Section E · Judiciary
Judicial Activism and Judicial Restraint
What the terms mean, how the post-Emergency Supreme Court became an activist court, the techniques it uses, the case for restraint, and how to evaluate the record.
Overview
"Judicial activism" describes courts using their powers to shape public policy, fill legislative gaps or expand rights beyond the evident terms of a text; "judicial restraint" describes deference to the elected branches. The terms are often used as praise or abuse rather than analysis, and the same court can be activist in one field and restrained in another.
The Indian Supreme Court became an activist court after the Emergency, partly to rebuild the legitimacy it lost in ADM Jabalpur. Its record includes some of the most important protections in Indian law and some of its most criticised interventions. A useful analysis asks, case by case, whether the court had a legal basis, whether it had the capacity to deliver the remedy, and what happened to the institutions it displaced.
Constitutional and legal provisions
- Articles 32 and 226
- Writ powers that courts have used to issue guidelines and supervise compliance.
- Article 142
- Orders necessary for complete justice.
- Article 141
- Law declared by the Supreme Court binds all courts, giving guidelines the force of law.
Activism, restraint, overreach and evasion
Four positions are worth distinguishing. Activism is the confident use of judicial power to protect rights or correct governance failure. Restraint is deference to legislative and executive choices, justified by democratic legitimacy and institutional competence. Overreach is activism without a legal basis or beyond the court's capacity, as when courts administer rather than adjudicate. Evasion is the failure to decide, through delay or avoidance, cases that the court has a duty to decide. Each can be criticised and defended, and much public debate collapses them into a single quarrel about whether judges should "interfere".
The post-Emergency turn
Before 1975 the Court's assertiveness had been largely in defence of property, which earned it the reputation of a conservative obstacle to reform. After ADM Jabalpur (1976) it faced a crisis of legitimacy of a different kind. Under Justices P.N. Bhagwati and V.R. Krishna Iyer it reinvented itself as a court for the poor and the voiceless: Maneka Gandhi (1978) transformed Article 21, Hussainara Khatoon (1979) took up the cause of undertrial prisoners, and S.P. Gupta (1981) opened the courts to public-spirited litigants. Upendra Baxi called the result "social action litigation".
Techniques of activism
The Court developed distinctive tools. Guidelines in a legislative vacuum: Vishaka (1997) on sexual harassment at work, D.K. Basu (1997) on arrest, Lalita Kumari (2013) on registering FIRs and Tehseen Poonawalla (2018) on mob lynching. Continuing mandamus: in Vineet Narain (1997) the Court kept a corruption investigation under supervision and laid down safeguards for the CBI's independence, later given statutory form in the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003; the forest case, T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad, has been open since 1995.
Structural directions: Prakash Singh (2006) ordered police reforms through seven directives, including State Security Commissions and minimum tenures for police chiefs, and the M.C. Mehta litigation produced orders on industrial hazards and vehicle pollution in Delhi. Interim institutional design: Anoop Baranwal (2023) required Election Commissioners to be chosen by a committee of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Chief Justice until Parliament legislated.
The case for restraint
The arguments for restraint are democratic and institutional. Judges are unelected and cannot be voted out for bad policy. Courts decide on the record of a single case and lack the information, expertise and budgetary tools to design policy; Lon Fuller called such problems "polycentric" and unsuited to adjudication. Judicial orders that cannot be enforced weaken courts' authority, and the Prakash Singh directions remain largely unimplemented nearly two decades later.
Indian judges have articulated restraint themselves. In Aravali Golf Course (2007) the Court warned against judges assuming executive and legislative functions. It has generally deferred on economic policy, and in Supriyo Chakraborty (2023) a majority declined to create a right to marry for same-sex couples, holding that the institution of marriage was for Parliament to reshape.
Evaluating the record
Activism has produced durable gains: prisoners' rights, environmental protection, legal guarantees against sexual harassment and custodial abuse, and the disclosure obligations on electoral candidates. It has also produced costs: courts acting as administrators, orders that displaced elected bodies (the forest case centralised much forest governance in a courtroom), and decisions that fell hardest on the poor, such as orders clearing slums in Delhi.
Critics also identify selectivity. The same Court that issues sweeping directions on governance has been slow to decide challenges involving state power and individual liberty, such as habeas corpus petitions from Jammu and Kashmir in 2019 and the electoral bonds challenge, filed in 2017 and decided in 2024. Whether this reflects principled deference or caution about confrontation is the most contested question in the current literature.
Debates
Is judicial activism a remedy for governance failure or a cause of institutional weakness?
The remedy view holds that courts stepped in where legislatures and executives failed citizens with no other recourse, and that many interventions (Vishaka, D.K. Basu, candidate disclosure) were later accepted or codified by Parliament.
The weakness view holds that each judicial substitution makes it easier for elected institutions to avoid hard choices, that courts cannot sustain administration over years, and that the resulting dependence on courts erodes democratic accountability. The two views may both be right in different cases, which is why criteria matter more than labels: legal basis, capacity, and the effect on the displaced institution.
Does the Supreme Court practise selective activism?
Critics point to a pattern of boldness against weak or diffuse targets (municipal bodies, polluting industries) and caution against the Union government on security, liberty and politically sensitive questions, including strict bail standards under anti-terror law. Defenders reply that deference on security reflects constitutional allocation of responsibility, not timidity, and that the Court has ruled against the government in major cases such as the electoral bonds and Delhi services judgments.
Prelims points
- Public interest litigation and judicial activism are associated with Justices P.N. Bhagwati and V.R. Krishna Iyer.
- Vishaka (1997): guidelines on sexual harassment at the workplace, later replaced by the POSH Act, 2013.
- Vineet Narain (1997): continuing mandamus; led to statutory status for the CVC (2003).
- Prakash Singh (2006): seven directives on police reform.
- Lalita Kumari (2013): registration of an FIR is mandatory for cognisable offences.
- Anoop Baranwal (2023): selection committee for Election Commissioners pending legislation.
- Aravali Golf Course (2007): warning against judicial overreach.
- Upendra Baxi described Indian PIL as "social action litigation".
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
2 questions · 2024–2026
2026 · GS-II · Q12 · 15 marks
What is meant by judicial legislation ? In this context, discuss the verdicts of the apex court allowing “passive euthanasia” and a “living will”.
2024 · GS-II · Q14 · 15 marks
Explain the reasons for the growth of public interest litigation in India. As a result of it, has the Indian Supreme Court emerged as the world’s most powerful judiciary ?
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Judicial Activism and Judicial Restraint in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Distinguish judicial activism, judicial restraint and judicial overreach, with Indian examples.
How to approach it
Define each, give one example of each, and add judicial evasion as a fourth category.
- Q2UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
Judicial activism in India has been both a remedy for and a symptom of institutional failure. Discuss.
How to approach it
Trace the post-Emergency origins, the techniques, the achievements and the costs, and evaluate with criteria of legal basis, capacity and institutional effect.
- Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Evaluate continuing mandamus as a judicial technique.
How to approach it
Explain its use in Vineet Narain and Godavarman, its strengths (supervision, accountability) and weaknesses (administration by court, indefinite proceedings).
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
Explore further
Concept
PSIR Optional
Polity & Governance
Article
- Article 32 · Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
- Article 226 · Power of High Courts to issue certain writs
- Article 141 · Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts
- Article 142 · Enforcement of decrees and orders of the Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc.
- Article 21 · Protection of life and personal liberty
Judgment
- Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla
- Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
- Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar
- S.P. Gupta v. Union of India
- Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan
- D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal
- Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh
- Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India
- Vineet Narain v. Union of India
- Prakash Singh v. Union of India
Institution
Sources
- 01Judgments of the Supreme Court of India (opens in a new tab). Supreme Court of India
- 02Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (2016). Oxford University Press
- 03S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits (2002). Oxford University Press
- 04Upendra Baxi, "Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India", Third World Legal Studies (1985)
- 05Lon L. Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication", Harvard Law Review 92 (1978)