a question of politics in the Northeast. The boundary of 1967 follows lines drawn under colonial rule through the homelands of Naga, Kuki, Chin and Mizo peoples who live on both sides, and the Free Movement Regime once let border residents cross without visas. The Union government's decision of February 2024 to end the regime and fence the entire border is defended as essential for security after the violence in Manipur since 2023, but the governments and civil society of Mizoram and Nagaland oppose it as dividing kin. Refugees from Chin State in Mizoram and Manipur, and drugs and arms that feed the conflict in Manipur, sharpen the dilemma. This reading holds that New Delhi's security logic and the borderlands' kinship logic pull in opposite directions, and that a policy made in the capital must still be lived in the border states.
Myanmar's many views of India
There is no single Myanmar view of India, which is the core of the problem. For the military-led government, India is a neighbour that abstained on the General Assembly resolution of June 2021, sent relief after the earthquake of 2025 and received Min Aung Hlaing within two months of his election as President: a source of legitimacy and a counterweight to Chinese leverage. For the National Unity Government and the democratic movement, which India once backed when it honoured Aung San Suu Kyi, New Delhi's engagement with the generals has cost it standing. For the Arakan Army, which holds most of Rakhine and the Kaladan route, India is a project partner it can help or obstruct. A Myanmar governed in fact by many authorities, on this reading, requires an Indian policy that deals with many authorities.
Reading the relationship through IR theory
Realism explains India's engagement with the military since the 1990s: border security, counter-insurgency and the competition with China for access to the Bay of Bengal outweigh the character of the regime. On this reading, refusing to deal with Naypyidaw would leave the field to Beijing without helping the people of Myanmar.
Liberal and human-rights critiques answer that a policy indifferent to the regime's character is short-sighted: military rule produced the civil war, the refugee flows into Mizoram and Manipur and the collapse of state authority along India's corridors, so the realist bargain has failed on its own terms. India's abstention on the General Assembly resolution of June 2021 and its swift engagement with the government formed after the 2025–26 elections are the evidence each side cites.
Constructivist and postcolonial accounts start from the border itself. The boundary agreed in 1967 follows lines drawn under colonial rule through the homelands of Naga, Chin, Kuki and Mizo peoples, whose kinship ties make the frontier porous and the fencing policy of 2024 contested. The idea of areas of limited statehood, associated with Thomas Risse, fits the present reality: large parts of Myanmar are governed by armed groups, and India's connectivity projects run through them. A foreign policy built for dealing with sovereign states has had to adapt to a neighbour whose sovereignty is formally intact and practically divided.
11Contemporary developments
As of 20 November 2026
Myanmar has a nominally civilian government led by the general who took power in 2021. Min Aung Hlaing's election as President on 3 April 2026, and a new Union Consultative Council that analysts say preserves his control over military and civilian affairs, have changed the form of military rule rather than its substance. Resistance and ethnic armed forces continue to hold large parts of the country, including most of Rakhine.
India engaged the new government quickly. During Min Aung Hlaing's official visit of 30 May to 3 June 2026, the joint statement recorded his assurance that Myanmar's territory would not be permitted to be used against India's security interests, a concern rooted in the insurgent groups that operate against the North-East from Myanmar. The two sides agreed to work towards completing the Kaladan project and the Trilateral Highway and to expand trade through the rupee–kyat settlement mechanism, and noted that agreements under discussion had yet to be concluded. The corridors remain hostage to the war: the military claimed in July 2026 to have retaken Kalewa, on the highway's route, a claim resistance groups dispute, and the Paletwa–Zorinpui road that would complete the Kaladan project runs through territory held by the Arakan Army.
Defence contacts with the new government continued in the autumn. On 7 October 2026 India hosted the third India–Myanmar Defence Cooperation Meeting in Guwahati, co-chaired by the Defence Secretary, Rajesh Kumar Singh, and Myanmar's Chief of Armed Forces Training, Lieutenant General Pyae Sone Linn. The two sides reviewed the initiatives agreed at the previous meeting, held in Yangon in 2025, and discussed new steps in training, capacity building and mutual security, and the Myanmar delegation thanked India for its earthquake relief under Operation Brahma.
On 19 November 2026 the International Court of Justice delivered its judgment on the merits in The Gambia v. Myanmar, the case brought under the Genocide Convention in 2019. The United Nations described the judgment as finding that Myanmar had committed genocide against the Rohingya, and the Secretary-General urged Myanmar to comply with it in full. In this profile's assessment, the ruling raises the reputational cost of India's close engagement with the military-led government, which India pursues for border security and connectivity.
12UPSC syllabus connections
Syllabus lines
GS-II
India and its neighbourhoodOfficial wording: “India and its neighborhood- relations.”
Where it is taught on this platformGS-II
Groupings and agreementsOfficial wording: “Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India's interests.”
Where it is taught on this platformPrelims
Current eventsOfficial wording: “Current events of national and international importance.”
Where it is taught on this platform
Quoted in UPSC’s official wording.
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
2 questions · 2024–2026
2026 · PSIR II · Q7(a) · 20 marks
How does illegal cross border migration pose challenges to India’s security ? Discuss the steps taken by the government in this direction and their effectiveness.
2024 · PSIR II · Q8(b) · 15 marks
Discuss the implications of the scrapping of the Free Movement Regime with Myanmar by the Indian Government on the complex ethno-political dynamics of the north-eastern region.
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to India and Myanmar in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
Critically examine India's policy of engaging the military authorities in Myanmar since 2021.
How to approach it
Explain the interests (border, China, Act East); give the normative critique; assess the shift towards engaging multiple actors.
- Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Why has the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project been delayed, and what does it reveal about connectivity diplomacy in conflict zones?
How to approach it
Describe the route; the Arakan Army's control; lessons on dealing with non-state actors.
- Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Discuss the implications of ending the Free Movement Regime on the India–Myanmar border.
How to approach it
Weigh security arguments against the concerns of divided communities and state governments.
- Q4UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
Myanmar is the hinge of India's Act East policy. Examine.
How to approach it
Show how land connectivity, the Northeast and ASEAN depend on Myanmar; discuss China's competing corridor.
- Q5UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
How does the instability in Myanmar affect internal security in India's Northeast?
How to approach it
Cover insurgent sanctuaries, refugee flows into Mizoram and Manipur, narcotics and arms trafficking; suggest border-management and diplomatic responses.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
13Relevant PSIR topics
Paper II · BUnit 3
India and South AsiaOfficial syllabus: “India and South Asia: (a) Regional Co-operation: SAARC – past performance and future prospects. (b) South Asia as a Free Trade Area. (c) India's "Look East" policy. (d) Impediments to regional co-operation: river water disputes; illegal cross-border migration; ethnic conflicts and insurgencies; border disputes.”
Each line is quoted from the official PSIR syllabus.
Explore further
Country
Organisation
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IB Global Politics
Sources
- 01Ministry of External Affairs, India–Myanmar bilateral relations (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
- 02Myanmar junta chief elected as president (opens in a new tab). The Jakarta Post, 3 April 2026
- 03Myanmar's parliament elects the ruling general as president, keeping the army firmly in charge (opens in a new tab). The Star (AP), 5 April 2026
- 04Myanmar's Parliament elects ruling General as President (opens in a new tab). The Hitavada, 4 April 2026
- 05New President, old playbook: democracy still on hold in Myanmar (opens in a new tab). Asia News Network, April 2026
- 06Thant Myint-U, Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011
- 07Indian PM Modi meets Myanmar military government leader in New Delhi (opens in a new tab). Al Jazeera, 1 June 2026
- 08India and Myanmar agree to accelerate work on the superhighway to Thailand (opens in a new tab). The Star, 1 June 2026
- 09President Hlaing's visit to India and the strategic diversification policy of Myanmar (opens in a new tab). Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 18 June 2026
- 10Resistance rejects regime's claim of control over India trade route (opens in a new tab). The Irrawaddy, July 2026
- 11India, Myanmar discuss initiatives to strengthen defence cooperation (opens in a new tab). Telangana Today (IANS), October 2026
- 12India, Myanmar discuss new initiatives to deepen defence cooperation (opens in a new tab). The Sentinel, October 2026
- 13Economic Survey 2025–26, Statistical Appendix, Tables 6.4(A) and 6.4(B): Imports from and Exports to Regions and Countries (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of Finance, Government of India, 29 January 2026
- 14Economic Survey 2024–25, Statistical Appendix, Tables 6.4(A) and 6.4(B): Imports from and Exports to Regions and Countries (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of Finance, Government of India, 31 January 2025
- 15Economic Survey 2023–24, Statistical Appendix, Tables 6.4(A) and 6.4(B): Imports from and Exports to Regions and Countries (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of Finance, Government of India, 22 July 2024
- 16India–Myanmar Joint Statement during the Official Visit of the President of Myanmar to India (May 30 – June 03, 2026) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1 June 2026
- 17Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar: 11 States intervening): Judgment of 19 November 2026 and press release 2026/30 (opens in a new tab). International Court of Justice, 19 November 2026
- 18Hailing International Court of Justice Judgment that Myanmar Committed Genocide against Rohingya, Secretary-General Implores Government to Fully Comply with Ruling (SG/SM/23378) (opens in a new tab). United Nations, 19 November 2026