Landmark judgment · 1992
Kihoto Hollohan
By three to two, the Court upheld the anti-defection law in the Tenth Schedule but struck down its bar on judicial review, holding that the Speaker acts as a tribunal whose disqualification decisions are open to limited review.
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Decided
- 18 February 1992
- Bench
- 5-judge Constitution Bench
- Citation
- [1992] 1 SCR 686; 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651
- Doctrine
- Presiding officer as tribunal; limited judicial review of disqualification
01The constitutional issue
The 52nd Amendment (1985) added the Tenth Schedule, disqualifying legislators who voluntarily give up membership of their party or defy its whip, with exceptions for splits and mergers. Paragraph 6 made the presiding officer's decision final, and paragraph 7 barred the jurisdiction of all courts.
Challenges to disqualification orders raised three questions: did the Schedule violate legislators' freedom of speech and parliamentary democracy; did paragraph 7, by affecting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Courts, require ratification by half the States under the proviso to Article 368(2); and, if so, could it be severed?
02The decision
Venkatachaliah, K. Jayachandra Reddy and S.C. Agrawal JJ upheld the Tenth Schedule. Defection was a recognised evil, and requiring legislators to abide by the party mandate was a reasonable means of sustaining the party system; no basic feature was violated.
Paragraph 7 did change the jurisdiction of the courts under Articles 136, 226 and 227 and so required ratification, which it had not received. It was invalid, but severable from the rest. The finality in paragraph 6 did not exclude review: the Speaker or Chairman acts as a tribunal, and his decision can be reviewed for jurisdictional error, mala fides, breach of natural justice and perversity. Courts would not intervene before a decision was made.
L.M. Sharma and J.S. Verma JJ dissented. In their view paragraph 7 could not be severed, so the amendment failed for want of ratification; Verma J added that a Speaker whose tenure depends on the majority cannot be the independent adjudicator the rule of law requires.
03Significance
The decision saved the anti-defection law and made the Speaker's role reviewable, but it left the weakest link in place: a partisan presiding officer deciding the fate of his own party's opponents, often after long delay.
The law itself remains contested. It curbs the legislator's freedom to dissent and strengthens party leaderships at the expense of deliberation. Its defenders reply that it reflects how Indian voters actually choose — by party — and that before 1985 defections for office had made governments unstable.
04What happened afterwards
The 91st Amendment (2003) removed the exception for a split by one-third of a legislature party. In Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020) the Court said disqualification petitions should ordinarily be decided within three months and suggested that Parliament consider an independent tribunal. Subhash Desai (2023) held that the whip must be appointed by the political party, not the legislature party.
Why it matters for UPSC
Prelims: 52nd Amendment, Tenth Schedule, 3:2, paragraph 7 struck down, Speaker as tribunal. Mains: anti-defection law reform, the Speaker's neutrality and proposals to give the decision to an independent body.
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
1 question · 2026
2026 · GS-II · Q3 · 10 marks
Examine whether the constitutional office of the Lok Sabha Speaker has become vulnerable to partisan politics under the current anti-defection regime. What institutional changes are required to ensure the neutrality of the Lok Sabha Speaker in managing a polarised House ?
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Kihoto Hollohan in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →
Explore further
Concept
Polity & Governance
Article
- Article 102 · Disqualifications for membership
- Article 191 · Disqualifications for membership
- Article 368 · Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor
- Article 122 · Courts not to inquire into proceedings of Parliament
- Article 212 · Courts not to inquire into proceedings of the Legislature
Amendment
Judgment
Institution
Timeline
Dictionary
Sources
- 01Supreme Court of India, judgment of 18 February 1992. Supreme Court of India
- 02Report of the Committee on Electoral Reforms (Dinesh Goswami Committee), 1990
- 03Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, [1992] 1 SCR 686: text of the judgment (opens in a new tab). Supreme Court of India