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Paper I · Part B · Unit 4

Principal Organs of the Union and State Governments

What the Constitution designed and what politics made of it: presidents and prime ministers, parliaments and assemblies, the Supreme Court and the High Courts.

Official syllabus

(a) Principal Organs of the Union Government: Envisaged role and actual working of the Executive, Legislature and Supreme Court. (b) Principal Organs of the State Government: Envisaged role and actual working of the Executive, Legislature and High Courts.

What the unit asks

The key phrase is repeated in both halves of the syllabus line: envisaged role and actual working. The unit is not a description of powers (those are on the platform's polity and institution pages) but an analysis of the gap between constitutional design and political practice, at the Union and in the states.

Three patterns run through it. Executives have grown stronger than the Constitution's parliamentary logic implied, through party discipline, ordinances and centralised offices. Legislatures have declined as deliberative bodies. Courts have expanded their role, through public interest litigation, the collegium and the basic structure doctrine, to the point that scholars speak of judicial sovereignty. In the states the office of Governor carries the tensions of Indian federalism. The examiner wants evidence for each pattern and an argued judgement.

01Union executive: President and Prime Minister

The framers envisaged the President as a constitutional head on the British model, bound by ministerial advice — a position made explicit by the 42nd and 44th Amendments to Article 74. In practice the office retains real discretion at the margins: choosing a Prime Minister when no party has a majority, as in 1979, 1989 and the 1990s; returning bills for reconsideration (Article 111); and, controversially, delaying assent, as with the Post Office (Amendment) Bill in 1986. Ordinances under Article 123, intended for emergencies, became a routine legislative instrument; the Court condemned repeated re-promulgation.

The Prime Minister was envisaged as first among equals in a collectively responsible cabinet. Actual working has swung with the party system: Nehru's dominance, Indira Gandhi's centralisation through the Prime Minister's Secretariat, the bargained leadership of the coalition era (1989–2014), and a return to a strong, personalised executive with single-party majorities after 2014. See The Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers and The Ordinance-Making Power.

02Union legislature: Parliament

Parliament was envisaged as the centre of the system: the forum of deliberation, the source of law, the controller of finance and the body to which government answers. Its formal powers remain intact. Its actual working shows decline as a deliberative institution: fewer sitting days than in the 1950s, a growing share of bills passed with little debate or without reference to committees, frequent disruption, and the use of the money bill route to bypass the Rajya Sabha, as with the Aadhaar Act (upheld in Puttaswamy (Aadhaar), over a strong dissent).

The anti-defection law (1985) stabilised governments but reduced individual members to party delegates; Kihoto Hollohan upheld it while subjecting the Speaker's decisions to judicial review. Departmentally related standing committees, created in 1993, are the strongest counter-trend. Sita Soren (2024) held that legislators enjoy no immunity for bribery. See Parliamentary Accountability of the Executive and Parliamentary Committees.

03The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court was envisaged as guardian of the Constitution, protector of rights under Article 32, federal umpire and final court of appeal. Its actual role has moved through phases. Early positivism (Gopalan) gave way to confrontation with Parliament over property and amendment (1967–80), the supersession of judges in 1973 and 1977, and the nadir of ADM Jabalpur during the Emergency.

After 1977 the Court reinvented itself through public interest litigation (Hussainara Khatoon, S. P. Gupta) and an expansive Article 21, and took control of judicial appointments through the collegium (1993, 1998), defending it by striking down the NJAC in 2015. Pratap Bhanu Mehta described a 'rise of judicial sovereignty'. Critics also point to pendency, opacity in appointments and listing, and the four senior judges' public protest in January 2018. Recent landmark decisions include the electoral bonds case. See Judicial Activism and Judicial Restraint.

04State executive: Governor and Chief Minister

The Governor was envisaged as a constitutional head acting on ministerial advice, with narrow discretion (Article 163) and a role as link between Union and state. Appointed by the President and holding office during the Union's pleasure (Article 156), the Governor has often acted as the Union's agent: recommending President's Rule under Article 356, which was invoked more than a hundred times, often against opposition governments, until S. R. Bommai (1994) made the floor of the House the test of majority; and choosing Chief Ministers in hung assemblies. Rameshwar Prasad, B. P. Singhal and Nabam Rebia further limited discretion.

A recent conflict concerns assent to bills under Article 200. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor (2025) the Court set timelines; the presidential reference that followed revisited that approach. The Chief Minister is the real executive, and many have become dominant regional leaders. See The Governor.

05State legislatures

State legislatures mirror Parliament's design: assemblies with ministries responsible to them, and Legislative Councils in a minority of states, created or abolished under Article 169. Their envisaged role (deliberation, legislation and control of the state executive) is weaker still in practice. Most assemblies sit for even fewer days than Parliament, committees are less developed, and budgets pass with little scrutiny.

Political instability adds distinctive features: defections engineered through mass resignations and 'resort politics', Speakers delaying disqualification petitions for partisan reasons, and floor tests ordered by courts. In Subhash Desai (2023), arising from the Maharashtra crisis, the Court criticised the Governor's call for a floor test and asked the Speaker to decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable time. Governors' power to reserve state bills for the President (Article 200 and Article 201) remains a point of friction. See The State Legislature and The Anti-Defection Law.

06High Courts

The High Courts were envisaged as the apex of each state's judiciary, with writ jurisdiction under Article 226 wider than the Supreme Court's under Article 32 (it extends to legal as well as fundamental rights) and superintendence over subordinate courts (Article 227). In L. Chandra Kumar (1997) their power of review over tribunals was held to be part of the basic structure.

In practice High Courts have been both protectors and bottlenecks. During the Emergency several High Courts upheld detenus' right to habeas corpus before the Supreme Court overruled them; many High Courts lead on public interest and environmental litigation. Yet vacancies, pendency, opaque collegium appointments and transfers, and uneven quality limit their capacity, and appeals funnel upward to an overloaded Supreme Court. See The High Courts and Judicial Independence and Appointments.

Debates

Has Parliament declined?

The decline thesis rests on falling sittings, hurried legislation, disruption, the money bill route and executive dominance enforced by the anti-defection law. Sceptics reply that Parliament was always executive-led under one-party dominance, that committees and questions remain effective, and that coalition periods produced real bargaining. The answer depends on whether Parliament is judged as a legislature, a forum of accountability or a site of representation.

Judicial sovereignty: rescue or usurpation?

Defenders argue that the Court filled vacuums left by weak legislatures and executives, protecting the poor, the environment and electoral integrity. Critics argue that it governs without accountability, chooses its own members and acts inconsistently through small benches. Both sides agree that the Court's authority now rests on public legitimacy rather than text alone.

Answer strategy

Structure each answer as design, practice and explanation. State the envisaged role with its constitutional basis (articles, Constituent Assembly intent), then show the actual working with dated evidence (cases, episodes, institutional data from sources such as PRS Legislative Research), then explain the gap — party system, federal politics, judicial self-assertion.

Treat the Union and the states in parallel; the Governor is the hinge between the two halves of the syllabus and between this unit and Federalism in India. Use recent cases, but avoid overstating holdings. Common errors: writing a list of powers; treating the President as purely ceremonial; ignoring High Courts; and ignoring the effect of the party system on every organ.

Readings

  • Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience
  • Devesh Kapur, Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Milan Vaishnav (eds), Rethinking Public Institutions in India
  • Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution
  • Rajni Kothari, Politics in India
  • D. D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India
  • M. P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

5 questions · 2024–2026

  1. 2026 · PSIR I · Q7(b) · 15 marks

    Highlight any five constitutional provisions that restrain the powers of the executive, and evaluate their effectiveness in current times.

  2. 2026 · PSIR I · Q8(b) · 15 marks

    Critically comment on the shifts in the functioning of the Indian Parliament in the last two decades.

  3. 2025 · PSIR I · Q6(a) · 20 marks

    Parliamentary committees are indispensable to the legislative process. It provides for the opportunity for cross-pollination between the two chambers of the Parliament. Discuss.

  4. 2025 · PSIR I · Q6(b) · 15 marks

    Examine the constitutional provisions and nature of advisory jurisdiction of Supreme Court of India. Evaluate your answer with relevant examples.

  5. 2024 · PSIR I · Q5(d) · 10 marks

    Relevance of the Legislative Council

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Principal Organs of the Union and State Governments in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Practice questions

  1. Q1PSIR style15 marks· 200 words

    'The President of India is neither a rubber stamp nor a real executive.' Discuss.

    How to approach it

    Article 74 and its amendments; discretion in hung parliaments and returning bills; pocket veto episode; the office's moral authority.

  2. Q2PSIR style15 marks· 200 words

    Examine the reasons for the decline of Parliament as a deliberative institution.

    How to approach it

    Sittings and scrutiny; anti-defection law; ordinances and money bills; disruption; committees as counter-trend.

  3. Q3PSIR style20 marks· 250 words

    'The Governor has functioned as the agent of the Union rather than as the constitutional head of the state.' Critically examine.

    How to approach it

    Constituent Assembly design; Article 356 before and after Bommai; hung assemblies; assent to bills and the 2025 litigation; Sarkaria and Punchhi recommendations.

  4. Q4PSIR style15 marks· 200 words

    Compare the envisaged and actual roles of the Supreme Court of India.

    How to approach it

    Guardian and umpire; phases from positivism to PIL; collegium; judicial sovereignty thesis; capacity problems.

Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01UPSC, Civil Services Examination Notice: Scheme and Syllabus (Political Science and International Relations) (opens in a new tab). Union Public Service Commission
  2. 02Constitution of India (Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice) (opens in a new tab)
  3. 03PRS Legislative Research (opens in a new tab)
  4. 04S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (Supreme Court of India), 1994
  5. 05Pratap Bhanu Mehta, 'The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty', Journal of Democracy, 2007