India's neighbourhood
India and Sri Lanka
A maritime neighbour tied to India by geography, faith and the Tamil question. India's lifeline in the 2022 economic crisis and the first defence MoU in 2025 have steadied ties under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, with China's presence the constant test.
India and Sri Lanka at a glance
- Relationship
- India's neighbourhood
01Geography
Sri Lanka is an island of about 65,600 sq km off India's south-eastern coast, separated from Tamil Nadu by the Palk Strait and the Gulf of Mannar; at the closest point, between Dhanushkodi and Talaimannar, the two coasts are about 30 km apart, joined by the chain of shoals called Adam's Bridge or Ram Setu. The island lies close to the main shipping lane between the Strait of Malacca and the Red Sea, and its harbours, Colombo, Hambantota and Trincomalee, one of the finest natural harbours in Asia, have long drawn outside powers.
The north and east, where Sri Lankan Tamils are concentrated, face Tamil Nadu across the Palk Bay, a shallow sea in which fishermen from both countries compete for the same grounds. The Sinhalese majority, about three-quarters of the population, lives mainly in the south, west and centre. A strategic coastline and an ethnic geography that reaches across the Palk Strait are the two facts that have defined India's interest in the island.
02Political context
Sri Lanka's political system
Sri Lanka is a unitary republic with an executive presidency, created by the constitution of 1978. The President, directly elected for five years, is head of state and government and commander-in-chief, and appoints the Prime Minister and cabinet from the 225-member Parliament, which is elected by proportional representation. Successive amendments have moved power back and forth between President and Parliament: the Eighteenth (2010) expanded the presidency, the Nineteenth (2015) curtailed it, the Twentieth (2020) restored it and the Twenty-first (2022) partly reversed that again. The Thirteenth Amendment of 1987 created elected provincial councils, but no provincial elections have been held since the councils' terms expired between 2017 and 2019.
Anura Kumara Dissanayake, leader of the JVP-led National People's Power, has been President since September 2024, and the NPP won 159 of 225 seats in the parliamentary election of November 2024, the largest majority won by a single party under the proportional system. The NPP has promised to abolish the executive presidency and to draft a new constitution, and its record on provincial devolution is the question Tamil parties, and India, watch most closely.
Political and diplomatic developments
Anura Kumara Dissanayake's election in September 2024 brought to power the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, whose insurrection of 1987–89 was fought partly against the Indo-Lanka Accord. His government's National People's Power alliance won 159 of 225 seats in November 2024. Expectations of friction proved wrong: Dissanayake made India his first state visit in December 2024, assured India that Sri Lanka would not allow its territory to be used against Indian interests, and received Narendra Modi in April 2025, when Sri Lanka conferred its Mitra Vibhushana on him and the two governments signed their first defence cooperation memorandum. Dissanayake returned to New Delhi for the AI Impact Summit in February 2026 and thanked Modi for India's support after Cyclone Ditwah.
The Tamil question remains on India's agenda. India has consistently called for full implementation of the 13th Amendment and for elections to the provincial councils, which have not been held for years. Sri Lanka's governments regard the matter as internal; India's position is that the Accord made it a bilateral commitment. India's votes on Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council have varied: it voted for resolutions in 2012 and 2013, abstained in 2014, and abstained again when resolutions were put to a vote in 2021 and 2022.
03Historical bilateral relations
The first problem of the independent relationship was citizenship. The descendants of the Tamil labourers the British had brought to the plantations were made stateless by Ceylon's citizenship laws of 1948–49; the Sirima–Shastri Pact of 1964 and a further agreement in 1974 divided them between repatriation to India and Sri Lankan citizenship. The maritime boundary agreements of 1974 and 1976 recognised Kachchatheevu as Sri Lankan and ended Indian fishing rights in Sri Lankan waters, settlements India accepted in the interest of good relations.
The ethnic war that began after the anti-Tamil pogrom of July 1983 drew India in deeply. India first trained and sheltered Tamil militant groups, then, after the airdrop of supplies to Jaffna in June 1987, imposed the India–Sri Lanka Accord of 29 July 1987. The Accord produced the 13th Amendment to Sri Lanka's constitution, creating provincial councils, and sent the Indian Peace Keeping Force to disarm the LTTE. The IPKF found itself at war with the group it was meant to disarm; about 1,200 Indian soldiers were killed before it withdrew in 1990. The LTTE's assassination of Rajiv Gandhi on 21 May 1991 ended Indian sympathy for it.
For the next two decades India kept its distance from the war while supporting Colombo diplomatically and supplying intelligence and non-lethal help; the LTTE was defeated in May 2009. India then financed tens of thousands of houses in the north and east. Sri Lanka's turn to China under Mahinda Rajapaksa, symbolised by Hambantota port and a Chinese submarine's visits to Colombo in 2014, made the post-war relationship a contest for influence. The 2022 economic collapse, in which India was the first and largest responder, reset it again.
Diplomatic timeline
5 events, 1974–2015
The dated events of the Global Political Timeline that involve Sri Lanka. Open an entry to read it in full.
India–Sri Lanka maritime boundary agreementDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineThe 1974 agreement drew the maritime boundary in the Palk Strait and placed the islet of Kachchatheevu on the Sri Lankan side, while allowing Indian fishermen and pilgrims access to it for rest, drying nets and the annual festival. A 1976 agreement extended the boundary and ended fishing in each other's waters. The settlement remains contested in Tamil Nadu politics and underlies the Palk Bay fishing dispute.
SAARC founded at DhakaDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineThe leaders of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka adopted the SAARC Charter at Dhaka on 8 December 1985; Afghanistan joined in 2007. The charter excludes bilateral and contentious issues and requires unanimity, which kept the association alive but made it ineffective. No summit has been held since Kathmandu in 2014.
India–Sri Lanka Accord and the IPKFDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineRajiv Gandhi and J. R. Jayewardene signed the Accord on 29 July 1987. Sri Lanka created provincial councils through the 13th Amendment to its constitution, and India sent the Indian Peace Keeping Force to oversee the disarming of Tamil militants. The IPKF was drawn into war with the LTTE and withdrew in March 1990; the episode shaped India's later reluctance to intervene militarily in its neighbours' conflicts.
BIMSTEC foundedDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineThe Bangkok Declaration of 6 June 1997 created an economic grouping of Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand, later joined by Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan and renamed the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. Neglected for two decades, it became India's preferred regional platform after SAARC stalled, and its charter was adopted in 2022.
SAGAR: Security and Growth for All in the RegionDiplomatic
See it on the Global Political TimelineIn a speech in Mauritius on 12 March 2015, Narendra Modi set out SAGAR as India's maritime vision: security for India's mainland and islands, capacity building for maritime neighbours, collective action against threats, sustainable development and a cooperative regional order. In March 2025, again in Mauritius, he extended it as MAHASAGAR.
04Strategic interests
Sri Lanka sits astride the sea lanes that carry much of the Indian Ocean's trade, and Colombo is the main transshipment hub for Indian cargo. A hostile power with access to Sri Lankan ports would threaten India's southern flank. That is why India watches Chinese research and survey vessels so closely: the visits of the Yuan Wang 5 to Hambantota in 2022 and the Shi Yan 6 in 2023 led Sri Lanka to impose a one-year moratorium on such vessels in 2024 and then to draft rules for them.
China holds Hambantota on a 99-year lease (2017) and is building Colombo Port City. Sri Lanka's strategy is to balance — taking Indian, Chinese, Japanese and Western money while avoiding exclusive alignment. Sri Lankan critics of India point to the IPKF, to Indian business interests in strategic assets and to Tamil Nadu's influence on Indian policy; Indian critics of Colombo point to debt-trap infrastructure and to assurances that have not always been kept.
05Key agreements
- 1964Sirima–Shastri Pact
Signed on 30 October 1964 to resolve the status of stateless persons of Indian origin through repatriation and Sri Lankan citizenship; supplemented in 1974.
- 1974Maritime boundary agreements
The 1974 agreement drew the boundary in the Palk Strait and recognised Kachchatheevu as Sri Lankan; a 1976 agreement extended it to the Gulf of Mannar and the Bay of Bengal.
- 1987India–Sri Lanka Accord
Signed on 29 July 1987 by Rajiv Gandhi and J. R. Jayewardene; led to the 13th Amendment and provincial councils and to the deployment of the IPKF.
- 1998India–Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement
India's first free trade agreement, in force from 2000, with phased tariff elimination and negative lists.
- 2025Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation
Signed during Narendra Modi's visit to Colombo in April 2025; the first framework agreement on defence cooperation between the two countries.
06Cooperation
Economy, connectivity, defence and technology: where the two work together, where they do not, and where cooperation could grow.
Economic relationship
The India–Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement, signed in 1998 and in force from 2000, was India's first FTA, and India is one of Sri Lanka's largest trading partners and its largest source of tourists. Talks on a broader Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement have stalled over Sri Lankan fears of Indian professionals and firms.
The 2022 crisis transformed India's economic role. When Sri Lanka defaulted, India provided about US$4 billion in credit lines for fuel, food and medicine, a currency swap and deferred payments, and in January 2023 became the first bilateral creditor to give the financing assurances that unlocked an IMF programme. Energy is the next frontier: the Trincomalee oil tank farm, the Sampur solar project, a proposed electricity grid interconnection and a 2025 plan with the UAE for an energy hub at Trincomalee. Not every project has survived Sri Lankan politics; Adani's wind projects in the north were withdrawn in 2025 after the new government sought to renegotiate tariffs.
After Cyclone Ditwah struck in late 2025, India announced a US$450 million reconstruction package, combining a US$100 million grant for houses and bridges with credit lines of US$350 million for railways and livestock, finalised in August 2026.
India’s merchandise trade with Sri Lanka
2021–22 to 2025–26 · USD billion
- Exports 2025–26
- 5.5
- India to Sri Lanka
- Imports 2025–26
- 1.7
- Sri Lanka to India
- Two-way trade 2025–26
- 7.2
- Exports plus imports
- Trade surplus 2025–26
- 3.8
- Exports exceed imports
- Exports from India
- Imports into India
- Balance: exports minus imports
| Financial year | Exports from India | Imports into India | Balance (exports minus imports) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021–22 | 5.8 | 1.0 | +4.8 |
| 2022–23 | 5.1 | 1.1 | +4.0 |
| 2023–24 | 4.1 | 1.4 | +2.7 |
| 2024–25 | 4.6 | 1.3 | +3.3 |
| 2025–26 | 5.5 | 1.7 | +3.8 |
Unit: USD billion. Balance and two-way trade are calculated here from the published exports and imports.
Note: Merchandise trade only; services excluded. Indian financial years (April–March). Figures for 2025–26 are provisional and those for 2021–22 to 2024–25 revised, as published by the Reserve Bank of India from data compiled by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (DGCI&S) of the Department of Commerce.
Official dataSource: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026.
Trade and connectivity
The Nagapattinam–Kankesanthurai passenger ferry, revived in 2023, and flights to Jaffna restored a link to the Tamil north that the war had cut. India is funding the upgrade of Kankesanthurai harbour through a grant, and the two governments have studied electricity interconnection and, more speculatively, a land bridge across the Palk Strait. Sri Lanka has adopted UPI payments for Indian visitors.
Defence and security
The defence cooperation memorandum of April 2025, the first in the relationship's history, gave a formal frame to training, exercises (SLINEX at sea, Mitra Shakti on land), hydrography and maritime domain awareness. India has gifted Dornier maritime aircraft and supports Sri Lanka's maritime rescue coordination. The Colombo Security Conclave, whose secretariat is in Colombo, brings India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and Bangladesh together on maritime security, terrorism, trafficking and cyber security.
Disaster relief is the most visible form of security cooperation. India's Operation Sagar Bandhu after Cyclone Ditwah sent ships, aircraft and relief teams, and Dissanayake thanked India for it during Defence Minister Rajnath Singh's visit to Colombo on 9 September 2026, when three further memorandums were signed on defence colleges, cadet corps and the supply of six L-70 air defence guns under an Indian grant.
Opportunities
- Energy cooperation: Trincomalee, Sampur, grid interconnection and a regional energy hub.
- Reconstruction after Cyclone Ditwah as a partnership in climate resilience.
- A framework defence relationship under the 2025 memorandum.
- Deeper trade through an upgraded FTA and digital payments.
- Tourism, Buddhist circuits and the restored ferry to the north.
07Points of disagreement
Border issues
The maritime boundary is settled by the 1974 and 1976 agreements; Kachchatheevu lies on the Sri Lankan side. The live problem is fishing in the Palk Bay. Indian fishermen, many using bottom trawlers banned in Sri Lanka, cross into Sri Lankan waters, where they are arrested and their boats seized; northern Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen, recovering from the war, see their livelihoods destroyed. The issue is politically potent in Tamil Nadu, where calls to retrieve Kachchatheevu periodically return. A Joint Working Group on fisheries exists; a lasting solution requires India to move its fleet away from bottom trawling.
Challenges
- The Palk Bay fishing conflict and its politics in Tamil Nadu.
- Chinese research vessels, port investments and debt.
- Unfulfilled commitments on the 13th Amendment and provincial council elections.
- Sri Lankan suspicion of Indian business in strategic assets, as the withdrawn wind projects showed.
- Sri Lanka's fragile post-default economy.
08Regional context
Sri Lanka is a member of BIMSTEC, whose charter was adopted at the Colombo summit of 2022, and of the Indian Ocean Rim Association. It is central to India's maritime vision, from SAGAR (2015) to MAHASAGAR (2025) (see SAGAR and MAHASAGAR). Its relations with China, Japan and the United States make it a barometer of great-power competition in the Indian Ocean.
09India's diplomatic approach
India's approach combines crisis support, development partnership, energy and connectivity projects, and a security relationship built on Sri Lankan assurances. Its response to the 2022 collapse is widely seen as the moment Indian policy in the neighbourhood matched its rhetoric: it was fast, large and not conditioned on strategic concessions.
The approach has limits that India controls and limits it does not. India controls its fishing policy, its handling of Tamil politics and the speed of its projects; it does not control Sri Lankan nationalism or Chinese money. The case for patience is that a Sri Lankan government that chooses closeness to India, as Dissanayake's has, is more durable than one pressed into it.
10Competing interpretations
Competing perspectives
How the relationship looks from different standpoints. A strong answer weighs them rather than adopting one.
The maritime security reading
A security reading starts from the island's place beside the main shipping lane between the Strait of Malacca and the Red Sea, and from Colombo's role as the main transshipment hub for Indian cargo. A hostile power with access to Sri Lankan ports would threaten India's southern flank, which is why India watched the visits of the Yuan Wang 5 to Hambantota in 2022 and the Shi Yan 6 in 2023 so closely; they led Sri Lanka to impose a moratorium on research vessels in 2024. China's 99-year lease at Hambantota and its work on Colombo Port City are the standing concern. India's answer is the defence memorandum of April 2025, the Colombo Security Conclave, the relief of Operation Sagar Bandhu and Dissanayake's assurance that Sri Lankan territory will not be used against Indian interests. The test is whether that assurance holds when Chinese vessels and investment return.
The economic lifeline reading
An economic reading treats the crisis of 2022 as the turning point. When Sri Lanka defaulted, India provided about US$4 billion in credit lines, a currency swap and deferred payments, and in January 2023 became the first bilateral creditor to give the assurances that unlocked an IMF programme. Whether that was generosity or strategic investment is where liberal and realist readings part company. The economic base is broadening into energy, from the Trincomalee tank farm and the Sampur solar project to a proposed grid interconnection, and the US$450 million package after Cyclone Ditwah extends the partnership into reconstruction. The limits are equally economic. Talks on a broader agreement beyond the free trade agreement of 1998 stalled over Sri Lankan fears of Indian professionals and firms, and the withdrawal of Adani's wind projects in 2025 showed how Sri Lankan politics can unwind Indian investment.
The Tamil Nadu factor in Indian politics
Within India, Sri Lanka policy has a domestic dimension that runs through Tamil Nadu. The Palk Bay fishing conflict sets Indian fishermen, many using bottom trawlers banned in Sri Lanka, against northern Tamil fishermen still recovering from the war, and arrests and seized boats make it politically potent in Tamil Nadu, where calls to retrieve Kachchatheevu periodically return. The Tamil question adds a further layer: India presses for full implementation of the 13th Amendment and for provincial council elections, while its votes at the UN Human Rights Council have moved between support and abstention. Sri Lankan critics point to Tamil Nadu's influence on Indian policy. The conclusion is uncomfortable for Indian politics, because a lasting solution in the Palk Bay requires India to move its own fleet away from bottom trawling, one of the few limits on the relationship that India itself controls.
Colombo's view of India
Seen from Colombo, India is the indispensable neighbour whose size invites caution. Sinhala Buddhist nationalism has often cast India as the large neighbour whose Tamil population and politics threaten the island's unity, and the 1987 Accord and the Indian Peace Keeping Force remain the clearest case of intervention by a neighbour in South Asia's recent history. The JVP, which leads the governing alliance, fought its insurrection of 1987–89 partly against that Accord. Yet Dissanayake made India his first state visit, signed the first defence memorandum and conferred the Mitra Vibhushana on Modi, choices that look more durable for being made rather than imposed. Colombo's strategy remains balance: Indian, Chinese, Japanese and Western money without exclusive alignment, the 13th Amendment treated as an internal matter, and the moratorium on research vessels used to bargain with both India and China.
Reading the relationship through IR theory
Realism treats Sri Lanka as a strategically placed small state courted by competing powers. Its location near the main east–west shipping lane makes access to its ports valuable to China and denial of that access valuable to India; Colombo's balancing, with Chinese infrastructure, Indian crisis support and Japanese and Western finance, is a small state's rational response, and the moratorium on foreign research vessels in 2024 shows it bargaining with both.
Liberal accounts point to the economic interdependence that has grown since the free trade agreement of 1998, and to the crisis of 2022, when Indian credit and India's assurances to the IMF treated a neighbour's economic stability as a shared interest. Whether that support was generosity or strategic investment is exactly the question on which liberal and realist readings part company.
Constructivism explains a persistent wariness. Sinhala Buddhist nationalism has often cast India as the large neighbour whose Tamil population and politics threaten the island's unity, while Tamil identity links the north of the island to Tamil Nadu. The 1987 Accord and the Indian Peace Keeping Force are the clearest case of intervention by a neighbour in South Asia's recent history, and the English School's debate between order and justice, over whether intervention to protect a minority can be legitimate, runs through the Accord, the end of the war in 2009 and the resolutions of the UN Human Rights Council.
11Contemporary developments
As of 20 November 2026
The relationship is steady and project-driven. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri's visit in August 2026 finalised US$350 million in credit lines under the post-cyclone package, with US$250 million for railways and US$100 million for livestock. During Rajnath Singh's visit on 9 September 2026, Dissanayake reiterated that Sri Lanka would never allow its territory to be used for activities inimical to India, and the two sides signed three defence memorandums. A US$61.5 million grant for Kankesanthurai harbour was still under negotiation.
The questions that will test the relationship are familiar: the fishermen, provincial councils and the 13th Amendment, and the terms on which Chinese vessels and investment return.
Sri Lanka's budget for 2027, presented by Dissanayake on 12 November 2026, announced plans to expand the free trade agreement with India, for which the Cabinet had appointed a committee of officials, and to seek new free trade agreements with China and other trading partners. The announcement revives the effort to broaden the 1998 agreement, whose extension through an Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement had stalled, while keeping to Colombo's practice of balancing its economic partners.
12UPSC syllabus connections
Syllabus lines
GS-II
India and its neighbourhoodOfficial wording: “India and its neighborhood- relations.”
Where it is taught on this platformGS-II
Groupings and agreementsOfficial wording: “Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India's interests.”
Where it is taught on this platformPrelims
Current eventsOfficial wording: “Current events of national and international importance.”
Where it is taught on this platform
Quoted in UPSC’s official wording.
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
3 questions · 2024–2026
2026 · PSIR II · Q6(a) · 20 marks
Accelerating of Chinese influence across South Asia is fundamentally reshaping the region’s geopolitical landscape. This is a big foreign policy challenge for India. Analyse.
2026 · PSIR II · Q7(b) · 15 marks
The island of Kachchatheevu remains an intractable issue in India-Srilanka relations. Comment.
2024 · PSIR II · Q5(e) · 10 marks
Despite deep ties, India’s relations with Sri Lanka have seen strains due to China’s growing influence in Sri Lanka through investments and economic dominance. Analyse.
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to India and Sri Lanka in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
How did India's response to Sri Lanka's economic crisis of 2022 change the bilateral relationship? Discuss.
How to approach it
Cover the scale and speed of assistance, the IMF assurances and their political effect; compare with China's response.
- Q2UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
The India–Sri Lanka fishermen issue is a livelihood problem with strategic consequences. Examine.
How to approach it
Explain the 1974 and 1976 agreements, bottom trawling and Tamil Nadu's politics; suggest solutions such as deep-sea fishing and licensing.
- Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Evaluate the significance of Chinese research vessels in Sri Lankan ports for India's maritime security.
How to approach it
Explain the dual-use concern; the 2022 and 2023 visits; Sri Lanka's moratorium and rules; India's response through MDA.
- Q4UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
What lessons does the Indian Peace Keeping Force experience hold for India's neighbourhood policy?
How to approach it
Narrate the Accord and the IPKF briefly; analyse why it failed; connect to India's later restraint and to the 13th Amendment question.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
13Relevant PSIR topics
Paper II · BUnit 3
India and South AsiaOfficial syllabus: “India and South Asia: (a) Regional Co-operation: SAARC – past performance and future prospects. (b) South Asia as a Free Trade Area. (c) India's "Look East" policy. (d) Impediments to regional co-operation: river water disputes; illegal cross-border migration; ethnic conflicts and insurgencies; border disputes.”
Each line is quoted from the official PSIR syllabus.
Explore further
PSIR Optional
Organisation
Foreign policy
IB Global Politics
Timeline
Dictionary
Sources
- 01Ministry of External Affairs, India–Sri Lanka bilateral relations (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
- 02Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka, 29 July 1987. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India
- 03Sri Lanka, India ink three MoUs on defence (opens in a new tab). Newsfirst, 9 September 2026
- 04Vikram Misri meets President AKD; US$350 million Indian credit facility to support Sri Lanka (opens in a new tab). Newsfirst, 5 August 2026
- 05India, Sri Lanka reaffirm commitment to regional security and people's welfare (opens in a new tab). United News of India, 9 September 2026
- 06J. N. Dixit, Assignment Colombo. Konark Publishers, 1998
- 07Lankan President meets PM Modi, thanks India for exceptional support during Cyclone Ditwah (opens in a new tab). Eastern Mirror (IANS), February 2026
- 08Govt. plans to expand FTA with India and seek new FTAs with China and other key trading partners (opens in a new tab). Ada Derana, November 2026
- 09Sri Lanka appoints committee to expand Free Trade Agreement with India (opens in a new tab). Newswire, 13 November 2026
- 10Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2025–26, Table 119: Direction of Foreign Trade – US Dollar (DGCI&S data) (opens in a new tab). Reserve Bank of India, 31 July 2026