Section E · Judiciary
Judicial Independence and Appointments
The constitutional safeguards of judicial independence, the three Judges cases and the collegium, the NJAC and its invalidation, and the unresolved problem of judicial accountability.
Overview
Judicial independence has two dimensions: the independence of individual judges from pressure in deciding cases, and the independence of the judiciary as an institution from the other branches. The Constitution secures the first through tenure, salary and removal protections. The second has been fought over through the question of who appoints judges.
Through three judgments between 1981 and 1998 the Supreme Court moved appointments from executive primacy to a collegium of senior judges, a system with few parallels anywhere. Parliament tried to replace it with a National Judicial Appointments Commission in 2014; the Court struck that down in 2015. The result is a judiciary that is highly independent of the executive and, critics say, insufficiently accountable to anyone.
Constitutional and legal provisions
- Article 124(2)
- Supreme Court judges are appointed by the President after consultation with such judges as the President deems necessary; the Chief Justice must always be consulted.
- Article 217
- High Court judges are appointed after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor and the Chief Justice of the High Court.
- Articles 124(4) and 218
- Removal only by Parliament, by special majority, for proved misbehaviour or incapacity.
- Articles 125 and 112(3)(d)
- Salaries fixed by law and charged on the Consolidated Fund; not reducible to a judge's disadvantage after appointment.
- Articles 121 and 211
- Conduct of judges may not be discussed in Parliament or a State legislature except on a motion for removal.
- Articles 124(7) and 222
- Bar on post-retirement practice; transfer of High Court judges after consulting the Chief Justice of India.
Constitutional safeguards
The framers protected judges as individuals. They hold office until sixty-five (sixty-two in High Courts) and can be removed only by an address of both Houses on proved misbehaviour or incapacity. Their salaries are charged on the Consolidated Fund, and their privileges and allowances cannot be varied to their disadvantage after appointment except during a financial emergency (Article 360(4)). Their conduct cannot be debated in legislatures. The courts' administrative expenses are charged, they control their own staff (Article 146), and they can punish contempt (Articles 129 and 215). Article 50 directs the separation of the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State.
The three Judges cases
The Constitution says the President appoints "after consultation" with judges. In the First Judges case (S.P. Gupta, 1981) the Court held that consultation did not mean concurrence: the executive had primacy. The background included the supersession of three senior judges in 1973, when A.N. Ray was made Chief Justice after Kesavananda, and of Justice H.R. Khanna in 1977 after his ADM Jabalpur dissent.
The Second Judges case (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association, 1993) reversed the position by 7:2: the opinion of the Chief Justice, formed after consulting the two senior-most judges, would have primacy, and seniority would govern appointment as Chief Justice. The Third Judges case (1998), an advisory opinion, enlarged the collegium to the Chief Justice and the four senior-most judges for Supreme Court appointments and required written opinions. A Memorandum of Procedure between the judiciary and the government governs the process.
The NJAC and its invalidation
The 99th Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 replaced the collegium with a six-member commission: the Chief Justice, the next two senior-most judges, the Union Law Minister and two eminent persons chosen by a committee of the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice and the Leader of the Opposition (or of the largest opposition party), one of whom was to be from the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes, minorities or women. Any two members could veto a recommendation.
In the NJAC case (16 October 2015) the Court struck down the amendment and the Act by 4:1. The majority held that primacy of the judiciary in appointments is part of judicial independence and therefore of the basic structure, and that the presence of the Law Minister and the two-member veto compromised it. Justice J. Chelameswar dissented, arguing that the collegium's opacity was itself a threat to the judiciary's legitimacy. The Court revived the collegium and invited suggestions for reforming it.
The collegium in practice
Since October 2017 the Supreme Court has published collegium resolutions, sometimes with reasons. The government can return a recommendation once, but must accept it if reiterated; in practice it has delayed appointments, sometimes for many months, and has segregated names from a list, appointing some and leaving others pending, which the Court has criticised. The revised Memorandum of Procedure contemplated after the NJAC case has not been finalised.
The collegium is also criticised for the narrow pool it draws from. Women, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes remain underrepresented on the higher bench, and appointments have been said to favour the relatives of judges and senior advocates. The Law Commission's 230th Report (2009) recommended that judges with close relatives practising in a High Court should not be appointed to that court.
Accountability
Removal has never been completed. The motion against Justice V. Ramaswami of the Supreme Court failed in the Lok Sabha in 1993, when the ruling party abstained; Justice Soumitra Sen of the Calcutta High Court resigned in 2011 after the Rajya Sabha voted for his removal. The judiciary has developed internal mechanisms instead: the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life (1997), an in-house procedure for complaints (1999), and declarations of assets. In CPIO, Supreme Court v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2019) a Constitution Bench held that the office of the Chief Justice is a public authority under the Right to Information Act, while protecting deliberations of the collegium on a case-by-case balance.
Post-retirement appointments raise a separate question. Retired judges head tribunals and commissions and some have become Governors or been nominated to the Rajya Sabha. Critics argue that the prospect of such appointments can influence judges in their final years; defenders point to the value of judicial experience in quasi-judicial office.
Comparative models
Appointment systems fall into three families. Executive appointment with legislative confirmation prevails in the United States, where the President nominates and the Senate confirms, making appointments openly political. Commissions combining judges, lawyers, legislators and lay members are used in the United Kingdom (the Judicial Appointments Commission created by the Constitutional Reform Act, 2005) and South Africa (the Judicial Service Commission). Judicial self-selection, India's collegium, is rare. The NJAC would have moved India into the commission family, which is why the debate continues.
Debates
Collegium or commission: which better secures independence and accountability?
For the collegium: it protected appointments from an executive that had superseded judges and transferred them as punishment, and it keeps the Union government, the largest litigant before the courts, from choosing its judges. For a commission: no democracy leaves appointments to judges alone, the collegium operates without published criteria, the opacity breeds suspicion of patronage, and a well-designed commission with a judicial majority could secure both independence and legitimacy. The NJAC failed, on this view, because of its design, not its idea.
Should judges accept appointments after retirement?
Opponents argue that offices in the government's gift create incentives to please it and damage public confidence, and propose a cooling-off period or a bar on political offices such as Governorships and nomination to legislatures. Supporters reply that many statutory tribunals require retired judges, that experience should not be wasted, and that a bar would be difficult to define. A middle path would bar political offices while allowing adjudicatory ones, with appointments made by an independent body.
Commissions and committees
Law Commission of India, 121st Report1987
Recommended a National Judicial Service Commission for appointments in place of executive-dominated consultation.
National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution2002
Proposed a National Judicial Commission of the Chief Justice, two senior-most judges, the Union Law Minister and an eminent person nominated by the President after consulting the Chief Justice.
Law Commission of India, 230th Report2009
Recommended that judges whose close relatives practise in a High Court should not be appointed to that court.
Prelims points
- First Judges case (S.P. Gupta, 1981): "consultation" does not mean "concurrence".
- Second Judges case (1993): primacy to the Chief Justice's opinion formed with the two senior-most judges.
- Third Judges case (1998): collegium of the Chief Justice and four senior-most judges for Supreme Court appointments.
- 99th Amendment and NJAC Act (2014) struck down on 16 October 2015 by 4:1; Justice Chelameswar dissented.
- Salaries of judges are charged on the Consolidated Fund and cannot be reduced except in a financial emergency.
- Article 121: judges' conduct cannot be discussed in Parliament except on a removal motion.
- No Supreme Court or High Court judge has been removed by Parliament.
- Supersessions: 1973 (A.N. Ray appointed Chief Justice) and 1977 (M.H. Beg).
- Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2019): the office of the Chief Justice is a public authority under RTI.
- Collegium resolutions have been published on the Supreme Court website since 2017.
In the UPSC papers
Asked by UPSC
2 questions · 2025
2025 · GS-II · Q11 · 15 marks
“Constitutional morality is the fulcrum which acts as an essential check upon the high functionaries and citizens alike... .” In view of the above observation of the Supreme Court, explain the concept of constitutional morality and its application to ensure balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability in India.
2025 · GS-II · Q13 · 15 marks
Discuss the evolution of collegium system in India. Critically examine the advantages and disadvantages of the system of appointment of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India and that of the USA.
Verbatim from the official UPSC Main papers, linked to Judicial Independence and Appointments in the PYQ dataset.PYQ Intelligence →
Practice questions
- Q1UPSC Mains style15 marks· 250 words
The collegium system secured judicial independence at the cost of accountability. Critically examine.
How to approach it
Trace the Judges cases and their background, evaluate independence gains against opacity, diversity and patronage concerns, and assess reform options short of and including a commission.
- Q2UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Why was the NJAC struck down, and what does the judgment imply for future reform?
How to approach it
Explain the NJAC's composition and veto, the majority's reasoning on primacy and the basic structure, the dissent, and the design constraints any future commission must meet.
- Q3UPSC Mains style10 marks· 150 words
Compare judicial appointment systems in India, the United Kingdom and the United States.
How to approach it
Contrast judicial self-selection, an independent commission and executive nomination with Senate confirmation, with one strength and one weakness each.
Practice questions are original to this platform and are not previous year questions. For questions actually set by UPSC, see PYQ Intelligence.
Explore further
Concept
PSIR Optional
Polity & Governance
Article
- Article 50 · Separation of judiciary from executive
- Article 121 · Restriction on discussion in Parliament
- Article 124 · Establishment and constitution of the Supreme Court
- Article 125 · Salaries, etc., of Judges
- Article 146 · Officers and servants and the expenses of the Supreme Court
- Article 211 · Restriction on discussion in the Legislature
- Article 217 · Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court
- Article 218 · Application of certain provisions relating to Supreme Court to High Courts
- Article 222 · Transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another
- Article 360 · Provisions as to financial emergency
Amendment
Judgment
- S.P. Gupta v. Union of India
- Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India
- In re Special Reference No. 1 of 1998
- Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India
- Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala
- Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla
Institution
Political system
Political briefing
Timeline
Dictionary
Sources
- 01The Constitution of India (as amended) (opens in a new tab). Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice
- 02Judgments of the Supreme Court of India (opens in a new tab). Supreme Court of India
- 03Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (2016). Oxford University Press
- 04Abhinav Chandrachud, The Informal Constitution: Unwritten Criteria in Selecting Judges for the Supreme Court of India (2014). Oxford University Press
- 05Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, 2002. Ministry of Law and Justice