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Political Issue Dossier · South Asia

The Indus Waters Treaty

For sixty-five years the Indus Waters Treaty converted the politics of a shared river system into engineering questions for commissioners, experts and arbitrators. Since India held it in abeyance after the Pahalgam attack in April 2025, a Court of Arbitration India does not recognise has kept issuing awards, and the treaty's machinery has split in two. The dossier asks what a water treaty can survive.

At a glance

Region
South Asia
Countries most involved
India, Pakistan, China
Facts checked to
Mapped
7 actors, 4 stakeholders, 13 dated events
Sources
14 · 11 primary or official
Syllabus lines
UPSC 4 · PSIR 6 · IB 7
How it is examined

The central question

What a reader should be able to answer by the end of the dossier.

Can a water-sharing treaty between adversaries survive when one party treats it as an instrument of security policy and the other as a matter of legal right, and what, if anything, can international adjudication do about it?

Contents 19 sections
  1. 01Locator map
  2. 02Background
  3. 03Geography
  4. 04Historical development
  5. 05Actor map
  6. 06Stakeholder map
  7. 07Institutional framework
  8. 08Legal framework
  9. 09Timeline
  10. 10Competing narratives
  11. 11Theories applied
  12. 12Political consequences
  13. 13India’s position
  14. 14Possible solutions
  15. 15Critical evaluation
  16. 16Examination applications
  17. 17Practice questions
  18. 18Sources
  19. 19Connected knowledge

How to read the labels

Facts
Sourced statements of fact.
Attributed
Positions and proposals, in the terms of those who hold them.
Analysis
The platform’s reading of the evidence.
Examination
How the issue maps to the syllabi.

01Locator mapFacts

INDIACHINAPAKISTANIRANTURKMENISTANTAJIKISTANNEPAL123456KarachiPahalgamKishtwarGurezTarbela DamAttariWORLD78
IndiaOther countries most involved: Pakistan, ChinaPlaces named in the dossierInset: places beyond the main map, with its area outlined
  1. 1. Karachi

    Where Jawaharlal Nehru and Ayub Khan signed the treaty on 19 September 1960, with the World Bank signing for specified purposes.

  2. 2. Pahalgam

    Site of the terrorist attack of 22 April 2025, after which India held the treaty in abeyance.

  3. 3. Kishtwar

    District on the Chenab where India is building the Ratle hydroelectric project, subject of the Court of Arbitration's interim order of August 2026.

  4. 4. Gurez

    Site of the dam of India's Kishenganga hydroelectric project, which diverts water from the Kishenganga to the Jhelum basin.

  5. 5. Tarbela Dam

    Pakistan's largest storage on the Indus, built under the Indus Basin Project that accompanied the treaty.

  6. 6. Attari

    The integrated check post closed by India on 23 April 2025, in the same decision that placed the treaty in abeyance.

  7. 7. Peace Palace, The Hague

    Seat of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which acts as registry for the Court of Arbitration.

  8. 8. World Bank, Washington DC

    Signatory for the treaty's financial and dispute-settlement provisions; it set both the Neutral Expert and the Court of Arbitration in motion in 2022.

Boundaries are from Natural Earth’s India point-of-view data and are approximate at this scale; the map is a teaching aid and does not purport to be an authoritative depiction of international boundaries. Markers that would overlap are drawn apart, with a line to the true position.

02BackgroundFacts

The Indus system rises in Tibet and the Himalaya and flows through India into Pakistan, where it sustains most of the country's irrigated agriculture. Partition in 1947 put the headworks of Punjab's canals in India and most of the irrigated land in Pakistan. After nearly a decade of negotiations in which the World Bank acted as broker, the two countries signed the Indus Waters Treaty at Karachi on 19 September 1960.

The treaty divides rivers rather than water. The eastern rivers, the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, are India's. The western rivers, the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, are Pakistan's: under Article III India must 'let flow' their waters, with exceptions for domestic, non-consumptive and agricultural uses and for run-of-river hydropower built to detailed design criteria in Annexure D. The treaty also built institutions to keep politics out: a Permanent Indus Commission of two engineers, a Neutral Expert for technical differences and a Court of Arbitration for disputes. It contains no clause allowing either party to suspend it; under Article XII(4) it continues in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty between the two governments.

The present crisis has two layers. The older one is a dispute over the design of India's Kishenganga and Ratle projects, pursued since 2016 on two parallel tracks: a Neutral Expert process that India accepts and a Court of Arbitration that it rejects. The newer one began on 23 April 2025, when India's Cabinet Committee on Security, after the Pahalgam attack, decided that the treaty 'will be held in abeyance with immediate effect, until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism'. Since then a Court of Arbitration has issued a series of awards, including one in August 2026 reported as holding that the treaty remains in force, and India has rejected each one.

03GeographyFacts

The basin's geography explains both the treaty's design and the limits of the current crisis. The western rivers carry most of the system's water, and Pakistan's canal network depends on them. India, upstream, controls the Chenab and Jhelum as they leave Jammu and Kashmir, but the treaty confines it to run-of-river projects with small pondage, and India has built little storage on these rivers. The western rivers are steep and seasonal, fed by snow and glacier melt, so their flow peaks in summer, when Pakistan needs it most.

That is why analysts in both countries have noted that India cannot substantially cut flows to Pakistan in the short run; doing so would need years of new storage and diversion works. India's practical leverage lies in information and timing: flood data, the scheduling of reservoir flushing and filling at existing projects, and the pace of new construction.

The disputed projects show the geography in miniature. Kishenganga diverts water from the Kishenganga river, known downstream as the Neelum, through a tunnel into the Jhelum basin; Pakistan objects that this reduces the water available to its own Neelum–Jhelum project downstream, in territory administered by Pakistan and claimed by India. Ratle is a run-of-river project on the Chenab in Kishtwar district.

The wider map matters too. The Indus itself rises in Tibet, and India is downstream of China on the Brahmaputra and upstream of Bangladesh on the Ganges, whose 1996 sharing treaty expires in December 2026. Any doctrine India advances about an upstream state's rights will be read in all three basins.

04Historical developmentFacts

The treaty survived the wars of 1965 and 1971 and the Kargil conflict of 1999, and its commission kept meeting through decades of hostility. Its dispute machinery was used sparingly. In 2007 a Neutral Expert ruled on India's Baglihar project, broadly accepting its design while requiring changes. In 2013 a Court of Arbitration in the Kishenganga case allowed India to divert water for power generation but required a minimum environmental flow downstream and ruled out reservoir drawdown below dead storage for new run-of-river plants.

The current dispute began in 2016, when Pakistan sought a Court of Arbitration over Kishenganga and Ratle and India sought a Neutral Expert. After a pause, the World Bank set both processes in motion in 2022. India took part only before the Neutral Expert, arguing that the treaty does not allow parallel proceedings on the same questions; Article IX(6) provides that the arbitral paragraphs do not apply to a difference while a Neutral Expert is dealing with it. On 25 January 2023 India's Commissioner for Indus Waters served notice on his Pakistani counterpart seeking negotiations under Article XII(3) to modify the treaty, saying Pakistan was in 'ongoing material breach'; a further notice followed in August 2024, as reported. On 20 January 2025 the Neutral Expert held that all seven questions referred to him were differences within his competence, a decision India welcomed.

The Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025 changed the frame. The next day India held the treaty in abeyance. The Court of Arbitration continued without India: a supplemental award on competence on 27 June 2025, an award on issues of general interpretation in August 2025, an award on maximum pondage on 15 May 2026, and, on 31 August 2026, an award on the treaty's status with an order on interim measures concerning Ratle. India rejected each, saying that its decision on abeyance remains in force.

05Actor mapFactsAttributed

Who acts on the issue, grouped by kind around it. Each actor’s role is a matter of record; a stated position is the actor’s own.

States2

  • India

    Stated positionAbeyance until Pakistan 'credibly and irrevocably abjures' cross-border terrorism; the tribunal's awards are void

    The upstream party. Holds the treaty in abeyance by decision of the Cabinet Committee on Security of 23 April 2025, rejects the Court of Arbitration as illegally constituted and has never appeared before it, while having taken part in the Neutral Expert process. Seeks modification of the treaty under Article XII(3).

  • Pakistan

    Stated positionThe treaty cannot be suspended unilaterally and remains in force

    The downstream party, dependent on the western rivers for irrigation. Initiated the arbitration in 2016, sought interim measures on Ratle in 2026, and presents the awards as confirmation that the treaty binds India.

Institutions2

  • Neutral Expert, Michel Lino

    Appointed in 2022 under Annexure F to decide technical differences over the Kishenganga and Ratle designs. Held himself competent on all seven questions in January 2025; India later asked for the agreed work programme to be paused, as reported.

  • Permanent Indus Commission

    The two commissioners who under Article VIII are meant to meet at least once a year and resolve questions under Article IX(1). It is the first rung of the treaty's dispute ladder and the channel through which India served its notices.

Court1

  • Court of Arbitration (registry: Permanent Court of Arbitration)

    Constituted under Article IX and Annexure G at Pakistan's request. Has ruled on its competence (2023 and 2025), on general interpretation (2025), on maximum pondage (May 2026) and on the treaty's status and interim measures (August 2026), without India's participation.

International organisation1

  • World Bank

    Signed the treaty for the purposes of Articles V and X and Annexures F, G and H, including procedures for appointing adjudicators. Set both tracks in motion in 2022; India's August 2026 statement accused it of constituting the Court 'in patent breach of the terms of the Treaty'.

Community1

  • Communities of the basin

    Farmers in Pakistani Punjab and Sindh who depend on canal water from the western rivers, and residents of Jammu and Kashmir, whose development plans rest heavily on hydropower.

06Stakeholder mapAnalysis

Who has a stake in the outcome, and what it is, placed by how much influence each has over the result. The placing is the dossier’s assessment.

Influence

High

  • Jammu and Kashmir and India's power sector

    Faster development of hydropower and irrigation on the western rivers, which the treaty's design criteria constrained. Influence is high: abeyance removes, from India's perspective, the treaty limits on its projects, and decisions on construction rest with the Union government.

  • India's and Pakistan's security establishments

    For India, an instrument of pressure against cross-border terrorism; for Pakistan, a red line on water security. Influence is high: on both sides water policy is now decided at the level of national security councils rather than commissioners.

Influence

Medium

  • Irrigators and cities of Pakistan's Indus plains

    Predictable flows in the sowing seasons and timely flood data. Influence is medium: their government can litigate and mobilise international opinion, but cannot compel India's compliance with any award.

Influence

Low

  • Other riparian states and the international legal community

    Bangladesh, China and other basin states watch the doctrine India applies; international lawyers watch whether non-appearance can neutralise binding adjudication. Influence is low on the outcome, but the precedent will shape future water diplomacy in South Asia.

07Institutional frameworkFacts

The treaty built a ladder for disagreements, and the crisis turns on how its rungs connect. Under Article IX(1) any question about interpretation, application or breach goes first to the Permanent Indus Commission. If the commission cannot agree, a 'difference' arises. A difference within Part 1 of Annexure F, a list of technical matters such as design criteria and pondage, goes at either commissioner's request to a Neutral Expert, whose decision on matters within his competence is final and binding. Anything else, or a difference the Neutral Expert says should be treated as a dispute, becomes a 'dispute', which the governments first try to resolve by negotiation or mediation and which may then go to a Court of Arbitration under Annexure G.

The design assumed that the rungs would be climbed in order. In 2016 the two parties chose different rungs for the same projects, and in 2022 the World Bank, which has functions in appointing adjudicators, set both processes in motion. India's case is that this created parallel proceedings the treaty forbids, pointing to Article IX(6). The Court of Arbitration held, in awards India does not recognise, that it was competent; the Neutral Expert held that the seven questions before him were differences within his competence. The treaty's two adjudicators have each proceeded on its own reading.

Abeyance added a further problem. The commission is the channel for data and notices, and India's position is that, while the treaty is in abeyance, it is not bound to perform any of its obligations. The institutions built to depoliticise water are therefore functioning partially or not at all, while the political decision rests with India's Cabinet Committee on Security and its Ministry of External Affairs. India's constitutional framework leaves treaty matters to the Union executive under Article 73; no parliamentary approval was sought for abeyance.

09TimelineFacts

  1. India and Pakistan sign the Indus Waters Treaty at Karachi, with the World Bank signing for specified purposes.

  2. A Neutral Expert rules on India's Baglihar project, broadly accepting its design with modifications.

  3. The Court of Arbitration's final award in the Kishenganga case sets a minimum downstream flow.

  4. Pakistan seeks a Court of Arbitration and India a Neutral Expert over the Kishenganga and Ratle designs.

  5. The World Bank sets both processes in motion, appointing a Neutral Expert and the chair of a Court of Arbitration.

  6. India's Commissioner serves notice seeking modification of the treaty under Article XII(3).

  7. The Neutral Expert holds that all seven questions referred to him are differences within his competence; India welcomes the decision.

  8. Terrorists kill 25 Indians and a Nepali citizen at Pahalgam.

  9. India's Cabinet Committee on Security holds the treaty in abeyance with immediate effect.

  10. The Court of Arbitration issues a supplemental award on competence; India rejects it.

  11. The Court issues an award on issues of general interpretation; India says it has no bearing on its rights.

  12. The Court issues an award on maximum pondage; India rejects it the next day.

  13. The Court rules on the treaty's status and on interim measures for Ratle; India rejects the award and says abeyance remains in force.

10Competing narrativesAttributed

Each narrative in its holders’ own terms, and attributed to them. A strong answer weighs them against each other rather than adopting one.

01

Sovereign response to terrorism

Held byGovernment of India

India placed the treaty in abeyance 'in exercise of its rights as a sovereign nation under international law' and holds that, while it is in abeyance, India 'is no longer bound to perform any of its obligations under the Treaty'. A treaty concluded, in its preamble's words, 'in a spirit of goodwill and friendship' cannot oblige India to behave as if that spirit survived sustained cross-border terrorism. The Court of Arbitration was constituted in breach of the treaty's graded mechanism, so its pronouncements are void, and India had in any case sought modification since 2023 to reflect changed circumstances.

02

Treaty sanctity and water security

Held byGovernment of Pakistan

The western rivers sustain Pakistan's agriculture, so abeyance threatens livelihoods, not militants. The treaty has no exit clause and allegations of terrorism are no legal ground for suspending a water treaty. Pakistan presents the awards, including the August 2026 ruling that the treaty remains in force, as proof that India, not Pakistan, is breaking the law, and has sought interim measures to stop construction it regards as non-compliant.

03

Pacta sunt servanda

Held byinternational lawyers and the tribunal

Treaties bind until lawfully ended. Suspension is lawful only on narrow grounds, such as material breach of the treaty itself or a proportionate and reversible countermeasure aimed at inducing compliance with an obligation. Many international lawyers doubt that an open-ended abeyance, aimed at conduct outside the treaty, fits those grounds, while also acknowledging India's procedural objection to parallel proceedings and the limits of law when a party will not take part.

04

Leverage and its limits

Held byrealist strategists in both countries

Treaties last as long as they serve the interests of the stronger party, and the real test is whether abeyance changes Pakistan's behaviour at an acceptable cost. Strategists also note that India's ability to change flows is far greater in prospect than in practice, because the western rivers carry little Indian storage, so the instrument works more through uncertainty and signalling than through water.

11Theories appliedAnalysis

Each theory is applied to the case, not merely defined.

01Compellence (coercive diplomacy)

Thomas Schelling distinguished deterrence, which tells an adversary not to act, from compellence, which demands that it change course, and argued that compellence is harder because compliance must be visible and looks like capitulation. India's condition, that Pakistan 'credibly and irrevocably' abjure support for cross-border terrorism, is a compellent demand with no defined benchmark for compliance. Schelling's analysis predicts that such open-ended demands tend to harden the target's resistance and prolong the instrument, which is consistent with abeyance having lasted more than eighteen months.

02Liberal institutionalism

Robert Keohane's After Hegemony (1984) explains how institutions sustain cooperation by reducing uncertainty and lengthening the shadow of the future. The treaty's survival through three wars is a textbook case: its graded machinery turned political conflict into technical questions. The theory also explains the crisis: once the two parties chose different rungs of the ladder in 2016 and the World Bank activated both, the institution lost its capacity to channel the conflict, and abeyance removed the remaining incentive to use it.

03Securitisation

The Copenhagen School of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde describes how an issue is moved out of normal politics when an actor presents it as an existential threat and an audience accepts the claim. Since April 2025 water has been securitised on both sides: decisions moved from commissioners to cabinet security committees, and the language of the debate shifted from cusecs and pondage to terrorism and national survival. Securitised issues are hard to return to technical management, which bears on whether the treaty's institutions can be revived.

04Hydro-hegemony

Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner's framework of hydro-hegemony (2006) analyses how riparian position, power and the capacity to exploit water combine to shape transboundary outcomes. India's upstream position and greater power make it a potential hydro-hegemon in the Indus basin, while infrastructure limits its exploitation potential in the short run. The same framework places India in a weaker position on the Brahmaputra, where China is upstream, which is why the doctrine India applies on the Indus has costs beyond it.

12Political consequencesAnalysis

On the rivers. The short-run hydrological effect is limited, since India's projects on the western rivers are run-of-river schemes with modest storage. The more immediate effects are informational and operational: the routine exchange of data and notices through the commission has been suspended from India's side, and India has gained freedom, in its own view, to operate and build projects without the treaty's design limits.

In law. Pakistan now holds a series of awards, including the August 2026 ruling on the treaty's status, that it can cite in every forum. India's position is that none has legal effect because the tribunal was illegally constituted. The interim order, as reported, ties concreting at Ratle above specified levels to the Neutral Expert's eventual decision, a decision India had earlier sought from that same expert and whose process India later asked to pause.

In strategy. Water has joined trade, visas and diplomatic staffing as an instrument in India's post-Pahalgam policy towards Pakistan. The crisis has removed one of the few functioning channels between the two governments.

For precedent. India is downstream of China on the Brahmaputra and upstream of Bangladesh on the Ganges, where the 1996 treaty expires in December 2026. Arguments that an upstream state may suspend obligations for security reasons may be invoked against India elsewhere, even though the treaty itself says it creates no general precedent.

For the region's climate future. The basin faces glacier retreat, changing monsoon patterns and rising demand. A treaty designed for 1960 hydrology needed updating; suspension has made joint adaptation harder.

13India’s positionAttributedAnalysis

India's official position is set out in statements of the Ministry of External Affairs. The Cabinet Committee on Security decided on 23 April 2025 that the treaty 'will be held in abeyance with immediate effect, until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism'. India regards the Court of Arbitration as 'illegally constituted', says it 'was constituted by the World Bank in patent breach of the terms of the Treaty', has never appeared before it, and rejects all its awards; its August 2026 statement adds that the Court's pronouncements 'will have no effect on India's actions in connection with the projects being undertaken by India'. India had earlier welcomed the Neutral Expert's decision of January 2025 and sought modification of the treaty under Article XII(3) from January 2023, citing Pakistan's alleged material breach.

Where India's interests lie is a matter of analysis. They pull in different directions. Deterring cross-border terrorism is the first priority, and abeyance is part of the doctrine that terror and talks cannot go together. Developing the hydropower and irrigation potential of Jammu and Kashmir is a long-standing aim the treaty constrained. Against these stand India's standing as a rule-based power seeking permanent membership of the Security Council, a standing it reinforced in 2014 by saying it respected an UNCLOS tribunal's award on its maritime boundary with Bangladesh; its interest as a downstream state on the Brahmaputra; and its stake in renewing the Ganges arrangement with Bangladesh. The most durable course may be the one India itself proposed before Pahalgam: renegotiation under Article XII(3), pursued as a legal objective rather than an open-ended suspension.

14Possible solutionsAttributedAnalysis

Each option is attributed to whoever proposed it; the assessment of its merits and weaknesses is analysis.

Possible solutions: each option, who proposed it, and an assessment of its merits and weaknesses
01Restore the treaty and return to its dispute ladderGovernment of Pakistan; consistent with the Court of Arbitration's August 2026 award as reported

India would resume performance and pursue its objections through the commission and the Neutral Expert. It restores legal certainty and data flows, but India regards it as rewarding a state it accuses of sponsoring terrorism and as legitimising a tribunal it rejects.

02Renegotiate under Article XII(3)Government of India, notices of January 2023 and August 2024

Negotiate a modified treaty, for example on storage, design criteria for modern run-of-river plants and the sequencing of dispute procedures. It is the only lawful route to change the treaty's terms, but needs a negotiating relationship that does not now exist.

03Conditional, benchmarked restorationDerived from India's own condition of 23 April 2025; benchmarks are a suggestion from conflict-resolution practice

Define verifiable steps against cross-border terrorism whose completion would lead to phased restoration of data-sharing and treaty performance. It would turn an open-ended compellent demand into a bargain, but requires trust that neither side currently has.

04Mediation under Article IX(4)The treaty itself, which allows the governments to enlist mediators acceptable to both

Use a mutually acceptable mediator to separate the technical dispute over Kishenganga and Ratle from the political crisis. It draws on the treaty's own text, but India has consistently resisted third-party involvement in its relations with Pakistan.

15Critical evaluationAnalysis

The Indus case shows a well-designed institution meeting a problem it was not designed for. The treaty's ladder assumed that disagreements would be technical and that both parties wanted the treaty to work. It survived wars because neither side used water as a weapon; it is now in crisis because one side does, in response to violence the treaty never addressed.

On the law, the weight of established doctrine favours the tribunal's conclusion that a treaty with no suspension clause, which can be ended only by a new ratified treaty, does not lapse because one party declares it in abeyance. Open-ended abeyance, aimed at conduct outside the treaty and without a defined end, fits uneasily within the recognised grounds of material breach or countermeasures. India's strongest legal point is procedural: the treaty's text, including Article IX(6), gives real support to its objection that a Court of Arbitration should not have proceeded in parallel with a Neutral Expert on the same questions, and the World Bank's 2022 decision to activate both deepened rather than resolved the dispute.

On strategy, the instrument is weaker than its rhetoric. India cannot materially reduce flows for years, so abeyance works through uncertainty and signalling, while the reputational and precedential costs are immediate. On the other side, a series of awards without compliance strengthens Pakistan's legal position without changing anything on the rivers.

The fairest conclusion is that law has settled what the treaty means but not what happens to it. Only renegotiation, which India itself sought before Pahalgam, can reconcile India's demand for change with Pakistan's demand for legality, and only a change in the wider relationship will make renegotiation possible.

16Examination applicationsExamination

UPSC CSE

4 syllabus lines

General Studies and Prelims

GS Paper II. The dossier serves the syllabus lines on India and its neighbourhood, on bilateral agreements involving India, and on international institutions (the World Bank's role and the Permanent Court of Arbitration).

GS Paper I. The Indus system belongs under the distribution of key natural resources across South Asia and the physical geography of the Himalayan rivers.

GS Paper III. The case bears on security challenges and their management in border areas, on the role of external state and non-state actors in creating internal security challenges, and on energy infrastructure through hydropower.

Essay. Essays on water, peace, terrorism or international law can use the treaty's sixty-five-year record and its suspension to examine whether cooperation can survive enmity.

Prelims. Know the eastern and western rivers, the three tiers of Article IX, Annexures F and G, Article XII(3) and (4), the Kishenganga and Ratle projects and the rivers they are on, and the dates of 2023 and 2025.

Answer craft. State each government's position as its position, quote India's official wording where it matters, distinguish the Neutral Expert from the Court of Arbitration, and treat the hydrological, legal and strategic dimensions separately before judging the policy.

UPSC CSE · Optional

6 syllabus lines

Political Science and International Relations

Paper II, Part B. The case belongs to India and South Asia and to the determinants of Indian foreign policy, where it shows security imperatives reshaping a long-standing cooperative commitment. It also fits recent developments in India's policy towards Pakistan after Operation Sindoor.

Paper II, Part A. In key concepts, it illustrates national interest, security and coercion; in contemporary global concerns, terrorism and the environment meet in a single case; and in approaches, realist, liberal and constructivist accounts each explain a different part of the story.

Thinkers to deploy. Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz on self-help and interest; Robert Keohane on institutions under strain; Alexander Wendt on how enmity is constructed and sustained; and Jawaharlal Nehru, who signed the treaty, for the Nehruvian view of cooperation as a foundation of peace. Kautilya's Arthashastra, which treats neighbouring states as natural rivals and every resource as an element of statecraft, offers an indigenous realist reading.

IB Diploma Programme

7 syllabus lines

Global Politics

What the guide prescribes. The case connects to prescribed core content on sovereignty (a state's claim to decide on its treaty obligations), interdependence (global governance, international law and the limits of enforcement), power and legitimacy, and to the thematic study of peace and conflict, which includes peacemaking through negotiations and treaties. Among the HL global political challenges, it touches environment, security and borders.

Teaching suggestions. The case pairs naturally with the IB case study on the South China Sea arbitration: in both, a tribunal ruled against a state that refused to appear, and in both the award changed legal positions without changing facts on the ground. Students can compare how India and China each justify non-participation and how the claimant states use the awards. Students should state each government's claims as claims and use the treaty's text and official statements as primary sources.

17Original practice questionsOriginal

  1. Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words

    Holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance marks a shift from strategic restraint to strategic coercion in India's policy towards Pakistan. Critically examine its legal, strategic and reputational costs and benefits.

    How to approach it

    State India's official rationale; assess hydrological leverage against legal exposure and precedent on the Brahmaputra and Ganges; distinguish India's procedural objection to the tribunal from the substantive question of suspension; conclude on renegotiation.

  2. Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words

    Explain the three-tier dispute settlement mechanism of the Indus Waters Treaty. Why has India refused to recognise the Court of Arbitration constituted in 2022?

    How to approach it

    Describe questions, differences and disputes under Article IX and Annexures F and G; explain the parallel proceedings since 2022 and India's reliance on Article IX(6).

  3. Q3PSIR style15 marks

    Can international adjudication constrain a state that refuses to appear? Discuss with reference to the Indus Waters Treaty arbitration and one other case.

    How to approach it

    Contrast realist and liberal accounts of compliance; use the Indus awards and the 2016 South China Sea award; distinguish legal validity from enforcement and reputational effects.

  4. Q4PSIR style15 marks

    'Shared natural resources turn interdependence into a source of leverage.' Evaluate with reference to the Indus basin.

    How to approach it

    Use liberal institutionalism, securitisation and hydro-hegemony; weigh sixty-five years of institutionalised cooperation against the instrumentalisation of water after 2025.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

18Sources

The dossier’s facts were last checked on . Primary and official documents are listed apart from the material that interprets them.

Primary and official sources

11

Constitutional and statutory texts, Bills, judgments and official reports.

  1. 01PrimaryIndus Waters Treaty, 1960 (text) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 19 September 1960 · consulted 20 November 2026
  2. 02JudgmentIndus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v India), Final Award. Permanent Court of Arbitration, 20 December 2013
  3. 03JudgmentGabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment. International Court of Justice, 25 September 1997
  4. 04OfficialStatement by Foreign Secretary on the decision of the Cabinet Committee on Security (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 23 April 2025 · consulted 20 November 2026
  5. 05OfficialIndus Waters Treaty, 1960: Decision by the Neutral Expert on his competence (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 21 January 2025 · consulted 20 November 2026
  6. 06OfficialTranscript of Weekly Media Briefing by the Official Spokesperson, 2 February 2023 (notice of 25 January 2023 under Article XII(3)) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 2 February 2023 · consulted 20 November 2026
  7. 07OfficialMatters pertaining to the illegally-constituted so-called Court of Arbitration (supplemental award on competence) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 27 June 2025 · consulted 20 November 2026
  8. 08OfficialTranscript of Weekly Media Briefing by the Official Spokesperson, 14 August 2025 (award on issues of general interpretation) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 14 August 2025 · consulted 20 November 2026
  9. 09OfficialOfficial Spokesperson's response to media queries on the so-called Court of Arbitration (award on maximum pondage) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 16 May 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026
  10. 10OfficialMatters pertaining to the illegally-constituted so-called Court of Arbitration (award on status and interim measures) (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 31 August 2026 · consulted 20 November 2026
  11. 11OfficialOfficial Spokesperson's response to a question on the award of the Tribunal on the Maritime Boundary Arbitration between India and Bangladesh (opens in a new tab). Ministry of External Affairs, 8 July 2014 · consulted 20 November 2026

Supporting sources

3

Scholarship, books, press reports and other secondary material.

  1. 01BookThomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence. Yale University Press, 1966
  2. 02BookBarry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Lynne Rienner, 1998
  3. 03ScholarshipMark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner, 'Hydro-hegemony: a framework for analysis of trans-boundary water conflicts', Water Policy 8(5). IWA Publishing, 2006

19Connected knowledge

Five-minute module

Facts checked to