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Case study · South Asia (Sri Lanka) · 2019–2026

Sri Lanka: default, protest and recovery under an IMF programme

A state that ran out of foreign exchange in 2022, a protest movement that toppled a president, and a creditor bargain spanning China, India, Japan, bondholders and the IMF: development, sovereignty and legitimacy in one national case.

The case

Sri Lanka's crisis had long roots and a short fuse. Years of borrowing, including on international bond markets, left the state with heavy foreign-currency debts. Tax cuts in late 2019 sharply reduced revenue; the COVID-19 pandemic collapsed tourism; and an abrupt ban on chemical fertilisers in 2021 hit harvests. By early 2022 the country lacked foreign exchange for fuel, medicine and food. In April 2022 the government suspended payments on most of its external debt: Sri Lanka's first sovereign default.

Shortages, power cuts and queues produced the Aragalaya ('struggle'), a mass protest movement centred on a protest camp in Colombo, largely peaceful despite outbreaks of violence in May 2022. In July 2022 protesters occupied the President's residence; Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled the country and resigned, and Parliament elected Ranil Wickremesinghe to succeed him. In March 2023 the IMF approved a four-year Extended Fund Facility of about US$3 billion, conditional on higher taxes, cost-reflective energy prices, a more independent central bank and a restructuring of debt. Official creditors negotiated on two tracks, a committee co-chaired by India, Japan and France and China separately, and private bondholders completed an exchange of their bonds in December 2024.

Elections in September and November 2024 brought Anura Kumara Dissanayake and his National People's Power coalition to power with a two-thirds parliamentary majority, on a platform hostile to the old political class but committed to staying in the IMF programme. Cyclone Ditwah struck in late November 2025, causing deaths and heavy damage. In May 2026 the IMF completed delayed reviews of the programme, releasing about US$695 million and accepting temporary relief and reconstruction spending.

Actors and stakeholders

  • Government of Sri LankaState (successive administrations)

    Role

    Borrowed, defaulted, negotiated the IMF programme and the restructuring, and implemented the reforms.

    Power and its sources

    Formal control of fiscal and monetary policy, heavily constrained by creditors and by the need for foreign exchange.

  • International Monetary FundInternational financial institution

    Role

    Lender of last resort; its debt sustainability analysis set the parameters of the restructuring.

    Power and its sources

    Catalytic: its approval unlocks other finance. Conditionality and weighted voting give it, and its largest shareholders, leverage.

  • ChinaOfficial bilateral creditor

    Role

    A major lender through its policy banks; negotiated outside the main creditor committee.

    Power and its sources

    Creditor leverage and strategic interests, symbolised by the 99-year lease of Hambantota port to a Chinese company in 2017.

  • IndiaNeighbouring state and official creditor

    Role

    Provided emergency credit lines and currency support in 2022 and co-chaired the official creditor committee.

    Power and its sources

    Proximity, speed and strategic interest in the neighbourhood.

  • International bondholdersPrivate creditors

    Role

    Held sovereign bonds issued under foreign law; accepted losses in an exchange completed in December 2024.

    Power and its sources

    Legal claims and the gatekeeping of future market access.

  • Aragalaya protesters and affected householdsCivil society and most affected groups

    Role

    Forced a change of president in 2022; bore the costs of shortages, inflation and austerity.

    Power and its sources

    Mass mobilisation and the capacity to withdraw consent; little voice in the programme's design.

Through the key concepts

sovereignty

Sri Lanka's sovereignty was never formally in question, yet its tax, energy and central bank policies were written with its creditors. This is sovereignty without autonomy: the state chose the IMF route, but whether a choice made without foreign exchange is a free one is the political question.

legitimacy

The Rajapaksa government lost performance legitimacy and then procedural legitimacy in the streets. The 2024 elections rebuilt legitimacy through the ballot, and the new government's decision to keep the programme shifted the debate from whether to adjust to who pays.

interdependence

The crisis exposed asymmetric interdependence: reliance on imported fuel, food and medicine, on tourism and on capital markets. Coordinating creditors with different rules and interests, China outside the traditional creditor club and India with strategic aims, was itself a collective-action problem.

power

A liberal reading sees the IMF solving a coordination problem among creditors; a Marxist reading sees debt disciplining a peripheral economy in creditors' interests. Both can point to evidence, which is why the case suits evaluation.

Perspectives

IMF and orthodox economists

The crisis was largely home-grown, through tax cuts, monetary financing and the fertiliser ban; conditionality restored credibility, and spending floors protect the poorest.

Civil society critics

Adjustment shifted costs onto poorer households through higher consumption taxes and prices, while creditors accepted modest losses; poverty rose sharply during the crisis.

Geopolitical analysts

The crisis was a contest for influence between India and China. Because bondholders and multilateral lenders held more of the debt than China, the case complicates the popular 'debt-trap' narrative.

The Aragalaya

This was a crisis of governance and dynastic politics as much as of economics; the demand was 'system change', not only solvency.

Evaluation

By the measures the IMF uses, recovery has been quick: inflation fell from its 2022 peak, reserves were rebuilt, growth resumed and the restructuring was completed. By measures of human development the picture is darker, because poverty rose during the crisis and the burden of adjustment fell heavily on lower-income households. The cyclone of 2025 showed how exposed that recovery remains to environmental shocks.

Politically, the case shows a democracy absorbing a default: a president removed by protest, a constitutional succession, and an electoral transfer of power to an outsider party that kept the programme. For the course it tests rival conceptions of development and sovereignty: whether a programme that restores solvency while deepening poverty counts as development, and whether a state that negotiates its policies with creditors remains sovereign in the sense that matters.

Questions to take further

  • Was the crisis caused more by domestic policy choices or by the structure of global finance?
  • Can an IMF programme be legitimate if those who bear its costs did not choose it?
  • Did the Aragalaya succeed?
  • What does the case reveal about competition between India and China in South Asia?

Sources

  1. 01IMF, 'IMF Executive Board completes the combined fifth and sixth reviews under the Extended Fund Facility for Sri Lanka' (27 May 2026) (opens in a new tab). International Monetary Fund, 27 May 2026
  2. 02IMF, press release on the approval of a 48-month Extended Fund Facility for Sri Lanka (March 2023). International Monetary Fund, March 2023
  3. 03Verité Research, Sri Lanka debt updates (2024–2025). Verité Research