India's neighbourhood
India and Bhutan
India's closest partner in the Himalaya, bound to it by hydropower, security cooperation and the Treaty of Friendship of 2007. The relationship's tests are Bhutan's boundary talks with China, the Doklam trijunction and Bhutan's search for a more diversified economy.
India and Bhutan at a glance
- Relationship
- India's neighbourhood
01Geography
Bhutan is a landlocked Himalayan kingdom between India and the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. Its southern foothills border four Indian states, Sikkim, West Bengal, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, and open onto the plains at Phuentsholing, Gelephu and Samdrup Jongkhar; its northern frontier with Tibet runs along the high Himalaya and has not been delimited. The land rises steeply from the edge of the plains to peaks above 7,000 metres, and its fast rivers, among them the Wangchhu, the Punatsangchhu and the Mangdechhu, give it a hydropower potential far beyond its own needs.
Two features make Bhutan's map India's concern. In the west, the Doklam plateau overlooks the Chumbi valley, the wedge of Tibet that reaches south between Sikkim and Bhutan towards the Siliguri Corridor. And because Bhutan has no outlet of its own, all its trade with third countries passes through India, which is why transit, roads and now railways are the substance of the relationship.
02Political context
Bhutan's political system
Bhutan has been a constitutional monarchy since its first Constitution was adopted on 18 July 2008, a transition initiated from the throne by the Fourth King, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, who abdicated in December 2006 in favour of his son, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck. The King is head of state and keeps significant appointive and reserve powers, yet the Constitution also provides that Parliament may move his abdication by a two-thirds vote in a joint sitting, to be confirmed by a national referendum, a provision unusual among monarchies.
Parliament consists of the King, the National Council of 25 members (20 elected on a non-party basis and 5 nominated by the King) and the National Assembly of 47 members. Elections to the Assembly have two rounds: a primary round in which all registered parties compete, and a general round contested by the two leading parties. No party has yet won two Assembly elections in succession: the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa won in 2008, the People's Democratic Party in 2013, the Druk Nyamrup Tshogpa in 2018 and the People's Democratic Party of Tshering Tobgay again in January 2024. The Constitution directs the state to pursue the conditions for Gross National Happiness, which gives development policy a vocabulary of well-being, culture and environment rather than growth alone.
Political and diplomatic developments
Bhutan's King, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, is the anchor of the relationship, and successive elected governments, now led by Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay (in office since January 2024), have kept India at the centre of Bhutan's foreign policy. Visits are frequent and warm: in March 2024 Bhutan conferred the Order of the Druk Gyalpo on Modi, its first award to a foreign head of government, and Modi returned in November 2025 for the 70th birth anniversary of the Fourth King.
The relationship is unusually personal and unusually institutional at once. India's support for Bhutan's Five Year Plans, its hydropower projects and its border roads are administered through long-standing mechanisms, while the political tone is set by the monarchy and India's leadership.
03Historical bilateral relations
The relationship descends from the Treaty of Punakha (1910), under which British India guided Bhutan's external relations. Independent India replaced it with the Treaty of Friendship signed at Darjeeling on 8 August 1949, whose Article 2 provided that Bhutan would be "guided by the advice" of India in its external relations. Nehru's journey to Paro in 1958, across the Chumbi valley, began the development partnership that has defined the relationship since: India financed Bhutan's first Five Year Plan in 1961 and supported its admission to the United Nations in 1971.
Two episodes built the trust on which the relationship rests. In December 2003 the Royal Bhutan Army, in Operation All Clear, expelled the camps of the ULFA, the NDFB and the KLO that had operated from southern Bhutan against India's Northeast. And in February 2007, as Bhutan prepared to become a constitutional monarchy, the two countries revised the 1949 treaty, replacing the "guided by the advice" clause with a commitment to cooperate closely on issues of national interest and not to allow their territory to be used against each other.
The relationship has not been free of strain. India's abrupt withdrawal of fuel subsidies on the eve of Bhutan's 2013 election was widely read in Bhutan as pressure, and it taught New Delhi that its influence works best when unseen. Narendra Modi made Bhutan his first foreign visit as Prime Minister in June 2014, and the standoff at Doklam in 2017 showed the security interests the two share.
Diplomatic timeline
4 events, 1949–2017
The dated events of the Global Political Timeline that involve Bhutan. Open an entry to read it in full.
Treaty of Friendship with BhutanDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineSigned at Darjeeling on 8 August 1949, the treaty provided that Bhutan would be "guided by the advice" of India in its external relations, while India undertook not to interfere in Bhutan's internal administration and returned the territory of Dewangiri. It defined the relationship until its revision in February 2007, which replaced the advice clause with a commitment to close cooperation on national interests.
SAARC founded at DhakaDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineThe leaders of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka adopted the SAARC Charter at Dhaka on 8 December 1985; Afghanistan joined in 2007. The charter excludes bilateral and contentious issues and requires unanimity, which kept the association alive but made it ineffective. No summit has been held since Kathmandu in 2014.
BIMSTEC foundedDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineThe Bangkok Declaration of 6 June 1997 created an economic grouping of Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand, later joined by Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan and renamed the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. Neglected for two decades, it became India's preferred regional platform after SAARC stalled, and its charter was adopted in 2022.
The Doklam standoffDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineOn 16 June 2017 Indian troops stopped a Chinese road crew on the Doklam plateau, territory Bhutan claims near the India–Bhutan–China trijunction. India acted in coordination with Bhutan, citing its security and the 2012 understanding that trijunction points would be settled in consultation with the third country. After 73 days both sides disengaged on 28 August 2017.
04Strategic interests
Bhutan's importance to India is geographic. Its western districts look down on the Chumbi valley and the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow strip that connects India's Northeast with the rest of the country. A Chinese presence on the Doklam plateau would bring Chinese forces within striking distance of that corridor. The Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) and the Border Roads Organisation's Project DANTAK have worked in Bhutan for six decades.
Bhutan has no diplomatic relations with China but has negotiated its boundary with Beijing since 1984. The talks matter to India because a settlement could involve exchanges of territory in the west, near Doklam, for Chinese concessions in the north. India's interest is that no settlement should change the trijunction or open the Doklam ridge to Chinese use; Bhutan's interest is to settle a frontier along which Chinese roads and settlements have advanced.
There is a Bhutanese view that the relationship should mature from protection to partnership between equals, with more room for ties with other states. Indian policy has adapted to this: it no longer treats Bhutan's external relations as its own domain, while relying on the 2007 treaty's commitment that neither country's territory will be used against the other.
05Key agreements
- 1949Treaty of Friendship
Signed at Darjeeling on 8 August 1949; Article 2 provided that Bhutan would be guided by India's advice in external relations.
- 1972Agreement on Trade, Commerce and Transit
Established free trade between the two countries and transit for Bhutan's trade with third countries; renewed periodically, most recently in 2016.
- 1974Agreement on the Chukha Hydroelectric Project
The first of the inter-governmental hydropower projects, financed by India through grant and loan, with power exported to India.
- 2007India–Bhutan Friendship Treaty
Signed on 8 February 2007; replaced the "guided by the advice" clause with a commitment to cooperate closely on national interests and not to allow either territory to be used against the other.
- 2014Framework inter-governmental agreement on joint-venture hydropower projects
Provided for hydropower projects developed jointly by Indian and Bhutanese public sector companies, beginning with Kholongchhu.
- 2025Cross-border rail links
Announced in September 2025: Kokrajhar–Gelephu and Banarhat–Samtse lines, Bhutan's first railways.
06Cooperation
Economy, connectivity, defence and technology: where the two work together, where they do not, and where cooperation could grow.
Economic relationship
Hydropower is the core of the economic relationship and of Bhutan's public finances. India has financed and buys the power of Chukha (336 MW), Kurichhu, Tala (1,020 MW), Mangdechhu (720 MW, 2019) and Punatsangchhu-II (1,020 MW), inaugurated jointly by Modi and the King on 11 November 2025. The 1,200 MW Punatsangchhu-I project has been held up for years by geological problems in the dam site; the two governments decided in November 2025 to resume work on its main dam.
The model is under strain as well as growing. Hydropower debt makes India Bhutan's main creditor, and Bhutan has sought fairer tariffs, access to India's power exchanges and investment beyond electricity. India is Bhutan's largest trading partner under a free-trade arrangement, and the ngultrum is pegged at par to the rupee. Emigration of young Bhutanese, especially to Australia, and pressure on foreign exchange reserves have pushed Thimphu towards a new growth strategy.
The Gelephu Mindfulness City, announced by the King in December 2023 as a special administrative region on the Assam border, is that strategy. India has backed it with transport links and has a stake in its success: a prosperous Gelephu would bind southern Bhutan to the economy of the Northeast.
India’s merchandise trade with Bhutan
2021–22 to 2025–26 · USD billion
- Exports 2025–26
- 1.3
- India to Bhutan
- Imports 2025–26
- 0.8
- Bhutan to India
- Two-way trade 2025–26
- 2.1
- Exports plus imports
- Trade surplus 2025–26
- 0.5
- Exports exceed imports
- Exports from India
- Imports into India
- Balance: exports minus imports
| Financial year | Exports from India | Imports into India | Balance (exports minus imports) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021–22 | 0.9 | 0.5 | +0.4 |
| 2022–23 | 1.1 | 0.5 | +0.6 |
| 2023–24 | 1.0 | 0.3 | +0.7 |
| 2024–25 | 1.3 | 0.6 | +0.7 |
| 2025–26 | 1.3 | 0.8 | +0.5 |
Unit: USD billion. Balance and two-way trade are calculated here from the published exports and imports.
Note: Merchandise trade only; services excluded. Indian financial years (April–March). Figures for 2025–26 are provisional and those for 2021–22 to 2024–25 revised, as published by the Reserve Bank of India from data compiled by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S) of the Department of Commerce.
Official dataSource: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026.
Trade and connectivity
In September 2025 the two governments announced Bhutan's first railway links, both to India: Kokrajhar–Gelephu and Banarhat–Samtse, about 89 km in all at an estimated cost of ₹4,033 crore. Roads built by DANTAK, integrated check posts such as Jaigaon–Phuentsholing, and India's permission for Bhutan to use Indian territory to reach Bangladeshi ports complete the picture. The BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement stalled after Bhutan's upper house declined to ratify it in 2016, out of concern about traffic and environmental pressure. Digital links are growing: Bhutan was among the first countries to adopt RuPay and UPI.
Defence and security
Security cooperation is close and quiet. During the Doklam standoff of June–August 2017, when Indian troops stopped a Chinese road crew on territory Bhutan claims, Bhutan issued a démarche to China and coordinated with India; the standoff ended with disengagement on 28 August 2017. Indian training of the Royal Bhutan Army through IMTRAT, joint intelligence on insurgent groups and disaster cooperation continue. Bhutan does not host Indian combat forces, and both governments prefer it that way.
Opportunities
- Gelephu Mindfulness City as an economic bridge to India's Northeast.
- Bhutan's first railways, linking it to the Indian network.
- New hydropower, solar and green hydrogen projects under joint ventures.
- Digital payments, space cooperation and education links.
- Climate partnership built on Bhutan's carbon-negative status.
07Points of disagreement
Border issues
The India–Bhutan boundary is settled. The difficulties lie on Bhutan's border with China. In the west, China claims areas including the Doklam plateau; in the north, areas such as Jakarlung and Pasamlung. Independent researchers using satellite imagery have documented Chinese roads and villages in areas Bhutan claims.
At the trijunction India's position is that the boundary point lies at Batang La and that, under the 2012 understanding with China, trijunction points are to be finalised in consultation with the third country concerned. China's claim places the trijunction further south. Bhutan and China signed a memorandum on a Three-Step Roadmap for expediting their boundary negotiations in October 2021 and agreed on the functions of a Joint Technical Team on delimitation and demarcation in 2023.
Challenges
- A Bhutan–China boundary settlement that could alter the Doklam trijunction or the security of the Siliguri Corridor.
- Bhutan's rising hydropower debt and the changing economics of electricity in India.
- Emigration of young Bhutanese and pressure on Bhutan's foreign exchange.
- Delays in projects such as Punatsangchhu-I.
- The temptation for India to treat a close partner as a client.
08Regional context
Bhutan participates in BIMSTEC, SAARC and the BBIN framework and has built ties with Bangladesh, with which it signed a preferential trade agreement in 2020. Its carbon-negative development and its philosophy of Gross National Happiness give it a voice in climate diplomacy out of proportion to its size. Regionally, Bhutan's relationship with India is the model India holds up for its Neighbourhood First policy, which also makes it the relationship China most wants to dilute.
09India's diplomatic approach
India's approach is to fund Bhutan's own priorities, to keep its influence discreet and to treat hydropower as shared prosperity rather than extraction. Modi described the relationship as "B2B": Bharat to Bhutan. India committed ₹10,000 crore to Bhutan's 13th Five Year Plan (2024–29), and its support for Gelephu signals a shift from aid to investment.
The approach works because Bhutan's leadership values it, but it rests on assumptions that cannot be taken for granted: that Bhutan's boundary talks will respect India's security, that hydropower will stay profitable as Indian electricity markets change, and that a new generation of Bhutanese will see India as an opportunity rather than a ceiling. Critics argue India should open its markets and labour mobility further, so that Bhutan's young people find their futures in India rather than abroad.
10Competing interpretations
Competing perspectives
How the relationship looks from different standpoints. A strong answer weighs them rather than adopting one.
The Himalayan security reading
A security reading begins at Doklam. The plateau overlooks the Chumbi valley and, beyond it, the Siliguri Corridor, so a Chinese presence there would bring Chinese forces within striking distance of India's link to its Northeast. Bhutan's boundary talks with China therefore matter to India as much as to Thimphu: a settlement that traded territory in the west for Chinese concessions in the north could move the trijunction south of Batang La or open the Doklam ridge to Chinese use. The standoff of 2017 showed the two governments acting together, Bhutan issuing a démarche to China while Indian troops stopped a Chinese road crew on territory Bhutan claims. The realist's worry is that Chinese roads and villages in areas Bhutan claims change facts while talks continue, and that a small state which cannot defend its frontier alone may settle on terms that weaken India's position.
The hydropower economist's reading
An economic reading sees a partnership that has carried Bhutan's public finances while tying them to one buyer. Chukha, Tala, Mangdechhu and Punatsangchhu-II sell their power to India, which also holds Bhutan's hydropower debt, and Bhutan now seeks fairer tariffs, access to India's power exchanges and investment beyond electricity. Dependency theorists read this as a periphery tied to a core; defenders answer that the revenues have financed Bhutan's welfare and education. The pressures are real all the same: young Bhutanese are emigrating, foreign exchange reserves are strained and Punatsangchhu-I has been delayed for years. On this view Gelephu Mindfulness City and the first railways are the test of whether India can move from aid and electricity purchases to investment, and from a ceiling on Bhutanese ambition to an opportunity.
Thimphu's view of India
Seen from Thimphu, the relationship is one between sovereign equals that must keep proving it is not a protectorate. The revision of the 1949 treaty in 2007, which dropped its advice clause, changed the norm as well as the text, and the abrupt withdrawal of fuel subsidies before the 2013 election was widely read in Bhutan as pressure. Bhutan values India's support for its Five Year Plans, hydropower and roads, and cooperates closely on security, yet it hosts no Indian combat forces and prefers it that way. Its boundary talks with China are, from this standpoint, an exercise of sovereignty: Bhutan needs to settle a frontier along which Chinese roads and settlements have advanced, and Indian policy has adapted by no longer treating Bhutan's external relations as its own domain. Gross National Happiness gives it a vocabulary of its own, and a voice in climate diplomacy beyond its size.
The Neighbourhood First showcase
A regional reading treats Bhutan as the model India holds up for its Neighbourhood First policy, which is also why China most wants to dilute the relationship. India's method here has been to fund Bhutan's own priorities and keep its influence discreet, a lesson New Delhi drew from the reaction to the fuel subsidy withdrawal of 2013. The showcase carries risks of its own, beginning with the temptation to treat a close partner as a client, and critics argue that India should open its markets and labour mobility further so that young Bhutanese find their futures in India rather than abroad. Bhutan's own regional choices, from its preferential trade agreement with Bangladesh to its upper house's refusal in 2016 to ratify the BBIN motor vehicles agreement, show that it weighs sub-regional schemes on its own terms, and that India's model depends on Bhutanese consent rather than Indian design.
Reading the relationship through IR theory
Realism sees Bhutan as a buffer state whose survival between two much larger neighbours depends on aligning with one of them. Bhutan has bandwagoned with India since 1949, and Doklam in 2017 showed why: road-building by one power in a contested area reads to the other as a threat, the classic security dilemma of the Himalaya. Realists also expect China to use Bhutan's boundary talks to probe the India–Bhutan bond, and Bhutan to keep the talks going to settle a frontier it cannot defend alone.
Liberalism points to the hydropower partnership as a case of complex interdependence: cooperation across many channels, in which economic ties make conflict costly. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye also warned that asymmetric interdependence is a source of power, and Bhutan's dependence on Indian markets, credit and tariffs is the material behind Bhutanese worries about the relationship. Dependency theory would push the point further, reading a small producer of electricity and raw materials tied to one large buyer as a periphery to India's core, though the revenues have financed Bhutan's welfare and education.
Constructivism captures what material accounts miss. The revision of the 1949 treaty in 2007 was a change in norms as much as in text, from a protectorate's deference to a relationship between sovereign equals, and Bhutan's identity as a Buddhist monarchy pursuing Gross National Happiness shapes both how it presents itself and what it asks of India. The trust built over decades, rather than any balance of forces, explains why Bhutan does not need Indian troops on its soil to feel secure.
11Contemporary developments
As of 20 November 2026
The relationship is in good repair and focused on projects. Modi's state visit of 11–12 November 2025 combined the 70th birth anniversary celebrations of the Fourth King and a Global Peace Prayer Festival with the inauguration of Punatsangchhu-II and the start of power exports from it; the two sides agreed to restart work on the main dam of Punatsangchhu-I, to extend UPI payments for Bhutanese visitors to India and to open a new immigration check post at Hatisar in Assam to ease travel to Gelephu. Survey work on the Kokrajhar–Gelephu rail line has been reported, with estimates of its length varying between about 57 and 69 km.
The External Affairs Minister's visit of 16–18 September 2026 carried the agenda forward. The two sides welcomed the signing of a concessional line of credit of ₹4,000 crore for energy projects, recalled the tariff protocol for Punatsangchhu-II and the resumption of dam construction at Punatsangchhu-I, noted progress on the Gelephu–Kokrajhar and Samtse–Banarhat rail links and on talks to renew the Agreement on Trade, Commerce and Transit, and recorded India's decision to open a temporary immigration facility at Hatisar for third-country nationals attending Gelephu's 108 Chortens project on 1 November 2026, ahead of the permanent check post. India also thanked Bhutan for supporting its candidature for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council in 2028–29.
Bhutan's talks with China have also gathered pace. The 15th Expert Group Meeting on the boundary was held in Beijing from 30 March to 1 April 2026 and the 16th in Thimphu from 13 to 15 October 2026, the latter with the fourth meeting of the Joint Technical Team on delimitation and demarcation; both sides spoke of building on the momentum of the Three-Step Roadmap and left the date of the next meeting to be fixed later. India follows the process closely, particularly as it bears on the Doklam trijunction.
12UPSC syllabus connections
Syllabus lines
GS-II
India and its neighbourhoodOfficial wording: “India and its neighborhood- relations.”
Where it is taught on this platformGS-II
Groupings and agreementsOfficial wording: “Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India's interests.”
Where it is taught on this platformPrelims
Current eventsOfficial wording: “Current events of national and international importance.”
Where it is taught on this platform
Quoted in UPSC’s official wording.
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
1 question · 2024
2024 · PSIR II · Q5(b) · 10 marks
Bhutan has historically been an ally of India, but the China-Bhutan border related issues have become a security issue for India. Discuss.
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to India and Bhutan in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Examine the significance of the Bhutan–China boundary negotiations for India's security.
How to approach it
Explain Doklam, the Chumbi valley and the Siliguri Corridor; refer to the Three-Step Roadmap and the trijunction question.
- Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
How did the revision of the India–Bhutan Friendship Treaty in 2007 reflect a changing relationship? Discuss.
How to approach it
Contrast Article 2 of 1949 with the 2007 text; link to Bhutan's constitutional monarchy and its search for autonomy.
- Q3UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
Hydropower has been the foundation of India–Bhutan relations. Assess its benefits and the emerging strains in this model.
How to approach it
Cover revenue, debt, tariffs and delays; add Gelephu and diversification; give Bhutanese and Indian perspectives.
- Q4UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
Is India–Bhutan relations a model for India's Neighbourhood First policy? Critically examine.
How to approach it
Identify what makes the relationship work (trust, monarchy, development partnership); consider whether it can be replicated; note the 2013 episode.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
13Relevant PSIR topics
Paper II · BUnit 3
India and South AsiaOfficial syllabus: “India and South Asia: (a) Regional Co-operation: SAARC – past performance and future prospects. (b) South Asia as a Free Trade Area. (c) India's "Look East" policy. (d) Impediments to regional co-operation: river water disputes; illegal cross-border migration; ethnic conflicts and insurgencies; border disputes.”
Each line is quoted from the official PSIR syllabus.
Explore further
PSIR Optional
Country
Organisation
Sources
- 01Ministry of External Affairs, India–Bhutan bilateral relations (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
- 02India–Bhutan Friendship Treaty, 8 February 2007. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
- 03PM Modi to visit Bhutan, inaugurate Punatsangchhu-II hydroelectric project and attend Global Peace Prayer Festival (opens in a new tab). News on AIR, 8 November 2025
- 04PM Modi, Bhutan King discuss cooperation in multiple areas including energy, connectivity, defence (opens in a new tab). Business Standard (PTI), 11 November 2025
- 05India, Bhutan to establish first rail link with ₹4,033 crore outlay (opens in a new tab). Business Standard, 29 September 2025
- 06Joint press release on the 16th Expert Group Meeting on the China–Bhutan boundary issues (opens in a new tab). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 15 October 2026
- 07Joint press release on the 15th Expert Group Meeting on the China–Bhutan boundary issues (opens in a new tab). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 1 April 2026
- 08MEA press statement on recent developments in the Doklam area, 30 June 2017. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 30 June 2017
- 09India–Bhutan: PM promises timely completion of rail links (opens in a new tab). Business Standard, 11 November 2025
- 10India–Bhutan border connectivity set to grow with new immigration check post in Assam's Hatisar (opens in a new tab). Swarajya, November 2025
- 11Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026
- 12Joint Press Release: Visit of External Affairs Minister of India to Bhutan (September 16–18, 2026) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 18 September 2026