Skip to content

Landmark judgment · 2025

State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor (Assent to Bills case)

A two-judge bench held that the Tamil Nadu Governor's withholding of assent to ten re-passed Bills, and his reservation of them for the President, were illegal, declared the Bills deemed to have received assent under Article 142, and prescribed timelines for Governors and the President.

State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu
Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
8 April 2025
Bench
2-judge bench
Doctrine
No pocket veto; deemed assent under Article 142

01The constitutional issue

The Governor of Tamil Nadu kept several Bills pending for long periods, some for years, and in November 2023 — days after the Supreme Court held in the Punjab case that a Governor cannot sit on Bills indefinitely — declared that he was withholding assent to ten of them. The Assembly re-passed the Bills; the Governor then reserved them for the President. The State petitioned under Article 32.

02The decision

J.B. Pardiwala J, with R. Mahadevan J, held that under Article 200 a Governor who withholds assent must return the Bill to the Legislature; there is no absolute or pocket veto. In choosing among the options, the Governor ordinarily acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers. Once a returned Bill is passed again, the Governor must assent and cannot reserve it for the President unless it is materially different. The reservation of the ten Bills was therefore illegal, and so were the steps taken on them.

Invoking Article 142, the Court declared the ten Bills to have received assent on the date they were presented again. It also prescribed time limits: one month for withholding or reserving a Bill on ministerial advice, three months where the Governor acts against advice, one month for assent to a re-passed Bill, and three months for the President to decide on a reserved Bill, with reasons recorded for any delay. Inaction would be open to judicial review.

03Significance

The judgment was the most far-reaching statement of the States' position in the long dispute over Governors' delays, and the first in which the Court treated Bills as having been assented to by its own order. Its critics argued that a two-judge bench had read into the Constitution timelines the framers chose not to write, bound the President, and used Article 142 to perform a function the Constitution gives to another authority; its supporters, that indefinite delay was itself a constitutional violation for which no other remedy had worked.

04What happened afterwards

In May 2025 the President referred fourteen questions arising from the judgment to the Supreme Court under Article 143. A five-judge bench answered the reference in November 2025, rejecting judicially fixed timelines and deemed assent while allowing limited review of prolonged inaction (Presidential Reference on Assent to Bills).

Why it matters for UPSC

Prelims: 8 April 2025; Articles 200, 201 and 142; deemed assent; the timelines. In Mains, use it with the Punjab case (2023) and the 2025 presidential reference on the Governor's role and the limits of judicial remedies.

In the UPSC papers

Asked by UPSC

2 questions · 2025–2026

  1. 2026 · GS-II · Q11 · 15 marks

    Discuss the position of the Governor in the federal polity of India. What is the nature of his power while giving assent to a bill passed by the State Legislature ? Is he bound by the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers in all his functions ?

  2. 2025 · PSIR I · Q6(c) · 15 marks

    The recent developments in Indian Politics has not eroded the true spirit of federalism in India. Critically examine this statement with the help of appropriate examples.

Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor (Assent to Bills case) in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →

Explore further

Sources

  1. 01Supreme Court of India, judgment of 8 April 2025. Supreme Court of India
  2. 02State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, 8 April 2025: text of the judgment (opens in a new tab). Supreme Court of India