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Landmark judgment · 1976

ADM Jabalpur (Habeas Corpus case)

During the Emergency, four judges to one held that while a presidential order under Article 359 was in force no detenu could seek habeas corpus to challenge a detention as illegal — a decision now regarded as the Court's lowest point and since repudiated.

Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla
Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
28 April 1976
Bench
5-judge Constitution Bench
Citation
(1976) 2 SCC 521

01The constitutional issue

An Emergency was proclaimed on 25 June 1975 on the ground of internal disturbance. A presidential order of 27 June under Article 359(1) suspended the right to move any court to enforce Articles 14, 21 and 22, and thousands were detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971.

Nine High Courts held that detenus could still show that a detention was not in accordance with the Act, or was mala fide. The Union appealed. The question was whether, while the order lasted, a detenu could seek a writ of habeas corpus on any ground at all.

02The decision

Ray CJ and Beg, Chandrachud and Bhagwati JJ held that he could not. Article 21 was the sole repository of the right to life and personal liberty against the State; with its enforcement suspended, a detenu had no standing to challenge a detention order as illegal, mala fide, based on extraneous considerations or not compliant with the Act. The rule of law during the Emergency was what the Emergency provisions themselves permitted.

Khanna J dissented. The right to life and liberty, he held, did not originate in Article 21: it existed before the Constitution, and even during an Emergency the State could not deprive a person of liberty without the authority of law. Suspending a remedy did not make an illegal detention lawful. His dissent invoked Lord Atkin's dissent in Liversidge v. Anderson (1941).

03Significance

The judgment is remembered as the judiciary's surrender to executive power. It accepted that, with the remedy suspended, the power to detain was beyond review even when exercised in bad faith; Khanna J recorded the Attorney General's concession that there would be no remedy even for a detenu deprived of life unlawfully while the order lasted.

The majority's reasoning was not without a basis: the Constitution itself provided for suspension, and the judges declined to read in an unwritten right against its text. That is the strongest case for it. The answer, given by Khanna J and by the later Court, is that a constitution which secures liberty cannot be read to authorise lawlessness. Bhagwati J later publicly regretted his part in the decision.

04What happened afterwards

In January 1977 Khanna J was superseded for the office of Chief Justice and resigned. The 44th Amendment (1978) provided that the enforcement of Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended during an Emergency and replaced "internal disturbance" with "armed rebellion" in Article 352. In Puttaswamy (2017) the plurality opinion declared ADM Jabalpur overruled.

Why it matters for UPSC

Prelims: five judges, 4:1, 28 April 1976; Khanna J's dissent; the 44th Amendment's change to Article 359. In Mains, use it on emergency powers, the rule of law and judicial independence, with Khanna J's supersession as the institutional cost of dissent.

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01Supreme Court of India, judgment of 28 April 1976. Supreme Court of India
  2. 02Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience (Oxford University Press, 1999)
  3. 03Upendra Baxi, The Indian Supreme Court and Politics (1980)
  4. 04Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521: text of the judgment (opens in a new tab). Indian Kanoon