India's neighbourhood
India and Nepal
An open-border neighbour bound to India by the 1950 treaty, kinship and trade, whose politics swing between dependence and assertion. After the Gen Z uprising of 2025 and a landslide for a new party in 2026, Kathmandu promises a reset with India.
India and Nepal at a glance
- Relationship
- India's neighbourhood
01Geography
Nepal is a landlocked state of about 147,000 sq km between India and the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. It falls from the high Himalaya, including Everest on the boundary with Tibet, through the hills and the Kathmandu valley to the Tarai, the strip of plains along an open border of about 1,750 km with Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Sikkim. Most of its people and farmland lie in the hills and the Tarai, closer to India than to Tibet.
Rivers that feed the Ganges, the Kosi, the Gandaki, the Karnali and the Mahakali among them, descend through Nepal, which gives it a large hydropower potential and makes its floods a problem for Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Its routes north to China cross high passes such as Rasuwagadhi and Tatopani that snow and landslides often close, so its trade with third countries passes through Indian ports. Geography makes India indispensable and China an option, which is the starting point of every Nepali foreign policy.
02Political context
Nepal's political system
Nepal is a federal democratic republic under the constitution of 20 September 2015, the first written by an elected Constituent Assembly; the monarchy was abolished in 2008. The President, Ram Chandra Paudel since 2023, is head of state, and executive power lies with the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, responsible to the House of Representatives. The Federal Parliament has two chambers: the House of Representatives of 275 members, 165 elected from single-member constituencies and 110 by proportional representation, and the National Assembly of 59. Seven provinces have their own assemblies and governments.
No prime minister has completed a full five-year term since democracy was restored in 1990, and for most of the period after 2008 governments rotated among coalitions of the Nepali Congress, the CPN-UML and the Maoist Centre. The uprising of September 2025 broke that cycle. Under an interim government led by Sushila Karki, the elections of 5 March 2026 gave the Rastriya Swatantra Party 182 seats, and Balendra Shah became Prime Minister on 27 March 2026 with a majority no government had enjoyed for decades.
Political and diplomatic developments
Nepal's coalition politics have made the relationship hostage to personalities. K. P. Sharma Oli built his appeal on resistance to India — he steered the 2020 map amendment through Parliament — while other leaders, from Sher Bahadur Deuba to Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda), have alternated between accommodation and complaint. Every government has sought Indian aid and Chinese balance at once.
The rupture of September 2025 changed the cast. A ban on social media platforms set off protests led by young people; on 8 September police fire killed at least nineteen demonstrators, and the next day Parliament, party offices and politicians' homes were set ablaze and Oli resigned. Sushila Karki, a former Chief Justice, led an interim government to elections on 5 March 2026. The Rastriya Swatantra Party won 182 of 275 seats, just short of two-thirds, while the Nepali Congress fell to 38 and the CPN-UML to 25; Balendra Shah, the 35-year-old former mayor of Kathmandu, who defeated Oli in his own constituency, was sworn in as Prime Minister on 27 March 2026.
New Delhi moved quickly. Modi congratulated Shah and invited him to visit; Shah replied that he was eager to work closely with India, and his foreign minister, Shishir Khanal, said territorial disputes would be pursued through dialogue rather than confrontation. The new government's nationalism is generational and anti-corruption rather than anti-Indian, but it has not dropped Nepal's territorial claims.
03Historical bilateral relations
The modern relationship rests on the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 31 July 1950, concluded with the Rana regime months before its fall. It gave each country's citizens national treatment in the other, kept the border open and, through an exchange of letters, committed both governments to consult on threats to security. India then helped broker the "Delhi compromise" of 1951 that restored King Tribhuvan and introduced party politics. From the start, India was both guarantor and interferer, and Nepali nationalism defined itself partly against it.
King Mahendra's dismissal of the elected government in 1960 and his partyless Panchayat system brought a policy of balancing India with China, symbolised by the Chinese-built road to Kodari. The lapse of the trade and transit treaties in March 1989 led to a year of shortages that Nepalis remember as a blockade; it fed the movement that restored multiparty democracy in 1990.
India's influence was most visible in the transition from monarchy. After the Maoist insurgency (1996–2006) and King Gyanendra's seizure of power in 2005, New Delhi facilitated the 12-point understanding between the Maoists and the parliamentary parties in November 2005, which led to the peace process and the abolition of the monarchy in 2008. The constitution promulgated on 20 September 2015 then provoked Madhesi protests that blocked the border crossings for months; Nepal's government blamed India for an unofficial blockade, which India denied. The episode, coming months after India's large relief operation for the April 2015 earthquake, did lasting damage to trust.
Diplomatic timeline
3 events, 1950–1997
The dated events of the Global Political Timeline that involve Nepal. Open an entry to read it in full.
India–Nepal Treaty of Peace and FriendshipDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineConcluded on 31 July 1950 with the Rana government, the treaty provides for national treatment of each country's citizens in the other and an open border, and, through an exchange of letters, for consultation on threats to security. It remains the legal basis of the relationship and the object of Nepali demands for revision, which an Eminent Persons Group examined between 2016 and 2018.
SAARC founded at DhakaDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineThe leaders of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka adopted the SAARC Charter at Dhaka on 8 December 1985; Afghanistan joined in 2007. The charter excludes bilateral and contentious issues and requires unanimity, which kept the association alive but made it ineffective. No summit has been held since Kathmandu in 2014.
BIMSTEC foundedDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineThe Bangkok Declaration of 6 June 1997 created an economic grouping of Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand, later joined by Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan and renamed the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. Neglected for two decades, it became India's preferred regional platform after SAARC stalled, and its charter was adopted in 2022.
04Strategic interests
Nepal sits on the Himalayan frontier between India and China, and the open border of about 1,750 km is both a bond and a vulnerability. Millions of Nepalis live and work in India, Gorkha soldiers have served in the Indian Army since independence, and families straddle the border in the Madhesh. The same openness has been exploited for smuggling and counterfeit currency, and in 1999 the hijacking of IC-814 began in Kathmandu.
China's presence has grown steadily. Nepal signed a memorandum on the Belt and Road in 2017 and a framework for Belt and Road cooperation during Oli's visit to Beijing in December 2024; Chinese aid, investment and the idea of a trans-Himalayan railway offer Kathmandu an alternative it uses for leverage. India's concern is less that Nepal will align with China than that Indian influence will be crowded out.
Nepali scholars and politicians argue that the problem is Indian condescension: the 1950 treaty's asymmetry, the micromanagement of Nepali politics and the 2015 crossings. Indian analysts reply that Nepal's leaders play the "China card" for domestic gain while relying on Indian goodwill. Both readings contain truth, which is why the Eminent Persons Group created in 2016 to review the relationship, including the 1950 treaty, matters; its report, completed in 2018, has not been formally received by India.
05Key agreements
- 1950Treaty of Peace and Friendship
Signed on 31 July 1950; provides for national treatment of each other's citizens and an open border, with letters on security consultation. Nepal has long sought its revision.
- 1954Kosi Agreement
Governs the Kosi barrage and embankments built by India in Nepal for flood control and irrigation; a long-standing source of Nepali grievance over terms and flooding.
- 1959Gandak Agreement
Provides for irrigation and power from the Gandak barrage.
- 1996Mahakali Treaty
Signed on 12 February 1996 for the integrated development of the Mahakali river, including the Sarada and Tanakpur barrages and the proposed Pancheshwar project.
- 2014Power Trade Agreement
Opened cross-border electricity trade and transmission between the two countries.
- 2015BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement
Signed by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal to allow passenger and cargo vehicles to cross borders; not in force for all four.
- 2024Long-term agreement on power trade
Signed in January 2024; India intends to import 10,000 MW from Nepal over ten years.
06Cooperation
Economy, connectivity, defence and technology: where the two work together, where they do not, and where cooperation could grow.
Economic relationship
India is Nepal's largest trading partner, its main source of investment and the route for nearly all its third-country trade, which passes through Kolkata, Haldia and Visakhapatnam. The asymmetry of trade, and Nepal's large deficit with India, is a constant political grievance. In October 2026 the UN General Assembly deferred Nepal's graduation from least-developed-country status, as it did Bangladesh's, to November 2029.
Hydropower is the field where interdependence works in Nepal's favour. Under the long-term agreement of January 2024, India intends to import 10,000 MW from Nepal within ten years; Nepal already sells electricity to India and, since November 2024, to Bangladesh through Indian transmission lines, the first trilateral power trade in the subregion. Indian companies are building Arun-3 and other projects. The Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project under the 1996 Mahakali Treaty is the great unfinished project: three decades on, its detailed project report is still unagreed.
India’s merchandise trade with Nepal
2021–22 to 2025–26 · USD billion
- Exports 2025–26
- 7.4
- India to Nepal
- Imports 2025–26
- 1.9
- Nepal to India
- Two-way trade 2025–26
- 9.3
- Exports plus imports
- Trade surplus 2025–26
- 5.5
- Exports exceed imports
- Exports from India
- Imports into India
- Balance: exports minus imports
| Financial year | Exports from India | Imports into India | Balance (exports minus imports) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021–22 | 9.6 | 1.4 | +8.2 |
| 2022–23 | 8.1 | 0.8 | +7.3 |
| 2023–24 | 7.0 | 0.8 | +6.2 |
| 2024–25 | 7.4 | 1.3 | +6.1 |
| 2025–26 | 7.4 | 1.9 | +5.5 |
Unit: USD billion. Balance and two-way trade are calculated here from the published exports and imports.
Note: Merchandise trade only; services excluded. Indian financial years (April–March). Figures for 2025–26 are provisional and those for 2021–22 to 2024–25 revised, as published by the Reserve Bank of India from data compiled by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S) of the Department of Commerce.
Official dataSource: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026.
Trade and connectivity
India's connectivity diplomacy in Nepal has delivered: integrated check posts at Raxaul–Birgunj and Jogbani–Biratnagar, the Jaynagar–Kurtha railway, and the Motihari–Amlekhgunj petroleum pipeline, opened in 2019 as South Asia's first cross-border oil pipeline. A railway from Raxaul to Kathmandu is under study, as is China's competing trans-Himalayan line.
Nepal wants more routes to the sea. It has sought access to additional Indian ports, including in Gujarat and Odisha, and better transit terms; the BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement of 2015, which would allow vehicles to move among Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal, has not entered into force across all four.
Defence and security
Security cooperation is close but politically sensitive. The Sashastra Seema Bal and the Armed Police Force manage the open border, and the two armies have a tradition of conferring honorary rank on each other's chiefs. Gorkha recruitment has been a casualty of the Agnipath scheme: since 2022 Nepal has not allowed recruitment under the four-year terms, which it says depart from the 1947 tripartite agreement among India, Nepal and Britain. Disaster response, from the 2015 earthquake onwards, is the most visible form of Indian security assistance.
Opportunities
- Hydropower exports to India and Bangladesh under the 2024 long-term agreement.
- A new government with a large majority and a reformist mandate.
- Cross-border railways, check posts and pipelines that reduce the cost of Nepal's trade.
- Review of the 1950 treaty on the basis of the Eminent Persons Group's work.
- Buddhist and cultural circuits linking Lumbini with Indian sites.
07Points of disagreement
Border issues
About 98 per cent of the boundary has been demarcated; Kalapani and Susta are the outstanding sectors. The Kalapani question turns on the Treaty of Sugauli (1816), which made the Kali river the boundary. Nepal claims that the river rises at Limpiyadhura, which would place Kalapani and Lipulekh in Nepal; India holds that the river begins below the Lipulekh pass and that the area is part of the Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand. In May 2020, after India opened a road to Lipulekh, Nepal issued a new political map and amended its constitution to include the area. India called this a unilateral act not based on historical facts and evidence.
The question resurfaced in August 2025, when India and China agreed to reopen border trade through Lipulekh, and again in May 2026, when Nepal sent diplomatic notes to both India and China protesting the use of the route for that year's Kailash Mansarovar Yatra. India's position is that the Lipulekh route has been in use since 1954 and that Nepal's claims are untenable, an artificial enlargement of territory not based on historical facts. In June 2026 Shah told Parliament that Britain, whose East India Company was party to the Treaty of Sugauli, should take an interest in the dispute; India rejected any third-party role, and the two sides have continued to discuss the matter through existing bilateral mechanisms.
Challenges
- The Kalapani–Lipulekh–Limpiyadhura dispute, now written into Nepal's constitution and map.
- Political volatility in Kathmandu and the memory of 2015, which make any Indian move look like interference.
- Nepal's trade deficit and its dependence on Indian transit.
- Chinese infrastructure and political influence, used by Nepali leaders as leverage.
- The suspension of Gorkha recruitment under Agnipath.
08Regional context
Nepal hosts the SAARC secretariat, and SAARC's paralysis has cost it most among the smaller members. It participates in BIMSTEC and the BBIN framework, and the Nepal–India–Bangladesh power trade shows what sub-regional cooperation can do when it is built on electricity rather than declarations.
China is the other pole of Nepal's foreign policy. Kathmandu also courts the United States, whose Millennium Challenge Corporation compact, ratified by Nepal's Parliament in 2022 after fierce debate, became a proxy for great-power rivalry in Nepali politics.
09India's diplomatic approach
India's stated policy is Neighbourhood First, expressed in Nepal through connectivity, hydropower, development projects, scholarships and Buddhist cultural links. Narendra Modi's 2014 visit, the first by an Indian prime minister in seventeen years, promised a new beginning; the 2015 crossings and the 2020 map dispute showed how fragile such beginnings are.
The lesson most observers draw is that India gains when it lets interdependence work and loses when it is seen to manage Nepali politics. Critics in India argue the opposite risk: that restraint leaves the field to China. The arrival of a new political generation in 2026 is a test of whether India can deal with a government that owes it nothing and owes the old parties nothing either.
10Competing interpretations
Competing perspectives
How the relationship looks from different standpoints. A strong answer weighs them rather than adopting one.
The security hawk's reading
A security-minded reading sees Nepal first as a stretch of the Himalayan frontier between India and China, where the open border of about 1,750 km is a vulnerability as much as a bond. The openness that lets millions of Nepalis live and work in India has also been exploited for smuggling and counterfeit currency, and the hijacking of IC-814 began in Kathmandu. China's presence has grown through a Belt and Road memorandum in 2017, a framework for cooperation signed in December 2024, aid, investment and the idea of a trans-Himalayan railway. The hawk's fear is less that Nepal will align with China than that Indian influence will be crowded out, and the halt to Gorkha recruitment since 2022 weakens one of the oldest human links between the two countries. On this view, restraint that leaves the field to China is the greater risk.
The interdependence reading
An economic reading sees an interdependence unlike any other in South Asia, and one that has begun to work in Nepal's favour. India is Nepal's largest trading partner, its main source of investment and the route for nearly all its third-country trade, and the resulting deficit is a constant grievance in Kathmandu. Electricity reverses the flow: under the long-term agreement of January 2024 India intends to import 10,000 MW within ten years, and since November 2024 Nepal has also sold power to Bangladesh through Indian transmission lines. Integrated check posts, the Jaynagar–Kurtha railway and the Motihari–Amlekhgunj pipeline have lowered the cost of Nepal's trade. The unfinished business is telling. The detailed project report for Pancheshwar is still unagreed three decades after the Mahakali Treaty, and Nepal still seeks access to more Indian ports and better transit terms.
The restraint debate in New Delhi
Within India, the argument about Nepal concerns method more than goals. The lesson most observers draw from the crossings of 2015 and the map dispute of 2020 is that India gains when it lets interdependence work and loses when it is seen to manage Nepali politics, as Nepali critics say it has done since the Delhi compromise of 1951. Indian analysts of a harder school reply that Nepal's leaders play the China card for domestic gain while relying on Indian goodwill, and that restraint leaves the field to Beijing. Indian decisions also shape the relationship quietly: the four-year terms of the Agnipath scheme led Nepal to stop Gorkha recruitment, and India has not formally received the report of the Eminent Persons Group on the 1950 treaty, completed in 2018. A government in Kathmandu that owes India nothing will test which school is right.
The view from Kathmandu
Seen from Kathmandu, geography makes India indispensable and China an option, and Nepali nationalism has been built partly against the larger neighbour. The grievances are concrete: the asymmetry of the 1950 treaty, the shortages of 1989 that Nepalis remember as a blockade, the closed crossings of 2015, and a boundary dispute that the constitutional amendment of 2020 turned into a matter of national identity. Prithvi Narayan Shah's image of a yam between two boulders still describes the logic of balancing one neighbour against the other. The government elected in 2026 adds a generational, anti-corruption nationalism that is not anti-Indian, and its foreign minister has promised to pursue territorial claims through dialogue rather than confrontation. Yet it has not dropped those claims, it protested the use of Lipulekh for the 2026 pilgrimage, and Shah's suggestion of a British role shows that sovereignty, not hostility, sets its limits.
Reading the relationship through IR theory
Realism begins with the image Prithvi Narayan Shah, the eighteenth-century founder of the unified kingdom, used for his country: a yam between two boulders. A small state between two large ones must balance or bandwagon, and Nepal has done both, relying on India for its economy and security while invoking China for leverage. Nepalis have often read Indian policy as an effort to keep Nepal within an Indian sphere, the logic of a regional power that treats the Himalaya as its security perimeter.
Liberal accounts point to an interdependence unlike any other in South Asia: an open border, national treatment for each other's citizens, millions of Nepalis working in India, Gorkha soldiers in the Indian Army and electricity flowing both ways. The 2024 power agreement and the first trilateral power trade with Bangladesh show how interdependence can turn asymmetry into mutual benefit. The border disruption of 2015 shows its other face: dependence on one neighbour for fuel and goods is a vulnerability that the neighbour can exploit, or be accused of exploiting.
Constructivism explains the politics. Nepali nationalism has been built partly in opposition to India, around sovereignty, maps and the memory of 1989 and 2015, and the constitutional amendment of 2020 turned a boundary dispute into a matter of national identity that no government in Kathmandu can easily concede. Madhesi communities of the Tarai, with close ties across the border, experience both the Nepali state and India differently from the hill elites who long dominated politics. Postcolonial scholars add that the Kalapani dispute is a legacy of colonial cartography: the Treaty of Sugauli named the Kali river without a map, and British maps of different periods placed its source differently, so that both sides can cite colonial evidence.
11Contemporary developments
As of 20 November 2026
Nepal has the most popular government it has had in years and a relationship with India that both sides want to reset. Rabi Lamichhane, chief of the ruling party, met Modi and the External Affairs Minister in New Delhi, and Shah's first bilateral visit abroad, to India, was due to begin on 22 November 2026; reports in Kathmandu said it had been shortened from four days to two. The agenda listed in Kathmandu includes reconstruction assistance after the unrest of 2025, hydropower and agreement on the detailed project report for Pancheshwar, trade and transit, access to additional ports and the boundary, and New Delhi said the visit would cover the entire spectrum of relations. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri prepared the visit in Kathmandu on 4–5 November, calling on Shah and discussing possible outcomes, and the Nepali leadership thanked India for its help after the Rasuwa–Bhotekoshi floods. No agreements had been announced before the visit.
The boundary is the friction point. Nepal protested to India and China over the use of the Lipulekh route for the 2026 Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, and Shah's suggestion of a British role drew a firm Indian rejection of third-party involvement.
12UPSC syllabus connections
Syllabus lines
GS-II
India and its neighbourhoodOfficial wording: “India and its neighborhood- relations.”
Where it is taught on this platformGS-II
Groupings and agreementsOfficial wording: “Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India's interests.”
Where it is taught on this platformPrelims
Current eventsOfficial wording: “Current events of national and international importance.”
Where it is taught on this platform
Quoted in UPSC’s official wording.
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
2 questions · 2025–2026
2026 · PSIR II · Q6(a) · 20 marks
Accelerating of Chinese influence across South Asia is fundamentally reshaping the region’s geopolitical landscape. This is a big foreign policy challenge for India. Analyse.
2025 · PSIR II · Q8(c) · 15 marks
Discuss the potential role India can play in initiating a possible phase of trilateral economic engagement among India, China and Nepal.
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to India and Nepal in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Examine the Kalapani–Lipulekh boundary question between India and Nepal and suggest a way forward consistent with India's position.
How to approach it
Explain the Sugauli treaty and the competing sources of the Kali; note the 2020 map and India's response; propose bilateral mechanisms.
- Q2UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
Should the India–Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 be revised? Discuss.
How to approach it
Set out what the treaty gives each side (open border, national treatment, security letters); weigh Nepali grievances against the benefits Nepalis enjoy; refer to the Eminent Persons Group.
- Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Hydropower can turn India–Nepal asymmetry into interdependence. Comment.
How to approach it
Use the 2024 agreement, trilateral trade with Bangladesh and stalled Pancheshwar; discuss pricing and trust.
- Q4UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
What does the political transformation in Nepal since 2025 mean for India's Neighbourhood First policy?
How to approach it
Describe the uprising and the 2026 election; analyse the new government's priorities; argue how India should adapt, including on China.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
13Relevant PSIR topics
Paper II · BUnit 3
India and South AsiaOfficial syllabus: “India and South Asia: (a) Regional Co-operation: SAARC – past performance and future prospects. (b) South Asia as a Free Trade Area. (c) India's "Look East" policy. (d) Impediments to regional co-operation: river water disputes; illegal cross-border migration; ethnic conflicts and insurgencies; border disputes.”
Each line is quoted from the official PSIR syllabus.
Explore further
PSIR Optional
Country
Organisation
Foreign policy
Dictionary
Sources
- 01Ministry of External Affairs, India–Nepal bilateral relations (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
- 02Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal, 31 July 1950. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
- 03Parliamentary Elections in Nepal (CRS Insight IN12677) (opens in a new tab). Congressional Research Service, 31 March 2026
- 04Ex-rapper Shah sworn in as Nepal prime minister after sweeping election win (opens in a new tab). Daily Maverick (AFP), 27 March 2026
- 05Five key issues on the agenda during Prime Minister Shah's India visit (opens in a new tab). The Kathmandu Post, 6 November 2026
- 06Reconstruction aid, strategic ties, pending disputes on PM's India visit agenda (opens in a new tab). The Kathmandu Post, 6 November 2026
- 07Nepal PM Balen Shah plans India visit in November, first bilateral trip since taking office (opens in a new tab). Business Today, 15 October 2026
- 08Nepal's Lamichhane meets Modi amid frictions over India's use of the Lipulekh route (opens in a new tab). The Wire, 2026
- 09Despite public silence, India and Nepal discuss boundary dispute, agree to talks under existing mechanism (opens in a new tab). The Wire, 2026
- 10Nepal election results: Balendra Shah's party wins in a landslide (opens in a new tab). Yahoo News (Reuters), March 2026
- 11India rejects 'third-party involvement' in boundary talks with Nepal (opens in a new tab). The Kathmandu Post, 3 June 2026
- 12India rejects Nepal's Lipulekh claim after Mansarovar Yatra announcement triggers protest (opens in a new tab). The Wire, May 2026
- 13Nepal PM's India visit to cover entire spectrum of bilateral ties, says New Delhi (opens in a new tab). Asia News Network, November 2026
- 14Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026
- 15Joint Press Release: Official Visit of Foreign Secretary Shri Vikram Misri to Nepal (04–05 November 2026) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 5 November 2026